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ABSTRACT 
 
In South Africa, the Labour Courts have experienced an important and continuing controversy 
regarding the permissible scope of judicial review of arbitration awards of the Commission 
for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) in terms of section 145 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”). Section 145(1) of the LRA specifically provides that 
arbitration awards, generally considered final and binding, can be reviewed and set aside by 
the Labour Court on the basis of a defect as defined in section 145(2)(a) and (b). These 
defects are not prescribed in an open-ended manner but limited to decisions involving 
allegations of misconduct by the commissioner in relation to his or her duties, a gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings and/or allegations that the commissioner 
exceeded his or her powers or that the award was improperly obtained. Unreasonableness 
and/or irrationality are not included within the scope of a defect as per section 145(2)(a) and 
(b). 
 
Initially, Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) found that 
the interpretation of section 145 was influenced by rational justifiability in accordance with 
the right to just administrative action as provided for in section 33, read with item 23(2) of 
Schedule 6, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the 1996 
Constitution’). Today, leading precedent in the form of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) dictates that section 145 of the LRA 
is suffused by reasonableness in accordance with the right to just administrative action as 
provided for in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. The ultimate enquiry is whether the 
arbitration award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach as articulated in Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 SA 
490 (CC). However, the enquiry into the reasonableness of a decision is indistinct. As a result, 
the Labour Courts have struggled to apply the concept of reasonableness in a consistent 
manner. This thesis seeks to identify the proper role of reasonableness in the judicial review 
process, including identifying factors that would assist in recognising an unreasonable 
decision. Relevant principles of judicial review in South Africa in the general administrative 
law context are considered and distinguished from the process of appeal. An assessment of 
English case law and commentary in the field of both administrative and employment law is 
conducted. Finally an extensive examination of South African case law and commentary on 
xi 
 
the subject, both pre- and post Sidumo, is undertaken. The English law approach is found to 
provide greater clarity to the interpretation of reasonableness in South African labour law in 
several respects.  
 
The conclusion to this thesis proposes that reasonableness should not be regarded as a 
threshold test or standard to determine the reviewability of CCMA arbitration awards in terms 
of section 145(2)(a) and (b). In fact, unreasonableness should be expressly included as an 
independent ground of review in section 145(2) of the LRA. This approach would clarify that 
unreasonableness does not replace or override the existing section 145(2) grounds of review, 
but continues to find application in categories of defects that may be irrelevant to or distinct 
from the defects contemplated in unreasonableness review. Reasonableness applies in the 
context of matters of fact-finding, policy based determinations, the weighing of factors and 
the exercise of discretion where more than one conclusion is available in the circumstances, 
including jurisdictional facts left to the subjective determination of the commissioner. 
Reasonableness does involve the review court in the review of the substance of decisions, but 
establishes a margin or range of reasonable decisions within which decision-makers acting 
reasonably may reach different conclusions. As such, the standard of review applicable to 
reasonableness review is not one of correctness. Reasonableness review is therefore less 
exacting than an appeal on the merits. It is, however, more exacting than rational justifiability 
that focuses only on the rationality of the connection made by the commissioner between the 
material properly available to him or her and the decision that was reached rather than the 
reasonableness of the substantive decision itself. It is proposed that the reasonableness of a 
CCMA arbitration award be established by means of a two-pronged test in conformity with 
the approach in English administrative law. The reasonableness of a decision would then 
depend both on the outcome falling within a range of acceptable outcomes as well as on a line 
of analysis that reasonably supports the conclusion reached. This test for reasonableness is an 
objective test, established with reference to the result of the CCMA arbitration award and the 
reasons of the commissioner in support of the result. In conclusion, it is submitted that the 
application of this interpretation of reasonableness would give effect to Bato Star Fishing’s 
introduction of the English law interpretation of reasonableness into South African law. 
 
xii 
 
KEYWORDS: Administrative Law; Judicial Review; CCMA; Labour Court; Arbitration 
Awards; Reasonableness; Rationality; Perversity; Sidumo; Ground; Test; England; South 
Africa 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
1 1 BACKGROUND  
 
Judicial review is a familiar court process in South African law. It has long since been recognised 
as a means to challenge the decisions or proceedings of inferior courts, both civil and criminal, as 
well as those of tribunals or boards whether it performs judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative 
functions. This is illustrated by, among others, section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 
and section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.1 Where judicial review is the court 
procedure prescribed, the courts are generally not required to re-hear evidence or information 
previously before a lower court or tribunal to determine whether the findings of the court or 
tribunal was correct.2 The review court is required to determine whether the result was obtained 
by means of an acceptable process. The enquiry therefore focusses on the lawfulness of the 
decision-making process as opposed to the correctness of the decision. As such, judicial review 
potentially holds the following advantages to a dispute: 1) the limited scope of judicial review 
safeguards against the institution of unsubstantiated claims on the whims of prospective litigants; 
and 2) because it is limited to the record of proceedings, it is considered to be a more expeditious 
and less expensive mechanism for challenging unsatisfactory decisions or proceedings.3  
  
With the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) and the establishment of 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA), the legislature 
introduced mechanisms to ensure a quick, cost-effective and final resolution of labour disputes.4 
The legislative intent is supported by the wording of several sections of the LRA. Section 1 
identifies “the effective resolution of labour disputes” as one of the primary objectives of the 
LRA. Section 138 promotes informality and flexibility by specifying that a commissioner may 
                                                 
1 See chapter 2 para 2 4 1 and 2 4 2. 
2 See chapter 2 para 2 2 and 2 3. 
3 See chapters 2, 5 and 6. 
4 The CCMA has been established as an independent juristic person with jurisdiction in all of the provinces to among 
others attempt to conciliate disputes referred to it in terms of the LRA and, if unsuccessful, to arbitrate disputes in a 
simple, inexpensive, expeditious and non-legalistic manner. See sections 112-114 of the LRA. 
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conduct an arbitration in such a manner considered appropriate to “determine the dispute fairly 
and quickly” as well as deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with “the minimum of legal 
formalities”. Also, in terms of section 143(1), an arbitration award is “final and binding and may 
be enforced as if it were an order of the labour court”.  
 
Despite an intention to finally resolve disputes at arbitration, the legislature nevertheless saw it fit 
to provide for a mechanism to challenge defective arbitration awards. On the basis that an appeal 
process would inhibit the overall aim of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes,5 the 
legislature opted for the less extensive and/or intrusive characteristics of judicial review.6 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Labour Relations Bill explains the rationale behind the 
introduction of the concept of judicial review to the Labour Court as follows:7 
 
“The absence of an appeal from the arbitrator's award speeds up the process and frees it from the 
legalism that accompanies appeal proceedings. It is tempting to provide for appeals because 
dismissal is a very serious matter, particularly given the lack of prospects of alternative 
employment in the present economic climate. However, this temptation must be resisted as 
appeals lead to records, lengthy proceedings, lawyers, legalism, inordinate delays and high costs. 
Appeals have a negative impact on reinstatement as a remedy, they undermine the basic purpose 
of the legislation and they make the system too expensive for individuals and small business." 
 
As a result, section 145(1) of the LRA specifically provides that arbitration awards, generally 
considered final and binding,8 can only be reviewed by the Labour Court on the basis of a defect 
as defined in section 145(2). The defects are not prescribed in an open-ended manner but limited 
to decisions involving allegations of misconduct by the commissioner in relation to his or her 
                                                 
5 In terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, parties who were dissatisfied with the decisions of the Industrial 
Court could appeal first to the Labour Appeal Court and then to the former Appellate Division. The Court had to 
determine whether, on the evidence, it would have come to the same conclusion. See J Grogan “Defective 
Decisions” (1998) 14(3) Employment Law 4. 
6 The legislature replaced the right of appeal from judgments of the Industrial Court with the more limited right to 
take CCMA arbitration awards on review. See J Grogan “Now it’s rationality – Carephone survives the test” 
(2001) 17(5) Employment Law 9. 
7 1995 16 ILJ 278-336. For a different perspective, see Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade 
Unions as amicus curiae) 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA). The Court reasoned that an appeal process was rejected and 
the narrow grounds of review selected because it sets an extremely high standard for setting aside arbitration 
awards. According to the Court, costs and delays inherent in review serve as a deterrent to parties seeking to 
challenge arbitration awards; supporting the overall aim of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes. 
8 Section 143(1) of the LRA. 
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duties, a gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings and/or allegations that the 
commissioner exceeded his or her powers or that the award was improperly obtained. The 
statutorily recognised defects are the only grounds upon which CCMA arbitration awards may be 
reviewed by the Labour Court. Litigants who therefore wish to challenge CCMA arbitration 
awards must base their cause of action on one or more of the statutory grounds of review. 
Interestingly, unreasonableness and/or irrationality are not included within the scope of a defect 
as per section 145(2) of the LRA. 
 
Whilst the LRA prescribes the grounds of review, it does not also prescribe the test that the 
review court must apply to establish whether the CCMA arbitration award meets the criteria of 
any one or more of the grounds that would render it reviewable. The test to be applied on review 
is however important because: 1) it affects the way parties present their cases; the procedure they 
follow; how commissioners reach their decisions and the way judges approach CCMA arbitration 
awards; and 2) the scope of the test may encourage or deter parties from challenging CCMA 
arbitration awards.9 In addition, despite judicial review generally being described as a process-
related type of scrutiny, the courts have recognised that review proceedings cannot be conducted 
in isolation of the substantive merits of a decision.10 This has raised the question whether judicial 
review is in fact more restricted than an appeal or whether judicial review has been transformed 
into an appeal-like process. 
 
In England, judicial review is also recognised as one of the primary means through which 
administrative law governs the making of decisions by public authorities and the application of 
decision-making procedures. Traditionally possible because of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction at 
common law to determine whether action was lawful or not, it has subsequently been entrenched 
in section 31(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Read with Civil Procedure Rule 54.1(2)(a), 
judicial review involves a claim to review the lawfulness of an enactment or a decision, action or 
failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function. The Senior Courts Act 1981 and the 
Civil Procedure Rules do not specifically identify the grounds upon which a review application 
may be brought. The grounds of review have been developed by the English courts on a case by 
                                                 
9 E Fergus & A Rycroft “Refining Review” in R le Roux & A Rycroft (eds) Acta Juridica: Reinventing labour law: 
reflecting on the first 15 years of the Labour Relations Act and future challenges (2012) 170. 
10 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA and others 2007 1 All SA 164 (SCA) para 31. 
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case basis and rationalised into a threefold classification of illegality, procedural impropriety and 
irrationality. This is not an exhaustive categorisation and development on a case by case basis 
may lead to the recognition of further grounds of review in the future.11 Where the ground of 
unreasonableness is concerned, English administrative law accepts that it does not require a 
decision as to the correctness of one view over another and that a mere difference of opinion 
between administrative decision-makers and review courts do not justify interference on review. 
Traditionally, the review courts test whether a decision is unreasonable by enquiring whether the 
decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could ever have come to it.12 
The review court effectively attempts a secondary, objective determination as to what a 
reasonable decision-maker could have determined in the circumstances. 
 
From an employment law perspective, the Employment Tribunal (Tribunal) has been established 
to determine complaints in a relatively quick and inexpensive manner, with less formalities and 
technicalities than the ordinary courts of record and with finality. The only exception to the 
principle of achieving finality is contained in section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act, 
1996. Section 21(1) allows for an appeal against a Tribunal finding to the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (Appeal Tribunal) on the basis of questions of law only. Questions of law have been 
classified into the following categories of grounds of appeal: 1) a misdirection, misunderstanding 
or misapplication of the law; 2) a misunderstanding or misapplication of relevant undisputed or 
indisputable facts that are material to the decision in question; and 3) “perverse” decisions. A 
decision is perverse if an overwhelming case is made out that the Tribunal reached a decision 
which no reasonable tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the evidence and the law, would have 
reached.13 Again, the Appeal Tribunal does not make a decision as to the correctness of one view 
over another, but attempt a secondary, objective determination as to what a reasonable tribunal 
could have determined in the circumstances. 
 
1 2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
Due to the narrow confines suggested by a first reading of section 145(2), parties dissatisfied with  
                                                 
11 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 1983 UKHL 6.  
12 See chapter 3 para 3 3 3. Wednesbury unreasonableness was restated with reference to the term “irrationality”. 
13 See chapter 4. 
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the outcome of CCMA arbitration awards for reasons not contemplated in the section have sought 
opportunities to circumvent the application, or expand the scope, of section 145(2).14 Initially, 
attempts were made to review CCMA arbitration awards in terms of section 158(1)(g) of the 
LRA. Opposed to the closed list of grounds provided for in section 145(2), section 158(1)(g) 
empowers the Labour Court to review the performance of any function provided for in the LRA 
on any grounds that are permissible in law. For similar reasons, attempts have been made to 
broaden the grounds of review by alleging that commissioners engage in administrative action 
when making arbitration awards. This argument justified reliance on the justifiability and 
reasonableness principles as provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
200 of 1993 (1993 Constitution) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(1996 Constitution) respectively and, since the introduction of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), the open-ended grounds of review provided for in section 6(2).15  
 
In Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others,16 the Constitutional Court 
considered the desirability of applying a PAJA-type administrative review on substantive and 
procedural grounds to CCMA arbitration award reviews. The Court found that the labour law 
setting, requiring a speedy resolution of disputes with outcomes basically limited to dismissal or 
reinstatement, made it inappropriate to apply the full PAJA-type administrative review. The 
Court however also found that, although the language of section 145 did not make specific 
reference thereto, the section had to be read in a manner that ensured that commissioners would 
make arbitration awards that were lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. According to the 
Court, the reasonableness standard accordingly suffused section 145 of the LRA and effectively 
required the review court to ask whether the decision, captured in the arbitration award, was one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.17 In the course of the judgment, the Court 
relied on an earlier decision in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism.18 In that case, the Court had referred to the English decision of Associated 
                                                 
14 Drafted in narrow, procedural terms, it does not traditionally find application where a commissioner chooses one 
remedy above another in a situation where a choice of remedies is given or the substantive outcome is 
undesirable. See Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others 1997 12 
BLLR 1632 (LC). 
15 See chapters 5 and 6. 
16 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
17 Para 105 and 110. 
18 2000 2 SA 674 (CC). 
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Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation19 and had been guided by the 
subsequent English decision of Regina v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International 
Trader's Ferry Ltd20 in order to determine the proper meaning to be accorded to the 
unreasonableness ground of review contained in section 6(2)(h) of PAJA.21  
 
Briefly, in Wednesbury Corporation, the House of Lords had recognised unreasonableness as a 
ground of review and had confirmed that a review court was only entitled to interfere with a 
decision on this basis if the decision satisfied the threshold of being so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever have come to it.22 In International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, the House 
of Lords had subsequently criticised the Wednesbury formulation of unreasonableness as 
repetitious and needlessly complex and had preferred a reformulated test that enquired whether 
the decision was one which a reasonable authority could reach.23 In both the decisions of the 
House of Lords, the question of unreasonableness arose against the background of the exercise of 
an administrative, discretionary power. 
 
The abovementioned judgements are important from a labour law perspective to the extent that 
the Constitutional Court in the labour law matter of Sidumo relied directly on the decision of Bato 
Star Fishing, and therefore indirectly also on International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, to determine that 
an arbitration award will be reviewable in terms of section 145 of the LRA if the decision is one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. The test of Sidumo unreasonableness, 
applicable to the review of CCMA arbitration awards, is therefore considered conceptually no 
different to that applied to the unreasonableness ground of review in terms of PAJA.  
 
A perusal of the judgments of Bato Star Fishing and Sidumo however reveals that in neither case 
did the Constitutional Court expressly and/or comprehensively discuss the English legal position 
before adopting its interpretation of unreasonableness into South African law under the 
constitutional dispensation. The South African courts and labour practitioners have therefore 
engaged in extensive deliberations as to its meaning and scope and have produced a 
                                                 
19 1948 1 KB 223.  
20 1999 2 AC 418. 
21 Para 44. 
22 230. 
23 452. 
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jurisprudence that lacks the desired consistency and certainty. In the circumstances, it must be 
clarified whether Sidumo unreasonableness: 1) constitutes a standard, test and/or an independent 
ground of review; 2) replaces or overrides the section 145(2) grounds of review; 3) is substantive 
or dialectical in nature or both; 4) is similar to or distinct from an appeal on the merits; 5) is 
distinguished from or the equivalent of rational justifiability; and/or 6) is limited to a certain type 
and/or nature of decisions. Lastly, the appropriate test for establishing Sidumo unreasonableness 
needs to be identified, including its limitations or boundaries. 
 
This thesis discusses the role of unreasonableness in the judicial review of administrative 
decisions in England and the role of perversity in an appeal from Tribunal findings. It then 
compares the English position with South African labour law to extract sound principles that 
should assist in the interpretation and application of unreasonableness in South African labour 
law in the future.  
 
1 3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis sets out the legal principles applicable to the judicial review of CCMA arbitration 
awards in South Africa, as contained in section 145 of the LRA, and the jurisprudence that has 
arisen in relation thereto. The legal principles and jurisprudence is then compared to the legal 
principles applicable to the appeal process provided for in English employment law to challenge 
Tribunal findings. To the extent that the making of a CCMA arbitration award in South Africa is 
recognised as an administrative act,24 the thesis also considers the legal position in England for 
challenging administrative decisions in general and affords particular attention to the role of 
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety and the jurisprudence that has developed in 
relation thereto. This thesis further focuses on whether England’s approach to an appeal against a 
Tribunal finding or the judicial review of an administrative decision can inform South Africa’s 
jurisprudence on the interpretation, application and/or development of the judicial review remedy 
provided for in section 145 of the LRA. The specific objectives of this study are: 
 
                                                 
24 See chapter 5. 
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 To examine the nature of an application to the Labour Court for the judicial review of a 
CCMA arbitration award in South Africa, including the grounds upon which the 
application may be brought, and with specific reference to the Constitutional Court’s 
approach to the concept of unreasonableness as provided for in Sidumo. To the extent that 
the approach was adopted from South African administrative law, reference is also made 
to the meaning attributed to unreasonableness in the administrative context. 
 
 To consider the judicial review of administrative decisions as applied in England, 
including the grounds upon which such an application may be brought, with particular 
reference to the role and interpretation of unreasonableness and/or irrationality therein.  
 
 To consider the right to appeal against a Tribunal finding in England, including the 
grounds upon which such an application may be brought, with specific reference to the 
role and interpretation afforded to the concept of perversity. 
 
 To analyse the South African courts’ approach to judicial review applications on the basis 
of unreasonableness as well as to consider how the equivalent concept has been interpreted 
and applied in England, to identify any errors in the interpretation and application and to 
propose effective means through which a review in South Africa can be better dealt with 
should the existing legal framework prove to be inadequate. 
 
1 4 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
During the first decade of the operation of the CCMA, roughly one in ten CCMA arbitration 
awards were taken on judicial review to the Labour Court; amounting to a total of 1700 review 
applications having being launched each year for that period.25 More recently, review 
proceedings have been instituted in respect of ten to fifteen percent of arbitration awards.26 The 
                                                 
25 P Benjamin, H Bhorat & H Cheadle “The cost of doing business and labour regulation: the case of South Africa” 
May 2009 downloaded on 16 December 2010 at http://www.iza.org /conference_files/worldb2010/bhorat 
_h4951.pdf. 
26 A total of 2189 reviews were brought in 2010-2011; representing an increase of seven percent on the previous year 
despite a one percent decrease in total awards rendered. See P Benjamin “Assessing South Africa’s Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)” Dialogue Working Paper No. 47 International Labour 
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judicial review procedure is therefore a key part of the labour dispute resolution process in South 
Africa and its frequent utilisation indicates that the correct and consistent interpretation and 
application by prospective litigants, labour practitioners and the courts are critical for establishing 
an efficient, effective and consistent labour regulatory regime in South Africa. As mentioned 
above, a perusal of case law however demonstrates that different interpretations and applications 
of section 145 have arisen, both in relation to the recognised grounds of review and the standard 
and/or test applicable when reviewing decisions in terms of this section.  
 
To date, a thorough comparative study of the role of unreasonableness in South African labour 
law as opposed to its role in English employment law and English administrative law as 
contemplated herein has not been conducted.27 This makes this study unique and of significance 
to scholars in both countries. As mentioned above, England utilises, in the employment context, 
the legal concept of “perversity” and, in the administrative law context, the concept of 
“unreasonableness”, that on first appearance are semantically similar to the standard of 
unreasonableness utilised in the review of CCMA arbitration awards in South Africa. In 
observing how matters have been dealt with in England, this study seeks to provide a better 
perspective of the South African position as well as enrich the approach to and understanding 
thereof. Lastly this study hopes to provide policy makers with a meaningful assessment of the 
remedies with the view of improving the interpretation and application of judicial review in 
South Africa and unreasonableness in particular.  
 
1 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This study examines and compares the remedy for challenging CCMA arbitration awards in 
South Africa with the remedy for challenging Tribunal findings as well as administrative action 
in England. This is done by logically setting out the principles applicable in each system and 
identifying the similarities and differences between or among them.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Office April 2013 24 accessed at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/ 
publication/wcms _210181.pdf  on 5 June 2013 at 20h38. 
27 A comparative study of South African law and Canadian law has been conducted. See E Fergus From Sidumo to 
Dunsmuir: The Test for Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards Doctor of Philosophy Thesis University of Cape 
Town (2013) 209-270. 
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This study uses both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source of information 
comprises of legislative measures and/or important case law dealing with the section 145 remedy 
of review in South Africa, the corresponding remedy in England and the judicial review of 
administrative action. The aforementioned is examined and discussed for the purpose of 
analysing the respective system’s similarities and differences.  
 
The secondary data which this study relies on include journal articles, law texts and other 
electronic sources. This data is subjected to a comparative and in-depth content analysis.  
 
The comparative study is not merely undertaken for the purpose of juxtaposing two different 
systems and to list their similarities and differences. The systems are compared both with regard 
to structure and their respective substantive legal rules to establish whether there are principles, 
well-suited to the South African legal context, that South African law can draw from the foreign 
jurisdiction that would be beneficial to the interpretation, application and/or further development 
of South African law. 
 
1 6 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPARISON  
 
This thesis examines the role of unreasonableness in the judicial review of CCMA arbitration 
awards in South African labour law against the background of a comparison with English law 
principles of judicial review and administrative law as well as the employment law dispute 
resolution process for challenging Tribunal findings. 
 
English law is considered suitable for comparative purposes because it has influenced a variety of 
legal systems worldwide. This is largely due to the fact that such countries were once ruled by 
Britain. South Africa is no exception. While South Africa has a pluralistic legal system, 
compared to England’s common law jurisdiction, it continues to have strong connections to the 
British legal tradition - being a former British colony. The pluralistic nature of the South African 
legal system compared to England’s common law jurisdiction does not render the two countries’ 
legal systems incomparable because, in its current form, England’s employment law, like South 
Africa’s, is largely a creature of statute rather than common law. 
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In the employment law context specifically, similarities and differences between the CCMA and 
the Tribunal are identified upon comparison. Both are designed to provide accessible, 
inexpensive, efficient and relatively informal dispute resolution services in certain categories of 
disputes.28 Neither the CCMA not the Tribunal follow a system of binding precedent. The 
Tribunal differs from the CCMA in so far as it is regarded as an independent judicial body29 
compared to the CCMA as administrative tribunal.30 This does not, however, detract from the 
suitability of an English law comparator.31 There are several similarities between the CCMA in 
performing its arbitration role and a court of law: 1) the prescribed manner of adducing evidence, 
questioning witnesses and concluding arguments; 2) the powers of subpoena conferred on a 
CCMA commissioner; 3) the possibility of CCMA arbitration awards being enforced through 
contempt proceedings; 4) the finality and binding nature of CCMA arbitration awards; and 5) the 
power of the CCMA in arbitration proceedings to make orders for the payment of costs. 
Essentially, the CCMA is considered to not be a court of law because CCMA commissioners are 
empowered to conduct proceedings as they see fit, with the minimum of formalities, as long as 
disputes are disposed of fairly and quickly. The CCMA process has, however, become more 
formal and legalistic and the CCMA has been obliged to become a tribunal of record because of 
the required analysis of the link between the reasons for the decision and the evidence upon 
which the decision is based.32 On the other hand, the Tribunal, despite being classified as inferior 
court, has an objective similar to the CCMA. The Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 
2013 specifies that Tribunal members have the overriding objective to handle cases fairly and 
justly by, so far as practicable: 1) ensuring that parties to the proceedings are on an equal footing; 
2) that cases are dealt with in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of 
                                                 
28 Throughout the existence of the CCMA, roughly eighty percent of referrals each year have been dismissal cases. 
See P Benjamin “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)” 
International Labour Office, Industrial and Employment Relations Department Dialogue Working Paper No 47 
April 2013 6. 
29 The Tribunal is not considered to be an administrative tribunal because it decides “party and party” disputes and 
not “individual and state” disputes. 
30 The CCMA is not a court. See Fredericks & others v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape & others 
2002 (2) SA 693 (CC) paras 30-31; Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 
(CC) para 80, 85 and 87. 
31 For a contrary view, see E Fergus From Sidumo to Dunsmuir: The Test for Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards 
Doctor of Philosophy Thesis University of Cape Town (2013) 186-192. However, see also Daly P “Wednesbury’s 
Reason and Structure” (2011) PL 238. Daly argues that reasonableness as it operates in the United States and 
Canada as a standard of review for error of law bears the same meaning as reasonableness review applied in the 
United Kingdom for control of discretion. 
32 J Murray “An Appeal for an Appeal” ILJ 2013 1. It was initially envisaged that arbitration hearings would not be 
recorded and reviews would be based on the commissioner’s notes and the parties’ submissions. 
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the issues; 3); avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; 4) 
avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues; and 5) saving 
expense.33 
  
The CCMA and the Tribunal also do not sit on the same point of the adversarial–inquisitorial 
spectrum. The Tribunal in England is described as more adversarial and court-like in nature 
whereas a CCMA commissioner may conduct an arbitration in an adversarial or inquisitorial 
form or in a form that combines these two approaches, provided that this is done in a manner that 
is fair to both parties.34 However, no statute explicitly enables the Tribunal to adopt either an 
adversarial or inquisitorial approach. The nearest instance is the Employment Tribunals Rules of 
Procedure 2013 which provides that the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure and shall 
conduct a hearing in the manner it considers fair, having regard to the principles contained in the 
overriding objective mentioned above. In addition thereto, the Tribunal must seek to avoid undue 
formality and may itself question the parties or any witnesses so far as appropriate in order to 
clarify the issues or elicit the evidence. The Tribunal is also not bound by any rule of law relating 
to the admissibility of evidence in proceedings before the courts.35 
 
Further, whilst the right to legal representation in CCMA arbitrations is restricted so that the 
majority of applicant employees is represented by trade union officials or represent themselves,36 
                                                 
33 Rule 2. 
34 See CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations, GN 602 of 2011, GG 34573 of 2 September 2011. See also P 
Benjamin “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)” 
International Labour Office, Industrial and Employment Relations Department Dialogue Working Paper No 47 
April 2013. While the arbitration system initially envisaged a significant role for a more inquisitorial process, its 
use has been rare. The significance of the arbitrator’s discretion has tended to be misunderstood by the Labour 
Court. While some judgments reflect a view that arbitrations should be conducted as a less formal version of a 
civil trial, others emphasise that an arbitrator must at the outset of proceedings decide whether the arbitration will 
be conducted on an “adversarial” or “inquisitorial” basis. 
35 Rule 41. 
36 P Benjamin “Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)” 
International Labour Office, Industrial and Employment Relations Department Dialogue Working Paper No 47 
April 2013 6. See Rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA, GN R1448, GG 
25515 of 10 October 2003. Legal representation is not permitted in dismissal arbitrations unless the parties 
consent to it or the commissioner permits it due to the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute, its 
complexity, the public interest and the comparative ability of the opposing parties to deal with the arbitration. See 
Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour and others 2013 1 All SA 688 (GNP). The High 
Court ruled that the prohibition of legal representation during CCMA arbitration proceedings was inconsistent 
with section 33 of the Constitution to the extent that it significantly abridged the discretion of the commissioner in 
a CCMA arbitration to afford the opportunity for legal representation in a serious but not complex case of 
dismissal for misconduct or incapacity. A declaration of constitutional invalidity was therefore issued. The 
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The Tribunal permits persons to have legal representation.37 Tribunal cases are also heard by a 
panel comprising of a legally qualified judge and two lay members compared to CCMA 
commissioners who need not have legal qualifications. That said, neither are protected from 
judicial oversight when falling into legal error. As mentioned above, both South Africa and 
England recognise a limited right to challenge unfair dismissal findings made by their respective 
tribunals to superior courts of record. In South Africa, a litigant on review has to establish the 
existence of a statutorily defined defect; whereas in England the litigant has to demonstrate an 
error of law. South Africa and England also apply standards of unreasonableness and perversity 
respectively that appear to share many common features. The two countries are also confronted 
with similar challenges when called upon to interpret and apply their review and appeal remedies 
in the employment law context respectively, especially attempts to review and/or appeal because 
the CCMA and/or Tribunal made wrong findings and/or arrived at the wrong conclusion. The 
Tribunal appeal process in England is, finally, an interesting comparator in so far as the Labour 
Appeal Court has suggested that the policy decision to permit reviews rather than appeals has not 
succeeded in promoting expedited dispute resolution. The argument is that South African 
employment law would be better served by a single right of appeal on the record in order to 
determine whether the commissioner made an incorrect decision on fairness.38   
 
Although one may therefore contend that the test for considering Tribunal decisions is less 
rigorous than that applicable to CCMA arbitration awards, submissions that they are not worthy 
of any comparison at all, calls to be rejected. At most, these differences will be a consideration to 
be taken into account when determining the appropriateness of the degree of unreasonableness 
that is fitting to apply in the South African context.  
 
In the administrative law context, the English law influence is prominent. As part of its colonial 
heritage, the South African courts developed administrative law principles by relying on the 
                                                                                                                                                              
declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of 36 months to enable the relevant parties to consider and 
promulgate a new sub-rule. The CCMA’s appeal was upheld in Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration and others v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (Incorporated as the Law Society of Transvaal) 
2013 11 BLLR 1057 (SCA). 
37 Section 6(1) of Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
38 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2012 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) paras 53-56. See J Murray “An Appeal for an Appeal” 2013 ILJ 
1. 
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English constitutional doctrines and ground of review.39 Although the common law grounds of 
review have subsequently been converted into legislation in terms of the constitutional mandate, 
the common law flavour of administrative law in South Africa have remained distinctive.40 
Section 39(1)(c) and 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution also makes it clear that a court, tribunal or 
forum may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights and must promote the spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation and when developing 
the common law or customary law. A comparative study for the purpose of determining the 
proper role and meaning of unreasonableness is therefore not misplaced. As in South Africa, 
allegations of unreasonableness may arise in review proceedings in England. Moreover, England 
recognises a remedy of review for challenging a public authority’s decision with a standard very 
similar to South Africa’s test of unreasonableness being applied. 
 
It must however be conceded that there are differences between the two countries in so far as 
England is not a constitutional state and given that it differs from South Africa in terms of 
political, social values, traditions, the economy as well as demographic factors. In terms thereof, 
it may therefore be contended that a less intensive measure of scrutiny is applied by the English 
courts than that prescribed by section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. On the other hand, both 
countries accept that there is a need for deference to administrative decisions and distinguish 
unreasonableness review from correctness review on the basis that a mere difference of opinion 
between decision-makers would not justify a review. In addition thereto, developments in 
England have led to criticism of Wednesbury unreasonableness and the application of a less strict 
standard of unreasonableness when assessing discretionary determinations. Whilst Wednesbury 
unreasonableness has been denounced by the Constitutional Court, the reformulated 
unreasonableness standard in International Trader’s Ferry Ltd was expressly adopted into South 
African law in Bato Star Fishing. As such, there is comparative value in English administrative 
law for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of unreasonableness suffusing the section 145 
grounds of review.41 
 
                                                 
39 Hoexter Administrative Law 13. 
40 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 
674 (CC) paras 33–45; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC). 
41 See section 39 of the 1996 Constitution. 
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Because South Africa is not unique in the challenges that it faces in respect of its review remedy, 
nor its grounds of review, this study will consider the jurisprudence that has arisen within 
England’s jurisdiction, which happened to be confronted with similar issues when interpreting 
and applying its remedy for challenging defective findings.  
 
Bearing in mind that borrowing from foreign legal systems must be effected with caution,42 there 
is no reason why the general administrative law of England cannot be used to modernise South 
African administrative law. If the South African courts are to be guided by the English 
comparative jurisprudence, as they are invited to be by section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution, it 
is contemplated that the challenges, arguments, patterns of change and development in England 
may introduce a way of thinking that will add value to any proposed interpretation and 
application of South Africa’s review remedy.  
 
The differences and similarities make these two countries comparable. 
 
1 7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is restricted to the topic of CCMA arbitration award reviews in South Africa 
compared to the equivalent process conducted in England, both in the narrower employment law 
context and the wider administrative law context. It does not extend to a study of the role of 
unreasonableness in private arbitration award reviews in South Africa or the Acas arbitration 
scheme’ available as a voluntary alternative to Tribunal hearings in England for the resolution of 
unfair dismissal disputes.43 This study also does not include a chapter dedicated to 
unreasonableness in South African administrative law because: 1) South Africa traces its legal 
heritage to England as a former colony of the British Empire; 2) South African administrative 
law in particular is premised on English administrative law; and 3) unreasonableness was 
                                                 
42 Sanderson v Attorney General (Eastern Cape) 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 26. 
43 See section 7 of the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998. The scheme is a confidential, relatively 
fast, cost efficient, non-legalistic, informal and non-confrontational process. There is no cross-examination of 
witnesses by a party or representative or swearing of oaths. Entry to the scheme is voluntary and there must be 
agreement by both parties to the dispute to go to binding arbitration. The employees must have an existing 
application to the Tribunal pending or must have grounds to lodge an application. Entry to the Scheme is via an 
arbitration agreement reached with the assistance of an Acas conciliator or in the form of a compromise agreement 
drawn up by appropriate representatives. In South Africa it is accepted that the grounds of review for private 
arbitration award reviews is interpreted more strictly because of the voluntary nature of the process. 
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introduced into South Africa employment law by means of a reliance on the Constitutional Court 
judgment in Bato Star Fishing which directly depended on an English administrative law 
decision of International Trader’s Ferry Ltd. In the English employment law context, reference 
is only made to the right not to be unfairly dismissed and the procedure to challenge unfair 
dismissals to explain the context within which a Tribunal finding is made and ultimately sought 
to be challenged. Where English administrative law judgments are discussed, this is only done for 
the purpose of extracting judicial review principles and not to conduct a detailed analysis of each 
and every particular area of law dealt with in the judgment. A brief description of the dispute 
and/or the legal question raised will therefore be presented concisely, and only to sketch the 
background to the courts’ findings in relation to the remedy of review. Analysis and observations 
arising from the research are applicable only within the defined parameters. The thesis addresses 
case law and material through to 31 August 2013 only. Related developments subsequent to 31 
August 2013 are not referred to and/or discussed. 
 
1 8 BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
With the above as background, the exposition of the proper approach to a review for 
unreasonableness proceeds as follows: In chapter 2, the general role of judicial review in South 
African law is conceptualised and distinguished from the appeal process; having regard also to 
the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law. In particular, 
consideration is afforded to the common law principles of review from which judicial review in 
the current constitutional dispensation has evolved. Judicial review in the present constitutional 
system is also examined and the role, if any, of unreasonableness in relation to both the common 
law and constitutional dispensation is explored. To the extent that judicial review in South 
African law was influenced by English law as part of its colonial heritage, foundational aspects of 
the concept of review in England is explained and distinguished from the English appeal process 
with reference to their identified differences in scope and content.The different categories of 
review is also identified and compared to those relevant to appeals. In conjunction herewith, 
judicial review in the context of the CCMA labour dispute resolution system is discussed, having 
regard to the LRA as source of the Labour Court’s powers of review, the dictates of section 145 
of the LRA and the legislature’s intention when promulgating that section of the legislation. 
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In so far as both Wednesbury Corporation and International Trader’s Ferry Ltd were decided 
within the context of administrative law, the nature and conceptual basis of judicial review in this 
area of English law is discussed in chapter 3 having regard to both the position at common law 
and in terms of statute. Ancillary hereto, the special meaning afforded to “lawfulness” and/or 
“contraventions of the law” are considered, including its scope and/or limitations. The different 
categories of grounds of review of illegality, procedural impropriety and unreasonableness are 
also discussed and case law examined in order to distinguish unreasonableness review from the 
other types of review recognised in English law. In relation hereto, the standard or test of review 
of correctness and unreasonableness are considered as well as its application to each of the 
different grounds of review. 
 
In particular, a discussion is undertaken of the meaning, role and/or impact of unreasonableness 
in the exercise of public discretionary powers and administrative decision-making in the 
substantive sense. It is considered whether unreasonableness serves as evidence of the presence 
of a vitiating factor on review or whether it constitutes a standalone ground for the setting aside 
of an administrative decision. The role, if any, of unreasonableness in the review of the merits of 
decisions is also explored having regard to the duty not to take account of irrelevant matters, to 
have regard to relevant considerations, to act in good faith and to not make decisions on the basis 
of an unfair balance of considerations, inadequate evidence and/or mistakes of fact. The question 
of different intensities of unreasonableness review in relation to different contextual decisions is 
also considered and discussed.  
 
In chapter 4, the remedy of appeal from the Tribunal to the Appeal Tribunal and the Court of 
Appeal is discussed. The jurisdiction and constitution of the Appeal Tribunal and the scope 
and/or ambit of the permissible ground(s) for appeal is also considered. The difference between 
questions of law and questions of fact is then discussed. Consideration is afforded to the 
circumstances in which the Tribunal's failure to give adequate reasons for a decision, a breach by 
the Tribunal of the rules of natural justice or excessive delay in the Tribunal giving a decision, 
can amount to an error of law on the Tribunal's part. The circumstances in which the Tribunal's 
treatment of facts can amount to an error of law and cases where there is no evidence to support 
findings of fact are also considered. In addition it is considered on what basis the Tribunal's 
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decision can be appealed on grounds of perversity or on the basis that it reached a decision 
following an erroneous exercise of discretion. Such a study will be conducted for the purpose of 
establishing whether meaningful principles can be extracted that will contribute to the 
interpretation and application of the section 145 review remedy provided for in the LRA. 
 
In Chapter 5, the historical debate related to the relationship between section 158(1)(g) and 
section 145 of the LRA is examined as well as the interaction between the constitutional right to 
justifiable administrative action and CCMA arbitration awards. In particular, it is considered how 
the courts have dealt with the allegation that CCMA arbitration awards should be reviewable in 
terms of section 158(1)(g) of the LRA, rather than section 145, mainly in those instances where 
the ground(s) of review identified in the application fall beyond the compass of section 145. 
Having regard to case law, it is also considered whether the CCMA function of making 
arbitration awards should be classified as administrative action that entitles the applicant on 
review to rely on the more extensive grounds for review contained in PAJA to review arbitration 
awards. Ancillary hereto, the courts’ approach to arbitration award reviews in light of the 
justifiability principle contained in the 1993 Constitution and the rationality principle enunciated 
in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and another In Re: Ex Parte Application of 
the President of the RSA is discussed.44 These discussions are undertaken for the purpose of 
better understanding the context within which section 145 operates as well as to extract principles 
to assist in the interpretation of the findings made in the precedent setting judgment handed down 
by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo.  
 
In chapter 6, the key findings in Sidumo are set out with an emphasis on the relationship between 
unreasonableness and judicial review in terms of section 145 of the LRA for the purpose of 
establishing its implications for subsequent review proceedings. Case law that has sought to 
interpret and apply the principles established in Sidumo are discussed in order to contextualise the 
place of unreasonableness in the review of CCMA arbitration awards with a view to better 
understand its implications for the courts’ review function. More particularly, it is considered 
whether the courts have interpreted unreasonableness as a test or ground of review and whether 
unreasonableness, be that as a ground of review or a test on review, is result-based, outcome-
                                                 
44 2000 JOL 6158 (CC). 
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focussed or process-related. The impact of unreasonableness on value judgments, inclusive of 
findings of guilt, the appropriate sanction and procedural fairness, is also discussed. It is then 
considered whether a review court is entitled to rely on reasons other than those provided for by 
the commissioner in his or her award to determine the unreasonableness of his or her decision. 
Following a discussion of the duty to consider materially relevant factors when making value 
judgments, the influence of unreasonableness on jurisdictional reviews is also contemplated. 
 
In chapter 7 the legal position in South African and English law is compared and proposals are 
made in respect of the interpretation and application of the unreasonableness principle for the 
purpose of assisting in future review proceedings. 
 
Finally, in chapter 8, the legal position and findings that have been considered and made is 
summarised. Proposals are made in relation to the research questions that have been raised and 
the thesis is concluded. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF REVIEW DISTINGUISHED FROM APPEAL 
 
2 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others,45 jurisprudence of the Labour Court and the 
Labour Appeal Court have been inundated with references to the distinction between appeal and 
review to delineate the proper scope of review.46 The common tread throughout the judgments 
has been an emphasis on the importance of maintaining the distinction when undertaking reviews 
in terms of section 145 of the LRA; even though instances may rise where the distinction is easily 
blurred. The judiciary’s confidence in the distinction between appeal and review maintaining 
court boundaries on review suggests that the distinction is important and will facilitate in defining 
the nature and scope of the review power of the Labour Court.47  
 
To determine the proper role of the Labour Court in the review of CCMA arbitration awards and 
to position a baseline for determining the role of unreasonableness in particular, it is therefore 
necessary to have an understanding of the role of judicial review in South African law in general 
and to distinguish it from the appeal process. The proposed point of departure for such a 
discussion is the common law principles of review from which judicial review in the current 
dispensation evolved. Thereafter, judicial review in the present constitutional system is 
examined. The role, if any, of unreasonableness in relation to both dispensations is also explored. 
To the extent that judicial review in South African law was influenced by English law as part of 
its colonial heritage, foundational aspects of judicial review in England are also referenced. This 
will assist in obtaining a general view of the appropriate levels of scrutiny, the intensity of review 
and/or the margins of deference or appreciation that are applied in South Africa and England 
respectively. 
                                                 
45 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
46 See International School of SA v Khabele 2002 9 BLLR 859 (LC) para 23-24; Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) 
Ltd v Radebe 2000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC) para 33-37; Transnet Ltd v CCMA 2007 JOL 20974 (LC) para 29; JHB to 
Fresh Produce Market (Pty) Ltd v Hiemstra NO & others 2007 JOL 20596 (LC) para 24-25; Coetzee v Lebea NO 
1998 JOL 3657 (LAC) para 10. 
47 See E Fergus “The Distinction between Appeals and Reviews – Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s Powers 
of Review” (2010) ILJ 1556. 
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The traditional distinction between appeal and review is then discussed in relation to the scope 
and content thereof as well as the reasons for the distinction. The different categories of review 
are also identified and compared to those relevant to appeals. In conjunction herewith, it is 
determined whether the distinction assists in delineating the courts’ review powers or whether 
there are other means of identifying the nature and extent of the courts’ powers to conduct 
reviews proceedings in terms of the LRA and unreasonableness review in particular. Lastly, 
judicial review is discussed within the context of labour dispute resolution in South Africa. This 
is done having regard to the LRA as the source of the Labour Court’s powers of review and the 
legislature’s intention in promulgating section 145 of the LRA. Reference is also made to the 
dictates of section 145 of the LRA and the different grounds of review in particular. 
 
2 2 THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
 
2 2 1 Administrative law and judicial review in context 
 
Judicial review is primarily recognised as a form of legal redress against the ill use of 
administrative power in South Africa. It is therefore an important aspect of administrative law. 
Administrative law forms part of public law in so far as it governs the execution and performance 
of the functions and duties of the public administration.48 Baxter explains that the concept of 
administrative law consists of the general principles of law which regulate the organisation of 
administrative institutions and the fairness and efficacy of the administrative process, govern the 
validity of and liability for administrative action and inaction, and govern the administrative and 
judicial remedies relating to such action or inaction.49 As the description indicates, administrative 
law is a broader concept than judicial review. Administrative law deals with the legal rules 
relating to the control of administrative power and concerns judicial and non-judicial safeguards 
against poor decision-making. Judicial review is essentially concerned with the judicial detection 
and correction of maladministration.50   
                                                 
48 M Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) 1-2. 
49 L G Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 2. 
50 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 9. 
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In English administrative law, the position is similar. Judicial review is recognised as a means of 
legal control over the exercise of administrative functions. As a branch of English public law, 
English administrative law encompasses the law relating to the functions of administrative 
decision-makers, the judicial review of the exercise of those functions, the liability and legal 
protection of those purporting to exercise those functions and the means whereby extra-judicial 
redress may be obtainable at the instance of the person aggrieved.51  
 
Since the abovementioned definition of administrative law in South Africa has been formulated, 
the underpinnings of South Africa have changed significantly from a constitutional system based 
on parliamentary sovereignty to one of constitution supremacy.52 However, despite these 
developments, the common law position pre-democracy is important in so far as it continues to 
serve as the foundation of the new constitutionalised administrative law of the democratic era and 
can assist in understanding and giving meaning to the constitutional right to just administrative 
action. Judicial review as an aspect of administrative law in the pre- and post-democratic era in 
South Africa will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
2 2 1 1 Judicial control under the common law dispensation 
 
In the previous dispensation, judicial review was a means of judicial supervision and control over 
administrative decision-making via the High Courts’ inherent power of judicial review.53 In 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council,54 Innes CJ described 
this common law review power as follows: 
 
“Whenever a public body has a duty imposed on it by statute, and disregards important 
provisions of the statute, or is guilty of gross irregularity, or clear illegality in the performance 
of this duty,  this Court may be asked to review the proceedings complained of and set aside or 
                                                 
51 H S G Halsbuty & J P H Mackay “Administrative Law” in Halsbury’s Law of England  1(1) (2001) para 1. 
52 K O’Regan “Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in Our Administrative Law” 121(2) (2004) 
SALJ 424 431; C Plasket The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in the Democratic South Africa Doctor of Philosophy thesis Rhodes University (2002) 15. 
53 Y Burns & M Wiechers “Administrative law” in LAWSA 1 2 ed (2003) para 71. See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) para 23. The Court noted 
that, prior to the enactment of the 1993 Constitution, the superior courts had jurisdiction to review subordinate 
legislation and administrative and executive action based on the inherent jurisdiction of the courts. 
54 1903 TS 111 115. 
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correct them. This is no special machinery created by the Legislature; it is a right inherent in the 
Court.” 
 
The inherent review jurisdiction enabled the courts to develop administrative law principles. The 
courts also relied on English administrative law; causing its constitutional doctrines and grounds 
of review to strongly influence the development of administrative law principles in South 
Africa.55 These principles formed the basis upon which the principle of the legality of 
administrative action in South Africa rested.56 The reliance on English law was not surprising 
taking into consideration that the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange River Colony and Transvaal 
were once British colonies and that England initially created the Union of South Africa;57 thereby 
embracing the English Westminister system into the South African constitutional institutions.58 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty was one of the English principles relied upon. As the highest 
legislative body, parliament was able to enact any law and the courts could not test the substance 
of the laws against standards such as fairness and equality.59 Inherited from English law, 
parliamentary sovereignty served as a significant restraint on the review power of the court; 
causing an inherent degree of judicial deference in the conduct of judicial review. While the 
principle of administrative legality empowered the court to review the legality of administrative 
conduct,60 the principle of parliamentary sovereignty effectively entitled Parliament to determine 
what would quality as lawful.61 Chaskalson P explained this as follows in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association:62 
 
“The exercise of public power was regulated by the courts through the judicial review of 
legislative and executive action. This was done by applying constitutional principles of the 
                                                 
55 Hoexter Administrative Law 13; C Hoexter "The Principle of Legality in South African Administrative Law" 2004 
Maquarie Law Journal 8 (2004) 4. See also Du Preez and Another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 
(3) SA 204 (SCA). 
56 Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” in LAWSA 1 para 73.  
57 South Africa Act 1909. 
58 C Plasket The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 
Democratic South Africa Doctor of Philosophy thesis Rhodes University (2002) 18. 
59 Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” in LAWSA 1 para 71.  
60 Y Burns & M Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution 3 ed (2006) 273. 
61 C Plasket The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 
Democratic South Africa Doctor of Philosophy thesis Rhodes University (2002) 41. 
62 2000 JOL 6158 (CC) para 37-38. 
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common law, including the supremacy of Parliament and the rule of law. The latter had a 
substantive as well as a procedural content that gave rise to what courts referred to as 
fundamental rights, but because of the countervailing constitutional principle of the supremacy 
of Parliament, the fundamental rights could be, and frequently were, eroded or excluded by 
legislation.” 
 
Another justification for review, also associated with parliamentary sovereignty and English law, 
the ultra vires doctrine, authorised court interference on the basis that the legislature conferred 
powers on decision-makers subject to statutory boundaries for the exercise of the powers. It was 
reasoned that it was the function of the court to see to it that the intention of the legislature was 
carried out and that decision-makers remained within the boundaries of the powers conferred 
upon them.63 Unfortunately the courts were often inclined to adopt a narrow view of ultra vires, 
similar to that of English law, by equating it with compliance with the requirements of the 
enabling statute only.64 As a result, other common law requirements, such as the requirement that 
administrative action must be clear and understandable and not vague and embarrassing, did not 
serve to invalidate the administrative act.65 
 
In the pre-democratic era, a review application therefore involved a challenge of the validity of 
administrative acts by relying on one or more of the recognised common law grounds of review. 
To the extent that it is not apparent from the discussion above, the grounds of review were not 
encapsulated in any one statutory framework but were developed by the courts having regard to 
the rule of judicial precedent.  
 
In Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd,66 Corbett CJ explained that the 
grounds of review were established when proof was presented of the administrator’s failure to 
apply his or her mind to the relevant issues in accordance with the behests of the statute and the 
tenets of natural justice. According to the Court, such a failure could be proved, amongst others, 
by evidence that: 1) the decision was arrived at arbitrarily, capriciously, mala fide, as a result of 
                                                 
63 Hoexter Administrative Law 111. I.e. only exercised powers for an authorised purpose. 
64 Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” in LAWSA 1 para 95. See M Elliott The Constitutional Foundations of 
Judicial Review (2001) 3. 
65 Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” in LAWSA 1 para 95. 
66 1988 3 SA 132 (A) 152C-D.  
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unwarranted adherence to a fixed principle or to further an ulterior or improper purpose; 2) the 
administrator misconceived the nature of the discretion conferred upon him or her and took into 
account irrelevant considerations or ignored relevant considerations; or 3) the decision was so 
grossly unreasonable as to warrant the inference that the administrator had failed to apply his or 
her mind to the matter in the proper manner.67 
 
In terms of the traditional common law approach, unreasonableness was thus not recognised as an 
independent ground of review but its presence signalled mala fides, ulterior motive or the failure 
of an administrator to apply his or her mind to the matter concerned.68 As a result, it was not so 
much the unreasonable effect of the administrative action on the individual that was considered 
as opposed to the unreasonable disposition of the administrator.69 This approach was influenced 
by the English decision of Wednesbury Corporation.70 In that case it was contended that a 
condition - introduced in terms of a discretionary, statutory power – was ultra vires on the ground 
that it was unreasonable. The Court stated that it was entitled to interfere if a decision was “so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”; thereby introducing the 
requirement of gross unreasonableness.71  
 
Despite the courts’ recognition of grounds of review, as indicated above, the system of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the courts’ strict interpretation of ultra vires and unreasonableness 
contributed to the general perception that the ambit of review was too narrowly confined. In 
particular, individual protection was considered inadequate to the extent that Parliament was able 
to curtail judicial scrutiny by providing for open-ended or wide statutory powers for 
administrative acts or alternatively ousting the court’s jurisdiction by legislative enactments.72  
 
                                                 
67 See also Hira and another v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) 93B-C. 
68 See J Taitz “But ‘Twas a Famous Victory” 1978 Acta Juridica 109 111. See also The Administrator, Transvaal 
and the Firs Investment (Pty) v Johannesburg City Council 1971 1 SA 56 (A); Johannesburg City Council v The 
Administrator, Transvaal and Mayofis 1971 1 SA 87 (A); National Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor 
Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 3 SA 726 (A); Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board and others v David 
Morton Transport (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 887 (A).   
69 See Northwest Township (Pty) Ltd v The Administrator, Transvaal 1975 4 SA 1 (T). 
70 1948 1 KB 223. See C P Nchabeleng Unreasonableness as a ground for judicial review in the South African 
administrative law Master thesis University of Limpopo (2007) 6. 
71 This judgment will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
72 See Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” in LAWSA 1 para 95. See Van der Westhuizen NO v United 
Democratic Front 1989 (2) SA 242 (A) and Staatspresident v United Democratic Front 1988 (4) SA 830 (A). 
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2 2 1 2 Judicial control under the constitutional dispensation 
 
The advent of the constitutional dispensation altered the nature, ambit and basis of judicial 
review. This was most notably recognised with the express rejection of parliamentary sovereignty 
and the inclusion of the rule of law as one of the founding values of the constitutional regime 
together with that of democratic governance aimed at ensuring accountability, responsiveness and 
openness. Rights that flow from and are a demonstration of the aforementioned values include 
provisions that: 1) the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights; and 2) the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.73 In addition thereto, courts are expressly empowered to review 
legislation and conduct inconsistent with the 1996 Constitution in order to control the exercise of 
public power. Within the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights, there is a right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair; a right to written reasons for 
administrative decisions; a right of access to information as well as a right of access to court.74   
 
Opposed to the common law dispensation, the inherent rationale for judicial review in the 
constitutional dispensation is therefore no longer in question. The power to judicially review 
administrative action is found within the values of constitutional supremacy and the doctrine of 
legality as an aspect of the rule of law; which is given specific form in the fundamental right to 
just administrative action.75 Whilst the doctrine of constitutional supremacy recognises that the 
exercise of legislative authority is subject to the prescripts of the 1996 Constitution, the doctrine 
of legality dictates that no power can be legitimately exercised if not conferred by law.76 
Arbitrariness in the exercise of public power is considered inconsistent with the doctrine of 
legality and, to pass constitutional scrutiny, the exercise of public power must be rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was given.77  
 
                                                 
73 Section 7(2) and (8) of the 1996 Constitution. 
74 Section 32, 33 and 34 of the 1996 Constitution. 
75 See in this regard Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and another In Re: Ex Parte Application of 
the President of the RSA 2000 JOL 6158 (CC) para 20. See also section 44(4) of the 1996 Constitution which 
requires that the legislature act in accordance with, and within the limits of, the 1996 Constitution. 
76 See Competition Commission of SA v Telkom SA Ltd 2010 2 All SA 433 (SCA). 
77 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and another In Re: Ex Parte Application of the President of the   
   RSA 2000 JOL 6158 (CC) para 85. 
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Thus, although Parliament is recognised as the highest legislative body in the constitutional 
supremacy system, it is no longer the highest organ of state which determines the existence of 
individual rights and the extent to which they may be curtailed.78 As the custodians of the 
fundamental rights entrenched in the 1996 Constitution,79 the courts’ role have also extended 
beyond that recognised under the common law dispensation to include giving content and 
meaning to the values and principles contained in the 1996 Constitution and to ensuring that the 
exercise of powers are authorised and comply with established law.  
 
The courts are presently able to intervene in administrative matters mainly as a result of the right 
to administrative justice entrenched in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. This section 
establishes reasonableness as one of the requirements for just administrative action and an 
independent basis for review.80 There is no express indication from the language of the 1996 
Constitution that the drafters contemplated gross unreasonableness as opposed to 
unreasonableness only.81 Although there is case law support for the continued recognition of so-
called gross unreasonableness,82 judgments like that of Roman v Williams NO83 and Standard 
Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds84 make it clear that gross unreasonableness is no longer 
required for judicial review. On this basis, the principle of no reasonable evidence may be used as 
a test for resolving questions of fact.85 This section as well as section 6(2) of PAJA will be 
discussed in more detail at a later stage with reference to the different forms of judicial review.86 
A discussion of the continued role, if any, of the common law jurisprudence, including the 
English law influences, under the constitutional dispensation follows below. 
 
 
                                                 
78 Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” LAWSA 1 para 75. 
79 Motala v University of Natal 1995 3 BCLR 374 (D) 382; Hugo v President of the RSA 1996 6 BCLR 876 (D). 
80 See Roman v Williams NO 1997 4 All SA 210 (C) 222. The Court recognised that the court in judicial review was 
no longer confined to the way in which an administrative decision was reached but extended to its substance and 
merits as well. 
81 Albeit with reference to the 1993 Constitution, see comment in Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Limited v 
Reynolds 1995 3 SA 74 (B). 
82 See Nel v Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige Raad 1996 4 SA 1120 (T) 1130G-H; Marais v Interim Nasionale 
Mediese en Tandheelkundige Raad van Suid-Afrika 1997 4 ALL SA 260 (O) 265G-H.  
83 Roman v Williams NO 1997 4 All SA 210 (C) 222. 
84 1995 (3) BCLR 305 (B) 325. 
85 See Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds NO 1995 3 BCLR 305 (B). 
86 See para 2 4 4 1. 
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2 2 2 Common law or constitutional review 
 
As indicated above, the courts’ ability to scrutinise and set aside administrative decisions or rules 
in the pre-democratic era was based on the invocation of its inherent power of judicial review as 
provided for in terms of the common law.87 Parties dissatisfied with administrative action 
challenged administrative decisions on the basis of grounds of review recognised at common law, 
such as that decisions were arrived at arbitrarily, capriciously, mala fide or for an ulterior or 
improper motive or because the decision-maker had not applied his or her mind to the matter or 
had misconceived the nature of the discretion conferred upon him and taken into account 
irrelevant considerations or ignored relevant ones.88 With the introduction of the constitutional 
dispensation, and the constitutional right to just administrative action in particular, the question 
arose whether the common-law grounds of review had been rendered redundant or whether they 
could still be relied upon. Initially, this was a matter of controversy. In Commissioner for 
Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner for Customs and Excise v 
Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight,89 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the entrenched right 
to administrative justice, as contained in section 24 of the 1993 Constitution, could not have been 
intended to do away with the common law approach to review and that administrative review in 
its common law guise continued to exist alongside the constitutional regime, enabling the court to 
set aside the administrative act concerned without reference to section 24. However, in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association,90 the Constitutional Court reached a conclusion 
opposite to that of the Supreme Court of Appeal. According to Chaskalson P, the common law 
principles that had previously provided the grounds for judicial review of public power have been 
subsumed under the 1996 Constitution. The Court reasoned that this development had the effect 
that common law review and constitutional review were intertwined and did not constitute 
separate concepts.91  
                                                 
87 Burns & Beukes Administrative Law 280; Hoexter Administrative Law 109; see also Johannesburg Consolidated   
    Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111 115. 
88 Burns & Beukes Administrative Law 59. See also Northwest Township (Pty) Ltd v The Administrator, Transvaal 
1975 4 SA 1 (T); Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd 1988 2 All SA 308 (A).  
89 1999 8 BCLR 833 (SCA). 
90 2000 JOL 6158 (CC) para 33 - 45. 
91 See The President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 JOL 5301 (CC) 
para 135-136. According to the Court, the right to just administrative action is entrenched in the 1996 Constitution 
in recognition of the importance of the common law governing administrative review, but it is not correct to view 
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In Bato Star Fishing,92 O’Regan J referred to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and 
confirmed that the grundnorm of administrative law was now to be found in the principles of the 
1996 Constitution. According to the Constitutional Court, the common law only informed the 
provisions of PAJA and the 1996 Constitution and derived its force from the latter.93 The Court 
reasoned that the continued relevancy of the common law to administrative review would have to 
be developed on a case-by-case basis as the courts interpreted and applied the provisions of PAJA 
and the 1996 Constitution. The Court concluded that there was not a system of common law 
review which existed independently of constitutional judicial review, but a single system of 
judicial review which gained its force from the 1996 Constitution. Concepts such as “lawful 
administrative action,” “procedurally fair administrative action” and administrative action 
“justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it,” therefore have the same meaning under the 
1996 Constitution and the common law. 
 
As a consequence of this jurisprudence, the inherent common law review power of the court has 
been replaced by a constitutional right to review based on section 33 – the right to just 
administrative action. Effectively, challenges to the validity of administrative action must 
therefore involve the application of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution as given effect to by 
PAJA and not the former common law grounds of review.94 The common law principles retain 
relevance for the purpose of determining the meaning and scope of section 33 of the 1996 
Constitution and supplement the provisions of the 1996 Constitution.95 As such, courts are not 
confined to the common law principles for administrative legality as developed by the courts but 
are entitled to develop and accommodate new principles to meet situations not previously dealt 
with under the common law.96 To the extent that it is not incompatible with the 1996 
Constitution, the common law jurisprudence, and hence also the English law, remain relevant and 
still find application as an interpretative and supplementary resource for the purpose of informing 
the content, ambit and application of administrative law. 
                                                                                                                                                              
section 33 as a mere codification of common-law principles. Principles previously established by the common law 
will be important though not necessarily decisive, in determining the scope and content of section 33. 
92 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
93 Para 22. 
94 See Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 644. See also para 2 4 4 1. 
95 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the RSA 2000 
JOL 6158 (CC) para 49. 
96 Burns & Wiechers “Administrative Law” LAWSA 1 para 94. 
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2 3 DEFINITION AND FUNCTION OF REVIEW DISTINGUISHED FROM APPEAL 
 
Whilst appeals and reviews are both ways of reconsidering a decision and the reason for seeking 
the one or the other are usually the same – dissatisfaction with the result - the two processes 
perform different functions.97 There are therefore certain generic characteristics attributable to 
appeals and reviews that, although they do not necessarily apply to all types of reviews and 
appeals, nevertheless can assist in understanding the courts’ retention of the two concepts’ 
distinctiveness.  
 
In England, judicial review traditionally enabled the courts, whilst recognising the supremacy of 
Parliament, to place constraints upon the exercise of public power as part of its common law 
jurisdiction.98 Put differently, judicial review was recognised as a remedy of last resort99 to 
challenge the legality of decisions as opposed to the merits thereof.100 In exercising a supervisory 
jurisdiction, the review court therefore focused on the way the decision was made, rather than 
made the decision itself.101 Today, the primary difference between appeal and review - within the 
context of English administrative law - is explained as follows by Wade and Forsyth:102 
 
 “The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals. When hearing 
an appeal the court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. When subjecting 
some administrative act or order to judicial review, the court is concerned with its legality: is it 
within the limits of the powers granted? On an appeal the question is ‘right or wrong?’ On 
review the question is ‘lawful or unlawful?’” 
 
That the same principle applies in South African law is made apparent in the decision of Lekota v  
                                                 
97 Hoexter Administrative Law 104. 
98 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the RSA 2000 JOL 
6158 (CC) para 38. 
99 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Preston 1985 AC 835 852. 
100 Kemper Reinsurance Company v Minister of Finance 2001 1 AC 1 14-15. 
101 R v Secretary of State for Home Department 1997 1 WLR 839 847. The same principle applies in South Africa; 
see Lekota v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1998 10 BLLR 1021 (LC) and Coetzee v Lebea NO 1998 JOL 3657 
(LAC). See also A A Landman “The New Labour Court of South Africa” (1998) Consultus 29 found at 
http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/1998/may/1998-may-vol011-no1-pp29-30.pdf on 11 December 2012 at 
19h46. 
102 H W R Wade & C F Forsyth Administrative Law 10 ed (2009) 28-29. 
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First National Bank of SA Ltd.103 In that case, the Labour Court explained that it was not the 
function of the review court in a labour law dispute to decide whether the commissioner acted 
correctly or whether the decision by the commissioner was wrong.104 This was confirmed by the 
Labour Appeal Court in Coetzee v Lebea NO.105 In this case, the Court recognised that an appeal 
and review may on occasion be co-extensive, particularly if it was the process of reasoning that 
was the subject of the review, but held that this should not constitute a basis for blurring the 
essential differences between the two processes. According to the Court, the constitutional 
entrenchment of the right to administrative justice did not mandate a destruction of the common 
law distinction between appeal and review. The Court reasoned that a review was concerned with 
the manner in which the tribunal came to its conclusion and an appeal with the correctness of the 
result and different tests accordingly applied: on review the question was whether the outcome 
could be sustained by the facts found and the law applied with the emphasis being on a range of 
reasonable outcomes; on appeal, the question was whether another court could have come to a 
different conclusion.106  
 
Appeals are therefore appropriate where it is alleged that the decision-maker came to the wrong 
conclusion on the facts or the law. As the challenge concerns the merits of the matter, the 
appellate body is entitled to declare the original decision right or wrong.107 In contrast, reviews 
are not concerned with the merits of the decision, but whether the decision was reached in the 
appropriate manner.108 Accordingly, instead of asking whether the decision on the facts or the 
law was correctly found or interpreted, a review court will concern itself with issues such as the 
impartiality of the decision-maker or the admissibility of evidence that was taken into account; 
the focus being on procedural propriety.109 Significantly, a decision may not be set aside on 
review simply because the court is confident that it would have come to a different conclusion.  
 
                                                 
103 1998 10 BLLR 1021 (LC). 
104 Para 16. 
105 1998 JOL 3657 (LAC). 
106 Para 10. The Court reasoned that the process of reasoning could not be attacked purely on the basis that a review 
court may have come to a different result if the matter had been brought on appeal. 
107 See Burns & Beukes Administrative Law 279. 
108 Hoexter Administrative law 104. 
109 See M H Cheadle, D M Davis & N R L Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 27-
16. 
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In addition to the principal difference mentioned above, other generic characteristics can be 
ascribed to the two proceedings respectively.110 Firstly, the right of appeal exists only where it is 
specifically provided for by statute. The scope of the right of appeal is dependent on the statutory 
provision and may include matters of fact or law or both.111 Secondly, appeals generally involve a 
rehearing of the merits as contained in the evidence and information before the court a quo. In 
this sense, appeal hearings constitute hearings de novo. Reviews on the other hand, involve only a 
limited examination of the merits and the grounds of review are generally restricted to alleged 
procedural irregularities. Thirdly, unlike an appeal, review proceedings do not necessarily 
automatically suspend the operation of the decision of an inferior court or tribunal until such time 
as the review is finalised. Fourthly, the remedies which may be granted by a review court are 
somewhat dissimilar to those which may be granted by an appellate court. A court tasked with 
determining an appeal may overturn the original decision and declare its own decision to be the 
decision of the court or tribunal of first instance.112 On review, the courts’ powers are more 
limited. Whilst a review court may set aside the original decision, it will generally not substitute 
its own decision for that of the court or tribunal of first instance. Instead, review courts are 
obliged, unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, to refer the matter back to the court 
a quo for a hearing de novo, upon such directions as it deems fit.113 Lastly, time frames and locus 
standi to bring the application may differ from the one process to the other. 
 
Despite these theoretical differences detailed above, the terms “appeal” and “review” continue to 
be somewhat difficult to define. In practice, the focus of judicial review frequently falls on the 
decision itself as opposed to the decision-making process.114 In some matters it is impossible to 
separate the merits from the rest of the matter, since the court cannot effectively judge the legality 
                                                 
110 See Fergus (2010) ILJ 1558. 
111 L G Baxter “Administrative Institutions and the Administrative Process” (1984) Annual Survey of SA Law 32 33;  
     Hoexter Administrative Law 64. 
112 See section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The appellate court has the power to increase any sentence 
imposed upon the appellant or to impose any other form of sentence in lieu of or in addition to such sentence. 
113 See for example section 8(1)(c)(ii) of PAJA. The court may substitute its own decision for that of the 
administrative decision-maker who is vested with a discretion, in exceptional circumstances only. See also 
Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Tvl 1969 2 SA 72 (T) 76. The court’s mandamus will usually extend 
only to directing the administrative decision-maker to comply with its duty of deciding the matter properly, but a 
court will depart from this general rule and substitute its opinion for that of the administrative decision-maker 
where the end result is a foregone conclusion and it would be a waste of time to order him or her to reconsider the 
matter. 
114 Hoexter Administrative Law 106. 
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of the decision without considering its merits as well.115 In attempting to clarify the boundaries 
between the two concepts, the courts have thus sought to categorise the different types of reviews 
and/or appeals which arise in practice. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
2 4 FORMS OF REVIEW 
 
In the South African legal system, various categories of review can be identified. In the 
authoritative and often quoted decision on the meaning of “review”, Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council,116 Innes CJ identified three distinct meanings 
according to the procedure applicable.117 This ranged from a narrow to a broad sense of review. 
Firstly, a “review” was found to denote the process by which the proceedings of inferior courts 
were brought before the court in respect of irregularities or illegalities during the course of the 
proceedings.118 At the time Johannesburg Consolidated Investment was decided, litigants were 
limited to instituting review proceedings by way of summons on the grounds provided for in the 
Administration of Justice Proclamation. The grounds could be summarised as incompetency of 
the court in respect of the cause or in respect of the judge; malice or corruption on the part of the 
judge; gross irregularity in the proceedings; the admission of illegal or incompetent evidence 
and/or the rejection of legal and competent evidence. 
 
The second type of review identified concerned those instances where a public body failed to 
perform or wrongly performed a statutory duty, leading to a grievance or injury on the part of a 
third party.119 Reviews of this nature were not established by legislative intent but could be 
brought before a superior court by way of motion on the basis of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction 
to hear disputes within their territories.  
 
The third species of review arose only where it was statutorily created.120 Innes CJ suggested that 
wider powers of supervision and a greater degree of authority could be conferred upon the courts 
                                                 
115 Hoexter Administrative Law 106. 
116 1903 TS 111. 
117 See also Stocks Civil Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Rip NO 2002 3 BLLR 189 (LAC) para 27. 
118 114. Hereafter referred to as the review of the proceedings of inferior courts.  
119 115. 
120 116. 
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in this category than those enjoyed under either the first or second type of review; interpreting 
“review” to mean “examine” or “take into consideration”. Innis CJ reasoned that if a court was 
not restricted from examining or considering a matter already dealt with by an inferior court, it 
could enter upon and decide a matter de novo. When used in this sense, and to the extent to which 
the expressed intentions of the legislature supported such a conclusion, the Court concluded that 
the powers of a review court could extend to those generally attributed to appellate courts.121  
 
Hoexter subsequently paraphrased the three types of review identified in Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment as incorporating the review of the proceedings of inferior courts, the 
common law review of decisions of administrative authorities and a wider form of statutory 
review.122 Hoexter also opined that, although the abovementioned three types of review 
continued to play a role in post-constitutional South Africa, it only did so in a qualified form. 
Developments, in the form of the passing of new legislation and the promulgation of the 1996 
Constitution, have had significant impact on the continued relevance of the reviews identified in 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment and the initial forms of review have been expanded to 
also incorporate automatic review and judicial review in the constitutional and administrative law 
sense.123 The types of review are briefly referred to herein in order to identify under which type 
the review of CCMA arbitration awards are to be classified. 
 
2 4 1 Review of the proceedings of inferior courts 
 
Review of the proceedings of inferior courts resembles the first type of review identified in 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment, subject to the qualification that its grounds are currently 
prescribed by the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. Section 24(1) of the relevant Act enables the 
High Court, as a court of higher instance, to review the proceedings of the court a quo, such as 
the Magistrates’ Court and Small Claims Court, on the following grounds: 
 
 Absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court; 
 Interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on the part of the presiding judicial officer, 
                                                 
121 117. 
122 Hoexter Administrative Law 108. 
123 Hoexter Administrative Law 108. 
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 Gross irregularity in the proceedings; and / or 
 The admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the rejection of admissible or 
competent evidence.  
 
2 4 2 Automatic review 
 
Automatic review occurs only in specialised instances and in accordance with the tenets of a 
statute.124 This form of review obliges a superior court to automatically review the decision of a 
stipulated judicial officer. The process is accordingly initiated by a superior court rather than by a 
party aggrieved by an inferior court decision. Section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 is an example of an automatic review. In terms of section 302, certain sentences of the 
Magistrates’ Courts must be reviewed by the provincial or local division of the High Courts “in 
the ordinary course of events”, without it being necessary for the accused to request it. 
 
2 4 3 Judicial review in the constitutional sense 
 
In terms of section 172(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution, the courts are empowered to scrutinise law 
and conduct to establish whether it is consistent with its provisions and to declare it invalid to the 
extent of the inconsistency. As a result of the recognition of the right to just administrative action 
in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution, reviews within the administrative law sphere are largely 
regarded as a species of constitutional review.125 
 
2 4 4 Judicial review in the administrative law sense 
  
Judicial review in the administrative law sense is reminiscent of the second species of review 
identified in Johannesburg Consolidated Investment. As indicated above, in the pre-democratic 
era this was an inherent power of the court governed by the common law and there was no 
statutory basis or defined ambit. Under the present-day constitutional era, judicial review of this 
                                                 
124 See Fergus (2010) ILJ 1563. 
125 See para 2 3 4 2 below. 
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nature however arises indirectly from section 33 of the 1996 Constitution and, as will be 
explained below, directly from the provisions of PAJA.  
 
2 4 4 1 Review in terms of PAJA 
 
Section 33(3)(a) of the 1996 Constitution specifically provides that national legislation must be 
enacted to give effect to the right to just administrative action and that it must provide for the 
review of administrative action by a court or independent and impartial tribunal. From the 
preamble of PAJA it can be deduced that PAJA is envisaged to be the “national legislation” 
referred to in section 33(3) of the 1996 Constitution and accordingly the primary or default 
pathway to the review of administrative action. That challenges to the validity of administrative 
action must be based on the statutory grounds of judicial review laid down in section 6(2) of 
PAJA, and not directly on section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution,126 was confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing:127 
 
“The cause of action for the judicial review of administrative action now ordinarily arises from 
PAJA, not from the common law as in the past. And the authority of PAJA to ground such 
causes of action rests squarely on the Constitution.” 
 
So construed, the constitutional right to just administrative action will mostly play an indirect 
role in judicial review, whilst direct constitutional review will be limited to instances not covered 
by PAJA or when PAJA, as ordinary legislation, is challenged on the basis that it limits the rights  
in section 33(1) unjustifiably.128  
 
In setting out the grounds upon which administrative action may be reviewed, PAJA seeks to 
ensure that everyone has the right to challenge administrative action that is not lawful, reasonable 
or procedurally fair. In this endeavour, PAJA does not capture a closed list of grounds, but allows 
review courts, in the absence of one of the specified grounds of review, to review administrative 
                                                 
126 See also PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture & others 2004 8 BLLR 822 (LC) para 9. 
127 Para 25. 
128 This is an important consideration when discussing the review of arbitration awards in terms of the LRA and 
when establishing the role of unreasonableness in section 145 of the LRA.   
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action if it is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.129 The list of grounds does, however, 
include administrative action that is materially influenced by an error of law; indicating that a 
distinction is no longer to be drawn between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law.130  
 
To avoid a usurpation of the powers of the administration, review courts are in principle not 
allowed to pronounce on the merits of administrative decisions.131 Whilst the issue of deference 
is not particularly troublesome within the context of lawful and procedurally fair administrative 
action, an examination as to the reasonableness of an administrative decision does contain a 
merits-based substantive element. This challenges the ambit of judicial review as distinguished 
from appeal. Although PAJA expressly recognises unreasonableness as a ground of review, it 
does not give clear guidance as to the appropriate level of engagement with the merits of 
administrative decisions or how the ground is to be applied in review proceedings.132 Section 
6(2)(h) of PAJA dictates that a decision will be reviewable if it is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable person could have come to the same decision. The formulation of unreasonableness 
suggests a very stringent standard of unreasonableness review in terms of which very few 
decisions would be identified as unreasonable. On the other hand, a simpler standard of 
unreasonableness might apply which requires decisions that are justifiable, defensible or capable 
of reasonable explanation only.133 As a further alternative, unreasonableness might extend to 
review courts the power of preferring their own substantive conclusions to those of 
administrative decision-makers.134 This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
2 4 5 Special statutory review 
 
Special statutory review refers to the entitlement of the courts to review the decisions of inferior 
courts because of an express empowerment in terms of legislation. According to Hoexter, the 
special statutory power of review is to be distinguished from the “ordinary” judicial review as 
                                                 
129 Section 6(2)(i) of PAJA. 
130 Section 6(2)(d) of PAJA. 
131 R Stacey “Democratising review: Justifiability as the animating vision of administrative law” (2007) 22(1) SA 
Public Law 79 80; See Bato Star Fishing para 45. 
132 Stacey (2007) SA Public Law 80. 
133 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC); Roman v William NO 1997 4 All SA 210 (C). 
134 Stacey (2007) SA Public Law 80.  
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governed by PAJA.135 Whereas the latter Act specifies its own grounds of review, the power to 
review and the extent thereof in terms of a special statutory review may be wider or narrower 
than PAJA and the procedure to be adopted and the remedies available may also be different.136 
This depends on the dictates of the statute in question as well as the intention of the legislature. 
 
Within the labour law context, the legislature, in an attempt to give effect to the constitutional 
obligations contained in section 27 of the 1993 Constitution,137 adopted section 145 of the LRA. 
Section 145 has been held to afford a special statutory power of review to the Labour Court to 
review compulsory arbitration awards. This classification has however subsequently become 
qualified in so far as the review grounds specified by the legislature within this statutory regime 
has been found to be suffused with the content of the rights to administrative justice provided for 
in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution.138 Section 145 of the LRA will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. A discussion of the different forms of appeal follows below. 
  
2 5 FORMS OF APPEAL 
 
The concept of “appeal” also has different connotations that depend on the powers conferred in 
terms of statute.139 In the leading case of Tikly & others v Johannes NO,140 Trollip J identified an 
appeal as falling into one of three possible categories: an appeal “in the wide sense”; an appeal 
“in the ordinary strict sense” and a review.141 According to the Labour Appeal Court, an appeal in 
the wide sense involved a complete rehearing and redetermination on the merits of the case with 
or without additional evidence or information.142 On the other hand, an appeal in the ordinary 
strict sense required the appellate body to rehear the merits of the matter and determine whether 
the decision was right or wrong having regard only to the record of the body a quo. Interestingly, 
the Court included a review in its categorisation of the different categories of appeal. According 
                                                 
135 Hoexter Administrative Law 109. 
136 C Hoexter “Clearing the Intersection? Administrative Law and Labour Law in the Constitutional Court” (2008) 1 
Constitutional Court Review 209 214. 
137 Section 23 of the 1996 Constitution. 
138 C Hoexter Constitutional Court Review 215. See chapter 5 and 6. 
139 See Fergus (2010) ILJ 1564. See also Tikly v Johannes NO 1963 (2) SA 588 (T); the scope of the appeal must, in 
each instance, be determined from the terms of the statute in question. 
140 1963 (2) SA 588 (LAC) 590. 
141 590F-591A. 
142 I.e. the appellate body is not confined to the record of the body a quo. 
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to the Court, a review amounted to a limited rehearing with or without additional evidence or 
information to determine, not whether the decision in question was correct or not, but whether the 
decision-maker had exercised their powers and discretion honestly and properly. 
 
In Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule,143 the Labour Appeal Court referred with 
approval to the categories of appeal recognised in Tikly to determine the nature and extent of the 
powers to hear appeals. This arose against the backdrop of a six month retrospective 
reinstatement ordered by the erstwhile Industrial Court as a result of the commission of an unfair 
labour practice by the employer in terms of the LRA. Having examined the applicable rules for 
appeals from the Industrial Court to the Labour Appeal Court, Nicholson JA noted that appellants 
were obliged to file notices of appeal, records of proceedings and heads of argument as well as 
clearly stipulate the grounds upon which the appeal was based. To the extent that the Court was 
further only afforded a limited right to hear appeals proceedings as a court of first instance, 
Nicholson JA concluded that the Court was limited to the evidence before the Court a quo and 
the law which applied to the Court a quo to determine whether the decision was correct.144  
 
Having regard to the categories of appeal and review that have been formulated by the courts, it 
is submitted that the terms do not always appear clearly distinguishable. This is no better 
illustrated than by Fergus’ contention that the Labour Appeal Court’s description of appeals “in 
the wide sense” echoes the description of the third species of review furnished in Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment. Both concepts confer almost unlimited powers on the review - or 
appellate court, entitling it to scrutinise the merits of the matter in question on the basis of both 
the record of the tribunal - or inferior court proceedings as well as with reference to any new 
evidence which might be advanced.145 According to Fergus, the overlap as well as Nicholson 
JA’s categorisation of the concept of review within the three types of appeal, suggest that the 
terms “appeal” and “review” cannot on its own ascertain the nature and extent of the courts’ 
powers of review or appeal.146 It is accordingly not sufficient to label the Labour Court’s power 
to scrutinise arbitration awards as a species of special statutory review. To ascertain the nature 
                                                 
143 2001 JOL 7890 (LAC) para 16. 
144 Para 20. 
145 Fergus (2010) ILJ 1566. 
146 Fergus (2010) ILJ 1566. 
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and extent of the review powers, reference should also be made to the context within which the 
decision under review has been made and the review powers have been granted to the Labour 
Court as well as the nature of the rights affected by the decision forming the subject-matter of the 
review. The so-called contextual considerations may include the source of the Labour Court’s 
powers to conduct the review; the provisions of the deriving legislation; the legislature’s 
intention when promulgating the legislation as well as relevant constitutional considerations. This 
will be discussed in more detail below, having regard also to the reasons for the distinction 
between appeal and review within the context of labour dispute resolution specifically.  
 
2 6 SPECIAL STATUTORY REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LRA 
 
In formulating the supervisory relationship between the Labour Court and the CCMA, the 
legislature chose to adopt a procedure already utilised in the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 
(“Arbitration Act”). The result was section 145 of the LRA. This section provides that CCMA 
awards, generally considered final and binding,147 can only be reviewed by the Labour Court on 
the basis of an alleged defect therewith. In defining this term, the legislature was also guided by 
the grounds of review recognised by the Arbitration Act in section 33(1).148 Consequently the 
review provisions of the LRA coincide with those in the Arbitration Act. According to section 
145(2) of the LRA, a defect means: 
 
“(a) that the commissioner- 
(i) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as an 
arbitrator; 
(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings; or 
(iii) exceeded the commissioner’s powers; or 
(b) that an award has been improperly obtained.” 
 
                                                 
147 Section 143(1) of the LRA. 
148 Section 33(1) of the Arbitration Act provides that where (a) any member of an arbitration tribunal has 
misconducted himself in relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or (b) an arbitration tribunal has committed 
any gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded its powers; or (c) an award 
has been improperly obtained, the court may, on the application of any party to the reference after due notice to 
the other party or parties, make an order setting the award aside. 
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The LRA, apart from listing the grounds of review, does not set out the test that the Labour Court 
must use in the review process. A study of case law however reveals that the Labour Court has 
been guided in its interpretation of section 145 of the LRA by the interpretations placed on the 
mirroring provisions of section 33 of the Arbitration Act. This is important because the latter 
section has been strictly interpreted by the judiciary to be limited to only the most flagrant 
miscarriages of justice.149 It may well be argued that, by replicating section 33 in section 145, the 
legislature intended the Labour Court to adopt the same strict approach when it came to 
reviewing CCMA arbitration awards. On the other hand, in Amalgamated Clothing & Textile 
Workers Union of SA v Veldspun,150 the Labour Court confirmed that the courts exercised greater 
judicial restraint in reviewing private arbitration decisions because the parties involved have 
agreed to the process for the benefit of among others speed and finality. It is generally accepted 
that the same principle may not necessarily apply to CCMA arbitrations because its processes are 
not characterised as being consensual by nature.151 Section 145(2) of the LRA is also considered 
to contain "wider" grounds of review than those provided for in section 33(1) of the Arbitration 
Act in so far as unreasonableness is inapplicable to private arbitration awards, but has been found 
to subsume the section 145(2) grounds of review.152 This question will be explored in more detail 
below with reference to the different statutory grounds of review recognised by the LRA. 
 
2 6 1 Section 145 grounds of review 
 
2 6 1 1 Misconduct in relation to the duties of an arbitrator 
 
There have been relatively few judgments in which commissioners have been found to have  
                                                 
149 J Grogan “Defective decisions” (1998) 14(3) Employment Law 4. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v International Parking Management (Pty) Ltd, case number 10548/2010, found at http://us-
cdn.creamermedia.co.za /assets/articles/attachments/32081_city_5.pdf on 10 April 2012 at 16h46. See also 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of SA v Veldspun (Pty) Ltd 1994 1 SA 162 (A) 169B-C; 
Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 3 SA 266 (SCA) para 51. 
150 1994 1 ALL SA 453 (A) 455. 
151 See Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 88; Pather v 
Kotecha & others 2006 JOL 17164 (T); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and others 2000 JOL 6430 
(LC) para 64-67 and Reunert Industries (Pty) Ltd v Naicker & others 1997 12 BLLR 1632 (LC). 
152 See Lufuno Mphaphuli and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews & Another 2009 (6) BCLR 527 (CC) and Telcordia 
Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (2) ALL SA 243 (SCA). In the employment context, see Volkswagen SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Koorts NO & Others 2011 6 BLLR 561 (LAC) and NUM obo 35 employees v Grogan NO & another 
2010 8 BLLR 799 (LAC). 
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committed misconduct. One such case is Stocks Civil Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Rip NO & 
another.153 In dealing with the meaning of “misconduct” in the context of a private arbitration 
award review, Van Dijkhorst AJA reasoned that it was implied in a commissioner’s appointment 
that he or she: 1) was fully cognisant of the extent and/or limit to any discretion or powers he or 
she may have; 2) will act honestly; 3) duly consider all the evidence before him or her; and 4) 
have due regard to the applicable legal principles. According to the Labour Appeal Court, a 
failure to comply with the foregoing principles in relation to a commissioner’s duties constituted 
a material malfunctioning which would render the award reviewable on the ground of misconduct 
whereas a wrong result by itself would not.154  
 
In Group Six Security Services (Pty) Ltd & Andrew Masters v R Moletsane, CCMA & Dean 
Weller,155 Waglay JA also found that an arbitration award was reviewable on account of 
misconduct on the part of the commissioner due to a failure on the part of the commissioner to 
apply his mind to material aspects of the evidence properly before him and the issues of law.156         
 
An approach similar to that of the Labour Appeal Court and Labour Court in Stocks Civil 
Engineering and Group Six respectively was adopted in Carter v CCMA.157 The Labour Court 
was called upon to determine whether a commissioner had committed misconduct in failing to 
consider whether there was a conceivable non-racist meaning which could have been attributed to 
the applicant’s utterances of “lily white” and “monkey around”. In accepting that the 
commissioner had failed to apply her mind properly to the foregoing consideration, Lagrange AJ 
reasoned that this had prevented the commissioner from making a balanced evaluation of the 
applicant’s prospects of success in arbitration proceedings should condonation be granted. 
According to the Labour Court, the failure was of such a nature that the applicant was denied a 
fair hearing which constituted misconduct in the performance of her duties as a commissioner.158     
 
                                                 
153 2002 3 BLLR 189 (LAC). 
154 Para 52. 
155 Unreported Labour Appeal Court judgment JA77/05 (26 February 2009).  
156 Para 52.    
157 Carter v CCMA & others 2010 31 ILJ 2876 (LC).  
158 Para 37-38. There is a potential overlap between “misconduct” and “gross irregularity” as grounds of review in so 
far as a commissioner’s failure to apply his or her mind to material facts may constitute both misconduct and a 
gross irregularity.   
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That the terms of a commissioner’s award may also evidence “misconduct” on the part of the 
commissioner is evident from the decision in Lithotech Manufacturing v Cape, A division of 
Bidpaper Plus (Pty) Ltd v Statutory Council Printing, Newspaper & Packaging Industries.159 In 
that case, Basson J referenced Stocks Civil Engineering160 and reasoned that an award may be 
reviewable on the ground of misconduct where the reasoning adopted by a commissioner was so 
flawed that it could not be concluded that he properly acquitted himself as an arbitrator by taking 
due consideration of matters that were vital to the dispute. Similarly, in the matter of Mohlakoana 
v Commissioner, CCMA,161 Lagrange AJ found that the commissioner’s failure to provide 
reasons for only awarding the employee two months’ remuneration as compensation for a 
substantively and procedurally unfair dismissal amounted to misconduct in the performance of 
the commissioner’s duties. According to the Labour Court the reasons for an award needed to 
demonstrate that the commissioner exercised a proper judicial discretion in arriving at the order 
made and an obvious rationale in the findings for the relief granted. 
 
2 6 1 2 Gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings 
 
The courts have held in a number of decided cases that a gross irregularity concerns the conduct 
of the proceedings rather than the result thereof.162 In terms of this general principle, review 
proceedings therefore do not look at the ultimate outcome of the arbitration, but at the conduct of 
the commissioner who was presiding over the arbitration. Moreover, not every irregularity in the 
proceedings will constitute a ground for review: the irregularity must be material163 and of such a 
serious nature that it resulted in the aggrieved party not having his or her case fully and fairly 
determined.164 In general, examples include a commissioner: 1) not complying with the rules of 
                                                 
159 2010 6 BLLR 652 (LC) para 18.  
160 2002 3 BLLR 189 (LAC). 
161 2010 10 BLLR 1061 (LC) at para 17. 
162 See Ellis v Morgan; Ellis v Desai 1909 TS 576 581; Goldfields Investment Limited  v City Council Johannesburg 
1938 TPD 551; R v Zackey 1945 AD 505 509; Ventersdorp Town Council v President Industrial Court and 
Others 1992 13 ILJ 1465 (LAC) 1476 and Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as 
amicus curiae) 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA). 
163 See Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2010 5 BLLR 577 (LC) para 22. 
164 Goldfields Investment Limited v City Council Johannesburg 560. See also Bester v Easigas (Pty) Ltd and another 
1993 (1) SA 30 (C) where Brand AJ reviewed the authorities in relation to the meaning of the provisions of 
section 33(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act, which provides for the setting aside of an award where an arbitration 
tribunal “has committed any gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings”; Smith v CCMA 
2004 6 BLLR 585 (LC) para 7. 
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natural justice; 2) failing to enquire into an issue before the commission; 3) misconstruing the 
nature of the dispute; 4) undertaking the wrong enquiry in relation to an issue; 5) failing to 
consider the credibility and reliability of witnesses or the inherent probabilities of the parties’ 
competing versions and/or 6) ignoring or improperly rejecting materially relevant evidence.165 
 
The courts recognise two types of gross irregularities: patent irregularities which take place 
openly as part of the conduct of the trial166 and latent irregularities, which are not strictly 
speaking errors of a procedural nature,167 but which take place inside the mind of the 
commissioner and are only ascertainable from the reasons provided.168 The latter is evident where 
a commissioner for example determines an arbitration by taking into account a materially 
irrelevant factor, failing to take into account a material factor169 or failing to apply his or her 
mind to the issue before him or her.170 In none of these cases need there be intentional 
arbitrariness of conduct or any conscious denial of justice. The crucial question is whether the 
irregularity prevented a fair trial of the issues.171  
 
The qualification to the general principle referred to above was demonstrated in Fipaza v Eskom 
Holdings Ltd.172 The Labour Court found that the commissioner had committed an error of law in 
finding that the employee had been under a contractual obligation to disclose that she had 
previously been dismissed by the company in the context of applying for a new job with it. As 
                                                 
165 See A Myburgh “Reviewing the Review Test: Recent Judgments and Developments” 2011 ILJ 1497. See also 
Reunert Industries (Pty) Ltd v Naicker 1997 ILJ 1393 (LC) and Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others 2008 
JOL 22087 (LAC). 
166 Examples include bias; interference and a refusal to allow cross-examination or argument. See Crown Chickens 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others 2002 6 BLLR 493 (LAC) para 59. 
167 Mutual & Federal Unsurance Co Ltd v CCMA & others 1997 12 BLLR 1610 (LC). The question is whether the 
commissioner’s award reveals errors of law or fact which are of such a nature that it warrants the inference that 
the commissioner has not applied his or her mind to the matter in accordance with the behest of the stature.  
168 Goldfields Investment Ltd v City Council of Johannesburg 1938 TPD 551 560; Sidumo para 264. Examples 
include: failing to consider material facts or to properly resolve factual disputes; failing to enquire into an issue 
before the commission; misconstruing the nature of the dispute or undertaking the wrong enquiry in relation to an 
issue or errors of law. See also Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others 2002 6 BLLR 
493 (LAC) para 59 where the Court, with reference to Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others 2000 21 
ILJ 340 (LAC), described a latent irregularity as occurring where the reasoning is so flawed that one must 
conclude that there has not been a fair trial of the issues. 
169 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae) 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA) 
para 16. 
170 Abdull & another v Cloete NO & others 1998 3 BLLR 264 (LC). Commissioners are obliged to resolve apparent 
contradictions which are essential to their decision and reasons and to make findings thereon. The findings must 
be briefly reasoned. 
171 Para 53. 
172 2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC).  
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regards the question when an error of law would warrant the setting aside of an award on review, 
Lagrange AJ held that it was well established that an arbitrator’s decision may be set aside where 
a mistake of law was such that it resulted in the arbitrator misconceiving the nature of the enquiry 
and addressing the wrong issue; provided that the arbitrator’s decision will stand if the result 
would have been the same had the arbitrator adopted the correct approach.173 
 
Applying this test in the context of the matter, the Labour Court held that, had the commissioner 
applied the correct legal test for determining the obligation to disclose, the outcome would 
necessarily have been different. In the result, the court held that the commissioner’s failure to 
apply the correct legal test led him to deny the employee a fair hearing in respect of the 
determination of the substantive fairness of her dismissal, which amounted to a reviewable 
irregularity.174 Although Lagrange AJ did not state as much, it is apparent from the authorities on 
which he relied upon that he considered the error of law in question to have given rise to a gross 
irregularity.175  The decision was upheld on appeal.176 
 
2 6 1 3 The commissioner exceeded his or her powers 
 
This ground of review refers to the powers conferred by the LRA and includes the exercise of 
such discretionary powers as the law allows.177 In Reunert Industries t/a Reutech Defence 
Industries v Naicker,178 the Labour Court confirmed that a commissioner will exceed the powers 
of a commissioner if he or she strayed from the ambit of the commissioner’s jurisdiction or where 
he or she made a ruling or an award which went beyond the powers of the commissioner.179 A 
commissioner will, however, not exceed the commissioner’s jurisdiction or powers merely by 
                                                 
173 Para 56.  
174 Para 58-59.   
175 The Court relied (in fn 10) on the decision in Local Road Transportation Board & another v Durban City Council 
& another 1965 (1) SA 586 (A) at 597H-598C: “A mistake of law per se is not an irregularity but its 
consequences amount to a gross irregularity where a judicial officer, although perfectly well-intentioned and 
bona fide, does not direct his mind to the issue before him and so prevents the aggrieved party from having his 
case fully and fairly determined.”   
176 Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and others 2013 4 BLLR 327 (LAC). The Court found that the failure or omission 
to disclose the information in question did not, in the circumstances, amount to a misrepresentation and the 
commissioner’s contrary finding was based on a material mistake of law and constituted a gross irregularity. 
177 D Bosch, E Molahlehi & W Everett The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook (2004) 128. 
178 1997 8(6) SALLR 91 (LC).   
179 Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others 1997 12 BLLR 1632 (LC) 
1637.  
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choosing one remedy above another in a situation where a choice of remedies is given.180 
Examples include purporting to determine a dispute in the absence of jurisdiction to do so181 and 
committing a material error of law, including misconstruing the appropriate statute and/or failing 
to follow the legal principles laid down in authoritative case law.182 There may be some overlap 
between this ground of review and the one of gross irregularity to the extent that a commissioner 
may have exceeded his or her jurisdiction due to misconceiving the nature of the process that 
should be followed or misunderstanding the legal principles applicable to the case. 
 
2 6 1 4 The award was improperly obtained 
 
As in the Arbitration Act, this ground of review refers to impropriety by a party to the arbitration 
as opposed to “misconduct” or “gross irregularity” on the part of the commissioner. Nevertheless, 
it also relates to the manner in which the commissioner functioned. This was confirmed by the 
Labour Court in Stocks Civil Engineering v RIP NO.183 In that case, the Labour Court ruled that, 
where false evidence was adduced or a bribe was taken, the award was reviewable because it 
detrimentally affected the arbitrator’s judicial functioning.184 This ground of review may 
nevertheless overlap with the misconduct ground of review in instances where a party is alleged 
to have bribed a commissioner. 
 
2 6 2 The role of the merits in statutory arbitration award reviews 
 
Earlier in this chapter it was established that it is not characteristic of review proceedings that the 
merits of the matter be entertained, but that review courts are focussed on determining whether 
the manner in which the decision was reached was appropriate. Having regard to case law and the 
writings of legal authors, however, this statement cannot be accepted without some further 
qualification. According to Cheadle, Davis and Haysom, judges are often influenced by the 
                                                 
180 See National Entitlement Workers Union v John NO & another 1997 12 BLLR 1623 (LC). Reunert Industries 
(Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others 1997 12 BLLR 1632 (LC). 
181 See for example, Chabeli v CCMA & others 2010 4 BLLR 389 (LC) para 8-9; Transnet Ltd v CCMA 2001 6 
BLLR 684 (LC). 
182 Superstar Herbs v Director CCMA 1999 1 BLLR 58 (LC). 
183 2002 3 BLLR 189 (LAC). 
184 Para 51. 
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merits of a matter when deciding whether or not to exercise their power to review.185 Similarly, in 
Sidumo, Cameron JA explained that the line between appeal and review was notoriously difficult 
to draw partly because process-related scrutiny could not blind itself to the substantive merits of 
the outcome.186 The traditional merits/process distinction between appeal and review respectively 
may therefore not necessarily be sufficient to portray the courts’ roles in the different 
proceedings. 
 
Considering this critique with reference to review judgments delivered by the Labour Court, it is 
apparent that the distinction in the field of labour law is also not as clear. In particular, litigants 
often argue that an award is reviewable in so far as the commissioner’s finding was not rationally 
connected to the evidence or information before him or her or that the commissioner failed to 
apply his or her mind and consider the material evidence presented. Stocks Civil Engineering is 
but one example wherein the Labour Appeal Court has held, within the context of a private 
arbitration, that in certain respects errors of law and fact are reviewable.187 Recognised 
reviewable errors of law include the arbitrator asking the wrong question, applying the wrong 
test, basing his or her decision on matters not prescribed for making the decision and failing to 
apply his or her mind to the relevant issues in accordance with the behest of the statute 
applicable.188 In Masstores (Pty) Ltd t/a Builders Warehouse v CCMA,189 the Labour Court also 
found that an arbitrator’s award, stating that the applicant employee had opposed a postponement 
application, while there never was such an opposition, constituted an error of fact, rendering the 
award reviewable as a procedural irregularity.190 Similarly, in Health & Hygiene (Pty) Ltd v 
YAWA NO,191 the Labour Court declined to review and set aside an arbitration award on the basis 
of an error of fact, not on the basis that an error of fact did not constitute a ground of review, but 
because there was, in the court’s opinion, no fact that the arbitrator overlooked or matter that, had 
the arbitrator known about it, would have caused him to act differently.192  
 
                                                 
185 Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional Law 27-16. 
186 Para 31. 
187 Para 37. 
188 Hira and another v Booysen and another 1992 4 SA 69 (A); see also Gray Security Services (WC) Pty Ltd v 
Cloete NO 2000 JOL 5974 (LC). 
189 2006 6 BLLR 577 (LC). 
190 Para 43. 
191 2000 JOL 7042 (LC). 
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At first glance, it appears as if the abovementioned cases have extended the remedy of review 
beyond its initially perceived procedural boundaries to include some measure of merit scrutiny.193 
Hoexter acknowledges, within the context of administrative law review, that a scrutiny of the 
merits does threaten the distinction between appeal and review. Hoexter however also contends 
that, other than cases decided on the narrowest or most technical of grounds, it is quite impossible 
to judge whether a decision is within the limits of reason or defensible without looking closely at 
matters such as the information before the administrator, the weight given to various factors and 
the purpose sought to be achieved by the decision.194 Thus while absence of authority to take a 
decision would not ordinarily require a court to look at the merits, nor a breach of a clear legal 
obligation or the failure to observe a formal mandatory formality, it is difficult to determine 
whether sufficient weight was given to a relevant consideration or whether an ulterior motive was 
pursued by the decision-maker without also entering into the merits of the decision. A scrutiny of 
the merits does however not necessarily require the review court to assess the correctness of the 
decision itself and substitute it with the review court’s own views.195  
 
A study of case law reveals that the courts have also accepted that a scrutiny of the merits is 
unavoidable. In the context of a justifiability review, the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone196 
accepted that value judgments almost inevitably involved a consideration of the merits of the 
matter in some way or another. According to the Court, the distinguishing factor was the reason 
for considering the merits: it was only permissible on review to determine whether the outcome 
was rationally justifiable and not to determine the correctness thereof.197 
 
Similarly, in Stocks Civil Engineering supra Van Dijkhorst AJA confirmed that an error of law or 
fact rendered an award reviewable only if it could be attributed to one of the statutory grounds for 
review as opposed to a mere incorrect reasoning leading to an incorrect result.198 That this 
consideration of the merits does not abolish the distinction between review and appeal was 
                                                 
193 See chapter 1. 
194 Hoexter Administrative Law 317. 
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confirmed in the matter of Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA.199 In that case, Harms JA 
explained that it was not an error of law per se which rendered an award reviewable:200 
 
“Errors of law can, no doubt, lead to gross irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings. 
Telcordia posed the example where an arbitrator, because of a misunderstanding of the audi 
principle, refuses to hear the one party. Although in such a case the error of law gives rise to the 
irregularity, the reviewable irregularity would be the refusal to hear that party, and not the 
error of law. Likewise, an error of law may lead an arbitrator to exceed his powers or to 
misconceive the nature of the inquiry and his duties in connection therewith.” 
 
The same was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo. In that case, the Court per 
Ngcobo J accepted that there was a fine line between a review and an appeal, in particular, where 
the review court considered the reasons given by a tribunal, not to determine whether the result 
was correct, but to determine whether a gross irregularity occurred in the proceedings.201 
According to the Court there was however a line that needed to be maintained to secure a simple, 
quick, cheap and non-legalistic approach to the adjudication of unfair dismissals.  
 
It is submitted that the above cases clearly demonstrate that errors of fact or law are not per se 
grounds for taking an award on review. It is only when such an error of fact or law can be 
attributed to one or more of the statutory recognised grounds for review that an award would be 
reviewable. It would then however not be the error of fact or law that renders the award 
reviewable, but the procedural irregularity, misconduct or impropriety; with the error of fact or 
law merely serving as evidence of the former. Whether errors of fact or law may serve as 
evidence of an unreasonable decision will also be considered in the chapters that follow. 
 
2 7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it has been established that judicial review primarily existed as a form of legal 
redress against maladministration in terms of common law administrative law; that present day 
administrative law review is indirectly grounded in the 1996 Constitution and that the pre-
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democratic common law, including the English law influences, continue to be relevant and 
applicable to this field of law as an interpretative and supplementary resource for the purpose of 
informing content, ambit and application.  
 
In has further been established that the distinction between appeals and reviews may be a useful 
tool for encouraging the courts to temper their interventions to appropriate levels on review. The 
distinguishing characteristic is that, unlike an appeal where the overturning of a decision is 
sought because the court a quo came to the wrong conclusion on the facts or the law, a review 
focuses on the process and the way in which the commissioner came to his or her conclusions 
and asks whether it shows that the decision was arrived at in an unlawful manner. It has however 
also been established that the distinction between the two processes may not always be very clear 
and that a focus on this distinction should not form the only basis for the delineation of the 
courts’ powers on review. Not only do different forms of reviews and appeals also exist, but the 
characteristics of each are not necessarily the same and the merits do play a role in review 
proceedings. As an alternative, it is has been suggested that the appropriate role of the court in 
reviewing proceedings should be determined having regard also to contextual considerations. In 
the context of CCMA arbitration award reviews, this includes the background against which 
CCMA arbitration awards are issued and section 145 of the LRA, as the relevant legislative 
provision, as well as the legislative intent. Background considerations include the following: 1) 
commissioners, appointed to arbitrate disputes, may deal with arbitrations in a manner that they 
consider appropriate to determine the disputes fairly and quickly, but with the minimum of legal 
formalities; 2) a less time-consuming process is encouraged in so far as commissioners are only 
required to provide brief reasons for their decisions; and 3) arbitration awards are final and 
binding and can only be challenged by means of review. 
 
In addition thereto, section 145 of the LRA provides for the review of arbitration awards on 
grounds identical to that of the Arbitration Act. The latter section has been strictly interpreted by 
the courts and the same interpretations borrowed when interpreting the coinciding section 145(2) 
grounds of review. Also, when reading section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA and the Explanatory 
Memorandum thereto,202 it is clear that the legislature were mindful of the legalism that tended to 
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accompany appeal proceedings203 and sought to ensure that labour disputes were both 
expeditiously and efficiently resolved by means of a narrow species of review. It is submitted that 
this rationale is an important consideration when determining the scope of the Labour Court’s 
powers under section 145 and in particular the role of unreasonableness on review. The fact that 
the review court is charged with determining whether a section 145 ground for review has 
occurred and not with the correctness of the outcome, does, however, not have the effect that the 
review court may not have regard to the merits of the matter. The case law referred to above 
makes it apparent that a contemplation of the merits is unavoidable on review. The only 
difficultly lies in determining to what extent and in what manner the merits of a particular case 
should be scrutinised. The courts seem to agree that the answer to this question also lies in the 
distinction between an appeal and review or, put differently, in the purpose for which the merits 
are considered. It has been established that, whereas on appeal the merits or reasons are 
considered to determine whether the finding is right or wrong, it is considered on review to 
determine whether one or more of the section 145 grounds of review can be identified as having 
occurred. When considering whether judicial intervention is appropriate in a given case the court 
should thus ask itself whether it wishes to interfere with the award because the merits, after 
scrutiny, reveal that the arbitration proceedings were defective on one or more of the recognised 
grounds for review or because it is of the opinion that it was the incorrect decision.204 In the first 
instance, the court will be entitled to review and set aside the award; in the latter not. 
 
It has finally been established that challenges to the validity of administrative action must in 
general be based on the grounds of judicial review laid down in section 6(2) of PAJA, and not 
directly on section 33 of the 1996 Constitution or in terms of the courts’ inherent common law 
power of review. The review of arbitration awards fall within the confines of special statutory 
review as opposed to judicial review in the administrative law sense and must continue to be 
dealt with in terms of the LRA. This suggests that even if the making of an arbitration award does 
constitute administrative action, the provisions of PAJA would not necessarily be applicable to 
the review thereof. 
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204 See C Botma & A van der Walt “The role of reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards (Part 1)” 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ROLE OF REASONABLENESS IN ENGLISH 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
3 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter 2 it was established that: 1) the development of common law administrative law in 
South Africa was strongly influenced by English administrative law and 2) in the context of 
judicial review in particular, the English doctrines and/or grounds of review formed a basis upon 
which the validity of administrative action in South Africa was interpreted and applied by the 
courts. For example, under the influence of the English symptomatic unreasonableness test, the 
South African courts were inclined not to recognise unreasonableness as an independent ground 
of review but rather that its presence served as an indication of mala fides, ulterior motive or the 
failure of an administrator to apply his or her mind to the matter concerned.205 In addition, a 
decision had to be grossly unreasonable to be reviewable.206 
 
With the advent of the constitutional dispensation, the common law principles of administrative 
law were entrenched in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution and reasonableness expressly 
recognised as a requirement for just administrative action. Whilst the review power of the court 
was thus no longer grounded in the common law and subservient to the authority of the 
legislature, the common law principles that previously provided the grounds for judicial review 
were subsumed under the 1996 Constitution in so far as it was not inconsistent with it.207 
Incompatibilities aside, it followed that the English law influences were not eradicated per se but 
that it could continue to inform and find application as an interpretative and supplementary 
resource for the purpose of informing the content, ambit and application of administrative law in 
                                                 
205 See A Pillay “Reviewing Reasonableness: An Appropriate Standard for Evaluating State Action and Inaction” 
(2005) 122(2) SALJ 419. See also The Administrator, Transvaal and the Firs Investment (Pty) v Johannesburg 
City Council 1971 1 SA 56 (A); Johannesburg City Council v The Administrator, Transvaal and Mayofis 1971 1 
SA 87 (A); National Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 3 SA 726 (A); 
Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board and others v David Morton Transport (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 887 
(A).   
206 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223. From a South African 
perspective, see National Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A). 
207 See the discussion in Chapter 5. 
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South Africa. This was no better illustrated than in Bato Star Fishing; a case involving a 
challenge to the discretionary allocation of fishing quotas. In this case, the Constitutional Court 
referred to the English decisions of Wednesbury Corporation and International Trader’s Ferry 
Ltd208 to determine the proper meaning of unreasonableness as provided for in section 6(2)(h) of 
PAJA.209 The Court accepted that the subsection drew directly on the language of Wednesbury 
Corporation and that a literal interpretation thereof could set such a standard that decisions would 
rarely be found unreasonable. The Court however reasoned that the subsection had to be 
construed consistently with the 1996 Constitution and in particular section 33 which required 
administrative action to be “reasonable” only. The Court then opted to be guided by the 
interpretation of unreasonableness in International Trader’s Ferry Ltd namely, that an 
administrative decision will be reviewable if it is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not 
reach. According to the Court, an unreasonableness review would not succeed if the decision-
maker took into account the range of relevant and/or competing factors, struck a reasonable 
equilibrium between these different factors and made a decision which amounted to a reasonable 
equilibrium in the circumstances.210 The above decisions are important to South Africa from a 
labour law perspective to the extent that the Constitutional Court in the labour law matter of 
Sidumo relied directly on its decision in Bato Star Fishing, and indirectly on the House of Lords’ 
decision in International Trader’s Ferry Ltd,211 to determine that a compulsory arbitration award 
will be reviewable in terms of section 145 of the LRA if the decision was so unreasonable that no 
reasonable decision-maker could have made that decision.  
 
A perusal of Bato Star Fishing and Sidumo however reveals that in neither case did the 
Constitutional Court comprehensively discuss the English legal position before approving the 
adoption of its unreasonableness interpretation into South African law under the constitutional 
dispensation. In so far as both Wednesbury Corporation and International Trader’s Ferry Ltd 
were decided within the context of English administrative law, this chapter remedies the omission 
of the Court by discussing the nature and conceptual basis of judicial review in this area of law in 
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general and the role of unreasonableness in these proceedings in particular, having regard to both 
the position at common law and in terms of statute. Ancillary hereto, the courts’ interpretation of 
the terms “lawfulness” and/or “contraventions of the law” is considered. The different categories 
of grounds of review are also discussed and case law examined to distinguish unreasonableness 
review from the other types of review recognised in English administrative law. In relation 
hereto, consideration is afforded to the standard or test of review applicable to each of those 
grounds of review. 
 
As recognised in chapter 2, the English courts have traditionally focused on the manner in which 
a decision was reached and have been reluctant to review a decision on any basis resembling 
substance review. An unreasonableness interpretation that stipulates that a decision will be 
reviewable if “it is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach” has however threatened 
to upset the distinction between merits and process having regard to the interplay that such an 
enquiry poses between facts, evidence and the conclusion arrived at. Unreasonableness is 
therefore discussed having regard to the meaning, role and impact thereof in the exercise of 
public powers and administrative decision-making in the substantive sense. It is considered 
whether unreasonableness has continued to serve merely as evidence of other grounds of review 
or whether it has developed into a standalone ground for setting aside administrative decisions. 
The role, if any, of unreasonableness in the review of the merits of decisions is also explored 
having regard to the duty to disregard irrelevant matters, consider relevant considerations, act in 
good faith and not make decisions on the basis of an unfair balance of considerations, inadequate 
evidence and/or mistakes of fact. Lastly the question of different intensities of unreasonableness 
review in relation to different contextual decisions is also considered and discussed.  
 
3 2 SCOPE AND NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
3 2 1 Judicial review, the common law and the Senior Courts Act 1981212 
 
“Administrative law” is the branch of law which governs public bodies in the exercise of public 
functions.213 It encompasses various aspects of the legal regulation of government power and 
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discretion.214 In contrast, judicial review refers to the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the 
courts in particular to ensure that administrative decision-makers do not exceed or abuse the 
powers that have directly or indirectly been conferred on them by Parliament.215 Traditionally 
possible because of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction at common law to determine whether action 
was lawful,216 the courts safeguarded the efficacy of the rule of law by developing doctrines to 
verify whether public authorities have acted within the boundaries of the law.217 This enabled the 
courts to interfere with administrative acts where authorities had exceeded their jurisdiction by 
for instance exercising powers contrary to the promotion of the policy and object for which the 
powers were afforded.218 Authorities exceeded their jurisdiction and acted unlawful or illegal if, 
having the power to adjudicate upon a dispute; they abused their power, acted in a procedurally 
irregular or unreasonable manner or committed any other error of law.219 If authorities arrived at 
decisions which were within their jurisdiction to make and did not commit any error which went 
to jurisdiction as just mentioned, it was generally accepted that the decisions would not be 
quashed on judicial review even if the decisions were considered incorrect.220 Opposed to an 
appeal on the merits that questioned the correctness of the decision itself, judicial review was 
focused on the legality of the decision-making process.221 As such, the question on review was 
whether decision-makers had exceeded or abused their powers and/or whether decision-makers 
had acted outside their discretionary limits.222 The question was not whether decision-makers’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
213 Administrative law is part of public law. The activities of private bodies may be governed by public law when 
they perform public functions. See P Cane Administrative Law 5 ed (2011) 3-4. See also Treasury Solicitor The 
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at http://www.tsol.gov.uk/ Publications/Scheme_Publications/judge.pdf on 30 November 2011 at 08h11. 
214 D Stott & A Felix Principles of Administrative Law (1997) 4. 
215 Other examples include internal reviews, ombudsmen, regulatory agencies and tribunals. See S Galera Judicial 
Review A Comparative Analysis inside the European Legal System (2010) 164-165. A Horne & G Berman 
“Judicial Review: A Short Guide to Claims in the Administrative Court” (2006) House of Commons Library 
Research Paper 06/44 7 found at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-
044.pdf on 20 October 2012. 
216 R v HM the Queen in Council, ex parte Vijayatunga 1988 QB 322 343E-F. See R Grote “The scope of judicial 
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513. 
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218 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 1968 AC 997 1030.  
219 See Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 1969 2 AC 147; R v Lord President of the Privy Council, 
ex parte Page 1993 AC 682.  
220 See Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 1969 2 AC 147 171, per Lord Reid, explaining his 
dictum in Armah v Government of Ghana 1968 AC 192 234 that if a tribunal has jurisdiction to go right it has 
jurisdiction to go wrong provided it does not err in law. 
221 Regina v Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, Ex parte Amin 1983 2 AC 818 829. 
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decisions on the facts were correct. As such, review courts were not required to re-examine the 
factual basis of a decision, weigh in the balance the particular merits of a case and/or substitute 
their own decision on the merits of the case for that of the administrative authority that was 
constituted by law to decide the matter in question.223  
 
Whilst South Africa has a relatively comprehensive judicial review statute to cover most aspects 
of review of actions that fall within its ambit,224 legislation in England, in contrast, only provides 
a framework for judicial review applications and by extension, to a lesser degree, for the 
remedies that may be granted.225 In particular, section 31(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 
provides that applications for a mandatory, prohibiting or quashing order or a declaration or 
injunction in an issue of public law must be made by way of an application for judicial review.226 
The Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53, which used to contain the rules of procedure for 
judicial review, has been abolished and replaced by Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules.227 In 
terms of Civil Procedure Rule 54.1(2)(a), a judicial review claim refers to a claim to review the 
“lawfulness” of an enactment or a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a 
public function. Lawfulness is not defined therein, but in terms of its ordinary dictionary meaning 
it refers to “the quality of conforming to law”228 and “lawful” means “allowed or recognised by 
law; legal”229. In the ordinary use of the English language, “lawful” and “legal” can be used 
interchangeably. The Civil Procedure Rules further provides that the judicial review procedure 
must be used when seeking a mandatory,230 prohibitory231 or quashing order232 and may be used 
when seeking a declaration or injunction.233 
                                                 
223 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans 1982 3 ALL ER 141 143-144; Adan v Newham London 
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Although the Senior Courts Act 1981 and Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules address the 
procedure and remedies of judicial review, neither mention the grounds upon which such an 
application may be brought. The Senior Courts Act 1981 only indicates by implication in section 
31(5A) that a decision can be quashed on the ground that there has been an “error of law”. 
Section 31(5A) concerns the power of the High Court to substitute its own decision for the 
decision forming the subject of the judicial review application and provides that such power can 
only be exercised if the decision in question was made by a court or tribunal, the decision is 
quashed on the ground that there has been an error of law, and without the error, there would 
have been only one decision which the court or tribunal could have reached.234 What constitutes 
an error of law has therefore been developed by the courts on a case by case basis.235 
 
3 3 GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Although there is no statutory classification of the grounds of review, the House of Lords in 
Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Minister for the Civil Service categorised the 
common law grounds of review into the three classes of illegality, irrationality and procedural 
impropriety.236 According to the Court, “illegality” required a decision-maker to correctly 
understand the law that regulates his or her decision-making power and to give effect to it.237  
“Irrationality” on the other hand was held to apply to a decision which was so outrageous in its 
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his or 
her mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.238 Lastly, the Court sought to 
include under the head of “procedural impropriety” a failure to observe the basic rules of natural 
justice; to act with procedural fairness towards a person who would be affected by the decision in 
question and/or to observe procedural rules that were expressly laid down in statute, even if such 
failure did not involve a denial of natural justice.239 This threefold classification has assisted in 
clarifying the principles underlying administrative law, but it has not rigidly set the grounds of 
judicial review. In CCSU, the Court accepted that further developments on a case by case basis 
                                                 
234 See also CPR 54.19(3). N Parpworth Constitutional and Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 330.  
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could over time add further grounds like “proportionality”. The grounds are also not strictly 
compartmentalised, but may overlap and cause uncertainty as to the exact scope of each one’s 
application.240 For example, a decision-maker may exercise powers for an improper purpose by 
considering irrelevant considerations or failing to consider relevant considerations and, 
depending on the extent of the considerations, either occurrence could also lead to an irrational 
result.241 Since CCSU, incompatibility with obligations arising out of the Human Rights Act 1998 
has also been recognised as a ground for review.242 To clarify the role of unreasonableness on 
review and to delineate its scope, the meaning, scope and content of the “illegality” and 
“procedural impropriety” grounds are discussed below. 
 
3 3 1 Illegality  
 
“Illegality” arises as a ground of review if decision-makers fail to correctly give effect to the law 
that regulates their decision-making powers. This includes decision-makers exceeding the limits 
of their prescribed powers by embarking upon an unauthorised inquiry as well as acting within 
the scope of their powers but then exercising the prescribed power in an unauthorised manner by 
asking themselves the wrong questions, failing to deal with the questions submitted to them or 
failing to take account of relevant considerations.243 Examples of sub-grounds of illegality 
include errors of law, errors of fact, exercising a power for an improper purpose, taking irrelevant 
considerations into account or disregarding relevant considerations, fettering of discretion and 
unauthorised delegation.244 In Stewart v Perth and Kinross Council, for example,245 the House of 
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Lords considered whether the licencing authority had acted ultra vires the Civic Government 
(Scotland) Act 1982 when it subjected a second-hand car dealer’s licence to trade to a condition 
to make copies of inspection reports and information sheets available to prospective customers.246 
The Court found that the licensing authority’s discretion to impose conditions did not go as far as 
to allow the authority to use it for the ulterior purpose of protecting consumers.247 According to 
the Court, the licence condition was incompatible with Parliament’s intention and hence ultra 
vires.248 The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Bromley LBC v Greater London Council illustrates the reviewability of a decision based on a 
failure to take account of relevant considerations.249 The House of Lords considered whether the 
Council was entitled to instruct London boroughs to levy a supplementary rate to finance by 
grant the cost of reducing bus and tube fares. Turning to the Transport (London) Act 1969, the 
Court accepted that the Council was empowered to make grants for revenue and capital purposes. 
The Court however also found that, on a proper construction of the Act, this power was 
circumscribed by an obligation to conduct the transport services on business principles that 
attempted to avoid a deficit and that ensured as far as practicable that expenditure were met by 
revenue. Not having considered these restrictions and failing to have held the balance between 
the transport users and the ratepayers, the Court, similarly to the Stewart matter, concluded that 
the Council’s instruction was ultra vires the powers conferred in terms of the relevant Act and 
dismissed the appeal.250 
 
“Illegality” is, however, not confined to matters of law, but may extend to certain errors of fact as 
well. By way of illustration, in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside 
                                                                                                                                                              
UKHL 6; Bromley LBC v Greater London Council 1981 UKHL 7; Roberts v Hopwood 1925 AC 578; Lavender v 
Minister of Housing and Local Government 1970 1 WLR 1231; R v Talbot Borough Council, ex parte Jones 
1988 2 All ER 207; and R v Talbot Borough Council, ex parte Jones 1988 2 All ER 207. 
245 2004 UKHL 16. 
246 Para 5. 
247 Para 9, 11 and 28. 
   248 Para 36-38.  
249 1981 UKHL 7; 1983 1 AC 768; 1982 1 All ER 153. See also Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Venables 1997 3 ALL ER 97. The Home Secretary exercised his discretion to impose a fifteen year 
sentence following a public petition et cetera. According to the Court, public opinion about the length of service 
was irrelevant and unlawful.  
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Metropolitan Borough Council,251 the Court accepted that a decision may be susceptible to 
challenge if: 1) precedent facts did not exist;252 2) precedent facts have not been taken into 
account; 3) the decision has been made upon an improper self-direction as to the facts;253 and/or 
4) the decision has been made upon facts which ought not to have been taken into account.254 The 
interplay between error of fact and illegality is demonstrated in R (March) v Secretary of State for 
Health.255 In this case, the secretary of state had declined to increase ex gratia payments to 
contaminated blood patients in line with the equivalent scheme in Ireland on the basis that the 
higher payments under the Irish scheme were due to the culpability of their blood transfusion 
service. Although resource allocation was a government matter, the Court found that the Irish 
scheme had not been established because the government was legally liable to sufferers and 
quashed the decision due to a material error of fact that undermined the reasoning process. 
 
The test for illegality on review is therefore not that of unreasonableness and reasonableness is no 
defence in this respect.256 The test is whether the decision-maker strayed outside the terms or 
authorised purposes of the governing law. Important to the illegality ground of review, English 
administrative law no longer distinguishes between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error of 
law. In R v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex parte Page,257 the Court referred to Anisminic 
Limited v Foreign Compensation Commission258 and held that generally any error of law made by 
an administrative tribunal or inferior court in reaching its decision could be quashed for error of 
law.259 According to the Court, Parliament had conferred the decision making power on the 
premise that it will be exercised on the correct legal basis and any misdirection in law in making 
the decision rendered the decision ultra vires and subject to review.260 This “no deference 
approach” to illegality was further illustrated in Pearlman v Keepers & Governors of Harrow 
                                                 
251 1976 3 All ER 665 695; 1977 AC 1014. Robbins v Secretary of State for the Environment 1989 1 All ER 878 
(condition precedent to serving compulsory purchase order that acquiring authority serve repairs notice); R v 
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252 See R v Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Zerek 1951 2 KB 1. 
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School.261 Considering the different court interpretations afforded to the statutory provision 
“improvement made by the execution of works amounting to structural alteration, extension or 
addition” as contained in the Housing Act 1974, the Court of Appeal commented that it would be 
intolerable, when an ordinary word came to be applied to similar facts, in one case after another, 
that different interpretations should all be considered reasonable. The Court reasoned that, in such 
circumstances, it was not required to show deference to any interpretation of the law that 
appeared to be reasonable, but that it was a matter of law which required the Court to give a 
definite ruling. As a result, the Court concluded that the installation of a full central heating 
system was a “structural alteration or addition” as contemplated by the Housing Act 1974. 
 
The above cases make it clear that, however unlimited or unfettered a decision-making power 
may appear to be, there are legal limits to the exercise of the power. At a minimum, decision-
makers must ensure decisions are compatible with the relevant higher legal authority and not 
made for a purpose that is foreign to the purpose for which the decision-making authority was 
granted. This includes disregarding irrelevant factors and taking into account factors which 
administrative decision-makers are obliged to consider.262 If not, it can be contended that the 
decisions are ultra vires and the decision will be reviewable based on illegality as a ground of 
review. The courts’ judicial capacity however also extends beyond that which is generally 
regarded as a legal error, to encapsulate decisions which demonstrate that the decision-maker has 
failed to establish a "precedent fact" that justifies the conclusion reached.263 In these instances, 
the court is also entitled to set the decision aside and remit the matter back to the decision-maker 
for reconsideration. As regards the test for illegality, no decision-maker has any jurisdiction to 
make an error of law on which the decision in the case depends and any such error implies that 
the decision-maker has gone outside its jurisdiction and that the decision is reviewable.264 
Therefore, although the exercise of administrative decision-making powers involves questions 
which administrators themselves have to decide, the legal limits to the exercise of those decision-
making powers are matters for the objective judgment of the court and, absent materiality or 
discretion, administrators are not allowed to make incorrect decisions in this regard.  
                                                 
261 1979 QB 56; 1979 1 All ER 365. 
262 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Thompson and Venables 1998 AC 407. 
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3 3 2 Procedural impropriety 
 
As per CCSU, procedural impropriety involves both a failure to comply with express, statutory 
procedural requirements as well as the common law rules of natural justice encapsulated in the 
principle of hearing both sides in the absence of apparent bias.265 In the past, there was judicial 
support for the view that the requirements of natural justice applied to judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions only, with the duty to act “judicially” only inferred if there was an express obligation to 
follow a judicial-type procedure in arriving at the decision.266 In Ridge v Baldwin, the House of 
Lords however found that the term “judicial” had been misinterpreted and the mere fact that the 
power affected some person’s rights or interests made it "judicial" and subject to the natural 
justice procedures.267 Since Ridge, procedural propriety has developed so that the review courts 
now require all administrative functions, whether judicial or not, to be carried out fairly.268 
Fairness is a flexible concept269 that essentially requires an intuitive judgment, taking into 
consideration that: 1) there is a presumption that a statutory, administrative power will be 
exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances; 2) the standards of fairness are 
flexible and can change with time; generally and in its application to decisions of a particular 
type; 3) the fairness principles applicable depended on the context of the decision, especially the 
language of the statute and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the 
decision was taken; and 4) fairness generally requires that persons who might be adversely 
affected by a decision be informed of the essence of the case which he or she has to answer and 
have an opportunity to make representations on his or her own behalf.270 
 
Procedural impropriety covers a broad range of issues including non-compliance with statutory  
                                                 
265 See Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works 143 ER 414 Court of Common Pleas (England). 
266 Woolf H “The Role of the English Judiciary in Developing Public Law” (1986) 27 William and Mary Law 
Review 669 675. See also H Woolf, S A De Smith, J L Jowell, A P Le Sueur & C M  Donnelly De Smith's 
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 270 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody 1994 1 AC 531 560 D-G. 
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procedural requirements, non-adherence to the rule against bias,271 failure to consult and/or 
provide a fair hearing,272 and a failure to provide reasons for the decision taken.273 A successful 
challenge based on the latter is found in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Al Fayed.274 In terms of section 6(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981, the secretary of state 
could grant an applicant a certificate of naturalisation as a British citizen if he was satisfied of his 
or her good character. In this case, the secretary of state declined to provide reasons for not 
granting a certificate; nor was there any process of consultation or representations. There were no 
procedural requirements in the Act and section 44(2) provided that the secretary of state was not 
"required to assign any reason for the grant or refusal of any application". Nevertheless, the Court 
held that fairness obliged the secretary of state to notify the applicant of the areas of concern on 
which his refusal to grant naturalisation was based so that the applicant may have an opportunity 
to allay such concerns.275  
 
Similar to illegality, the test for procedural impropriety on review is therefore not that of 
unreasonableness. In dealing with the question whether a decision-maker had acted in breach of 
the rules of fairness or natural justice, the Court in R (Mahfouz) v General Medical Council 
confirmed that it was not confined to reviewing the reasoning of the decision-maker on 
Wednesbury principles, but that it had to make its own independent judgment in accordance with 
                                                 
271 See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) 1999 UKHL 52. In an 
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the principles of a fair procedure developed by the courts.276  Similarly, in R (Medway Council) v 
Secretary of State for Transport, the Court asserted that it was its task to decide what was fair and 
that it was not for the public authority to contend that it had a discretion to adopt a certain 
procedure.277 Legislation and/or the common law can therefore impose procedural conditions or 
requirements which must be satisfied before a power may be exercised. Depending on the 
requirements imposed in a particular instance, the review court will be entitled to query for 
example whether: 1) the person affected by the decision was afforded a proper opportunity to 
state his case;278 2) the reasoning process was adequately expressed in the decision;279 and/or 3) 
the decision-maker was unbiased and objective.280 If an administrative decision-maker proceeds 
to make a decision without having regard to the procedural principles imposed in any particular 
instance, whether in terms of statute or general requirements of fairness, such a decision will be 
unlawful and subject to review on the ground of procedural impropriety without a need for 
reference to unreasonableness. 
 
3 3 3 Irrationality or unreasonableness 
 
A logical point of departure for ascertaining the meaning of unreasonableness is the well-known 
1948 Wednesbury Corporation judgment in which the concept of “unreasonableness” was 
recognised as a ground of review.281 This case concerned a licensing authority’s power in terms 
of the Sunday Entertainments Act 1932 to impose conditions upon cinemas opening on Sundays 
and its resultant decision to allow the same on condition that children under the age of fifteen 
were not admitted for reasons relating to their moral and physical health.  
 
In seeking to establish whether the licensing authority had exercised its power unreasonably, the 
Court of Appeal conceptualised the following three principles: first, the matter concerned an 
executive act as opposed to a judicial one; secondly, the conditions that could be imposed by the 
licensing authority were within its discretion without limitation; and thirdly, the statute provided 
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no appeal from the decision of the licensing authority.282 Against this background, the Court 
found that its right of interference was limited to contraventions of the law and that the onus of 
proving that proposition rested upon the party who asserted it.  
 
Although in the present case the condition appeared to be lawful,283 the Court accepted that there 
was a strictly limited class of case in terms of which a discretionary decision could amount to a 
contravention of the law due to unreasonableness. According to the Court, decision-makers 
entrusted with a discretionary power were required to: 1) direct themselves properly in law; 2)  
call their attention to matters which they were bound to consider; 3) exclude from their 
consideration irrelevant considerations; and 4) generally not do something so absurd that no 
sensible person could dream that it laid within their powers.284 Having said this, the Court 
accepted that it was not the plaintiff’s case that the licensing authority had unreasonably 
considered extraneous and irrelevant matters, but that they had acted unreasonably per se in 
imposing the condition. In this regard, the Court reasoned that the licensing authority had been 
entrusted with the decision and that, absent the relevance of the subject-matter of the condition, 
the Court could not find the decision wrong because it was unreasonable. According to the 
Court, unreasonableness as an independent ground of review had a special and limited meaning 
that only applied to decisions that were so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever 
have come to it.285 The Court made it clear that the reasonableness of the condition did not 
depend on what it regarded as reasonable, but that the licensing authority was the arbiter of the 
correctness thereof. Having satisfied itself that the discretionary decision in this case was not so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, the Court dismissed the 
appeal.  
 
Although unreasonableness was recognised as the yardstick for the exercise of administrative 
discretion prior to Wednesbury,286 this case was significant in three respects. Firstly, it confirmed 
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the non-existence of an unfettered public discretionary power.287 Secondly, it recognised 
substantive unreasonableness in administrative decision-making; challenging the dividing line 
between merits and legality on review. Inherent herein, was the fact that it exemplified the rule of 
reason as a fundamental principle of the law.288 Thirdly, it acknowledged that reasonableness was 
a wide concept in so far as different persons could reasonably hold different views on what was 
reasonable in a given context.289  
 
The above principles are important from a South African perspective to the extent that it clarifies 
the type of decisions typically subjected to am unreasonableness query as well as confirms that 
unreasonableness is a substantive ground of review as opposed to a test for some other review 
grounds.290 However, criticisms levelled against Wednesbury unreasonableness indicate the 
difficulties often associated with identifying an unreasonable decision. Firstly, Wednesbury 
unreasonableness has been described as an imprecise, tautological formula that fails to guide 
legal practitioners with certainty.291 Secondly, it has been condemned for not providing sufficient 
justification for judicial intervention or the reasons why decisions are considered unreasonable.292 
Thirdly, Wednesbury unreasonableness has been called unrealistic because so-called 
unreasonable decisions often follow a rational decision-making process.293 Lastly, it has been 
criticised for depicting a requirement of particularly extreme behaviour – like bad faith and 
perverse or absurd decisions - denoting a very low level of judicial scrutiny and very high 
standard for invalidation.294 
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Despite these objections, it is possible to extract some guiding principles from case law on how 
to proceed in the identification of unreasonable decisions. In Tameside Metropolitan Borough 
Council, for example,295 the House of Lords considered whether the secretary of state had 
exceeded his powers when he directed a newly elected local education authority to implement 
their predecessors’ proposals for the re-organisation of secondary education. The direction was 
made in circumstances where the secretary of state was statutorily entitled to give such direction 
as appeared to him to be expedient provided he was satisfied that the authority had or will act 
unreasonably.296 The Court recognised that an administrative discretion inevitably involved a 
right to choose between more than one possible course of action whereupon there was room for 
reasonable people to hold different opinions as to which was to be preferred.297 Taking this into 
consideration, the Court found that it was not the Court’s role to substitute its own opinion for 
that of the decision-maker, but to determine whether the decision-maker, in reaching its decision, 
had directed itself properly in law and had taken into consideration relevant matters and excluded 
from its consideration irrelevant matters.298 According to the Court, “unreasonableness” was not 
a synonym for “wrong” and a decision was only unreasonable if objectively speaking no 
reasonable decision-maker would act in the way in which the decision-maker concerned had 
acted or was proposing to act.299 Applying these principles to the facts of the matter, the Court 
reasoned that it was for the secretary of state to decide whether the authority’s proposal involved 
such interference with efficient instruction and training in secondary schools that no sensible 
authority acting with due appreciation of its statutory responsibilities could have decided to adopt 
the course which they proposed.300 In applying this test of unreasonableness, the Court found that 
there was no evidence on which the secretary of state could properly have decided that the 
council had proposed to act unreasonably and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
                                                 
295 Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 1977 AC 1014. See para 
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A decision is also unreasonable if it defies comprehension301 or if the decision itself is preceded 
by flawed logic.302 This was confirmed in CCSU. The Court reiterated that it was no longer 
required to treat irrationality as evidence that a decision-maker had misunderstood the law or 
overlooked a critical requirement, but that it was a separate ground for challenging a decision on 
review. Restating Wednesbury unreasonableness with reference to the term “irrationality”, the 
Court held that judicial interference was permissible if a decision had no rational basis or the 
decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible 
person who had applied his or her mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.303 
Although the Court acknowledged that it could employ logic and accepted moral standards as 
criteria by which to assess decisions under unreasonableness review, it did not divulge more 
specific categories of substantive decisions that would be legally acceptable. This 
interchangeable reference to unreasonableness and irrationality brings into question the South 
African argument that unreasonableness means something different from, and arguably more 
than, irrationality.304 
 
An example of a strict approach to unreasonableness can be found in Nottinghamshire County 
Council v Secretary of State for the Environment; City of Bradford Metropolitan Council v 
Secretary of State for the Environment.305 In this case, the Court considered whether expenditure 
guidelines imposed on the authorities were so disadvantageous when compared with its effect 
upon others that it constituted a perverse exercise of power. The Court held that the law had 
developed beyond the limits applied by the review courts as provided for in Wednesbury 
Corporation. With reference to CCSU, the Court then found that a discretionary decision was 
now reviewable on the ground of unreasonableness if the decision-maker had abused his or her 
power.306 According to the Court, this could be attributed to: 1) a misconstruction of the limits 
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imposed upon the scope of the power; 2) procedural irregularities; 3) Wednesbury 
unreasonableness; or 4) bad faith and/or an improper motive in the exercise of the power. 
 
Turning to the facts, the Court confirmed that court interference with a political matter307 was 
only justified if a prima facie case demonstrated that the secretary of state had acted in bad faith, 
for an improper motive or that the consequences of his guidance were so absurd that he must 
have taken leave of his senses. As the guidance complied with the statutory terms, the Court 
explained that the principles had to demonstrate a perversity pattern or an absurdity of such 
proportions that the Court could conclude that the guidance could not have been framed by a 
bona fide exercise of political judgment on the part of the secretary of state. Not having been 
established on the evidence, the Court dismissed the appeal.308 
 
A reformulated Wednesbury unreasonableness was introduced in R v Minister of Defence ex parte 
Smith309 in the context of an irrationality challenge to a policy that did not permit homosexual 
persons to serve in the armed forces. The Court confirmed that the unreasonableness test only 
permitted interference with an administrative discretion on substantive grounds if the decision 
was unreasonable in the sense that it was beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable 
decision-maker.310 On the facts, the Court found that not only was the policy supported by both 
Houses of Parliament and by those to whom the Ministry looked for professional advice, but 
there was no evidence before the Ministry which plainly invalidated that advice.311 The Court 
accordingly dismissed the matter on the basis that the threshold of irrationality was not met. 
 
Reasonableness should however not be equalled to proportionality unreservedly. This was 
confirmed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind.312  In this case, the 
House of Lords had to determine whether the minister had unreasonably exercised his discretion 
in terms of the Broadcasting Act 1981 to issue directives when he prohibited the IBA and BBC 
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from broadcasting the voices of members of proscribed organisations to combat terrorism. The 
House of Lords rejected the proposition that proportionality was applicable in domestic English 
law, but confirmed that reasonableness required decision-makers to call their attention to 
mandatory considerations and to identify the factors which had motivated their decision to ensure 
that they had not overlooked that which a reasonable decision-maker should have considered.313 
If the conditions were satisfied on the evidence, the Court held that the only other possible basis 
for court interference was irrationality or perversity.314 Having regard to the facts of the case, the 
Court noted that, save in one respect, no suggestion was made that the minister had ignored 
relevant considerations or that he considered irrelevant considerations.315 According to the Court, 
it could therefore only quash the decision if no reasonable minister properly directing himself 
would have reached the impugned decision and not if the correct or objectively reasonable 
decision was other than the one the minister had made.316 With reference to Tameside 
Metropolitan Borough Council, the Court concluded that, irrespective of whether the minister 
was right or wrong in deciding to issue the directives, a reasonable minister could hold that the 
appearance of terrorists on programmes increased their standing and provided them with political 
legitimacy. In making this determination, the Court weighed the considerations relevant to the 
outcome of the case and found that it was relatively modest restrictions imposed to protect the 
public interest of combating terrorism and hence not unreasonable. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly,317 the Court clarified the 
reasonableness/proportionality distinction when it accepted that there was an overlap between 
reasonableness and proportionality, but held that the intensity of review was slightly greater 
under the proportionality approach in that: 1) proportionality could require the review court to 
assess the balance which the decision-maker had struck and not merely whether it was within the 
range of reasonable decisions; 2) the proportionality query could go further than that of 
reasonableness as it could require a consideration of the relative weight accorded to interests and 
considerations; and 3) even the anxious scrutiny test of reasonableness was not necessarily 
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appropriate to the protection of human rights with reasonableness and proportionality sometimes 
yielding different results.318 According to the Court, proportionally – as opposed to 
reasonableness – was to be used in matters involving a human rights element.319 
 
Having regard to the foregoing case law, it is evident that unreasonableness requires the courts to 
engage in the review of the substance of a decision or its justification. As part of substantive 
review, the court has to ask itself whether the power under which the decision-maker acts has 
been improperly exercised320 or insufficiently justified.321 In practice, this query may unfold in 
two parts. In the first place, a court may conclude that whatever considerations may appear to 
have been taken into account, the decision is so unreasonable in relation to those considerations 
that the decision maker must have failed to properly consider the relevant considerations and was 
influenced by other considerations. Alternatively, a decision-maker may have regard to all the 
right considerations and disregard all the wrong considerations, but nevertheless reach a 
conclusion that bears no reasonable relation to the considerations which it had in mind.322  
 
The courts’ hesitation in finding a particular decision reviewable on unreasonableness grounds 
may also essentially be twofold. Firstly, where broad discretionary powers have been conferred 
on a decision-maker, the courts recognise that there is a range of decisions that may all qualify as 
reasonable. Secondly, there is a presumption that the decision in question is within the range of 
that discretion and the onus is on the party asserting the unreasonableness of that decision to 
demonstrate the contrary. The court therefore needs to be satisfied that the decision in question is 
so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. Put differently, 
unreasonableness review will be available where it is apparent that, rather that falling within a 
                                                 
318 Para 27. See also R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex Parte Alconbury 2001 UKHL 23. 
319 See Smith and Grady v United Kingdom 1999 29 EHRR 493. The European Court of Human Rights found that 
the English unreasonableness test, even upon applying “anxious scrutiny”, was insufficient. According to the 
Court, it effectively excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the question whether the interference 
with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national security and 
public order aims pursued. 
320 I.e. unreasonableness demarcates the scope of the decision-maker’s competence. See M Bobek Reasonableness 
and Law 316. 
321 I.e. unreasonableness demarcates in what way a discretion can be exercised within the decision-maker’s 
competence. See also S Rose-Ackerman & P L Lindseth Comparative Administrative Law (2010) 142. I.e. 
substantive versus procedural unreasonableness. 
322 B Jones & K Thompson “Administrative Law in the United Kingdom” in R Seerden & F Stroink (eds) 
Administrative Law of the European Union, Its Member States and the United States (2002) 242. 
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range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law, 
the decision is of such a nature that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to that 
decision.323 As the language of the formulation suggests, the court is not required to imagine 
itself in the position of the decision-maker when the decision was taken and to then test the 
unreasonableness of that decision against the decision they would have taken.324 In doing so, the 
court would become involved in a merits review; as if the court itself was the recipient of the 
power. Reasonableness does also not require the court to engage in a proportionality exercise.325 
Whereas reasonableness simply requires the court to maintain a check on excesses in the exercise 
of discretionary powers by determining whether other decision-makers could have made the same 
decision, proportionality necessarily requires an assessment of the balance that has been struck 
between interests and objectives. As a ground of review, unreasonableness is therefore of limited 
application - in a sense a safety mechanism to cater for those decisions that are obviously 
irrational or perverse but may escape being set aside on review on the other recognised grounds 
of review.326  To objectively determine the presence of unreasonableness in a substance review, 
and to avoid so-called “palm tree justice”, the interaction between reasonableness and decisions 
of merit, policy and human rights, including intensity of review, will be considered below.327  
 
                                                 
323 See Re W (An Infant) 1971 AC 682 700. Two reasonable persons can come to opposite conclusions on the same 
set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as reasonable. Not every reasonable exercise of judgment 
was right and not every mistaken exercise of judgment was unreasonable. See also Kruse v Johnson 1898 2 QB 
91. A decision is not unreasonable just because the Court thought it went further than was prudent or because it 
did not have some desirable qualification. 
324 The review courts: 1) set a high threshold for interference; 2) exercise a secondary judgment only; and 3) vary the 
intensity of judicial scrutiny and the deference due to the decision-maker depending on the subject-matter and the 
context within which the decision was made. R v Minister of Defence ex parte Smith 1996 1 All ER 257; 1996 
QB 517; Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment; City of Bradford 
Metropolitan Council v Secretary of State for the Environment 1986 1 ALL ER 199; 1986 AC 240; 1985 UKHL 
8. Compare this with R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay 1987 AC 514. 
325 The two standards co-exist with reasonableness being applied to alleged domestic law violations and 
proportionality where fundamental rights are involved. See De Freitas v The Permanent Secretary of Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 1999 1 AC 69. See also Huang v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2007 UKHL 11 where the Court 
emphasised that proportionality involves balancing the interest of the individual and the interests of the 
community. The Association of British Civilian Internees – Far East Region v Secretary of State for Defence 
2003 EWCA Civ 473; 2003 QB 1397. 
326 See B J Narain Essays in Administrative Law – A study in rational principles (1996) 48. 
327 In R v Department for Education & Employment ex parte Begbie 1999 All ER (D) 983, the Court explained that 
fairness and reasonableness were objective concepts, otherwise there would be palm tree justice. 
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3 4 UNREASONABLENESS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS328 
 
3 4 1 Reasonableness and merit review 
 
Review courts are reluctant to interfere with decision-makers’ assessment of evidence or facts.329 
There are various reasons for this: 1) a distinction is drawn between appeal and review;330 2) 
original decision-makers hear and see evidence firsthand and have the necessary expertise to best 
evaluate it; and 3) judicial review proceedings are considered unsuitable for making 
determination on facts.331 Opposed to a review based on a consideration of irrelevant matters 
and/or a failure to consider relevant matters, unreasonableness review per se does however have a 
tendency to threaten the maintenance of the distinction between the legality and the merits of 
decision-making.332 Firstly, reasonableness seeks to limit the width of the substantive exercise of 
a discretionary power whilst keeping the original decision-maker responsible for the decision on 
the merits within those limitations. Secondly, the substantive limitations to the exercise of a 
discretionary power are often unclear because the courts are able to determine whether a 
decision-maker has gone beyond the limits of reasonableness without defining the same with 
precision. This will be explored in more detail below. 
 
3 4 1 1 Unreasonable reasoning process 
 
A decision may be unreasonable because of a defect in the decision-making process either as a  
                                                 
328 See J Laws The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord 187, 201. Reasonableness is not monolithic but depends 
on the context. 
329 See Adan v Newham London Borough Council 2001 EWCA Civ 1916. 
330 See Re Amin 1983 2 ALL ER 864. Judicial review is primarily concerned with the decision-making process as 
opposed to the substance of the decision. 
331 C Forsyth and E Dring “The Final Frontier: The Emergence of Material Error of Fact as a Ground of Judicial 
Review” in Forsyth et al, Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 246-250. It is 
argued that it would breach the separation of powers which exists between government and the judiciary if the 
latter were to substitute its own views for those of the public body responsible for the decision. See D Oliver 
“The Judge Over Your Shoulder” Parliam Aff (1989) 42(3): 309. Downloaded from http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/ 
at University of London Senate House on 3 May 2012. Administrative law developed primarily to redress the 
balance of power and to safeguard the interests and rights of citizens. See D Stott & A Felix Principles of 
Administrative Law 2-3.  
332 See para 3 3. 
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result of the way the decision was reached or the manner in which it was justified.333 The 
application of the latter principle was demonstrated in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Ex p BT3G Ltd.334 In this case, the Court a quo had determined that the secretary of state had 
acted rationally in allowing associated bidders at the pre-qualification stage of a government 
auction provided they cease their association before the final granting of licences. This decision 
caused licences to be granted and licence fees to be paid at different times under the auction rules 
and let to accusations of state aid to those licensees benefiting from the later payment date. On 
appeal, the Court agreed with the Court a quo that the secretary of state's refusal to exercise his 
discretion was not irrational but objectively justifiable having regard to the considerations that: 1) 
the auction rules safeguarded competition by ensuring that no entity had more than one licence 
and that associated bidders divested themselves as soon as possible; 2) the auction rules provided 
for circumstances where licences would be granted at different times; 3) the auction rules were 
accepted without objection by the auction participants; 4) changes to the payment regime at the 
grant stage could lead to legal challenge; 5) the precondition had potentially adverse 
consequences and the benefit of deferred payment; 6) the benefit of deferred payment was not 
great when considering the price differences in different auctions for identical licences;335 and 7) 
no effective, alternative course of action had been suggested. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
In West Glamorgan County Council v Rafferty and others, the Court again considered whether 
the council had unreasonably balanced relevant considerations when it evicted gypsies that had 
moved onto a site in the council's area without its consent or licence.336 Considering the facts, the 
Court found that the council had wrongly concluded that it had done all it could to discharge its 
duty to provide accommodation to the gypsies in terms of the Caravan Sites Act 1968. According 
to the Court, the council could have provided temporary accommodation. In the circumstances, 
the Court concluded that the decision was unreasonable when weighing the council’s interest as 
landowner and their continued breach of duty against the decision to evict the gypsies in the 
absence of providing alternative accommodation. The appeal was dismissed. 
                                                 
333 The focus is on the factors taken into account by the decision-maker in making the decision, the evidence by 
which the decision was influenced and/or the quality of its justification. See H Woolf, S A De Smith, J L 
Jowell, A P Le Sueur & C M  Donnelly De Smith's Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 556- 557. 
334 2001 EWCA Civ 1448. 
335 The benefit of deferred payment was no more than about 2% of the licence price. 
336 1987 1 All ER 1005 found at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/west-glamorgan-county-council-v-rafferty-and-
others-r-v-secretary-state-wales-and-another-ex-p- on 24 October 2012. 
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Opposed thereto, International Trader’s Ferry Ltd serves as an example of a case where the court 
assessed the balance struck by the decision-maker between competing considerations and found 
that they have been reasonably balanced.337 In this case, the Court considered whether the police 
had unreasonably decided, in the face of disruptive demonstrations, to withdraw protection from 
animal exporters for certain days of the week. The Court accepted that the police were required to 
balance the danger to the rule of law flowing from the withdrawal of protection against pressures 
on police protection elsewhere when confronted with a situation involving conflicting rights and 
the police’s duty to uphold the law. Considering the police’s balancing exercise in the present 
instance, the Court was satisfied that the police had not ignored relevant facts or taken account of 
irrelevant factors in a way which vitiated the overall decision, but had allocated resources on a 
carefully considered basis that was not unreasonable.  
 
A decision may also be reviewable for lack of reasonableness if an error of reasoning deprives it 
of logic or comprehensible justification.338 In The Association of British Civilian Internees – Far 
East Region v Secretary of State for Defence,339 the Court of Appeal for example considered 
whether a non-statutory compensation scheme was irrational in denying British civilians 
compensation if neither they, nor their parents or grandparents, were born in the United 
Kingdom. Introduced to pay the debt of honour owed by the United Kingdom to British civilians 
interned by the Japanese during the Second World War, the Court accepted that reasonableness 
required a rational connection between the objective and the measures designed to further the 
objective. According to the Court, large numbers of British subjects had no birth link with the 
United Kingdom at the time of internment save for being British subjects by reason of statute and 
the United Kingdom was now a medium-sized European country compared to the empire 
controlled by it at the time of the War. Taking this into consideration, the Court found that the 
evidence presented rational reasons for the Government’s distinction between those that had a 
close connection with the United Kingdom at the time of internment and those that did not. 
Whilst the Government could have decided to include in the scheme all those who were British 
                                                 
337 See para 1. 
338 See Norwich and Peterborough Building Society, R (on the application of) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd    
     2002 EWHC 2379 (Admin). See H Woolf, S A De Smith, J L Jowell, A P Le Sueur & C M  Donnelly De Smith's  
    Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 559. 
339 2003 EWCA Civ 473; 2003 QB 1397. 
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subjects at the time of their internment, the Court concluded that it its failure to do so was not 
irrational. 
 
A similar approach was followed in Fawcett Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council.340 In 
this case, the local planning authority had granted a licence to build two cottages on condition 
that their occupation was to be limited to persons connected with agriculture. The Court accepted 
that the condition was lawful if it was fairly and reasonably related to the implementation of the 
planning policy and not imposed for an ulterior objective. Imposed to control urban growth, the 
Court found that the condition’s failure to achieve its object was not so great that it could not 
reasonably be expected to carry out the local planning authority’s policy.341 A rational connection 
test was therefore applied to ensure that there was not such a departure from logic that the means 
chosen by the decision-maker to achieve a particular aim were not apt to achieve the aim.342 In 
such instances, the inaptness may have pointed towards the decision being unreasonable.343 
 
By contrast, in R (Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust, the Court found that the 
defendant had irrationally refused Herceptin funding for an early stage breast cancer patient 
because she could not demonstrate “exceptional personal or clinical circumstances”.344 Not only 
was there no evidence before the Court that such a distinction could be made between patients 
within the same eligible group, but having stated that financial considerations were irrelevant, the 
Court found that the only reasonable approach was to consider the patient's clinical needs and to 
fund treatment for all patients within the eligible group provided they had been properly 
prescribed Herceptin by their doctors. 
 
These judgments demonstrate that a decision does not have to be perfect in all respects to qualify 
as reasonable, but that the quality of reasoning underlying or supporting the decision, the weight 
attached and the balance ascribed to the range of relevant and/or competing factors taken into 
account to reach the decision and/or the justifications offered for the decision will play a role in 
determining the reasonableness of that decision in the circumstances. In these instances, the 
                                                 
340 1961 AC 636. 
341 674. 
342 See P Daly (2011) PL 242. 
343 See M Supperstone, J Goudie & P Walker Judicial Review 4 ed (1992) 208. 
344 2006 EWCA Civ 392. 
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review court does not substitute decisions on issues of weight, but analysis weight in deciding 
whether the requisite irrationality exists.345 
 
3 4 1 2 Reasonableness and errors of fact 
 
In has already been established that the courts can review errors of fact in circumstances 
involving: 1) precedent facts,346 2) evidentiary findings347 and/or 3) a misunderstanding of an 
established and relevant fact.348 In E v Secretary of State for the Home Department,349 the Court 
found that the third category of error of fact would constitute a ground of review if: 1) there has 
been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence; 2) the 
fact or evidence was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; 3) the appellant or his advisers 
have not been responsible for the mistake; 4) the mistake has played a material, though not 
necessarily decisive, part in the decision-maker’s reasoning; and 5) the statutory context is one 
“where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result”. 
 
Within the context of these material errors of fact, Williams contends that there is a potential 
distinction to be drawn between factual findings that are objectively verifiable and those that 
require the exercise of a discretion and for which there is strictly speaking no correct answer. In 
support of the distinction, she specifically refers to the example of a decision-maker failing to 
provide a grant because it wrongly assessed a person’s age compared to the meaning of an 
“illegal entrant”. This distinction is important because, depending on the classification, the 
finding of fact in question will either be substituted with the objectively correct answer 
automatically350 or be subjected to a rationality review in the same way as the substantive 
outcome to the exercise of a discretionary power would have been.351 Pulhofer v Hillington 
London Borough Council is a case in point.352 In this case, a couple’s application for assistance 
under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 was refused because they were not considered 
                                                 
345 P P Craig “Nature of Reasonableness Review” 7. 
346 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja 1984 AC 74. 
347 See R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex p. A 1999 2 AC 330. 
348 See Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 1977 AC 1014. 
349 2004 EWCA Civ 49. 
350 I.e. whether or not the decision is correct is not dependent on the reviewing court. 
351 R Williams “When is an Error not an Error? Reform of Jurisdictional Review of Error of Fact and Law” (2007) 
PL 793 798. 
352 1986 UKHL 1; 1986 AC 484. 
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homeless when accommodation was available to them in the form of a room at a guest house on a 
bed-and-breakfast basis. On review, the applicants convinced the Court that this room was not 
accommodation which answered the statutory duty of the council under the Act, but this decision 
was overturned on an appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
 
On a further appeal to the House of Lords, the Court found that the council could conclude, as a 
matter of fact, that the couple was not homeless for purposes of the Act because they had 
accommodation within the ordinary meaning of the word. The Court reasoned that, where the 
existence of a fact was left to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact involved 
a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable, it was its 
duty to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Parliament had entrusted the 
decision-making power. According to the Court, the only exception was where it was obvious 
that the decision-maker, consciously or unconsciously, had acted perversely. In dismissing the 
appeal, the Court did therefore not comment on the objective and correct meaning of 
“accommodation”, but rather engaged in an assessment of the reasonableness of the initial 
decision-maker’s exercise of jurisdictional discretion in defining the term as it did.  
 
This same approach was followed in R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p South 
Yorkshire Transport.353 In this case, the question arose whether the Commission was entitled to 
investigate a merger, allegedly only affecting a small part of the country, when its powers were 
limited to mergers affecting a “substantial” part of the United Kingdom. The Court confirmed 
that size, character and importance were relevant criteria in determining whether a merger was 
‘‘worthy of consideration for the purpose of the Act’’ and hence “substantial”, but qualified this 
criteria on the basis that the meaning of “substantial” was broad enough to call for the exercise of 
judgment rather than an exact quantitative measurement. According to the Court, the conclusion 
of the Commission was therefore not irrational, but within the permissible field of judgment.354 
   
While courts do therefore rely on the fact/law distinction to determine whether to intervene on 
review, it is clear that the courts do not decline to review all errors of fact. On the contrary, case 
                                                 
353 1993 1 WLR 23. 
354 32-33. See also Puhlhofer v Hillingdon London Borough Council 1986 AC 484; 1986 UKHL 1. 
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law demonstrates that there have been instances where the review courts have considered the 
reviewability of errors of fact relating to precedent facts, evidentiary findings and/or a 
misunderstanding of established and relevant facts. Reasonableness plays a role in the review of 
these errors of fact when the facts in question are not objectively verifiable by requiring decision-
makers to rationally relate the evidence and their reasoning to the decision which they have 
made.355 Within the context of the discretionary power that has been conferred, reasonableness 
therefore requires a logical connection between the reasons for the decision and the merits of the 
matter.356 As such, a disproportion between the facts and their legal application and/or a mistake 
of fact in and of itself may render a decision unreasonable. Viewed in this manner, it is evidently 
difficult to determine the reasonableness of a decision without at the same time considering the 
merits of the decision. This does however not necessarily mean that the courts engage in a so-
called merits review; nor does it have the effect that there are two kinds of review—review of 
process and review of merits. A consideration of the merits is not the same as a decision on the 
merits.357 In a reasonableness review, the test is that of the reasonableness, as opposed to the 
correctness, of the findings of fact. As such, the question remains whether the evidence is such 
that a reasonable person, acting reasonably, could have reached the decision from the evidence 
and the inferences. In making the determination, the courts do not leave the weighing of 
competing values to the decision-maker without satisfying itself that due weight has been 
accorded to relevant interests and factors, but consider whether or not the decision is supported 
by factors, values and/or standards that reasonable persons would recognise as legitimate.358  
 
Downes distinguishes reasonableness review from a complete merits review; holding that the 
latter does not only involve a consideration of the merits of the original decision, but also a 
substitution of the decision under review if it is not the correct decision.359 Although 
                                                 
355 See M Supperstone, J Goudie & P Walker Judicial Review 213. In the event of objectively verifiable 
jurisdictional facts, the question is whether the determination that the matter is within the decision-maker’s 
jurisdiction is correct. See R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation 2003 2 
All ER 977 997. 
356 P Daly “Wednesbury’s Reason and Structure” (2011) PL 258. 
357 P Daly “Wednesbury’s Reason and Structure” (2011) PL 258. 
358 See J Chan “A Sliding Scale of Reasonableness in Judicial Review” 2008 Comparing Administrative Justice 
Across the Commonwealth 233 234. 
359 Garry Downes “Reasonableness, Proportionality and Merits Review” Paper delivered to the New South Wales 
Young Lawyers Public Law CLE Seminar, The Law Society, Sydney, 24 September 2008 found at 
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reasonableness review does therefore tend to go beyond a pure consideration of legal error to 
include a consideration of the merits of the matter, the courts’ power to act as the ultimate 
decision-maker and substitute that decision with the courts’ perception of the correct one is 
restricted and the primary remedy is the setting aside of the decision and its remittal to the 
primary decision-maker for reconsideration.360 It is only where a decision-maker, without the 
reviewable error, would have reached one decision only that the reviewing court may substitute 
its own decision for the decision in question.361 The power to make the substitute decision in this 
limited class of case is considered to be a time saving departure from the accepted doctrine that 
the review court is not concerned with the merits of decisions.362 
 
3 5 POLICY DECISIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SLIDING SCALE OF 
REASONABLENESS REVIEW  
 
It has now been established that the exercise of a discretionary power may be subject to judicial 
review on the basis of unreasonableness in the substantive sense if a decision-maker has made a 
decision that is alleged to be arbitrary, capricious or incapable of logical justification. It has also 
been established that the success of the unreasonableness review will depend on whether the 
court finds that the original decision-maker’s scrutiny and evaluation of the facts, reasoning 
and/or conclusions was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to 
it.363 This formulation advocates a relatively high threshold for court interference that, if adhered 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.aat.gov.au/Publications/SpeechesAndPapers/Downes/ReasonablenessSeptember2008.htm on 8 July 
2012 at 11h16. 
360 S 31(5) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 - “If, on an application for judicial review, the High Court quashes the 
decision to which the application relates, it may in addition - (a) remit the matter to the court, tribunal or authority 
which made the decision, with a direction to reconsider the matter and reach a decision in accordance with the 
findings of the High Court, or (b) substitute its own decision for the decision in question.” 
361 S 31(5A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 - “But the power conferred by subsection (5)(b) is exercisable only if - (a) 
the decision in question was made by a court or tribunal, (b) the decision is quashed on the ground that there has 
been an error of law, and (c) without the error, there would have been only one decision which the court or - 
tribunal could have reached. See also CPR 54.19(2)(b) - “The court may – (a)(i) remit the matter to the decision-
maker; and (ii) direct it to reconsider the matter and reach a decision in accordance with the judgment of the 
court; or (b) in so far as any enactment permits, substitute its own decision for the decision to which the claim 
relates.” 
362 D Feldman English Public Law 2ed (2009) 798.  
363 Although the test was slightly reformulated in subsequent cases, the focus has remained on the nature of the 
impugned decision. In CCSU, the Court required a decision which was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could 
have arrived at it. In R v Devon CC ex p George 1989 AC 573, the Court explained that unreasonableness should 
provoke an exclamation that the decision must certainly be wrong. 
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to, may effectively render very few decisions reviewable on the basis of unreasonableness.364 
Increasingly dissatisfied with the narrow scope of reasonableness, especially where constitutional 
rights or policy decisions are concerned,365 the courts have found that a “one size fits all" 
formulation of reasonableness is not possible, but that a more contextually sensitive approach is 
required.366 A variable intensity of unreasonableness review has therefore developed that has a 
more or less intrusive quality having regard to the nature and gravity of the matter concerned.367 
To determine the appropriate measure of court deference, respect or restraint when carrying out a 
substantive reasonableness review, consideration must therefore be afforded to the intensity of 
reasonableness review applied by the courts in the context of merits-, policy- and/or human 
rights’ decisions respectively.  
 
3 5 1 Policy decisions 
 
In the administrative law context, it is recognised that decisions often involve interacting interests 
and repercussions which are not easily accommodated within the adjudicative model of the 
courts, but are better left to the decision-maker to make a value judgment by properly weighing 
those competing claims which the decision-maker considers relevant.368 In R v Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board ex parte P, for example, the Court acknowledged that the judiciary process 
was not best-suited to deal with decisions involving a balance of competing claims on 
government funds, but also accepted that these types of decisions should not be excluded 
altogether from the scope of judicial review.369 The Court accordingly adopted a restrictive 
interpretation of reasonableness whereby intervention would only be possible in cases of 
                                                 
364 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Daly 2001 UKHL 26 para 32. The Court followed 
the determination of the European Court of Human Rights in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom (1999) 
29 EHRR 548 to hold that even a lowered threshold of unreasonableness in human right cases (i.e. anxious 
scrutiny) was insufficient to protect human rights upon judicial review. 
365 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Daly 2001 UKHL 26. In this case, it was argued that 
the depth of judicial review and the deference due to administrative discretion should vary with the subject matter 
of the case, viewed in its statutory context. 
366 See R (Pro-life Alliance) v BBC 2003 UKHL 23. 
367 I.e. a sliding scale of reasonableness review ranging from a light-touch unreasonableness review to one of anxious 
scrutiny. See J Laws The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord 187, 196. See also D R Knight “A Murky 
Methodology: Standards of Review in Administrative Law” 2008 6 NZJPIL 117. 
368 K Syrett “Of resources, rationality and rights: emerging trends in the judicial review of allocative decisions” 2000 
1 Web JCLI. [ 
369 1995 1 WLR 845 857. 
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irrationality, where, for example, a scheme for criminal injuries compensation excluded all of 
those with red hair.  
 
Similarly, in the matter of Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, the Court held that judicial interference would only be 
justified if the evidence supported a prima facie case of bad faith, improper motive or 
consequences that were so absurd that the decision-maker must have taken leave of his or her 
senses.370 According to the Court, it preferred such a strict scrutiny where matters of public 
expenditure or government policy were involved. 
 
In International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, a case concerning the disposition of police resources during 
a period of protests at live animal exports, the Court conducted a more comprehensive 
examination of the test.371 The House of Lords commented that Wednesbury Corporation was a 
briefly-considered case which might no longer be decided in the same way: its unreasonableness 
formulation was "tautologous" and amounted to an "admonitory circumlocution" which was not 
necessary to prevent judges from infringing the separation of powers. The Court proposed a 
reformulated test: "whether the decision in question was one which a reasonable authority could 
reach". Turning to the facts, the Court accepted that there was no absolute duty to protect the 
exporter’s activities, but that this was a matter of discretion. In exercising this discretion, the 
Court found that the decision-maker had balanced the various competing interests, had regard  to 
the priorities identified by the police authority as he was statutorily obliged to do, had not ignored 
other relevant factors or taken account of those which were irrelevant and had allocated his men 
on a carefully considered basis. The Court was accordingly unable to accept that the decision was 
unreasonable. 
 
The cases discussed above make it clear that policy decisions typically involve the exercise of a 
lawful discretion which is not rule-bound and does not require a dispositive, right-or-wrong 
answer. As such, the nature of the problem posed may render the review court unsuitable to make 
a determination. As the “red hair” illustration in ex parte P suggested, the courts in these policy-
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type decisions therefore apply a strict formulation of unreasonableness that will rarely be 
satisfied.372 On the one hand, this formulation provides the courts with the means to justify 
judicial self-restraint vis-à-vis the decision-maker whilst stopping short of holding that the 
decision is not amendable to judicial review at all. On the other hand, it also enables the courts to 
avoid involvement in polycentric questions whilst leaving open the possibility of intervention in 
noticeably bad or offensive cases. 
 
3 5 2 Fundamental rights 
 
In England, there is a growing realisation that the traditional Wednesbury test is inappropriate 
where a decision is alleged to interfere with fundamental rights or important interests.373 This was 
first propounded in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Bugdaycay.374 In this 
case, the secretary of state had refused to grant an asylum application on the ground that the 
appellant was not a genuine refugee despite indications that he was unlikely to be allowed re-
entry into Kenya and that he would be returned to Uganda where persecution was likely. An 
application for the judicial review of the decision was dismissed and an appeal against that 
refusal was also unsuccessful. On a further appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Bridge accepted 
that the question whether the appellant was a refugee was to be determined exclusively by the 
officials acting for the secretary of state and only open to challenge on Wednesbury principles. 
The Court however also reasoned that, within the limitations of the court’s power of review, it 
was entitled to subject an administrative decision to more rigorous examination to ensure that it 
was not flawed according to the gravity of the issue which the decision determined. In the present 
instance, the Court found that anxious scrutiny was warranted in so far as the administrative 
decision under challenge was one which had the potential to imperil life or liberty. 
 
Turning to the facts, the Court noted that the secretary of state's decision was taken on the basis 
of a confidence in Kenya's performance of its obligations under the Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees. However, based on the evidence available, the Court found that the 
                                                 
372 I.e. light touch unreasonableness review. See H Woolf, S A De Smith, J L Jowell, A P Le Sueur & C M  Donnelly 
De Smith's Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 592. See also City of Bradford Metropolitan Council v Secretary of State 
for the Environment 1986 AC 240; R (Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust 2006 EWCA Civ 392. 
373 H Woolf, S A De Smith, J L Jowell, A P Le Sueur & C M  Donnelly De Smith's Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 594. 
374 1987 AC 514. See A Le Sueur “The Rise and Ruin of Unreasonableness?”(2005) 10 JR 32-51.  
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dangers and doubts involved in sending the appellant back to Kenya had not been adequately 
considered and resolved. In consequence of this anxious scrutiny of reasonableness, the appeal 
was allowed.  
 
A clearer indication of the potential impact of the different approaches to reasonableness is to be 
found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in ex parte Smith.375 In this case, the applicants 
contended for an anxious scrutiny application of reasonableness, whilst the Ministry of Defence 
supported a strict application of the Wednesbury test. In determining the appropriate application 
in the present instance, the Court commented that the greater the policy content of a decision and 
the more remote the subject matter of a decision from ordinary judicial experience, the more 
hesitant the Court should necessarily be in holding a decision to be irrational. According to the 
Court, the reasonableness test was sufficiently flexible to cover all situations, but greater caution 
was required where decisions of a policy-laden, esoteric or security-based nature were in issue.376 
In this instance, the Court opted for a more stringent level of scrutiny because the policy did not 
depend essentially on political judgment and the human rights dimension was considered 
prominent.377 The Court nevertheless decided, partly also because the policy was supported by 
Parliament, that the practice could not be determined to have the requisite degree of 
unreasonableness. 
 
Similarly, in R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State the Court confirmed that there were different 
approaches to the correct standard of review; suggesting that the varying degrees of intensity 
should be regarded as points along a spectrum.378 Referring to the Smith formula, the Court 
commented that the different approaches were not hermetically sealed from one another, but that 
a sliding scale of review meant that the graver the impact of the decision in question upon the 
individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that would be required. In the 
context of human rights, the Court commented that an intensity of review would generally be 
                                                 
375 1996 1 All ER 257. 
376 264. 
377 R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith 1995 4 All ER 427 448d-452d. The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court had 
rejected a challenge to the policy of the Ministry which prohibited homosexuals from the armed forces on the 
basis of irrationality because reasons had been given and had held that ordinary Wednesbury should govern the 
situation. In the Court of Appeal all were in agreement that the anxious scrutiny approach applied. 
378 2001 1 WLR 840. See also Begbie 2000 1 WLR 1115 1130: “But each is a spectrum, not a single point, and they 
shade into one another. It is now well established that the Wednesbury principle itself constitutes a sliding scale 
of review, more or less intrusive according to the nature and gravity of what is at stake.” 
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followed which required the decision-maker to demonstrate either that its decision did not in truth 
interfere with the right or, if it did, that there existed considerations which could reasonably be 
accepted as amounting to a substantial objective justification for the interference.379 
 
In Brind the majority of the Court also indicated that a decision-maker who exercises broad 
discretion must show that an infringement of the right to expression can only be justified by an 
‘‘important competing public interest’’.380 
 
This test was reformulated in a fractionally more stringent way in R v Lord Saville of Newdigate ex p 
A.381 The Court confirmed that were fundamental rights were concerned; the options available to 
a reasonable decision-maker were curtailed. According to the Court, it was unreasonable to reach 
a decision that contravenes or could contravene human rights unless there were significant 
countervailing considerations justifying interference with the human rights. The latter was to be 
determined having regard to the strength of the countervailing circumstances and the degree of 
the interference with the right involved.382   
 
Whilst the concept of anxiously or heightened scrutiny is difficult to define, case law does serve 
to provide some guiding principles. For example in R (Sarkisian) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 
the Court confirmed that anxious scrutiny did not require the Court to strive by “tortuous mental 
gymnastics” to find error in the decision under review when in truth there has been none.383 
According to the Court, its concern ought to be focused on substance not semantics. Similarly, in 
R (Puspalatha) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Court confirmed that decisions must be read 
as a whole in a common sense way.384 In this regard, the Court explained that it was not 
appropriate for the Court to focus on particular sentences and to subject them to the kind of 
legalistic scrutiny that might perhaps be appropriate in the case of statutory instruments. More 
recently, this stricter application of unreasonableness has not been confined to human right cases. 
For example, when seeking to reject an ombudsmen decision, it was held that the secretary of 
                                                 
379 852. 
380 1991 1 All ER 720 749-751. 
381 2000 1 WLR 1855. 
382 1867 para 37. 
383 2001 EWHC Admin 486. 
384 2001 EWHC Admin 333. 
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state must have cogent reasons for doing so.385 The principle of a sliding scale of scrutiny 
therefore demonstrates that there are different shades and degrees of unreasonableness and that 
the unreasonableness standard applied should be commensurate with the seriousness of the 
subject-matter.386 The more the challenged decision lies in what may conveniently be called the 
political field, the less intrusive court supervision will be. On the other hand, interference with 
fundamental or constitutional rights will be subjected to more intrusive scrutiny with the public 
authority having the obligation to produce a justification for the decision as well as specify the 
considerations involved in the weighing exercise prior to the decision-making.387 In principle, 
however, the sliding scale of reasonableness requires the review court to examine the decision-
making process and to articulate clearly the basis of judicial scrutiny and the importance of the 
subject-matter. 
 
3 6    CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it was established that review is the primary mechanism for judicial supervision 
over the exercise of public power in English administrative law. Opposed to an appeal on the 
merits, the right of interference on review is limited to unlawful or illegal decisions.388 The 
challenge is not focussed on the correctness of the decision itself, but on the manner in which the 
decision was made.389 As a result, the courts scrutinise the lawfulness of decisions, in 
substance390 and procedure,391 taking into consideration the material available, the reasons 
afforded for the decision by the primary decision-maker and the law as it stood at the time the 
decision was made. Judicial review does not require the courts to perform the decision-making 
                                                 
385 R (Bradley and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 2008 EWCA Civ 36. The Court held that 
where the Parliamentary Commissioner had found maladministration in a ministerial department, the Secretary of 
State, although not bound by the Commissioner’s decision, was not entitled to reject the Commissioner’s finding 
on the basis that he preferred another view which could not be categorised as irrational. R (Equitable Life 
Members Action Group) v HM Treasury 2009 EWHC 2495 (Admin). The Court held that the Government had 
failed to produce cogent reasons for rejecting a number of the Ombudsman’s findings of maladministration and 
injustice, and quashed its decision to do so. 
386 See See J Chan Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth 255. 
387 H Woolf, S A De Smith, J L Jowell, A P Le Sueur & C M  Donnelly De Smith's Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 595. 
388 See para 2 1.  
389 See Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans 1982 3 ALL ER 141 in para 3 2 1. 
390 E.g. has the decision-maker taken irrelevant considerations into account or failed to take relevant considerations 
into account? 
391 E.g. has the decision-maker afforded the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard and/or has the decision been  
     made by a decision-maker who is free from actual bias or the appearance of bias? 
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task properly allocated to the relevant authority by law.392 By curtailing judicial control in this 
manner, it is reasoned that courts are able to preserve the position that they only fulfill the 
legislative will and not dictate the results that should be reached.393 This view is merely 
strengthened by the fact that the typical judicial review remedy is setting aside and remitting the 
decision to the original decision-maker as opposed to the court varying the decision and making a 
substitute decision.394  
 
Reviewable decisions have conveniently been grouped by the CCSU case into three classes of 
grounds of review: illegality, procedural impropriety and unreasonableness.395 The Senior Courts 
Act 1981 has not confirmed these common law grounds of review, but it is generally accepted 
that they are reconcilable with the statutory application for judicial review based on the 
requirement of lawfulness.396 In consequence, a decision would qualify as unlawful as envisaged 
by the Senior Courts Act 1981 if the decision is considered illegal, procedurally improper and/or 
unreasonable as contemplated in CCSU. This threefold classification does not rigidly set the 
grounds of judicial review; nor are the grounds strictly compartmentalised. Since CCSU, 
incompatibility with obligations arising out of the Human Rights Act 1998 has also been 
recognised as a ground for review in addition to proportionality in the fundamental rights’ 
context. 
 
The principle of legality requires a decision-maker to correctly understand the law that regulates 
his or her decision-making power and to give effect to it.397 In these instances, there is no 
question of decision-makers having a discretion to interpret the law or any jurisdiction to 
interpret the law incorrectly. If a decision-maker misdirected himself or herself in law and asked 
the wrong question, the courts are entitled to find that decision unlawful, correcting the 
misconstructions of the law to ensure that such decision-makers act within the confines of their 
allocated powers. Examples include decision-makers: 1) acting outside the scope of their powers; 
2) exercising powers for improper purposes; 3) erroneously interpreting and/or applying principle 
                                                 
392 See Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans 1982 3 ALL ER 141 in para 3 2 1 as well as Brind and 
others v Secretary of State for the Home Department 1991 UKHL 4 in para 3 3. 
393 P P Craig Administrative Law 537. 
394 See s 31(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 in para 2 2. 
395 See para 3. 
396 See para 2 2 and 3. 
397 See para 3 1. 
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of laws; and/or 4) not taking precedent facts into account or taking into account facts which ought 
not to have been taken into account. 
 
Procedural impropriety as a ground of review implies that decision-makers are required to 
observe the basic rules of natural justice and/or act with procedural fairness towards the person 
who will be affected by the decision.398 Again, a standard of correctness will apply to the extent 
that non-compliance with procedural requirements lead to a decision being set aside for 
procedural impropriety. 
 
Therefore, where the focus is on the procedure by which the decision was arrived at or the legal 
basis on which it was founded, decision-makers do not have a right to choose between more than 
one possible course of action. In fact, decision-makers’ failure to adopt the right course of action, 
having regard to the legality and procedural principles imposed in any particular instance, would 
render the decision unlawful. In these instances, review courts thus require compliance with a 
correctness standard with no question of deference to the decision of the administrative authority. 
 
Opposed thereto, unreasonableness as a ground of review is focused on the discretionary 
decision forming the subject matter of the review proceedings; that is, the substance of a decision 
or its justification. It requires decision-makers to apply logical or rational principles in their 
decision-making process so as to make a competent decision based on the facts available.399 As 
part of substantive review, the courts ask whether the discretionary power under which the 
decision-maker has acted has been improperly exercised or insufficiently justified. In this regard, 
the courts consider decisions for evidence of: 1) a failure to identify relevant considerations, 2) 
the placement of manifestly undue or inadequate weight to relevant considerations; 3) irrelevant 
considerations having been taken into account; 4) an error of reasoning which deprives the 
decision of logic or comprehensible justification; 5) error of fact that is significant in the 
decision-making process or may have been material to the decision and/or 6) inferential 
unreasonableness. In the latter instance, the courts presume that, because the decision in question 
appears unreasonable, the decision-maker must have been influenced by irrelevant considerations 
                                                 
398 See para 3 2. 
399 See para 3 3. 
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or had acted with bias or in some other improper way despite the fact that the decision appears to 
have been made within the four corners of the decision-maker’s powers. Unlike an illegality 
and/or procedural impropriety challenge, an unreasonableness allegation can therefore not be 
tested against a correctness standard. Because the decision in question follows an administrative 
discretion, the decision cannot be determined to be right or wrong in any objective way. It is the 
very nature of an administrative discretion that there is a right to choose between more than one 
possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing 
opinions as to which is to be preferred.400  
 
To ensure some measure of control over the rationality of decisions, the courts have thus 
approved a measuring stick which requires the decision to be so unreasonable that no reasonable 
authority could ever have come to it. Other formulations of the same test have required decisions 
that: 1) have no rational basis or are so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral 
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could 
have arrived at it; 2) are beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker; 
and/or 3) demonstrate that, in reaching its decision, the decision-maker had directed itself 
improperly in law and had taken into consideration irrelevant matters and included in its 
consideration irrelevant matters. 
 
Although an unreasonableness review will inevitably involve a review court in a consideration of 
the merits of the impugned decision, it does not necessarily have the effect that the courts engage 
in a full scale merits review or that there are two kinds of review—review of process and review 
of merits.401 When courts find a decision to be reasonable, they are inevitably commenting on the 
reasonable or logical connection between the evidence thought by the court to be true and the 
reasoning or purposes supporting the decision that was made. Such a value determination cannot 
be made in isolation of the evidence and/or facts of the matter. In reviewing factual findings, the 
test however remains whether the evidence is such that a reasonable person, acting reasonably, 
could have reached the decision from the evidence and the inferences. The question is not 
whether the finding as such is right or wrong; the courts will simply hold that a decision-maker 
                                                 
400 See Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 1977 AC 1014. 
401 See P Daly “Wednesbury’s Reason and Structure” (2011) PL 258. 
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has acted unlawfully if they have breached any of the reasonableness principles without also 
substituting the decision under review if it is not the correct decision. Framing the test in this 
manner is considered to legitimise judicial supervision in administrative decisions and to defend 
the courts from the allegation that they are overstepping their boundaries and intervening too 
greatly in the merits of the matter. Although there is an overlap between proportionality and 
unreasonableness,402 the concept of ‘‘proportionality’’ is accepted to advocate a more stringent 
scrutiny and has been adopted as the appropriate test for review of European Community law and 
Convention rights (under the Human Rights Act 1998) only. In contrast, unreasonableness 
continues to apply to domestic law.  
 
The unreasonableness test is also not cast in stone but may have a more or less intrusive quality 
based on the nature and gravity of the matter concerned. Evidence of light-touch review and 
anxious scrutiny is particularly prominent in decisions involving policy and fundamental rights 
respectively. Whereas the courts are hesitant to scrutinise polycentric decisions, the courts are 
more willing to engage in deeper scrutiny when fundamental rights are in issue. This approach 
requires decision-makers to articulate its weighing process and enables the court to enter into a 
more in-depth reasonableness debate. In determining whether the decision-maker has exceeded 
the reasonableness margin of appreciation in a particular case, context is therefore important. 
 
In essence, unreasonableness concerns the decision that a decision-maker could not reasonably, 
in all the circumstances of the case, have reached. It is to be determined objectively having regard 
to the substantive principles of judicial review. Unreasonableness does not enable a review court 
to strike down a decision because that particular court considered the decision to be wrong and 
hence subjectively considered it to be an “unreasonable” decision. On the contrary, rather than 
focusing on issues of jurisdiction403 or procedural prerequisites for reaching a decision,404 
unreasonableness addresses the mental processes involved in making the decision. Put 
differently, unreasonableness as a ground of review deals with those decisions that do not sit 
comfortably in any of the other recognised grounds of review, but nevertheless require 
intervention because it is obviously a very bad decision. The test for unreasonableness makes it 
                                                 
402 I.e. in the sense of achieving a fair balance between factors that have been or can be deemed relevant. 
403 I.e. illegality. 
404 I.e. procedural impropriety. 
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abundantly clear that the courts are required to make a secondary decision, with the primary 
decision about the merits of the matter being left to the public authorities. As such, the test for 
unreasonableness lies at the heart of the judicial review process, the control of the exercise of 
administrative discretion and the supervision of judicial decision making.405 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
405 See M T Molan Constitutional and Administrative Law 2 ed (2004) 3. 
92 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ROLE OF PERVERSITY IN CHALLENGING TRIBUNAL FINDINGS IN 
ENGLAND 
 
4 1 INTRODUCTION 
  
In English employment law, employees after one year of continuous service with the same 
employer have the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed and to enforce this right, if it has 
been encroached upon, or to obtain a remedy for a breach of this right, by presenting unfair 
dismissal complaints to the Tribunal within three months from the date of termination.406 The 
Tribunal is an independent judicial body407 with jurisdiction in terms of the Employment 
Tribunals Act 1996 to determine unfair dismissal disputes as well as all other employment 
complaints as may be conferred upon it by statute.408 Generally having exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of the complaints falling within its jurisdiction,409 the Tribunal is envisioned to be an 
easily accessible body for determining complaints in a relatively quick and less expensive manner 
and with fewer formalities and technicalities than the ordinary courts.410 With some minor 
exceptions, its decisions are also generally final and binding.411 Whilst a claimant before the 
Tribunal may therefore seek to challenge the outcome of the proceedings before a higher 
authority simply because a finding was not made in his or her favour, this will not be sufficient. 
Section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 only allows an appeal against a Tribunal 
finding to the Appeal Tribunal on the basis of a question of law. Issues of fact are considered to 
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal acting as an industrial jury.412  
 
                                                 
406 Section 94(1) read with sections 108(1), 111(1) and 111(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
407 See Employment Tribunal Guidance found at http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/employment on 30 October 
2012 at 18h29. See also L Dickens & M Hall “Labour Law and Industrial Relations: A New Settlement?” in P 
Edwards (ed) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice (2009) 134. 
408 See section 2 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
409 See section 205(1) of the Employment Rights Act. 
410 See Hardy Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain 3 ed (2007) 70. See also the aims, standards and 
targets of the Employment Tribunal at http://www.employmenttribunals.gov.uk/AboutUs/charter 
Statement.htm#l1 found on 21 February 2011 at 10h07.  
411 See para 4 2 2. 
412 See R Painter & A Holmes Cases and Materials on Employment Law 9 ed (2012) 29. 
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The Employment Tribunals Act 1996 does not define what constitutes a “question of law”. Its 
meaning and scope is however important to all parties involved in appeal hearings before the 
Appeal Tribunal to establish whether the decision or conclusion in question warrants court 
scrutiny and interference.413 Mechanisms put in place to safeguard the proper application of 
jurisdiction and the fact/law distinction include the initial vetting of prospective appeals by the 
registrar of the Appeal Tribunal and the listing of appeals for preliminary hearings for directions 
as to whether they should proceed to full hearings.414 To satisfy the Appeal Tribunal that there are 
reasonable grounds for an appeal, a claimant must be able to clearly identify in his or her papers 
the point(s) of law on which the appeal is based as well as properly substantiate the reasoning 
underlying the points.  
 
The treatment in English law of certain errors of fact as errors of law further complicates 
delineating the scope of an appeal on a point of law. In Neale v Hereford and Worcester County 
Council, the Court of Appeal held that an appellate court could interfere with a finding of fact if it 
was evident that the finding was certainly wrong.415 In Piggott Brothers & Co. Ltd v Jackson, the 
Court of Appeal accepted that the absence of evidence to support a finding of fact was an 
appealable question of law.416 In British Telecommunications Plc v Sheridan the Court of Appeal 
also confirmed that a misunderstanding and/or misapplication of the facts may amount to a 
question of law if the Tribunal had made a wrong finding on a relevant undisputed or 
indisputable fact and that error was the basis of further conclusions of fact.417 
 
In this chapter, the remedy of appeal from the Tribunal to the Appeal Tribunal is discussed with 
specific reference to the jurisdiction and constitution of the Appeal Tribunal and the scope and/or 
ambit of the permissible ground(s) of appeal. The differences between questions of law and 
questions of fact are also discussed. Consideration is then afforded to the circumstances in which 
the Tribunal's failure to give adequate reasons for its decision, a breach by the Tribunal of the 
rules of natural justice and/or excessive delay on the part of the Tribunal in giving its decision, 
                                                 
413 See para 4 3. 
414 See Rule 3(7) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 as amended and para 11 of the Practice Direction 
(Employment Appeal Tribunal - Procedure) 2013. See discussion in para 4 2 2. 
415 1986 IRLR 168 174. 
416 1991 IRLR 309 312. 
417 1990 IRLR 27 30. 
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can amount to an error of law. The circumstances in which the Tribunal's treatment of facts can 
amount to an error of law and cases where there is no evidence to support its findings of fact is 
also considered. In addition it is considered in what circumstances Tribunal decisions can be 
appealed against on the basis of perversity or because the Tribunal reached its decision following 
an erroneous exercise of discretion. This study is conducted for the purpose of extracting 
meaningful principles to contribute to the interpretation and application of the review remedy 
provided for in section 145 of the LRA. 
 
4 2 THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL  
 
In England, employment disputes are not dealt with by the ordinary courts but by a specialist 
Tribunal.418 Initially referred to as the “Industrial Tribunal”, it was renamed the “Employment 
Tribunal” in the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998.419 From inauspicious 
beginnings under section 12 of the Industrial Training Act 1964,420 the Tribunal’s jurisdiction has 
been extended under section 2 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 to cover the greater part of 
the statutory, individual employment rights.421 The Tribunal has, for example, jurisdiction in 
respect of complaints of unfair dismissal;422 breach of contract of employment;423 redundancy 
payments;424 unauthorised deduction from wages;425 discrimination in the employment context426 
and unequal pay.427 The Tribunal is generally constituted by an employment judge and two 
members.428 They participate equally in decision-making429 and use their employment and/or 
                                                 
418 S Hardy Labour Law in Great Britain 4 ed (2011) 68. 
419 See section 1 of the Act. The Industrial Tribunals Act 1996 was renamed the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
All references to the “Industrial Tribunal” in pre-1998 case law must thereto be understood to be references to the 
“Tribunal”. For simplicity, the Employment Tribunal and/or Industrial Tribunal will herein both be referred to as 
“the Tribunal”. 
420 I.e. the Tribunal initially only dealt with appeals from employers against levies imposed upon them by industrial 
training boards. 
421 S Hardy Labour Law in Great Britain 4 ed (2011) 68. See also I T Smith & G Thomas Smith and Wood’s 
Employment Law 9 ed (2008) 24. 
422 Section 111(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
423 Section 3(2) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
424 Section 163(1) of the Employment Rights Act. 
425 Section 23 of the Employment Rights Act. 
426 Section 120 of the Equality Act 2010. For the nature of discrimination contemplated, see Part 5 (Work) of the 
Equality Act 2010. 
427 Section 2 of the Equal Pay Act 1970.  
428 One member is selected from the panel of persons appointed by the Lord Chancellor after consultation with 
organisations or associations representative of employees and the other member from the organisations or 
associations representative of employers. See Rule 8(2)(a)-(c) and Rule 9(1)(a) and (b). 
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industrial experience and expertise to adopt a common sense approach to decision-making rather 
than make determinations in a legalistic manner.430 The Employment Tribunals Rules of 
Procedure also makes it clear that the Tribunal members must handle cases fairly and justly.431 
This includes: 1) ensuring that parties to the proceedings are on an equal footing; 2) avoiding 
unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; 3) dealing with cases in ways 
which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues; 4) avoiding delay so far 
as is compatible with a proper consideration of the issues; and 5) saving expense.432 The 
Tribunal, however, deals with a great number of disputes which turn heavily on the facts of the 
particular case involved and often require the application of complex law.433 The Tribunal’s 
challenge lies in reconciling the duties to hear the respective parties’ cases, make factual findings, 
apply the relevant law and reach a conclusion to which its findings and experience lead it with the 
objective of resolving disputes in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.  
 
4 3 THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL 
 
The Employment Tribunals Act 1996 recognises that Tribunal judgments, decisions, directions or 
orders may be challenged on appeal to the Appeal Tribunal established under section 87 of the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 and continued in existence under section 20(1) of the 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996.434 The Appeal Tribunal is a superior court of record435 that 
retains the Tribunal’s character as a quick, fair, inexpensive and accessible means for individuals 
                                                                                                                                                              
429 G Mansfield, J Bowers QC, D Brown, S Forshaw, A Korn, J Palca & D Reade QC Blackstone's Employment Law 
Practice 2012 (2012) 5. 
430 S Honeyball Honeyball and Bowers' Textbook on Employment Law 12 ed (2012) 165. 
431 Schedule 1 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013. 
432 Rule 2(a)-(e). See also A Sinclair, N Botten & S Cahill “Unfair Dismissal, Representation and Compensation” 
2000 5 Web JCLI found at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue5/sinclair5.html on 28 October 2012 at 10h13. 
433 See D Lockton Q&A Employment Law 2011-2012 7 ed (2011) 12. See also Meek v Birminingham District 
Council 1987 IRLR 250. See also Schedule 1 of The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of 
Procedure) Regulations 2013. The Tribunal’s decision must: identify the issues which the Tribunal has identified 
as relevant to the claim; if some identified issues were not determined, what those issues were and why they were 
not determined; findings of fact relevant to the issues which have been determined; a concise statement of the 
applicable law; how the relevant findings of fact and applicable law have been applied to determine the issues; 
and where the judgment includes an award of compensation or a determination that one party make a payment to 
the other, a table showing how the amount or sum has been calculated or a description of the manner in which it 
has been calculated. 
434 See section 21 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 as well as definition of “Appeal Tribunal” in Rule 2(1) of 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 as amended.  
435 Section 20(3) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.  
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to seek remedies for alleged infringements of their statutory employment rights.436 It is composed 
of a High Court judge and two or four appointed members with special knowledge or experience 
of industrial relations and that equally represents both sides of industry.437 These lay members are 
not assessors or side members, but function as independent, uncommitted lay judges with equal 
voting powers.438  
 
Similar to the limited review jurisdiction of the Labour Court in South Africa, appeals from the 
Tribunal to the Appeal Tribunal have traditionally only been available on a question of law 
arising from the Tribunal’s originating jurisdiction under the specified employment protection 
legislation referred to in section 88(1) of the Employment Protection Act 1975. This jurisdiction 
has since been expanded to take account of increases in employment legislation,439 but, as part of 
a continued policy to minimise appeals, section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 
with one exception (relating to appeals against a decision of a certification officer) continues to 
only allow appeals on points of law arising from any decision of, or any proceedings before, the 
Tribunal in respect of a designated list of statutes.  
 
Broadly and in general, a question of law concerns the interpretation of the law and its 
application to the facts of the matter only.440 Appellants must therefore seek to identify flaws in 
the legal reasoning of the original decision.441 The Appeal Tribunal is not entitled to substitute its 
own interpretation of the facts for that of the Tribunal and afford second chances to parties who 
have not properly and fully argued their facts before the Tribunal.442 In those instances where the 
Appeal Tribunal does allow an appeal, it may substitute its own decision for that of the Tribunal 
                                                 
436 See S T Hardy Labour Law in Great Britain (2011) 71. See also G Mansfield, J Bowers, D Brown, S Forshaw, A 
Korn & J Palca Blackstone's Employment Law Practice (2011) 252 and para 1 of the Practice Direction 
(Employment Appeal Tribunal - Procedure) 2013. 
437 I.e. employers and workers. Section 28(2) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. See I T Smith & G Thomas 
Smith and Wood’s Employment Law 27. 
438 See J Phillips “Some Notes on the Employment Appeal Tribunal” (1978) 7(1) Industrial Law Journal 137; 
downloaded from http://ilj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of London Senate House on 3 May 2012 as well as I 
T Smith & G Thomas Smith and Wood’s Employment Law 27. 
439 See L Dickens & A C Neal The Changing Institutional Face of British Employment Relations (2006) 145. 
440 See chapter 3. 
441 See Ministry of Justice “Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics, 2011-12” for the period 1 April 2011 to 31 
March 2012 found at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/tribs-stats/employment-trib-stats-april-
march-2011-12.pdf on 1 November 2012. 
442 Gilham v Kent County Council 1985 IRLR 18. See I T Smith & G Thomas Smith and Wood’s Employment Law 
28. 
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or remit the case to the same Tribunal or a differently constituted Tribunal for a complete 
rehearing or the reconsideration of a particular point only.443 The Appeal Tribunal will only 
substitute a decision with its own view if no further investigation is required to determine that the 
Tribunal’s decision is plainly and unarguably wrong on the facts as a result of a misdirection in 
law and it is equally clear what the correct decision is.444 However, irrespective of the direction 
taken, the written determinations of the Appeal Tribunal are final and conclusive, subject only to 
the appropriate avenue of appeal to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme Court, 
provided the leave of either the Appeal Tribunal or the Court of Appeal has been obtained.445  
 
4 4 GROUNDS OF APPEAL: QUESTION OF LAW 
 
The Employment Tribunals Act 1996 does not define what constitutes a “question of law”. The 
Appeal Tribunal and the Courts have therefore applied their own minds to this question. In 
certain categories of cases this has proven to be relatively easy. A question concerning the 
construction of a statute must, for example, be a question of law.446 In other cases it has been 
more difficult; requiring the appellate body to engage in an exercise of statutory interpretation to 
determine its meaning and scope.447 However, as the Court of Appeal has emphasised, the 
difference between legal questions and findings of fact and inferences is important.448 Appellate 
bodies must therefore be able clearly to identify the difference between questions of law and 
challenges to primary findings of fact disguised as questions of law. On the other hand, care must 
be taken not to follow a “too narrow” or “too broad” approach to its interpretation and 
application.449 A broad interpretation would defeat the legislature’s objective to establish the 
Tribunal as a quick, accessible, less expensive and more informal means of resolving 
                                                 
443 Section 35(1) and (2) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. See also G Mansfield, J Bowers QC, D Brown, S 
Forshaw, A Korn, J Palca & D Reade QC Blackstone's Employment Law Practice 2012 para 18.187. 
444 I.e. the Tribunal will not substitute its view unless there is only one possible conclusion that could have been 
reached by the Tribunal. See Morgan v Electrolux Ltd 1991 ICR 369; O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc 1983 ICR 
728. See also G Mansfield, J Bowers QC, D Brown, S Forshaw, A Korn, J Palca & D Reade QC Blackstone's 
Employment Law Practice 2012 para 18.187 as well as The City Law School Employment Law in Practice 8 ed 
(2008) 71. 
445 Section 37(1) and (2) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
446 See Phillips (1978) Industrial Law Journal 138. 
447 G Sneath “Matadeen: ‘Question of Law’ in Appeals from Industrial Tribunals” (1993) 14(2) Statute Law Review 
146-148 found at slr.oxfordjournals.org on 10 February 2011. 
448 See Fuller v The London Borough of Brent 2011 EWCA Civ 267 found at http://www.bailii 
.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/267.html on 6 November 2012 at 20h22. 
449 Para 28-30. 
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employment disputes. However, a very restrictive interpretation could possibly deprive a party of 
justice in a situation that would otherwise have warranted interference. This raises the question 
whether the Appeal Tribunal, in circumstances where it strongly disagrees with the Tribunal, can 
rule that the decision is wrong in law.450 
 
Although the facts of Watling v William Bird & Son (Contractors) Ltd are not directly relevant 
to the present discussion, the Queen’s Bench Division, hearing the appeal because the Appeal 
Tribunal had not yet been established, made an important ruling regarding the manner in which 
Tribunal decisions should be challenged as wrong in law.451 According to the Court, an appellant 
who claimed the commission of an error of law had to establish one of three things on the part of 
the Tribunal: 1) that it misdirected itself in law, misunderstood the law or misapplied the law; 2) 
that it misunderstood the facts or misapplied the facts; or 3) that, although it apparently directed 
itself properly in law and did not misstate, misunderstand or misapply the facts, the decision was 
perverse or there was no evidence to justify the conclusion which was reached.452 In respect of 
the third point of perversity, the Court referred to Cooper v British Steel Corporation. In that 
case, it was held that the Court would not interfere with a decision unless it appeared from the 
primary facts that the decision on a point of fact was plainly wrong.453 According to the Court, 
“plainly wrong” went beyond a mere matter of opinion or approach, but required the Court to 
deduce from looking at all the facts that, although the Tribunal had not expressed a wrong 
approach, it must in fact have followed one because the decision was clearly wrong. 
 
In Melon v Hector Powe Ltd, the House of Lords also accepted that interference on the basis of a 
question of law was only warranted if the appellant could demonstrate that the Tribunal had 
misdirected itself in law or reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal, directing itself 
properly on the law, could have reached.454 According to the House of Lords, the fact that the 
appellate tribunal would have reached a different conclusion on the facts was not a sufficient 
ground for allowing an appeal.  
                                                 
450 J Wood “The Employment Appeal Tribunal as it Enters the 1990s” (1990) 19(3) Industrial Law Journal 133-141; 
downloaded from http://ilj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of London Senate House on 3 May 2012. 
451 1976 ITR 70. I.e. in this case the Court recognised the Tribunal’s misunderstanding and/or misapplication of the 
facts as a ground of appeal. 
452 71. 
453 1975 ICR 454. 
454 1981 ICR 43. 
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In Dobie v Burns International Security, the Court of Appeal clarified the appellate courts’ role 
by dividing the appeal query into two separate questions.455 According to the Court, it was first 
required to establish whether there had been an error of law on one of two alternative bases: 
either the Tribunal’s direction on the law was wrong or the conclusion was one that no reasonable 
tribunal could have reached on the evidence. In the latter instance, the Court commented that, 
since all Tribunals were supposedly reasonable tribunals, it had to follow that there had been a 
misdirection in law despite the Court’s inability to detect what it was.456 Once such a 
misdirection of law had been detected, the Court held that it was obliged to move to the second 
part of the enquiry and ask whether the conclusion of the Tribunal was plainly and unarguably 
correct notwithstanding that misdirection. According to the Court, it was only if the decision was 
plainly and unarguably correct notwithstanding the misdirection that it should not be set aside. If 
the conclusion was wrong or might have been wrong, the Court reasoned that it was for the Court 
to remit the case back to the Tribunal which was charged with making the findings of fact.457 
 
In Gilham v Kent County Council (No.2), the Court of Appeal accepted that it was in the nature 
of questions of fact that different people, looking at the same set of circumstances, may 
reasonably come to different conclusions.458 According to the Court, it was common in a system 
where there was no appeal on fact that different Tribunals would from time to time give different 
answers to broadly similar situations and that neither decision could be challenged on appeal. For 
these reasons, the Court cautioned that it was important to resist the temptation to overturn a 
factual decision with which it might not agree by searching for a “shadowy point of law on which 
to hang its hat for the purpose of bringing uniformity to the differing decisions”.459 The Court 
reasoned that such an approach would have the undesirable effect of encouraging appeals which 
raised no point of law, but depended upon comparative findings of fact.460 
 
                                                 
455 1984 IRLR 329. 
456 Para 17. 
457 Para 18. 
458 1985 IRLR 18. 
459 22. 
460 22. 
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In British Telecommunications Plc v Sheridan,461 the Court of Appeal also cautioned against 
scrutinising matters of fact. The Court accepted that any court with the experience of the Appeal 
Tribunal would from time to time disagree with or have doubts about Tribunal decisions, but 
warned that the Appeal Tribunal should proceed with great care in such circumstances.462 
According to the Court, the Appeal Tribunal did not have the benefit of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses and Parliament had given the Appeal Tribunal a role limited to questions of law 
only.463 The Court then referred to Watling v William Bird & Son (Contractors) Ltd and accepted 
that an error of law would comprise of: 1) a misdirection, misunderstanding and/or 
misapplication of the law and 2) a perverse decision. The Court, through Lord Justice McCowan, 
was, however, not convinced that an error of law would also include a misunderstanding and/or 
misapplication of the facts. According to the Court, a misunderstanding and/or misapplication of 
the facts should only be appealable as a perverse decision where there was no evidence to support 
the conclusion that was reached. The Court doubted whether a different approach would be 
correct; since this would suggest that the Appeal Tribunal was entitled to allow an appeal simply 
on the basis that it took a different view of the facts from that of the Tribunal; effectively entitling 
it to substitute the decision with its own view of the evidence.464  
 
Lord Justice Gibson agreed that an appellate body should not interfere with the Tribunal’s factual 
conclusions simply because it disagreed with it. According to the Court, a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of facts could amount to an error of law only where the Tribunal had wrongly 
decided upon a relevant, undisputed or indisputable fact and had then proceeded to consider the 
evidence and reach further conclusions of fact based upon that demonstrable initial error. The 
Court reasoned that such a decision could amount to an error of law because the Tribunal was 
required by law to consider the case in accordance with agreed or undisputed facts. On the other 
hand, where the alleged misunderstanding of fact depended upon a decision of fact that the 
                                                 
461 1990 IRLR 27. 
462 A perversity appeal would not apply where it is alleged that: 1) the overall decision is perverse because the 
findings of fact on specific issues on which there was a conflict of oral evidence are perverse; 2) the chairman’s 
decision is silent or incomplete on factual points and have therefore been overlooked or the resultant findings of 
fact are therefore not supported by the evidence or;462 or 3) the Tribunal has reached different conclusions in 
cases based on similar facts. It is also not enough that the Appeal Tribunal would, on the basis of the merits and 
the oral evidence, have decided the matter differently than the Tribunal or feels strongly that the result is unfair. 
See Retarded Children’s Aid Society Ltd v Day 1978 IRLR 128 130. 
463 Para 34. 
464 Para 23-24. 
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Tribunal was entitled to make, and which it did make, the Court reasoned that an attack on that 
finding could not be converted into an error of law unless it could be shown that there was no 
evidence to support it or that the conclusion was perverse.465  
 
In East Berkshire Health Authority v Matadeen,466 the Appeal Tribunal made reference to 
Watling v William Bird & Son (Contractors) Ltd,467 Melon v Hector Powe Ltd468 and British 
Telecommunications Plc v Sheridan469 and likewise accepted that it could only interfere with a 
decision of the Tribunal if it fell within the ambit of a question of law. According to the Appeal 
Tribunal, this entailed: 1) a misdirection and/or a misapplication of the law; 2) a material finding 
of fact which was unsupported by any evidence or contrary to the evidence before the Tribunal; 
and 3) a finding of perversity.470 In the latter respect, the Appeal Tribunal commented that 
although perversity operated as a free-standing basis in law, interference on this basis should not 
amount to a mere substitution of the Appeal Tribunal’s view for that of the Tribunal because the 
Appeal Tribunal disagreed therewith or felt strongly that the result was unjust. According to the 
Appeal Tribunal, it was to be limited to those qualified occasions where the Appeal Tribunal 
found that: 1) it was completely satisfied in the light of its own experience and of the sound 
practices in the industrial field that the decision was not a permissible option; 2) the conclusion 
offended reason or was one to which no reasonable Tribunal could have come to; 3) the decision 
was so very clearly wrong that it just could not stand; and/or 4) the decision was so outrageous in 
its defiance of logic or of accepted standards of industrial relations that no sensible person who 
had applied his or her mind to the question, and with the necessary experience, could have 
arrived at it.471 Although the Appeal Tribunal did not claim that the foregoing constituted a 
definition, it referred to it as the legal principles applicable in so-called perversity cases.472  
 
                                                 
465 Para 30-31. 
4661992 IRLR 336. 
467 Para 40. 
468 Para 54. 
469 Para 40. 
470 Para 53. 
471 Para 55-56. 
472 Para 39. 
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Perversity was discussed further in the matter of County Council of Hereford and Worcester v 
Neale.473 In this case, the Court of Appeal accepted that, where the Tribunal had found the facts, 
applied the relevant law and had reached a conclusion to which its findings and experience have 
led it, it would not often be that one could legitimately say that the conclusion “offended reason” 
or that the conclusion was one to which no reasonable tribunal could have come. According to 
the Court, factual matters were the function of the Tribunal and when it had not erred in law; 
neither the Appeal Tribunal nor the Court was to disturb the decision unless one could effectively 
say: “My goodness that was certainly wrong”.474 
 
The practical distinction between questions of fact and law was illustrated in Nethermere (St 
Neots) Ltd v Taverna and Gardiner.475 In this instance, the two respondents were engaged by the 
company as part-time homeworkers to sew trouser flaps and pockets using company sewing 
machines. Following a dispute which led to the termination of this arrangement, the Tribunal 
determined, as a preliminary finding to an unfair dismissal dispute, that the respondents were 
employees within the meaning of section 153(1) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) 
Act and were not self-employed under a contract for services.476 In a subsequent appeal, the 
Appeal Tribunal held that the question whether a person worked under a contract of service or a 
contract for services was a question of law, not fact, which required the Appeal Tribunal to reach 
its own view on the facts. The Appeal Tribunal, however, dismissed the appeal holding that, 
since the particular circumstances of the case supported the view that the respondents were not in 
business for themselves, the Tribunal had correctly concluded that they were employed under 
contracts of service.477 However, in a further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal 
Tribunal had erred in identifying as a question of law the question whether the respondents 
worked under a contract of service. According to the Court, whether there was a contract of 
service was a question of law but the answer to it included questions of degree and fact which the 
Tribunal had to determine. With reference to Edwards v Bairstow,478 the Court therefore 
determined that the decision could only be interfered with if it was shown that the Tribunal had 
                                                 
473 1986 IRLR 168. 
474 Para 45. 
475 1984 IRLR 240. 
476 Para 1-4 and 7. 
477 Para 10. 
478 1956 AC 14. See para 12-14. 
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misdirected itself in law or the decision was one which no tribunal, properly directing itself on 
the relevant facts, could have reached. Having regard to the evidence, the Court found that there 
was just enough material to make a contract of service a reasonably possible inference. The 
Tribunal decision was accordingly upheld and the appeal dismissed.479 
 
In Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Mr M Mylott,480 the Court of Appeal classified 
findings as to the credibility of witnesses as a question of fact. In Eclipse Blinds Ltd v Wright,481 
the Appeal Tribunal also refused to entertain an appeal concerning the adequacy or otherwise of 
weight to be attached to evidence. According to the Appeal Tribunal, the weight to be attached to 
evidence in any case was a matter for the Tribunal determining the facts. The Appeal Tribunal 
reasoned that it was not for an appellate body concerned only with errors of law, to take upon 
itself the task of deciding what weight should be attached to particular facts. Having found that 
the judgment in question was one which the Tribunal was entitled to make on the facts, the 
Appeal Tribunal ruled that it could not displace that judgment of fact with its own view.482  
 
Although the greater part of the cases discussed above were decided before the legislature 
extended the gateway to an appeal through section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, 
the Appeal Tribunal’s interpretation of its jurisdiction has not changed subsequent thereto. In 
Stanley v Capital Law LLP,483 the Appeal Tribunal referred to Lewis v Motor World Garages 
Ltd484 and accepted that it was settled law that an appellate court may only overrule a decision if 
the Tribunal had misdirected itself as to the relevant law or had made a finding of fact with no 
supporting evidence or which no reasonable tribunal could have make.485 Likewise, in Yeboah v 
                                                 
479 Para 30. Findings of fact also include the questions whether a person’s services is engaged in the capacity of an 
employee or as an independent contractor; whether an employee resigned or was dismissed; whether taking part 
in an overtime ban amounted to taking part in a strike or other industrial action; whether there was a constructive 
dismissal; and whether the employer’s decision to dismiss was within a range of reasonable responses. See 
O’Kelly & others v Trust House Forte PLC 1984 1QB 90; Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd 1981 
IRLR 347; 1982 IRLR 27 EAT. 
480 2010 UKEAT 0399_10_1304 found at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2011/0399_10_1304.html on 19 
March 2011 at 08h36. 
481 1992 IRLR 133. 
482 Para 14. 
483 UKEAT/0417/08/LA found at http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/results.aspx on 6 November 2012. 
484 1985 IRLR 465. 
485 Para 13. 
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Crofton, the Court of Appeal reiterated its reluctance to interfere with matters of fact.486 
According to the Court, only the Tribunal heard evidence firsthand and the evidence available to 
the Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal on an appeal on a question of law was seriously and 
incurably incomplete. Although an appeal from the Tribunal was not a re-trial of the case, the 
Court accepted that the legal points had to be considered in the context of the entire proceedings 
and the decision as a whole, but with an awareness of the limitations on the Court's competence 
to question the evidential basis for findings of fact by the Tribunal. In this regard the Court 
reasoned that, if the Tribunal conducted proceedings and delivered a decision in accordance with 
the law, neither the Appeal Tribunal nor the Court of Appeal were entitled to interfere with that 
decision even if they might have conducted and decided the case differently.487  
 
Broadbent, in an article entitled Fact and Law in the Casual Inquiry, explains that there are good 
reasons for legal process to distinguish between questions of fact and law including clarity of 
reasoning, justice and common sense.488 Central to the deployment of juries and the jurisdiction 
of appellate courts, this distinction suggests that questions of fact are to be answered by evidence 
and sound inferences from that evidence. On the other hand, questions of law are to be answered 
by statute, precedent and policy, to the satisfaction of an expert in those things – which usually 
means a judge. The article however also acknowledges that it is not always possible to entirely 
separate questions of fact from questions of law because several legal tests tend to mix the two 
questions in complex ways. Reasonable foreseeability is mentioned as one example of this. As a 
legal doctrine which aims to capture an objective fact about what a reasonable person would 
foresee; it is contended that a legal professional will be more able to predict what a court will 
consider reasonably foreseeable than the average, ordinary person. For another example, 
Broadbent contends that what courts call findings of fact are governed by admissibility and 
relevance of evidence, as well as standards of proof and inference, which are all matters of law.489  
 
Taking this into consideration, it is evident that there are three stages to the decision-making 
process, namely fact-finding (questions of fact), stating the applicable legal rule (questions of 
                                                 
486 2002 IRLR 634. 
487 Para 12. 
488 A Broadbent “Fact and Law in the Casual Inquiry” (2009) 15(3) Legal Theory 173-191. 
489 See discussion in para 1. 
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law) and applying the legal rule to the facts (mixed questions of fact and law) and that this 
distinction is of great importance in the English appeal context.490 In essence, questions of law 
involve the scope, effect and/or application of a rule of law which is usually of general 
application and applied by the courts in determining the rights of parties.491 Opposed thereto, 
questions of fact involve an inquiry into the conflicting views of the factual circumstances of the 
particular case concerned and are material to its outcome.492 The task of determining the primary 
facts may be shaped by legal requirements as to procedural fairness or evidence, but on the 
assumption that those requirements have been adhered to; the Tribunal will not commit an 
appealable error of law simply by misunderstanding or misapplying the facts. There are 
exceptions, as will be explained in more detail below, but they are limited. Mixed questions of 
fact and law comprise a combination of questions of fact and law. The question is whether the 
facts found satisfy the legal test determined to be applicable.493 Mixed questions of fact and law 
produce questions of law for appeal purposes when the result reached is beyond a tolerable 
margin.494 The definition of that margin will be discussed further below.  
 
The justification for this distinction is premised on the basis that the trier of fact is in a better 
position to make factual findings because it, among others, observed the witnesses’ demeanour 
and heard their testimony first hand.495 This distinction is strengthened by the fact that England is 
well acquainted with the jury system. It is considered the chief function of a jury to see, hear and 
interpret or evaluate the circumstances surrounding a particular case or to resolve questions of 
fact arising therefrom. Questions of law on the other hand are left for the decision making of the 
court, including the overseeing of points of law in the presentation of the evidence and the 
                                                 
490 M Elliott, J Beatson & M Matthews Beatson, Matthews and Elliott's Administrative Law Text and Materials 4 ed 
(2011) 37. 
491 See discussion at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Question+of+Law found on 26 February 2011 at 
10h14. P Cane Administrative Law 181-182. Questions of law are deemed to have a single, correct answer. 
492 See discussion at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Error+of+fact found on 3 October 2012 at 09h05. 
493 See discussion at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Question+of+Law found on 26 February 2011 at 
10h14. See also Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd 1981 IRLR 347. In that case, the question 
whether there has been a breach of contract and, if so, whether such breach was fundamental were considered 
mixed questions of fact and law. 
494 See references to a “plainly wrong decision” in Watling v William Bird & Son (Contractors) Ltd, an 
“impermissible option” in East Berkshire Health Authority v Matadeen and a decision that “offends reason” in 
County Council of Hereford and Worcester v Neale above. See also para 19 of White v Burton’s Foods Ltd 
UKEAT/0514/09/LA, referring to the threshold required for a claim of perversity to succeed, found at 
http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/ Public/results.aspx on 6 November 2012 at 20h00. 
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process observed by the parties to the litigation. The fact that the Tribunal has a tripartite 
structure, consisting of an employment judge and lay members with employment and/or 
industrial experience, and is often described as an “industrial jury” by the Appeal Tribunal and 
Court of Appeal is therefore very significant; as is the statement in UCATT v Brain496 that the 
Tribunal has to look at questions of fact “…in the round and without regard to the lawyers’ 
technicalities. It has to look at it in an employment and industrial relations context and not in the 
context of the Temple and Chancery Lane”.497 Unlike the Tribunal, the Appeal Tribunal and the 
Court of Appeal are declared by statute to be superior courts of record and are unable to 
completely draw back from a more formal approach. This further explains why it is considered 
improper to allow an appeal based on questions of fact to the appellate bodies.  In using an unfair 
dismissal dispute as an example, it would, therefore, be for the employer to decide to dismiss an 
employee; for the Tribunal to make findings of facts and decide whether, on an objective basis, 
the dismissal was fair or unfair and for the Appeal Tribunal to decide whether a question of law 
arose from the proceedings in the Tribunal. As appellant courts and tribunals are confined to 
questions of law they ought not, in the absence of an error of law, to take over the Tribunal’s role 
as an industrial jury and decide whether or not such a dismissal was fair. 
 
Having regard to the case law discussed, it is clear that one is able to classify the categories of 
appeal upon a point of law as follows: 1) the Tribunal has misdirected itself in law or 
misunderstood or misapplied the law; 2) the Tribunal has reached findings of primary fact 
without evidence to support it; and 3) the finding is perverse. This ground includes instances 
where the Tribunal has reached findings of primary fact without evidence to support it and such 
fact forms part of the reasoning. An appeal on a point of law also resembles judicial review in 
terms of the grounds of challenge.498 The grounds of appeal will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
                                                 
496 1981 ICR 542. 
497 550A-D. 
498 The Tribunal’s decisions of fact are decisive and an error of law is present if: 1) the decision contains a 
misinterpretation or misapplication of the law; 2) the decision is supported by no evidence; 3) there has been a 
breach of natural justice or the procedure followed led to unfairness; 4) there is no proper findings of fact or 
adequate reasons for the decision; and/or 5) the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly 
instructed as to the evidence and relevant law could reasonably have come to the determination in question (a 
perverse decision). 
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4 4 1 Misdirection, misunderstanding and/or misapplication of the law 
 
In Paw v HMRC,499 the Appeal Tribunal accepted that the question of an error of law in the 
decision of, or in the proceedings before, the Tribunal was wide enough to include: 1) an appeal 
against an omission; 2) an unreasonable delay where by definition there was no judicial decision; 
3) an allegation of actual or apparent bias; and 4) an automatic disqualification for having an 
interest in imminent or current proceedings before any adverse decision was made.500  
 
In Lodwick v Southwark London Borough Council,501 the point of bias and/or procedural 
impropriety received attention when the Appeal Tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis that it 
raised no question of law. This decision was made against the background of a request that the 
Tribunal chairperson recuse himself because he had previously presided over a case in which the 
appellant had acted as representative. Although no copy of the decision was available, the 
appellant submitted that the written decision of the earlier case contained adverse comments 
about his conduct of the hearing and costs were awarded against the party whom he represented.  
 
The Court of Appeal accepted that the Appeal Tribunal would have jurisdiction unless the 
allegation of bias was on its face so lacking in substance that it could not be said to amount to a 
real challenge to the decision.502 Having considered the material before the Appeal Tribunal, the 
Court was not convinced that the Appeal Tribunal was entitled to hold, as a matter of jurisdiction, 
that the bias allegation had passed this test. On the contrary, the Court was satisfied that the 
Appeal Tribunal’s reasoning raised a question of law upon the test to be applied when bias was 
alleged. According to the Court, had jurisdiction been accepted, the Appeal Tribunal would have 
been required to consider the Tribunal proceedings as a whole and decide whether a perception of 
bias had arisen by asking whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the 
facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased.503 The Court 
                                                 
499 UKEATPA/0703/11/DA; UKEATPA/0704/11/DA; UKEATPA/0705/11/DA; UKEATPA/0715/11/DA; 
UKEATPA/1552/11/DA found at http://www.employmentcasesupdate.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed11458 on 3 
November 2012 at 09h28. 
500 Para 20. 
501 2004 EWCA Civ 306. 
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therefore allowed the appeal against the Appeal Tribunal's decision and remitted the case to the 
Appeal Tribunal to determine the issue of bias. 
 
Stanley Cole (Wainfleet) v Sheridan illustrates the operation of the right to a fair hearing as a 
question of law.504 In this case, the appellant contended that the chairperson’s failure to allow the 
parties an opportunity to consider and make representations in relation to certain case law 
subsequently referenced in the ruling had deprived it of its absolute right to a fair trial in breach 
of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the Court of Appeal 
accepted that the absence of a fair hearing would be a serious procedural irregularity sufficient to 
allow an appeal, it held that an appeal on this basis would not be allowed simply because a 
tribunal judgment cited authority which had not been referred to in the hearing. According to the 
Court, judicial research would be stultified if parties had to be given an opportunity to address all 
cases eventually set out in a judgment.505 The Court reasoned that it was its task to determine 
whether the Tribunal had altered or affected the way the issues had been addressed to such an 
extent that it could be said by a fair-minded observer that the case was decided in a way which 
could not have been anticipated by a party fixed with such knowledge of the law and procedure 
as it would be reasonable to attribute to him or her in all the circumstances.506 The Court accepted 
that this was not intended to be an all-encompassing test, but that everything depended on the 
subject matter and the facts and circumstances of each case.507 Not having been persuaded that 
the authorities were central to the Tribunal decision, the Court was however satisfied that the 
manner in which the judgment had been delivered did not constitute a serious irregularity or a 
denial of the right to a fair hearing. The appeal was according dismissed.508 
 
Unreasonable delay as a ground of appeal was discussed in Bangs v Connex South Eastern Ltd.509 
In this case, a ticket inspector had referred a complaint to the Tribunal, alleging unfair dismissal 
and direct race discrimination, after he was dismissed for misappropriating company monies 
                                                 
504 2003 Adj LR 07/25 found at http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/ArbitrationLR/STANLEY.COLEv 
     SHERIDAN2003.pdf on 3 November 2012 at 10h05.  
505 Para 29. 
506 Para 32. 
507 Para 33. According to the Court, it was impossible to lay down a rigid rule as to where the boundaries of 
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following an excessive number of credit/debit card chargebacks.510 The matter was duly heard, 
but the Tribunal only promulgated a decision in favour of the complainant more than a year 
later.511 The appellant subsequently appealed to the Appeal Tribunal and was successful on the 
ground of unreasonable delay because material errors or omissions in the decision showed a real 
risk that the decision was unsafe by virtue of the delay.512  
 
On a further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that there were serious objections to transplanting 
the "wrong/unsafe decision" approach from an ordinary civil appeal to an appeal from the 
decision of the Tribunal, where the right to appeal was confined by statute to questions of law. 
According to the Court, this would enable appellants to challenge findings of fact, not 
characterised as perverse, and circumvent the provisions of 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals 
Act 1996.513 The Court preferred to hold that unreasonable delay was a matter of fact, not a 
question of law, and did not constitute an independent ground of appeal. According to the Court, 
a question of law did not arise and no independent ground of appeal existed simply because, by 
virtue of material factual errors and omissions resulting from delay, the decision was considered 
"unsafe". The Court reasoned that, within the confines of section 21(1), a challenge to the 
tribunal's findings of fact was not, in the absence of perversity, a valid ground of appeal and there 
was no jurisdiction under section 21(1) of the Act to entertain it.514 The Court accepted that there 
may be exceptional cases in which unreasonable delay by the Tribunal in promulgating its 
decision could properly be treated as a serious procedural error or material irregularity giving rise 
to a question of law in the "proceedings before the tribunal”. According to the Court, such an 
                                                 
510 Para 25-26. The complainant alleged that: 1) in the disciplinary enquiry, he had been asked whether he was 
Nigerian and was accused of getting his "brothers" to help him defraud the company; 2) the insufficient record of 
debit/credit card numbers occurred because he had used a short cut method for completing debit card details in 
imitation of what was done by another employee; 3) other employees had been issuing tickets in the same way 
without being disciplined 
511 The Tribunal found that the appellant had discriminated against the complainant on racial grounds in subjecting 
him to a disciplinary process, in the manner in which it conducted the disciplinary investigation and disciplinary 
procedure and in dismissing him from his job. Para 28. 
512 In this regard, the Appeal Tribunal accepted the contentions that the Tribunal: 1) in making a credibility finding in 
favour of the complainant, had failed to take into consideration that the complainant has initially omitted to 
address the issue of racist remarks with the appellant or in his application to the Tribunal; 2) with the passage of 
time, had overlooked or forgotten the evidence as to which chargebacks were subject to the disciplinary 
proceedings; and 3) omitted to deal with the evidence of one Mr Osborne, which conflicted with the evidence of 
the complainant, and was relevant to the question of consistency, credibility and whether the Tribunal's 
assessment was flawed by the delay. 
513 Para 42. 
514 Para 43(3).  
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argument would fall within the scope of section 21(1), which was not confined to questions of 
law to be found in the substantive decision itself.515 The Court reasoned that this could occur if 
the appellant for example established that the failure to promulgate the decision within a 
reasonable time had given rise to a real risk that, due to the delayed decision, the party 
complaining was deprived of the substance of his guaranteed right to a fair trial under article 
6(1).516 According to the Court, the question whether a person had been afforded a fair trial in the 
Tribunal was capable of giving rise to a question of law. In this regard, the Court explained that 
section 21(1) did not expressly or impliedly exclude a right of appeal where, due to excessive 
delay, there was a real risk that the litigant had been denied or deprived of the benefit of a fair 
trial of the proceedings and where it would be unfair to allow the delayed decision to stand.517  
 
Turning to the present appeal, the Court summarised that the key question was whether, due to 
the unreasonable delay, there was a real risk that the appellant had in substance been deprived of 
the article 6 right to a fair trial in respect of the race discrimination claim and whether in the 
circumstances it was unfair to allow the delayed decision to stand.518 According to the Court, this 
test was, on the one hand, less stringent than the perversity ground of appeal, but also on the 
other hand more stringent than the "unsafe" decision test formulated and applied by the Appeal 
Tribunal, as it excluded an appeal on fact and insisted on the existence of a question of law in 
accordance with the requirements of section 21(1) of the 1996 Act.519 In the circumstances, the 
Court concluded that the errors and omissions relied upon by the Appeal Tribunal to rule that the 
decision was unsafe did not satisfy the stringent test for raising a question of law. Reading the 
decision as a whole in the light of the specific criticisms made of it, the Court was satisfied that 
the delay in promulgating it did not create a real risk that the appellant was deprived of the 
benefit of a full and fair trial. According to the Court, it was therefore fair and just to allow the 
decision to stand rather than to order a new hearing by a different tribunal.520 
 
                                                 
515 Para 6 and 43(7). 
516 Para 43(7). 
517 Para 43(7). 
518 Para 44. 
519 Para 44-45. 
520 Para 52. 
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Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police demonstrates that the Tribunal’s assessment of 
compensation may also amount to an error of law.521 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered 
the reviewability of a compensation award for injured feelings in circumstances where the Appeal 
Tribunal had reduced the Tribunal’s award of £74 000 substantially on the basis that it lacked 
sound reasons to support its size.522 The Court accepted that an appellate body was not entitled to 
interfere with the Tribunal’s assessment simply because it would have awarded more or less than 
the Tribunal. According to the Court, it had to be established that the Tribunal had acted on a 
wrong principle of law or had misapprehended the facts or made a wholly erroneous estimate of 
the loss suffered.523 Considering the argument before it, the Court found that the totality of the 
award for non-pecuniary loss was seriously out of line with: 1) the majority of those types of 
awards made and approved on appeal in reported Appeal Tribunal cases; 2) the guidelines 
compiled for the Judicial Studies Board; and 3) with reported cases in the personal injury field 
where general damages have been awarded for pain, suffering, disability and loss of amenity.524 
The Court accordingly allowed the cross-appeal and reduced the compensation for hurt feelings 
and personal injury to a total amount of £32 000.525 
 
In Cancer Research UK v Harding, a decision was also set aside on appeal because of a 
misapplication of the law when the Tribunal erroneously held that the burden of proof rested on 
the employer, not only to establish the reason for the dismissal, but also to show reasonable 
grounds for its belief in the claimant’s misconduct based on a reasonable investigation.526 
According to the Appeal Tribunal, the Tribunal had failed to note that under section 98(4) of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 the burden of proof on the issue of the reasonableness of the 
dismissal was neutral. The Appeal Tribunal was satisfied that this misdirection in law had 
infected the totality of the Tribunal judgment and allowed the appeal.527 
 
                                                 
521 2002 EWCA Civ 1871. 
522 Para 2, 5 and 8. The Tribunal reasoned that the appellant’s treatment had been less favourable than a hypothetical 
male officer in the same circumstances and that the respondent was vicariously liable for acts of sex 
discrimination leading to the termination of the appellant’s services. 
523 Para 51. 
524 Para 61. 
525 Para 62. 
526 UKEAT/0485/09/DA found at http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/results.aspx on 3 November 2012 at 
11h13. Para 9-10. 
527 Para 14. 
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Similarly, in Dobie v Burns International Security, the Court of Appeal accepted that, in 
determining whether an employer had acted unreasonably in terms of section 57(3) of the 
Employment Protection Act 1978 as amended, it was important to take into account the injustice 
suffered by the employee and the extent thereof.528 According to the Court, the Tribunal had 
misdirected itself when it adverted to section 57(3) in terms excluding injustice to the employee. 
Accepting that there had been an express misdirection of law, the Court then asked whether the 
conclusion of the Tribunal was plainly and unarguably right notwithstanding that misdirection.529 
Not satisfied that the decision had passed this test, the Court remitted the case to the Tribunal.530 
 
A Tribunal decision will therefore be appealable as an error of law if the Tribunal wrongly 
understood and/or applied a principle of law. This includes a compensation award in 
circumstances where its calculation is in conflict with reported case law and any guidelines that 
may have been compiled.531 In these circumstances, the decisive question is whether the 
Tribunal’s conclusion is plainly and unarguably right notwithstanding the misdirection or 
misapplication of the law532 and not whether the decision falls within a range of reasonable 
responses. It is further apparent that errors of law as per section 21(1) of the Employment 
Tribunals Act 1996 are not confined to the substantive decision itself, but that allegations of bias 
or procedural impropriety on the part of the Tribunal may also be appealable as an error of law 
from a procedural perspective. In the case of bias, the Appeal Tribunal must consider the 
proceedings before the Tribunal as a whole and determine whether the fair-minded and informed 
observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias on 
the part of the Tribunal.533 In the case of procedural impropriety, the pertinent question is again 
whether the decision evidences the absence of a fair hearing. Excessive delay on the part of the 
Tribunal in promulgating a decision is a further sub-category of appeal on the basis of an error of 
                                                 
528 1984 ICR 812. 
529 818. 
530 The Appeal Tribunal recognised that the Tribunal’s approach amounted to a misdirection, but nevertheless 
affirmed its unanimous decision that the employee had not been unfairly dismissed. the Court reversed the 
decision of the Appeal Tribunal. 
531 See earlier discussion of Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police 
   532 See earlier discussion of Dobie v Burns International Security. 
533 See earlier discussion of Lodwick v Southwark London Borough Council. 
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law. It is considered unfair to uphold this decision in circumstances where there is a real risk 
from the lapse of time that the applicant had not received a fair trial of the proceedings.534  
 
4 4 2 Material finding of fact without supporting evidence or despite contrary evidence 
 
In Yeboah v Crofton,535 the Court of Appeal accepted that an appeal will generally succeed if the 
Tribunal had misunderstood the evidence; leading to a crucial finding of fact unsupported by 
evidence or contrary to uncontradicted evidence.536 This principle was demonstrated in Francis v 
Cleveland Police Authority537 in circumstances where the claimant had resigned from her 
position and referred an unfair dismissal complaint following a period of alleged bullying and 
isolation. The Tribunal accepted that the claimant had been constructively and unfairly dismissed, 
but limited the compensation for loss of earnings to the date on which the claimant resigned from 
her new job because there were no medical records supporting the claimant’s claim that she was 
still suffering from work-related stress when she resigned from her new post approximately three 
months later.538 
 
On appeal, the Appeal Tribunal referred to Yeboah v Crofton539 and accepted that the significance 
of an individual finding of fact, unsupported by evidence or contrary to uncontradicted evidence, 
must be assessed in the context of the decision as a whole. According to the Appeal Tribunal, if a 
finding was of no real significance – because the conclusions of the Tribunal had been reached 
for reasons which were demonstrably independent of the finding – the appeal would not be 
allowed. On the other hand, the Appeal Tribunal accepted that, if a finding was of real 
significance - in that an important conclusion of the Tribunal rested wholly or mainly on the 
finding – the appeal would generally succeed.540  
 
                                                 
  534 See earlier discussion of Bangs v Connex South Eastern Ltd. 
535 2002 IRLR 634. 
  536 Para 95. 
    537 UKEAT/0335/10/ZT found at http://www.employmentcasesupdate.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed8361 on 7 November   
    2012 at 10h44. 
  538 Para 19. 
  539 2002 IRLR 634. 
540 Para 45. 
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On the facts of the present matter, the Appeal Tribunal found that the Tribunal was wrong to have 
proceeded on the basis that there was no relevant reference in the claimant’s medical records at 
the time she left her new post.541 According to the Appeal Tribunal, the Tribunal should have 
checked with the claimant and her doctor whether there were in fact recorded visits to the doctor 
at the relevant time.542 In the circumstances, the Appeal Tribunal concluded that the Tribunal had 
proceeded on an assumption or finding of fact concerning the absence of recorded visits to the 
doctor which no reasonable Tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the law and the evidence, could 
have proceeded.543 The appeal was accordingly allowed.544 
 
4 4 3 Perversity of the decision 
 
It is difficult to formulate with clarify the meaning of a “perverse” decision. However, in general, 
it refers to a decision that no reasonable tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the evidence and the 
law, could have reached. This class of case raises complications because the appellant is 
essentially arguing that the decision is so unreasonable that it must be wrong. Perversity appeals 
challenge the dividing line between merits and legality because its trigger is the poor quality of 
the Tribunal decision.545 This is difficult to explain or justify in an appeal system that consistently 
denies appeal on the merits; insisting that it is a matter left for the judgment or discretion of the 
Tribunal concerned. The challenge in such cases lie in formulating the correct legal approach to 
the question whether and in what circumstances there has been an error of law and where the line 
should properly be drawn. On the one hand, too great a readiness to interfere would involve an 
assumption of jurisdiction not provided for by statute, but on the other hand, too great a 
reluctance would cause the Appeal Tribunal to serve no useful purpose.546 
 
In terms of its ordinary dictionary meaning, the adjective “perverse” refers to “showing a 
deliberate and obstinate desire to behave in a way that is unreasonable or unacceptable” and 
                                                 
541 Para 46. 
542 Para 49. 
  543 Para 50. 
  544 Para 55. 
545 See Phillips (1978) Industrial Law Journal 138. 
546 See Phillips (1978) Industrial Law Journal 138-139. 
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behaving “contrary to the accepted or expected standard or practice”.547 “Perversity” as a ground 
of appeal is not defined in statute. The Practice Direction (Employment Appeal Tribunal - 
Procedure) 2008, handed down by the Appeal Tribunal in the exercise of its power to regulate its 
own procedures, only stipulates that an appellant may not state as a ground of appeal simply 
words to the effect that “the judgment or order was contrary to the evidence”, that “there was no 
evidence to support the judgment or order” or that “the judgment or order was one which no 
reasonable Tribunal could have reached and was perverse”.548 The notice of appeal must also set 
out full particulars of the matters relied on in support of those general grounds.549  
 
Case law does not only demonstrate that general allegations of perversity without substantiation 
are not accepted by the courts, but also that perversity is a difficult ground to establish because of 
the strict test that has to be satisfied. The reasoning behind such a strict approach is evident from 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds v Croucher.550 In this case, the Appeal Tribunal 
reminded itself that the Tribunal had the advantage of seeing the witnesses, sensing the 
atmosphere in the particular workplace, gauging the qualities of the different personalities and 
weighing the impact of their effect upon the other.551 Taking this into consideration, the Appeal 
Tribunal confirmed that it was its duty and function to follow the factual findings of the Tribunal 
loyally, unless the decision was not tenable by any reasonable tribunal properly directed in law. 
 
This narrow approach to perversity as a ground of appeal was approved by the Court of Appeal in 
Neale v Hereford and Worcester County Council.552 In this case, a music teacher was dismissed 
following an incident which occurred whilst he was invigilating pupils sitting an A levels 
examination.553 The Tribunal initially dismissed the unfair dismissal complaint, but the Appeal 
Tribunal reversed the decision on the basis that it was one which no reasonable tribunal could 
have reached.554 On a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court found that the Appeal 
                                                 
547 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/perverse found on 31 July 2012 at 19h05. 
548 See par 1.3 and 1.4 of the Practice Direction available at http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/  
FormsGuidance/practiceDirection.htm#link1 and accessed on 19 March 2011 at 07h41. 
549 See para 2.6 of the Practice Direction available at http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/ 
FormsGuidance/practiceDirection.htm#link1 and accessed on 19 March 2011 at 07h41. 
550 1984 ICR 604. 
551 609. 
552 1986 IRLR 168. 
553 Para 4-9. 
554 Para 2. 
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Tribunal had erred in overruling the Tribunal's decision that it was within the band of reasonable 
response of a reasonable employer in the circumstances of the case to dismiss the respondent 
teacher on grounds of misconduct, notwithstanding some procedural deficiencies.555 According to 
the Court, the Appeal Tribunal had substituted its own view for that of the Tribunal in finding 
that: 1) there was too much haste, stubbornness and secrecy and too little concern for the 
appearance of fairness and its substance when considering the employer's response to the 
employee's misconduct; and 2) the employer’s reaction could not be seen in the eyes of any 
reasonable tribunal as conduct which would have commended itself to a reasonable employer in 
that position.556 
 
The Court held that it was the function of the Tribunal to find the facts, apply the relevant law 
and to reach the conclusion to which its findings and the experience of its members lead.557 The 
Court confirmed that when a Tribunal had complied with the foregoing principles, it would not 
be often that it could legitimately be said that its conclusion offended reason or was one to which 
no reasonable tribunal could have come. According to the Court, if the Tribunal had not erred in 
law, its decision should not be disturbed by an appellate body unless it could be said in effect: 
“My goodness, that was certainly wrong!”.558 In the present case, the Court found that the 
reasoning of the Tribunal had not led it to the conclusion that there was an express misdirection 
or that the decision must be wrong. In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the Tribunal 
had well in mind the matters relied upon by the Appeal Tribunal. Given the teacher's serious 
misconduct on the evidence and findings of the Tribunal, the Court concluded that those matters 
could not adequately sustain the Appeal Tribunal's disagreement with the Tribunal’s conclusion 
that in the circumstances the dismissal was fair.559 
 
A similar approach was followed in Yeboah v Crofton.560 In this instance, the Tribunal had found 
that the appellant, Mr Crofton, had directly discriminated against the claimant, one Mr Yeboah, 
                                                 
555 Para 43 and 49. 
556 Para 49. 
557 Para 45. 
558 Para 45. 
559 Para 44 and 47. 
560 2002 IRLR 634. 
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on the basis of race, contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976.561 On appeal, the Appeal Tribunal 
disagreed, finding that the Tribunal’s decision was perverse, and remitted the matter to a fresh 
Tribunal for re-hearing.562 On a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court rejected Mr 
Yeboah’s contention that its role was limited to considering whether there was an error of law in 
the decision of the Appeal Tribunal and not to consider the correctness of the decision of the 
Tribunal. According to the Court, its function was to review the proceedings in, and the decision 
of, the Tribunal to determine whether a question of law arose from them.563 The Court held that if 
the Tribunal had conducted the proceedings and delivered decisions in accordance with the law, 
no questions of law would arise for correction by the Court: neither the Appeal Tribunal nor the 
Court of Appeal would be entitled to interfere with the original decisions, even if they concluded 
that they might have conducted and decided the cases differently.564 
 
The Court acknowledged that where the perversity of the decision of the Tribunal was the main 
ground of appeal, there was an increased risk that the appellate body's close examination of the 
evidence and factual findings by the Tribunal may lead it to substitute its own assessment of the 
evidence and to overturn factual findings made by the Tribunal.565 The Court made specific 
reference to litigants’ frequent attempts to present appeals on fact as questions of law by trawling 
through the reasons of an Tribunal, selecting adverse findings of fact on specific issues on which 
there was a conflict of oral evidence, and alleging, without adequate particulars, supporting 
material or proper grounds, that the particular findings of fact are perverse and that therefore the 
overall decision is perverse.566 The Court, however, also accepted that it was inevitable that there 
would from time to time be cases in which a Tribunal had erred by misunderstanding the 
evidence, leading it to make a crucial finding of fact unsupported by evidence or contrary to 
uncontradicted evidence.567 Although the Court confirmed that the foregoing cases would usually 
                                                 
561 Para 32, 42 and 47. The essence of the finding was that Mr Crofton had repeatedly made untrue accusations 
against Mr Yeboah on no basis other than that his ethnic origins as West African. Specifically, these findings 
related to allegations that: 1) Mr Yeboah had covered up fraud in respect of recruitment allegedly committed by a 
black African redeployee of the council; 2) Mr Yeboah had as a reward arranged sabbatical leave for an 
employee of the council who had signed his naturalisation papers and 3) investigations were required regarding 
Mr Yeboah’s immigration status and his criminal background. 
562 Para 7. 
563 Para 9-11. 
564 Para 11. 
565 Para 12 
566 Para 94. 
567 Para 95. 
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succeed on appeal, the Court also warned that no appeal on a question of law should be allowed 
to be turned into a rehearing of parts of the evidence by the Appeal Tribunal.568  
 
In the present instance, the Court of Appeal found that the Appeal Tribunal had erred in allowing 
the respondent's appeals against the Tribunal's decisions that he had racially discriminated against 
the appellant on grounds that the decisions were perverse. According to the Court, the 
conclusions in all three applications were permissible options on the evidence before the 
Tribunal. The Court of Appeal accordingly allowed the appeals, set aside the order of the Appeal 
Tribunal and restored the decisions of the Tribunal.569 
 
The formulation of perversity as expressed in Neale v Hereford and Worcester County Council is 
however not universally accepted. In Piggott Brothers and Jackson, three employees were 
dismissed following their continued refusal to resume work after unusual fumes of a consignment 
of PVC-coated material caused them to be booked off sick.570 Their refusal persisted despite the 
employer having taken steps to minimise the effect of the problem and despite Health and Safety 
Executive inspectors confirming that there was no continuing danger.571 In dealing with the 
subsequent unfair dismissal challenge, the Tribunal summarised that it was required to decide 
whether the employer had taken reasonable steps to deal with the problem created by the 
materials and whether the employees had acted reasonably in refusing to work with such 
materials.572 The Tribunal accepted that the employer had taken some steps to deal with the 
matter, but noted that it had never received a definitive answer from anyone as to the cause of the 
employees’ symptoms. Not having discovered the cause of the symptoms, the Tribunal concluded 
that the employer had failed to take a reasonable step and that it was reasonable for the 
employees to refuse to work with the relevant materials.573 The Tribunal reasoned that, as long as 
the cause was unknown, it could not be confirmed that no harmful, secret, long-term adverse 
                                                 
568 Par 94-95. 
569 Para 69. 
570 1991 IRLR 309. 
571 Para 4-5. 
572 Para 10. 
573 Para 10. 
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effects on the employees’ health were inherent in the use of the materials. The dismissals were 
accordingly found unfair.574 
 
On appeal, and only having regard to the notes of evidence of the expert witnesses, the Appeal 
Tribunal reasoned that it could not be unreasonable for the employer to fail to take steps if the 
Health and Safety Executive itself had been unable to identify the cause and take action and for 
which there was no evidence to show it was possible.575 On this basis, the Appeal Tribunal 
concluded that the Tribunal had asked itself the wrong question and had fallen into an error 
which led to a perverse decision on the facts. The Appeal Tribunal accordingly allowed the 
appeal on the basis that it was certainly wrong and perverse.576  
 
On a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court referred to the decision in Neale v Hereford 
and Worcester County Council and accepted that the Appeal Tribunal was entitled to interfere 
with the Tribunal’s decision if it was certainly wrong.577 The Court however also warned that the 
perversity formulation in Neale v Hereford and Worcester County Council could cause appellate 
bodies to fall into error by deciding that, because it would have come to a different conclusion, 
the Tribunal was certainly wrong. According to the Court, a decision was not perverse merely 
because an appellate body would have come to a different conclusion.578 In consequence, the 
Court proposed the application of a stricter test. In terms thereof, a Tribunal decision could only 
be characterised as perverse if it was not a permissible option. To recognise a decision as not 
being a permissible option, the Court held that the Appeal Tribunal would have to identify a 
finding of fact which was unsupported by any evidence or a clear self-misdirection in law by the 
Tribunal.579 If it could not do that, the Court cautioned the Appeal Tribunal to carefully re-
examine its preliminary conclusion that the decision under appeal was not a permissible option 
and was therefore perverse. According to the Court, although reasonableness was to be 
characterised as a mixed issue of fact and law, its factual element predominated.580 
 
                                                 
574 Para 10. 
575 Para 22 and 25. 
576 Para 15. 
577 Para 16. 
578 Para 17. 
579 Para 17. 
580 Para 8. 
120 
 
In the present case, the Court found that the Tribunal had not misdirected itself or erred in law in 
holding that the employer could reasonably have been expected to do more than it did to obtain a 
definitive answer as to the cause of the symptoms suffered by the employees.581 The Court went 
further and held that, even if the Appeal Tribunal had been correct in concluding that the 
Tribunal’s decision was flawed, the proper course would have been to remit the case to the 
Tribunal.582 The Court reasoned that, having directed that only the evidence notes of the expert 
witnesses be transcribed for the appeal, the Appeal Tribunal had reached its decision without 
having before it all the relevant evidence. The Court explained that, although it was important 
that Tribunal’s should not be burdened with transcribing notes of evidence which were irrelevant 
to an appeal on a question of law, if an appeal was based upon or included an allegation that the 
Tribunal’s decision was perverse, it was impossible to contemplate allowing that appeal without 
having access to all the evidence bearing on the alleged perversity.583 In the present case, the 
Court accepted that the relevant evidence included not only that of the expert witnesses but also 
the evidence of the employees and the employer, in particular how it viewed the employees' 
conduct and the problems which it faced in the situation as it developed.584 In light of the above, 
the Court concluded that there were no grounds for the Appeal Tribunal to hold that no 
reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have reached that conclusion. The appeal was 
allowed and the decision of the Tribunal restored.585 
 
In Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd,586 the Appeal Tribunal considered a perversity 
appeal against the backdrop of a constructive dismissal complaint. In this instance, the applicant 
had been part of a minority group of women employed at a factory and had objected to male 
employees being allowed to display pictures of nude women in the manufacturing area.587  The 
company initially took the view that the pictures did not warrant action,588 but after further 
complaints from the applicant through the union, issued instructions that the pictures be removed. 
Subsequently, a delegation of women employees told the company that they did not agree with 
                                                 
581 Para 30. 
582 Para 33. 
583 Para 13. 
584 Para 13. 
585 Para 34. 
586 1994 lRLR 440.  
587 Para 17. 
588 Para 19. 
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the applicant and that they had no objection to the picture display. When the applicant learned 
that everyone knew that the pictures had been removed because of her complaint, she felt that she 
could not return to work because she had no confidence that the company would protect her from 
the embarrassment and distress caused by the other employees' attitude. The applicant 
accordingly resigned and claimed that she had been constructively dismissed and discriminated 
against on grounds of sex.589 
 
The Tribunal accepted that the company, through its male employees, had subjected the applicant 
to detriment within the meaning of section 6(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The 
Tribunal reasoned that, not only had the company failed to deal with the complaint properly or 
within a reasonable time, but it had also not addressed the hostility and ridicule directed towards 
the applicant by the other employees when they knew about her complaint.590 On the other hand, 
the Tribunal found that the display of pictures was not aimed at women and that no man had 
complained of the display. The Tribunal accordingly ruled that the company had not treated the 
applicant less favourably than they would a man in the same circumstances within the meaning of 
section 1(1)(a) and proceeded to reject the applicant’s discrimination complaint.591 
 
On appeal, the applicant argued that the Tribunal had perversely concluded that the picture 
display was not aimed at women and was sexually neutral:592 1) the pictures displayed women in 
a sexually explicit fashion in a workplace where most of the workers were men and where the 
prevalent attitude of the men was characterized by remarks and conduct which treated women as 
sex objects;593 and 2) a man would not object to such a display on the ground of his sex.594 
 
In considering the appeal, the Appeal Tribunal emphasised that the decision in every case of this 
kind had to turn on its particular circumstances. The Appeal Tribunal also confirmed that, 
whenever an appeal was based on the perversity ground, it had to be extremely cautious not to 
conclude that the decision of the Tribunal was flawed because it would have reached a different 
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conclusion on the evidence or thought that another Tribunal would have reached a different 
conclusion on the evidence. According to the Appeal Tribunal, an appeal was likewise not to be 
allowed on perversity simply because the Appeal Tribunal disagreed with the Tribunal as to the 
justice of the result, the merits of the case or the interpretation of the facts.595 The Appeal 
Tribunal reasoned that it should only interfere with the decision of the Tribunal where the 
conclusion of that Tribunal on the evidence before it was “irrational”, “offended reason”, “was 
certainly wrong”, “was very clearly wrong”, “had to be wrong”, “was plainly wrong”, “was not a 
permissible option”, “was fundamentally wrong”, “was outrageous”, “made absolutely no sense” 
or “flied in the face of properly informed logic”.596 According to the Appeal Tribunal, this 
characterisation of perversity had the result that it would only be in rare or exceptional instances 
that an appeal would succeed on the grounds of perversity.597 
 
The Appeal Tribunal explained the reasoning behind this heavy burden of discharge as follows: 
1) it had been recognised by those with wide experience and practical wisdom that there were 
many factual situations arising in the field of industrial relations in which different conclusions 
could be reached by different tribunals, all within the realm of reasonableness; 2) it was an area 
in which there could be no "right answer".598  
 
In terms of this approach, the Appeal Tribunal found that it was not appropriate or fruitful to 
subject the language of the decision of the Tribunal to "meticulous criticism" or "detailed 
analysis" or to trawl through it with a "fine tooth comb". The Appeal Tribunal reasoned that it 
had to consider the substance of the Tribunal's decision "broadly and fairly" to see if the reasons 
given for the decision were sufficiently expressed to inform the parties as to why they won or lost 
the case and to enable their advisers to identify an error of law that may have occurred in 
reaching the conclusion.599 According to the Appeal Tribunal, no one in this instance was better 
placed to make a decision on the facts of the case than the Tribunal: it heard evidence from the 
witnesses, saw the material which the applicant found to be offensive and considered the detailed 
arguments on the law and the facts. The Appeal Tribunal accepted also that there was, of course, 
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room for disagreement among different groups of people, such as Tribunals, as to what was or 
was not less favourable treatment and as to the extent to which women in the workplace were 
vulnerable to such treatment.600 Viewed in this way, the Appeal Tribunal concluded that the 
decision of the Tribunal was not perverse. 
 
In East Berkshire Health Authority v Matadeen, 601 the employee, a male night charge-nurse at a 
hospital which predominantly provided residential care for mentally ill patients, complained of an 
unfair dismissal after admittedly having made nuisance calls to other nursing staff on the internal 
house telephone when staff members at the hospital were engaged in industrial action. The 
Tribunal found that the employer’s decision to dismiss was unfair because it was not within the 
band of reasonable responses in the circumstances. According to the Tribunal, the employer was 
not entitled to regard the conduct in question as gross misconduct and therefore grounds for 
dismissal.602  
 
On appeal, the Appeal Tribunal disagreed. According to the Appeal Tribunal, the Tribunal had 
erred in law in: 1) failing to find that the conduct of the employee amounted to gross misconduct; 
and 2) substituting its own view for that of the employer in finding that the decision to dismiss 
was not within the band of reasonable response for the employer in the circumstances.603 The 
Appeal Tribunal then held that, even if the Tribunal's decision had not disclosed the foregoing 
errors of law, the appeal would have been allowed on the ground of perversity.604 According to 
the Appeal Tribunal, the latter ground allowed interference with factual findings of the Tribunal 
if the industrial members of the Appeal Tribunal were satisfied in the light of their own 
experience and of the sound practices in the industrial field that the decision was not a 
permissible option and hence viewed as unreasonable and erroneous in law.605 
 
Considering the factual findings against this criteria, the industrial members of the Appeal 
Tribunal were satisfied that the decision to dismiss a senior nurse, holding managerial and 
                                                 
600 Para 34. 
6011992 IRLR 336. 
602 Para 25. 
603 Para 57. 
604 Para 58. 
605 Para 55. 
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supervisory responsibility in a mental hospital, for gross misconduct and who had previously 
received a final warning, had to fall within the band of reasonable response of the employer. 
According to the Appeal Tribunal, a decision to the contrary would have made no sense in an 
industrial relations context.606 The appeal was accordingly allowed and substituted with a finding 
that the dismissal was fair.607 
 
The courts have, however, emphasized that not all factual findings can be scrutinised and set 
aside for perversity reasons. In Bowater v Northwest London Hospitals NHS Trust, the Court of 
Appeal reminded the Appeal Tribunal that it had to pay proper respect to the decision of the 
Tribunal.608 The Court reasoned that Parliament had entrusted the Tribunal with the responsibility 
of making the sometimes difficult and borderline decisions in relation to the fairness of dismissal 
and that the Appeal Tribunal could not, under the guise of a charge of perversity, substitute its 
own judgment for that of the Tribunal.609 
 
Phillips contends that, in the context of unfair dismissal appeals, particularly the question 
whether or not an employer has shown a dismissal to be fair, it is possible to say that the question 
is one of fact rather than law.610 According to him, the Appeal Tribunal has however not adopted 
that approach, but because dismissal cases can be categorised and the controversial questions 
become familiar, it has made it its task to improve the standard of industrial relations by 
establishing a coherent body of practice prescribing the correct approach in standard situations 
and ensuring as far as possible some degree of uniformity so as to prevent each Tribunal from 
being a law unto itself.611 As a formula for perversity, Phillips then contends that a decision will 
be wrong in law if the Appeal Tribunal is individually and collectively satisfied that the decision 
was wrong judged by the standards of good industrial practice.612 
 
                                                 
606 Para 59. 
607 Para 60. 
608 2011 EWCA Civ 63. 
609 Para 19. 
610 J Phillips (1978) Industrial Law Journal 137-142 
611 J Phillips (1978) Industrial Law Journal 140. 
612 J Phillips (1978) Industrial Law Journal 140. 
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The interaction between perversity and mistakes of fact was demonstrated in Parfums Givenchy v 
Tabaquin Finch.613 In this case, the appellant was dismissed in a redundancy situation where 
vacancies were available elsewhere within the same group of companies, but the appellant was 
rejected for all of them following interviews by the respective line managers. The appellant 
concluded that there was collusion among the human resources department to unfairly 
disadvantage her because the human resources functions for all three perfume divisions were 
presided over by the same person, namely Sophy Brown.614 An unfairly dismissal dispute was 
successfully referred to the Tribunal.615  
 
On appeal, the employer contended that the Tribunal had made two mistakes of fact which made 
the Tribunal decision perverse: 1) the Tribunal wrongly recorded the decision-makers in the 
interview process as human resources managers when they were line managers from separate 
companies; and 2) the Tribunal failed to make a finding consistent with the employer’s evidence 
that one company did not have the power to allocate a redundant employee to another company 
within the group, but that each one operated autonomously.616  
 
The Appeal Tribunal agreed that misunderstanding the facts was a basis for setting aside a 
decision on the ground of perversity. In wrongly forming the view that decision-making was 
done by human resources managers, as opposed to line management detached from human 
resources, the Appeal Tribunal accepted that the perception was created that Sophy Brown was 
able to influence the selection or non-selection of the appellant by one of the other companies in 
the group. As a result of this error, the Appeal Tribunal was not convinced that the decision was 
unarguably correct, notwithstanding the misappropriation of functions. The appeal was 
accordingly allowed and the claim remitted to a fresh Tribunal.617 
 
Whilst the fact-finding function has been entrusted to the Tribunal and appeals are limited to 
questions of law, the latter term has therefore specifically been interpreted by the courts to 
                                                 
613 UKEAT/0517/09/RN found at http://www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/results.aspx on 4 November 2012 at 
13h11. 
614 Para 10. 
615 Para 11. 
616 Para 11. 
617 Para 17 and 29. 
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include perverse decisions. Because the presence or otherwise of perverse decisions are identified 
by examining the evidence and the findings of fact and therefore turn on the particular 
circumstances of the case, perversity has a predominately factual element. As defined, it includes 
a misunderstanding of the evidence, leading to a crucial finding of fact that is unsupported by 
evidence or that is contrary to uncontradicted evidence. This does not mean, however, that the 
appellate body may weigh the evidence and assess its importance with a view to substitute the 
decision with its own assessment of the evidence and overturn findings of fact made by the 
Tribunal because it disagrees with the Tribunal as to the justice of the result, the merits of the 
case or the interpretation of the facts. The substitution of a decision in this manner will in itself 
constitute an error of law that it capable of being taken on appeal. The appellate bodies accept 
that the Tribunals are the final arbiter of facts in so far as they have had the advantage of seeing 
and hearing the witnesses, sensing the atmosphere in the particular workplace, gauging the 
qualities of the different personalities and weighing the impact of their effect upon the other.618 
Likewise, appellate bodies accept that there are many factual situations in the field of industrial 
relations in which different conclusions could be reached by different tribunals, all within the 
realm of reasonableness, and where there is no right or wrong answer.619  
 
As such, the scope for an appeal which effectively challenges factual conclusions is limited. 
Appellate bodies will not interfere with the original decisions, even if they reason that they might 
have conducted and decided the cases differently, unless it is able to identify a finding of fact 
which was unsupported by any evidence or demonstrates a clear self-misdirection in law by the 
Tribunal.620 It is not enough that the finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence or that the 
Tribunal heard evidence that was hard to believe.621 The question remains whether an 
overwhelming case has been made out that the Tribunal concerned reached a decision which no 
reasonable tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the evidence and the law, would have reached. In 
determining whether or not this threshold has been surpassed for a claim of perversity to succeed, 
the appellate bodies also do not subject Tribunal decisions to microscopic analysis, but consider 
the substance of the Tribunal’s decision broadly and fairly to see if the reasons given for the 
                                                 
618 See earlier discussion of Royal Society for the Protection of Birds v Croucher. 
619 See earlier discussion of Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd. 
620 See earlier discussion of Piggott Brothers and Jackson. 
621 G Mansfield, J Bowers QC, D Brown, S Forshaw, A Korn, J Palca & D Reade QC Blackstone's Employment Law 
Practice 2012 (2012) 18.21. 
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decision were sufficiently expressed to inform the parties as to why they won or lost the case and 
to enable their advisers to identify errors of law that may have occurred in reaching the 
conclusion.622 Perversity is therefore established with reference to the outcome and the reasons 
for the outcome.623 The Appeal Tribunal is entitled to invite the Tribunal to amplify the reasons 
for the decision where the reasons are inadequate.624  It is not considered appropriate where the 
inadequacy of reasoning is on its face so fundamental that there is a real risk that supplementary 
reasons will be reconstructions of proper reasons. 
 
4 5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it has been established that the Appeal Tribunal hears appeals from the Tribunal 
on questions of law arising out of proceedings in respect of a designated list of statutes only. 
What constitutes a question of law has not been statutorily defined, but the Appeal Tribunal and 
the appellate courts have accepted that its meaning is tightly circumscribed and that it specifically 
excludes questions of fact. Questions of fact are considered to fall within the exclusive domain of 
the Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal is required to show considerable self-restraint in those 
instances where it strongly disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision on the facts but can identity no 
error of law. The reasoning is essentially two-fold: 1) the Tribunal has the overriding objective to 
deal with cases justly by ensuring that they are dealt with proportionately, expeditiously, fairly 
and in a cost effective manner; and 2) in contrast to appellate bodies, the Tribunal with its lay 
members sit as an “industrial jury” when it hears firsthand and in full the evidence and 
submissions of the parties involved, find the facts, apply the relevant law and reach the 
conclusion to which their findings and their experience lead them. 
  
Contrary to a question of fact, a question of law concerns the identification and interpretation of 
norms which are typically of general application and to be answered to the satisfaction of a court 
with reference to statute, precedent and/or policy. On appeal, an appellant would therefore be 
                                                 
622 See earlier discussion of Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd. 
623 See Harrod v Ministry of Defence 1981 ICR 8. It is not permissible to appeal where the sole purpose is to 
challenge the reasons for the decision or a particular finding of fact. The outcome must also be challenged. 
624 Barke v SEETEC Business Technology Centre Ltd 2005 IRLR 633, CA. Prior to The Employment Tribunals 
(Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 coming into effect, the power to ask for amplified 
reasons stemmed from rule 30(3)(b) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) 
Regulations 2004 and/or section 30(3) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
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required to identify any flaws in the legal reasoning of the original decision with reference to the 
recognised norms and not urge the Appeal Tribunal to substitute its own interpretation of the 
facts for that of the Tribunal. From the case law discussed, it is evident that the courts have 
readily accepted that a question of law includes an allegation concerning the misinterpretation of 
a statute, the misapplication of case law, a finding made in the absence of any evidence to support 
it; a failure to resolve a conflict of evidence or opinion central to a case; a failure to comply with 
the rules of natural justice and/or a perverse decision.625 These questions of law have been 
classified by the courts into the following categories of grounds for appeal: 1) a misdirection, 
misunderstanding and/or misapplication of the law; 2) the absence of any evidence to support 
material findings of fact and/or material findings of fact that are contrary to the evidence before 
the Tribunal and 3) a perverse decision.626 
 
Firstly, a decision may amount to a misdirection, misunderstanding and/or misapplication of the 
law, if there is for example an allegation of: 1) actual or apparent bias; 2) the absence of a fair 
hearing; 3) an unreasonable delay in promulgating the decision; 4) an error in the assessment of 
compensation; and/or 5) the wrong application or understanding of a principle of law. In these 
instances, the test is whether the conclusion of the tribunal is plainly and unarguably right 
notwithstanding the misdirection or misapplication of the law.  
 
Secondly, a decision may be appealable because of a misunderstanding or a misapplication of the 
evidence leading to a material finding of fact unsupported by evidence or contrary to 
uncontradicted evidence. In this instance, the significance of the misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the evidence is assessed within the context of the decision as a whole. If the 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the evidence is demonstrably independent of the ultimate 
finding that has been reached, the appeal would not be allowed. However, if the Tribunal had 
made a wrong determination on a relevant undisputed or indisputable fact and had then 
proceeded to consider the evidence and reach its ultimate conclusions of fact based wholly or 
mainly upon that demonstrable initial error, the appeal would generally succeed. Again, the 
                                                 
625 See discussion in para 6 3 above. 
626 See discussion in para 6 3 above. 
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question is therefore whether or not the decision is unarguably correct, notwithstanding the 
misappreciation of a primary fact. 
 
Thirdly, a decision may be appealable on the basis of perversity if the decision is so defective that 
no reasonable tribunal could have arrived at that decision. This ground of appeal may potentially 
even apply where the decision under appeal involves: 1) no question of statutory construction; 2) 
no misapplication of case law; 3) no contention that the primary facts were found upon non-
existing evidence; and 4) no contention that wrong inferences of fact were drawn from the 
primary facts.627 
 
From this classification, it is apparent that there is thus an exception to this fact/law distinction on 
an appeal of law. An appeal on a question of fact would be permissible as a question of law if the 
Appeal Tribunal is able to conclude that the Tribunal's finding was perverse in the sense that it 
was one which no reasonable tribunal could have come to on the evidence. Similar to “questions 
of law”, “perversity” is not statutorily defined. The courts have, however, determined that 
perversity does not entail overturning a decision on appeal merely because the appellate body 
does not agree with the decision of the initial decision-maker or because it is possible that a 
differently constituted Tribunal might have come to a different conclusion. The substitution of a 
decision in this manner will in itself constitute an error of law that is capable of being taken on 
appeal. Nor can an appellant simply refer to an adverse finding of fact on a specific issue and 
allege that because that particular finding was perverse, the overall decision of the Tribunal was 
also perverse. As per the courts’ definition, an appeal brought on the ground of perversity will 
succeed only if an overwhelming case is made out that, although the Tribunal apparently directed 
itself properly in law and did not misstate, misunderstand or misapply the facts, the decision was 
perverse or there was no evidence to justify the conclusion which was reached. In terms hereof, it 
is presumed that, although the Tribunal had not expressed a wrong approach that the court is able 
to detect, it must in fact have followed one because the decision is plainly wrong. This test 
requires the Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal to consider the Tribunal’s findings overall 
and ask whether, with reference to the evidence before it, it was entitled to draw the conclusions 
                                                 
627 See G Sneath “Matadeen: ‘Question of Law’ in Appeals from Industrial Tribunals” (1993) 14(2) Statute Law 
Review 146-148 found at slr.oxfordjournals.org on 10 February 2011. 
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it did from the facts it had found. In making this determination, the question remains whether or 
not the Appeal Tribunal can conclude that: 1) it is completely satisfied in the light of its own 
experience and of the sound practices in the industrial field that the decision was not a 
permissible option; 2) the decision offended reason or was one to which no reasonable tribunal 
could have come to; 3) the decision was so very clearly wrong that it just could not stand; and/or 
4) the decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted standards of industrial 
relations that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question and with the necessary 
experience could have arrived at it. Perversity appeals in the context of error of law are typically 
used to determine whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of a term such as employee is legally 
sustainable and hence whether the Tribunal has authority to determine the matter at all. Because 
it involves matters of fact, degree and/or inferences, the appellate body does not substitute 
judgment on the legal meaning of the disputed term on a correctness standard, but accord the 
Tribunal a measure of latitude through perversity appeal. However, from the manner in which the 
test has been formulated by the courts, it is clear that it is difficult to bring a successful appeal 
against the decision of the Tribunal that initially heard a case on the basis of the substantive 
perversity ground of appeal.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
JUSTIFIABILITY, REASONABLENESS AND CCMA ARBITRATION AWARD 
REVIEWS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As is characteristic of special statutory reviews,628 the LRA makes specific provision for the 
review of compulsory arbitration awards. However, as will be noted from the discussions below, 
the statutory grounds of review are prescribed in a manner that limits considerably the scope 
within which these arbitration awards may be reviewed.629 This poses a challenge to any potential 
litigant that is dissatisfied with the decision recorded in an arbitration award and seeks to launch 
review proceedings, but is unable to attribute this dissatisfaction to any one or more of the 
specific and limited grounds of review listed in section 145(2) of the LRA. Consequently, the 
courts have in the past been confronted with innovative arguments designed to circumvent or 
expand upon the grounds of review sanctioned by the LRA in order to secure the review of an 
award that would otherwise have fallen beyond the statutory limits of the Labour Court’s review 
powers. These included submissions that arbitration awards should be reviewable in terms of the 
broader common law and/or constitutional grounds of review provisions by virtue of section 
158(1)(g) of the LRA or in terms of the justifiability concept found in the 1993 Constitution.630 In 
terms of the latter contention, the making of an arbitration award was an administrative act to 
which the provisions of the right to lawful, procedurally fair and justifiable administrative action 
as contained in the 1993 Constitution applied. In an attempt to provide an answer to these 
questions, the courts have engaged in various legal discussions, which included weighing the 
making of CCMA arbitration awards against the definition of administrative action and 
considering whether the CCMA could be described as an organ of state. Although it can 
retrospectively be said that the aspects referred to above have largely been resolved by the 
leading case of Carephone and that the principles established therein have become academic in 
                                                 
628 See chapter 2 para 2 4 5. 
629 See chapter 2 para 2 6. 
630 See para 5 3 and 5 4 below. 
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light of the introduction of the 1996 Constitution, it is submitted that it remains relevant for 
interpretation purposes, especially when the findings made in Sidumo are considered.  
 
The historical developments are also important for comparative purposes. Different to Sidumo, 
Carephone was decided on the basis of the wording of the administrative justice provision as 
contained in section 33 read with item 23(2) of schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution, namely that 
administrative action should be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.631 The 1996 
Constitution does not, however, refer to justifiability, but in section 33(1) rather provides that 
administrative action should be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Despite this different 
choice in wording, the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone gave the impression that justifiability 
and reasonableness were to be regarded as one and the same when it held that:632 
 
“Many formulations have been suggested for this kind of substantive rationality required of 
administrative decision-makers, such as ‘reasonableness’, ‘rationality’, ‘proportionality’ and the 
like (cf eg Craig Administrative Law above at 337 – 3349; Schwarze European Administrative 
Law 1992 at 677). Without denying that the application of these formulations in particular cases 
may be instructive, I see no need to stray from the concept of ‘justifiability’ itself.” 
 
Similarly, in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others the Court expressed a 
willingness to view justifiability and rationality as similar, if not synonymous, concepts.633 Also, 
in Roman v Williams NO it was held that administrative action must meet the requirements of 
suitability, necessity and proportionality in order to qualify as justifiable in relation to the reasons 
given for it. The latter requirements was held to involve a test of reasonableness.634 
 
However, in Sidumo, the Constitutional Court for the first time considered whether the change in 
wording from “justifiability” in the 1993 Constitution to “reasonableness” in the 1996 
Constitution materially impacted the interpretation afforded to section 145 of the LRA. In the 
process, the Court did not confine itself to such a determination, but also set out the standard to 
                                                 
631 Section 24(d) of the 1993 Constitution. Carephone was determined under item 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the 1996 
Constitution. The provisions are identical. 
632 Para 37. 
633 2001 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) para 25. 
634 1998 JOL 1514 (C). See also Heyneke v Umhlatuze Municipality 2010 JOL 25625 (LC) para 60. Reasonableness 
was held to import elements of rationality and proportionality 
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be applied in the review of arbitration awards in terms of section 145 of the LRA. These matters 
will all be discussed in more detail below, including the findings of the Constitutional Court in 
Sidumo in order to establish the content of reasonableness. 
 
5 2 THE ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE OF CCMA ARBITRATIONS 
 
In Carephone,635  the Labour Appeal Court had to determine whether the making of arbitration 
awards in terms of compulsory arbitration proceedings constituted administrative action as 
contemplated by the administrative justice provision contained in section 33 read with item 23(2) 
of schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution.636 The Court rejected the contention that the judicial 
nature of CCMA arbitrations rendered it incapable of being classified as administrative action. 
According to the Court administrative action could take many forms, even if judicial in nature, 
but the action remained administrative.637 The Court therefore concluded that the CCMA was an 
organ of state that was subject to the basic values and principles governing public administration. 
The Court reasoned that the CCMA exercised a public power and function when it resolved 
disputes between parties in terms of the LRA without needing the consent of the parties.638 
 
Similarly, in Mkhize v CCMA639, the Labour Court held that the CCMA was a tribunal as 
envisaged in section 39 of the 1996 Constitution and that, in so far as it exercised public power 
and performed public function in terms of legislation, it was an organ of state as defined in 
section 239(b)(ii) of the 1996 Constitution. 
 
The Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court have therefore confirmed that the compulsory 
arbitration function of the CCMA constitutes administrative action as provided for in section 
33(1) of the 1996 Constitution. As a result of this, the question that then arose was whether the 
review of CCMA arbitration awards could be influenced by the terms of the constitutional 
administrative justice provision and, upon the enactment of PAJA, be reviewable in terms of the 
                                                 
635 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
636 Section 33 read with item 23(2) of schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution was an interim measure. 
637 Para 19. 
638 Para 11-12. 
639 2001 1 SA 338 (LC) para 17–20. 
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grounds of review identified in PAJA.640 A potential for conflict hence existed in so far as the 
legislature, in an attempt to give effect to the constitutional obligations contained in section 27 of 
the 1993 Constitution,641 adopted the LRA and more particularly section 145 to establish a 
special statutory review in terms of the LRA rather than the 1996 Constitution and/or PAJA. 
These arguments will be addressed below when this matter is discussed in more detail in light of 
the 1996 Constitution and the findings made by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo. 
 
5 3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 145 AND SECTION 158(1)(g) 
 
Section 145(1) of the LRA provides that any party to a dispute who alleges that a defect exists in 
arbitration proceedings may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside the arbitration 
award. As was established in chapter 2, a defect means that the commissioner committed 
misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as arbitrator; that the commissioner 
committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings; that the 
commissioner exceeded his powers; and/or that the award was improperly obtained.642  
 
Section 145 is, however, not the only section in the LRA making provision for the remedy of 
review. In the context of listing the powers of the Labour Court, section 158(1)(h) provides for 
the review of actions of the state as employer, whilst section 158(1)(g), prior to its amendment, 
provided that:643 
 
“The Labour Court may, despite section 145, review the performance or purported performance 
of any function provided for in this Act or any act or omission of any person or body in terms of 
this Act on any grounds that are permissible in law.”  
 
Taking into consideration that arbitration by the CCMA is a function provided for in the LRA, 
and that section 158(1)(g) was introduced with the words “despite section 145”, it was contended 
that section 158(1)(g), with its wider scope of review, should subsume the more restricted review 
                                                 
640 See discussion in chapter 2 para 2 4 4 1. 
641 See section 1(a) of the LRA. 
642 See chapter 2 para 2 6. 
643 Own emphasis added. 
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provided for in terms of section 145.644 This argument was attractive, not only because section 
158(1)(g) review applications could be brought within a “reasonable” time as opposed to the six 
week time limit in terms of section 145,645 but also due to a common perception that section 145 
provided for a more restricted kind of review than that allowed for by the 1996 Constitution.646 
On the other hand, it was countered that this interpretation would render section 145 ineffective, 
contrary to the intention of the legislature.647 The ensuing debate over whether CCMA arbitration 
awards were reviewable in terms of section 145 or section 158(1)(g) is evident from the case law. 
Revelas J first held in Edgars Stores (Pty) Ltd v Director, CCMA & others648 that the review of 
CCMA arbitration awards should take place on the basis of the narrow grounds provided for in 
section 145(2) of the LRA and that section 158(1)(g) was not applicable.649 Then, in Kynoch 
Feeds (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,650 Revelas J conceded that Edgars Stores was wrongly 
decided and found that arbitration awards could be reviewed on the wider grounds for review 
contained in section 158(1)(g).651 In Ntshangane v Speciality Metals CC,652 the Labour Court 
again ascribed the formulation of section 158(1)(g) to inelegant draftmanship. According to 
Mlambo J, the appropriate interpretation of section 158(1)(g) meant that, in addition to the 
court’s power to review CCMA arbitration awards, the court was also empowered to review any 
other function performed in terms of the LRA.653 
 
The uncertainty sparked by the forgoing judgments was finally resolved in Carephone.654 The 
Court considered the impact of the two contradictory interpretations: on the one hand, if it was 
found that the provisions of sections 145, 158(1)(g) and 158(1)(h) applied to distinct and 
different forms of administrative action, the sections would not overlap; on the other hand, if the 
                                                 
644 J Grogan “‘Justifiability’ is the key Review judgments reviewed” (1998) 14(5) Employment Law 4. 
645 J Grogan “Untimely reviews Unresolved issues after Carephone” 1999 Employment Law 17. It was contended 
that the six week time limit was aimed at preventing the CCMA from being encumbered by queues of 
applications stretching back into the distant past. 
646 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 7. 
647 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others 1998 8 BLLR 872 (LC) para 12. According to the Court, section 
158(1)(g) had the potential to cause the courts to be seen to be interfering too much in the discretionary arena of 
commissioners by enticing the courts to embark on a reconsideration of the merits and the conclusion reached by 
commissioners. 
648 1998 1 BLLR 34 (LC). 
649 41G–I. 
650 1998 4 BLLR 384 (LC). 
651 Para 46. 
652 1998 3 BLLR 305 (LC). 
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application field of sections 145 and 158(1)(g) were found to overlap it would have the result that 
the provisions of section 145 were superfluous. Taking this into consideration, Froneman DJP, in 
a reasoning process similar to Mlambo J’s in Ntshangane, confirmed that the review of 
arbitration proceedings must proceed under section 145 of the LRA and that it was not necessary 
to resort to section 158(1)(g).655 According to the Court, section 158(1)(g) was intended to 
provide for the court’s residual powers of review for administrative functions not defined 
specifically in sections 145 and 158(1)(h). The Court did however acknowledge that the use of 
the word “despite” in section 158(1)(g) was undesirable in so far as it allowed for an 
interpretation of section 158(1)(g) that granted a general review power to the Labour Court over 
any function, act or omission.656 In order to attempt an interpretation of section 145 that was 
consistent with the 1996 Constitution, the Court thus proposed that the word “despite” in section 
158(1)(g) should be read as “subject to”.657 The legislature took note of this recommendation and, 
through the 2002 amendments to the LRA, replaced “despite” with “subject to” in section 
158(1)(g).658 This made it clear that section 145 and section 158(1)(g) apply to distinct and 
different forms of administrative action that do not overlap and that proceedings for the review of 
arbitration awards must be instituted in terms of the limited grounds of review contained in 
section 145 of the LRA. Since this amendment, the interpretation and application of section 145 
has however sparked another debate relating to the role and/or impact of the constitutional right 
to just administrative action on the interpretation of section 145. 
 
5 4 CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFIABILITY AND SECTION 145(2) 
 
It has already been established that case law supported the proposition that the compulsory 
arbitration function of the CCMA constitutes administrative action. It was as a result of this 
determination that the argument was subsequently raised that the restrictive grounds of review 
provided for in section 145 failed to give expression to the requirements of the constitutional 
administrative justice right.659 In Speciality Metals, Mlambo J however disagreed and held that, 
although section 145 of the LRA did amount to a statutory limitation of the constitutional right to 
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658 Substituted by s 36(b) of Act 12 of 2002. 
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administrative justice, it was a reasonable and justifiable limitation that did not negate the right to 
administrative justice.660 Similarly, in Carephone the Court accepted that section 145 was not in 
conflict with the constitutional administrative justice right, but that the interpretation of section 
145 was simply frustrated as a result of reliance on decisions interpreting a corresponding section 
in the Arbitration Act.661 According to the Court, such reliance was misplaced because there were 
material differences between section 145 and its equivalent section in the Arbitration Act: 1) 
section 146 of the LRA expressly excluded the operation of the Arbitration Act in respect of 
CCMA arbitrations; 2) the Arbitration Act applied to private, consensual arbitrations in contrast 
to the compulsory arbitrations under the LRA; 3) its provisions were assessed and interpreted in a 
different constitutional context; and 4) even under the Arbitration Act, an award could be 
reviewed and set aside if the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers by making a determination 
outside the terms of the submission. 
 
According to the Court, the grounds of review under section 145 of the LRA further did give 
expression to what the 1996 Constitution required. The Court reasoned that there were no express 
or implied provisions in the LRA that suggested that the powers of a commissioner in 
compulsory arbitration under the LRA could exceed the constitutional constraints on those 
powers or could be given in conflict with constitutional values:662 
 
 “The constitutional imperatives for compulsory arbitration under the LRA are thus that the 
process must be fair and equitable, that the arbitrator must be impartial and unbiased, that the 
proceedings must be lawful and procedurally fair, that the reasons for the award must be given 
publicly and in writing, that the award must be justifiable in terms of those reasons and that it 
must be consistent with the fundamental right to fair labour practices. The provisions of the LRA 
dealing with arbitration proceedings are not in conflict with these constitutional requirements.” 
 
However, despite finding that section 145 was not in conflict with the 1996 Constitution,663 the 
Court held that the administrative justice section in the Bill of Rights had broadened the scope of 
judicial review in so far as administrative action was required to be justifiable in relation to the 
                                                 
660 Para 37. 
661 Para 25. 
662 Para 20. 
663 Para 27. 
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reasons given for it.664 This, according to the Court, was due to the fact that administrative justice 
required a kind of substantive rationality from administrative decision-makers665 in the merit or 
outcome of the decisions concerned.666 According to the Court, the concept of justifiability gave 
expression to the fundamental values of accountability, responsiveness and openness without 
purporting to give courts the power to perform the administrative function themselves.667 
Opposed to a correctness question, the court therefore proposed testing for justifiability by asking 
whether there was a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative 
decision-maker between the material properly available to him or her and the conclusion he or 
she eventually arrived at.668 In doing so, the Court did not specify whether a rational connection 
between the reasons and the arbitration award was required in addition to the rational connection 
between the evidence and reasons. 
 
It is unfortunately also not clear from Carephone whether the Court regarded the constitutional 
imperatives as establishing an independent ground of review in addition to those grounds already 
provided for in section 145(2) of the LRA. It is submitted that such a submission can be deduced 
from the following held by the Court:669 
 
“Accordingly, the only bases for review are (1), that the facts amount to misconduct or gross 
irregularity or impropriety under section 145(2)(a)(i) to (ii) and section 145(2)(b) of the LRA, or 
(2), that his actions are not justifiable in terms of the reasons given for them and that he has 
accordingly exceeded his constitutionally constrained powers under section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the 
Act.” 
 
Read within the context of the judgment as a whole, an argument can however be made that the 
Court only “extended” the grounds of review in section 145 to the extent of finding that the 
Labour Court could review an award in terms of section 145(2)(a)(iii) because the award was not 
justifiable in terms of the reasons given. Ancillary to this, the Court did not hold that justifiability 
                                                 
664 Para 30-31. This suggests that the constitutional imperative of “justifiable” administrative action was read into 
section 145. 
665 Para 37. 
666 Para 31. 
667 Para 35. 
668 Para 37. 
669 Para 53. Own emphasis added. 
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was a separate ground for review, but deduced that the commissioner had exceeded his powers 
because the award was not justifiable in terms of the reasons given. Justifiability was thus 
considered a measure or test to determine whether the commissioner had exceeded his powers in 
terms of section 145(2)(a)(iii). Such a submission is supported by the following:670 
 
“Once again [the commissioner’s] reasoning was rationally connected to the material before 
him. His decision and the reasons he gave for it do not support an inference of misconduct, 
irregularity or impropriety. The decision not to postpone and to continue the proceedings are 
rationally justifiable in terms of the reasons given for the decision by the commissioner. He thus 
did not exceed the substantive constitutional limits to the exercise of his powers in arbitration 
under the LRA.” 
 
In County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,671 a differently-constituted Labour Appeal 
Court referred to Carephone672 and agreed that a commissioner would exceed his or her powers if 
the award was not justifiable in terms of the reasons given. The Court however also held that it 
was not restricted to applying the provisions of section 145(2)(a)(iii) when reviewing an 
arbitration award, but that in appropriate circumstances non-compliance with the constitutional 
imperatives referenced in Carephone could also amount to misconduct in terms of section 
145(2)(a)(i) or a procedural irregularity in terms of section 145(2)(a)(ii). 673 
 
The Court was not convinced that the introduction of the constitutional prescript of justifiability 
distorted the distinction between appeal and review. Per Ngcobo J the Court held that 
justifiability meant no more than that the decision of the commissioner must be supported by the 
facts and the applicable law.674 Conradie J noted that the test for altering a sanction imposed by a 
CCMA commissioner was similar to the test applied to the alteration of a sentence in a criminal  
appeal:675 
                                                 
670 Para 57; own emphasis added. 
671 1999 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC). 
672 See para 6-7. 
673 Para 8. 
674 Para 27. The Court reasoned that if an award could be sustained by the facts and the law, interference with the 
award was not warranted, but if it could not, interference was warranted. 
675 Para 43. See DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 1 All SA 446 (SCA) para 10. In this case, the Court held that the test 
for interference by an appeal court is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is vitiated by irregularity or 
misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate. See also S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) para 12. In this case, 
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“A result which a court of appeal considers to be incorrect may nevertheless be justifiable. It is 
not justifiable if it is dramatically wrong. Where the result is, for some reason or other, perverse, 
one would quite naturally say ‘I cannot allow this to happen’. There is no real difficulty with 
cases of that kind. But where the result diverges from the result which one would like to have 
seen, interference is not justified. The test for altering a sanction imposed by a CCMA 
commissioner is not so far removed from the one applied to the alteration of a sentence in a 
criminal appeal. If you look at the sentence and you say to yourself ‘this sentence is so excessive 
(or so lenient) that I cannot in all good conscience allow it to stand’, it is open to interference. If 
you think merely that you would not have imposed the same sentence, it is not. Unless the 
sentence makes you whistle, it must stand. The general principle underlying this approach is that 
a court is reluctant to interfere on appeal in the exercise of discretion if the only ground for the 
suggested interference is its unreasonableness. The reluctance of a court to interfere on review 
(on the grounds of its unreasonableness) with the exercise of a discretion must therefore be at 
least as strong, if not stronger.” 
 
In Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe,676 the Labour Appeal Court (per Nicholson 
JA) also referred to Carephone and accepted that section 145 was the relevant section for the 
review of arbitration awards. The Court was however not convinced that justifiability constituted 
an independent ground upon which an arbitration award could be attacked. Firstly, justifiability 
was not part of the wording of section 145. Secondly, there was a difference between appeals and 
reviews. According to the Court, justifiability appeared to be very similar to the test on an appeal 
of fact that allowed the court to interfere if there were misdirections of fact including the 
overlooking of other facts and probabilities. The Court reasoned that, by referring to a gross 
irregularity in section 145, the legislature was contemplating a more serious ground for 
interference than mere mistakes of fact and law.677 Thirdly, the Court queried the constitutional 
implications of section 145 should it be determined that the grounds set out in section 145 were 
not the only avenues open to a party to challenge an arbitration award, but that an arbitration 
award that was unjustifiable as to the reasons given was reviewable on this basis as an 
                                                                                                                                                              
it was held that an appellate court can interfere with the sentence imposed if the disparity between the sentence of 
the trial court and the sentence which the appellate court would have imposed had it been the trial court is so 
marked that it can properly be described as “shocking”, “startling” or “disturbingly inappropriate”. 
676 2000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC). 
677 Para 39. The Court held that a court of appeal or a review court will not lightly overturn a finding of fact made by 
a trier of fact who has had the benefit of hearing and seeing witnesses in the witness box except in certain defined 
cases. One of such cases is where the probabilities clearly point the other way. See para 18. 
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independent ground of review.678 Although the Court accepted that it was not required to 
determine this issue for purposes of its judgment, it was of the opinion that, failing a successful 
constitutionality challenge, section 145 was fully operative and the constitutional provision of 
justifiability had to be seen in the context of the specific grounds for review in section 145 and 
not as an independent ground of review.679 In the circumstances, the Court chose to deal with the 
challenge posed to the commissioner’s sanction by asking whether there was such a yawning 
chasm between the sanction which the court would have imposed and that which the 
commissioner imposed then it would seem to be that a gross irregularity had been committed.680 
 
From the above it is evident that the Labour Appeal Court (in County Fair Foods and Radebe 
respectively) preferred to support an interpretation of Carephone that did not hold justifiability as 
an independent ground of review. Support for such an interpretation is also found in the generally 
accepted principle that litigants cannot bypass ordinary legislation and rely directly on a 
constitutional provision in the absence of a constitutional challenge to that ordinary legislation.681 
On the application of this principle it is noted that applicants on review cannot challenge the 
justifiability of decisions based on the constitutional right to administrative justice,682 but must 
seek to review arbitration awards with reference to section 145 of the LRA – from which 
justifiability as an independent justifiability ground of review is notably absent.683 Alternatively, 
adopting an interpretation of justifiability that recognises it as an independent ground of review 
would mean that the courts are required to read justifiability into the section 145(2) grounds of 
review – a seemingly strained interpretation of that section. 
 
The reasoning applied in Carephone was subsequently challenged by the Labour Court in 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw & others.684 Wallis AJ noted that in Carephone, the 
                                                 
678 Para 33 and 40. 
679 Para 40; see also Cadema (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (Western Cape 
Region) and others 2000 JOL 7425 (LC) para 17. 
680 Para 53-54. The Court was satisfied that the sanction imposed by the commissioner was so egregious and so out 
of kilter with what the Labour Appeal Court would have imposed, that it constituted a gross irregularity. 
681 See Sidumo para 248-249 and South African National Defense Union v Minister of Defense Chief of the South 
African National Defense Force 2007 9 BLLR 785 (CC).  
682 The concept of “justifiability” derives from the 1993 Constitution. 
683 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) para 21; Ex Parte   
Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 64. 
684 2000 7 BLLR 835 (LC). See J Grogan “Justifying the unjustifiable New challenges to Carephone” (2000) 16(4) 
Employment Law 10. 
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Labour Appeal Court had concluded that a CCMA arbitration constituted administrative action 
simply because the CCMA was considered to be an organ of state. According to the Court, this 
reasoning was in conflict with the approach subsequently adopted by the Constitutional Court in 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Local Metropolitan Council & 
others that not every action by an organ of state constituted administrative action for the purposes 
of constitutional review.685 Wallis AJ relied on this judgment to determine that, although the 
CCMA was an organ of state acting in terms of statutory authority and exercising statutory 
powers, the issuing of an arbitration award by a CCMA commissioner did not constitute 
administrative action and was therefore not reviewable on the constitutional ground that the 
award must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given. According to the Court, Carephone 
could no longer be regarded as authoritative and the only available grounds of review were those 
set out in section 145. 
 
On appeal,686 the Labour Appeal Court referred to Carephone and in particular the finding that 
the ground for review contained in section 145(2)(a)(iii) incorporated the constitutional 
requirement that administrative action must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.687 
The Court accepted that Carephone had erroneously decided that the classification of state 
actions into administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial acts was outmoded.688 According to the 
Court, this classification was sometimes necessary under the constitutional order so as to give 
effect to constitutional provisions. However, the Court also noted that the Constitutional Court in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association689 had subsequently decided that all public power 
must be exercised rationally and that it was hence no longer of consequence whether Carephone 
was correct in concluding that the issuing of an arbitration award by a CCMA commissioner 
                                                 
685 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC). In this case, the Constitutional Court had to consider whether the passing of 
resolutions relating to rates by a local council constituted an administrative action as contemplated in s 24 of the 
1993 Constitution. 
686 2001 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). 
687 Para 8.  
688 Para 14. 
689 2000 JOL 6158 (CC) para 85, 86 and 90. The principles of rationality are as follows: 1) decisions that are the 
result of an exercise of public power can be set aside by a court if it is irrational; 2) the bona fides of the person 
who made the decision do not by themselves put such a person’s decision beyond the scrutiny of the court; 3) the 
rationality of a decision made in the exercise of public power must be determined objectively; 4) a court cannot 
interfere with a decision simply because it disagrees with it or it considers that the power was exercised 
inappropriately; 5) a decision that is objectively irrational is likely to be made only rarely; 6) decisions must be 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and 
inconsistent with the requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power should not be arbitrary. 
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constituted administrative action. According to the Court, there was no doubt that the CCMA 
exercised a public power when it arbitrated under the LRA and CCMA arbitration awards could 
accordingly be reviewed and set aside by the Labour Court if they were irrational.690  
 
Zondo JP then raised the question whether “rationality” and “justifiability” bore the same 
meaning, reasoning that if it did, it would not serve much purpose for the court to come to the 
conclusion that Carephone was wrongly decided. According to the Court, justifiability, in so far 
as it fell within the ambit of the rationality ground of review as it emanated from Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, would still be applicable to CCMA arbitration awards.691 Zondo JP 
then turned to Carephone and noted that the Court in that case had viewed the concept of 
justifiability as related, at least to some extent, to the concept of rationality. Zondo JP accordingly 
found that, although the term “justifiable” and “rational” may not, strictly speaking, be 
synonymous, they bore a sufficiently similar meaning to justify the conclusion that rationality 
could be said to be accommodated within the concept of justifiability as used in Carephone.692  
 
However, despite finding that a justifiable decision cannot be said to be irrational and an 
irrational decision cannot be said to be justifiable, leading to the inference that there should be no 
departure from Carephone, the Court found that the issuing of an arbitration award by a CCMA 
commissioner under the LRA was an exercise of public power that could be set aside if it failed 
to meet the constitutional requirement of rationality.693 On this reading, the Court seemingly 
adopted rationality as a ground of review that was severable from the grounds specifically 
mentioned in section 145(2).  On the other hand, Zondo JA also held that there were sound policy 
considerations which justified that Carephone remain as is:694 
 
 
 
                                                 
690 Para 21. 
691 Para 21. 
692 Para 25. See Niewoudt v Chairman, Amnesty Subcommittee, TRC, Du Toit v Chairman, Amnesty Subcommittee, 
TRC; Ras v Chairman, Amnesty Subcommittee, TRC 2002 3 SA 143 (C). Rationality requires that a decision 
must not be arbitrary; but that there must be a rational connection between the decision, the information relied 
upon to form the factual basis of the decision and the reasoning provided for in the decision 
693 Para 26. 
694 Para 33. 
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“This appeal can, therefore, be considered on the basis that, as was decided by this Court in  
Carephone, CCMA awards can be reviewed and set aside if they are not justifiable in relation to 
the reasons given for them.” 
 
In particular, the Court noted that, in determining that the ground of review of justifiability fell 
within section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA, Carephone in effect held that the time limit set out in 
section 145 for the bringing of review applications against CCMA awards would apply to that 
ground of review as well.695 In this regard the Court pointed out that, if the ground of review 
relied upon was not under section 145, the period within which a review on such ground must be 
launched is a reasonable time from the day of the issuing of the award and not six weeks as 
prescribed by section 145.  
 
In terms of this judgment, CCMA arbitration awards can be set aside on review if they fail to 
meet the objective standard of rationality. Judicial review has therefore become an opportunity 
for the courts to scrutinise arbitration awards to determine whether the decision was rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was given. 696 This means that the review court is not 
obliged to allow a defective award to stand merely because the award was not irrational enough 
to warrant the inference that the commissioner has committed one or more of the section 145(2) 
grounds of review. On the other hand, the judgment has not prescribed a conclusive test. The 
Court simply considered that, in determining whether a commissioner’s award falls to be set 
aside on the ground that it is not justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, one must have 
regard to the material that was properly available to the commissioner, the decision of the 
commissioner and the reasons that the commissioner gave for such a decision.697 It therefore 
continues to leave a considerable discretion to the review court to decide, on the facts of each 
case, whether awards were rational enough to pass scrutiny.  
 
In Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others,698 the Court seemingly 
accepted irrational unjustifiability as a separate round for review. It was the Court’s 
                                                 
695 Par 32. 
696 J Grogan “Now it’s rationality – Carephone survives the test” (2001) 17(5) Employment Law 9. 
697 Para 82. 
698 2002 6 BLLR 493 (LAC) para 58. The Court was of the view that the award was not rational or justifiable as to 
the reasons given because the commissioner had failed to properly consider the evidence. According to the Court, 
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understanding that the CCMA arbitration award must not be arbitrary, but must be arrived at in a 
manner which demonstrates that the commissioner has applied his or her mind seriously to the 
issues at hand and has reasoned his or her way to the conclusion.699 According to the Court, the 
conclusion was justifiable as to the reasons given if it was defensible as regards the important 
logical steps on the road to the conclusion.700 Referring to this decision in JHB to Fresh Produce 
Market (Pty) Ltd v Hiemstra NO & others,701 the Labour Court confirmed that it was trite that a 
CCMA arbitration award does not have to be defensible in all respects, but that it must meet the 
objectionable standard of rationality in that it must reflect an attempt by the commissioner to 
consider the evidence before him or her, and to arrive at a conclusion which is rationally 
connected to the evidence which was before him or her.702 
 
In Sidumo, the judgments of County Fair Foods, Toyota South Africa Motors, Shoprite Checkers 
and Crown Chickens proved to be fertile ground for the Constitutional Court from which to 
commence an investigation into the role of justifiability, rationality and/or reasonableness and 
provide direction to legal practitioners that were divided on the matter. 
 
5 5 SIDUMO, THE REVIEW OF CCMA ARBITRATION AWARDS AND THE  
            CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
The facts of Sidumo were not very complex. After noticing a marked drop in production at its 
Waterval Redressing Section, the employer conducted an investigation which revealed that Mr 
Sidumo, a security officer tasked with guarding a high risk security point, had repeatedly 
neglected to search, either properly or at all, employees exiting that particular security point. As a 
result, Mr Sidumo was brought before a disciplinary enquiry to answer to charges of negligence 
                                                                                                                                                              
the award was not defensible on any of the reasons advanced and there was no reason on the facts to have come 
to the same conclusion. See also De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA and others 2000 JOL 6467 (LAC). 
699 To prevent arbitrariness in the decision-making process, it is focused on whether there is a rationale for the 
decision. A Price “The Content and Justification of Rationality Review” in S Woolman & D Bilchitz (eds) Is This 
Seat Taken? Conversations at the Bar, the Bench and the Academy about the South African Constitution (2012) 
51.  See also M Bishop “Rationality is dead! Long live rationality! Saving rational basis review” in S Woolman 
& D Bilchitz (eds) Is This Seat Taken? Conversations at the Bar, the Bench and the Academy about the South 
African Constitution (2012) 7. 
700 Para 58. The award must not be based on conjecture, fantasy, guesswork or hallucination. 
701 2007 JOL 20596 (LC). 
702 Para 36. See also Federated Timbers (Pty) Ltd v Lallie NO & others 1999 20 ILJ 348 (LC). 
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and a failure to follow established company procedures. At the conclusion of these proceedings, 
Mr Sidumo was found guilty of both charges and dismissed. In mitigation of sanction, the 
chairperson of the enquiry accepted and took into account that no theft or loss could be proven to 
have resulted from Mr Sidumo’s misconduct as well as Mr Sidumo’s clean disciplinary record of 
fifteen years. The internal appeal hearing also confirmed the sanction of dismissal; considering it 
significant that although Mr Sidumo’s misconduct was not known to have caused any losses to 
the employer, such losses could indeed have been suffered. Failing attempts at conciliation, Mr 
Sidumo subsequently referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA for arbitration; 
contending among others that the employer had not managed to prove that he had violated its 
search procedures and that dismissal was in any event an inappropriate sanction for the type of 
offense involved.703  
 
After analysing the evidence and argument presented, the commissioner ruled that, although Mr 
Sidumo was guilty of misconduct, it was not of such a nature that it rendered the continuation of 
the employment relationship intolerable and dismissal was accordingly not an appropriate or fair 
sanction.704 The commissioner reasoned that there had been no “proven” losses suffered by the 
employer; the violation by Mr Sidumo had been unintentional and a mistake and Mr Sidumo had 
not been dishonest. Mr Sidumo’s unblemished service record also weighed in significantly with 
the commissioner’s decision that Mr Sidumo’s dismissal was unfair.705  
 
The mine’s subsequent review to the Labour Court and appeal to the Labour Appeal Court was 
unsuccessful. The Labour Court dismissed the application; concluding, with reference to the 
grounds of review set out in section 145 of the LRA and the test in Carephone that it could find 
no reason to interfere with the commissioner’s application of the principle of progressive 
discipline. The court considered Mr Sidumo’s service record an overwhelming factor in his 
favour, noting that honest employees should not automatically face dismissal. In the Labour 
Court’s view, there was no evidence that theft had occurred during Mr Sidumo’s shift.706 
 
                                                 
703 Sidumo v RPMR Security (Amplats) & another 2001 2 BALR 197 (CCMA). 
704 201. 
705 The commissioner reinstated Mr Sidumo and awarded him compensation equal to three months’ salary. 
706 J Partington J & A van der Walt “Re(viewing) the Constitutional Court’s Decision in Sidumo” 2008 Obiter 
209 213-214. 
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On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court was critical of the commissioner’s findings and rejected the 
notion that no losses had been suffered by the employer.707 The Court held that the possibility 
that precious metals had been stolen whilst Mr Sidumo was on guard was a possibility that could 
not be discounted. The Court also had the following to say:708 
 
“It is not clear what the [Commissioner] meant when he said that the violation of the rule by [Mr 
Sidumo] was unintentional or a ‘mistake’. He might have been referring to the fact that one of 
the offences that [Mr Sidumo] was found guilty of was based on negligent conduct as opposed 
to intentional conduct. He did not elaborate on this but, even if that were the position, that would 
have to be taken into account in light of all the circumstances. Quite frankly, how the third 
factor, namely, honesty, came into the picture in this case, is baffling. No dishonesty by [Mr 
Sidumo] was alleged.” 
 
Notwithstanding its criticism of the commissioner’s findings, the Labour Appeal Court dismissed 
the employer’s appeal. Since the employer had not attacked the commissioner’s finding that Mr 
Sidumo’s service record was a significant consideration on sanction, in the court’s view, the 
commissioner’s award could not be set aside because the unchallenged finding was in itself 
capable of sustaining the commissioner’s award.709 
 
A further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal resulted in the overturning of both the decisions 
of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court and the commissioner’s finding being replaced 
with a ruling that the dismissal had been fair.710 More particularly, in applying the rationality test 
to the facts before it, the Court noted and endorsed the Labour Appeal Court’s criticism of the 
commissioner’s findings. Nevertheless, the court considered Mr Sidumo’s misconduct to go to 
the heart of the employment relationship and the trust the employer placed in him. The Court did 
not allow a consideration of other legitimate reasons that were capable of sustaining the outcome, 
but limited the enquiry to the question whether the commissioner’s reasons as a whole could 
provide a rational connection to a sustainable outcome. In its view, the bad reasons considered by 
                                                 
707 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA & others 2004 1 BLLR 34 (LAC). 
708 Para 12. 
709 Para 15.  
710 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA and others 2007 1 All SA 164 (SCA). The 
Supreme Court of Appeal found that the commissioner’s decision to reinstate Mr Sidumo had not been rationally 
connected to the information before him. 
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the commissioner in deciding that the dismissal was too harsh played too much of an appreciable 
or significant role in the outcome of the decision for it to be considered a rational one.711 
 
In reaching such a conclusion, the Court made two important findings: firstly, it held that a 
commissioner was required to show a measure of deference to the sanction imposed by the 
employer provided it was a fair sanction;712 and secondly, it held that CCMA arbitrations 
undertaken in terms of the LRA constituted administrative action as defined in section 1 of PAJA 
and that the broader review grounds of PAJA, as general legislation relating to administrative 
action, accordingly subsumed the grounds of review in section 145(2) of the LRA; superseding 
the specialised enactment of the LRA.713 According to the Court, the review criterion was thus 
whether or not the decision was rationally connected with the information before the 
commissioner and the reasons for it.714 On a subsequent appeal to the Constitutional Court, the 
latter disagreed with the findings of the Supreme Court of Appeal and adopted a different 
approach, which will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
5 5 1 PAJA or the LRA 
 
Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to the case of Carephone wherein the Labour Appeal 
Court confirmed that the right to just administrative action in the Bill of Rights (section 33 read 
with item 23(2) of schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution) applied to CCMA arbitrations.  
 
However, subsequent to Carephone, PAJA was enacted for the purpose of giving effect to the 
constitutional right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.715 In 
the process, administrative action was statutorily defined,716 confining its operation, and the 
question arose whether PAJA would henceforth apply to statutory arbitrations and in particular 
the grounds of review for administrative action as provided for in section 6(2).  
 
                                                 
711 Para 34 and 51. 
712 Para 48. The Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned that it was primarily the function of the employer to decide on 
the proper sanction. 
713 Para 25. 
714 See J Grogan “Back to Basics The SCA revisits review” (2006) 22(6) Employment Law 11. 
715 See preamble to the PAJA. 
716 Section 1. 
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In addressing this question, the courts were required to ask, this time with reference to the 
statutory administrative action definition, whether the nature of CCMA arbitration proceedings 
was such that it constituted a decision taken by an organ of state exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of legislation. The premise was that if arbitration amounted 
to judicial conduct, the powers of review would be limited to the relatively narrow confines 
established by the LRA, but, should it be regarded as administrative action, a review court could 
exercise the relatively wide powers granted by section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA. 
 
As mentioned above, it has already been established in Carephone and Mkhize that the CCMA 
constitutes an organ of state for purposes of the 1993 and 1996 Constitution respectively.717 This 
is important because PAJA has adopted the same definition of “organ of state” as provided for in 
section 239 of the 1996 Constitution. Moreover, not only is the CCMA also recognised as a 
public institution created by statute,718 but its compulsory arbitration power is also generally 
considered to involve the exercise of public power and functions.719 In this regard, Currie and De 
Waal explains that the arbitration power is designed to promote labour peace by the effective 
settlement of disputes by means of an element of compulsion, corresponding to the traditional 
government or governed relationship.720 The CCMA thus performs a public function by, among 
other things, providing an infrastructure for resolving labour disputes. 
 
On the face of it, the CCMA thus for all intent and purposes appear to engage in administrative 
action and should be subject to PAJA. In fact, the only item counting against compulsory 
arbitration being classified as administrative action appears to be the requirement that the 
“decision” must be “of an administrative nature”.721 Establishing the meaning of this phrase has 
proven to be somewhat of a challenge.722 Hoexter suggest that parties should resist any 
interpretation that attempts to re-introduce the classification of administrative functions as 
“judicial”, “quasi-judicial”, “legislative” and “purely administrative”:723  
                                                 
717 See para 5 2 above. 
718 Section 112 of the LRA. 
719 See Hoexter Administrative Law 52. 
720 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (Juta & Co Ltd, Wetton 2005) at 651, fn 34. 
721 See section 1 of PAJA. 
722 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 JOL 5301 (CC); De Lange  
    v Smuts NO and others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC); and Nel v Le Roux NO and others 1996 ( 3) SA 562 (CC). 
723 Hoexter Administrative Law 191. See also Sidumo par 135. 
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“Given that the classification of functions has been discredited in our system, and given the 
courts’ deliberate efforts to root it out of our common law, it would be perverse to read this 
conceptual approach into the Act on such flimsy evidence. There is even less justification for 
asserting that the effect of the phrase is to exclude ‘legislative’ (or, for that matter, ‘judicial’) 
administrative conduct from the PAJA since the New Clicks case, where Chaskalson CJ 
regarded the phrase ‘of an administrative nature’ as bringing regulation making within the scope 
of the definition of ‘decision’.” 
 
The diverse opinions expressed in relation to this question, however, gives rise to the inference 
that the courts were not equally convinced as to the administrative nature of the compulsory 
arbitration function. In Ramdaw, Zondo JP, albeit obiter, held that the definitions of 
“administrative action” and of “decision” in section 1 of PAJA may be wide enough to include 
the making of an arbitration award by a CCMA commissioner as administrative action.724 
 
On the other hand, in PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture & others,725 Pillay J held that the 
essential character of arbitration was not altered simply because the arbitrator acted under the 
auspices of an administrative organ. According to the Labour Court, arbitration was distinct from 
an administrative process, even though it shared features common with adjudicative 
administrative acts, and PAJA could accordingly not apply to arbitration proceedings, but such 
had to be reviewed under section 145 of the LRA. 
 
Taking into account the conflicting court opinions, the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Sidumo was an interesting one indeed. In this case, the Court compared the grounds of review 
provided for in section 145 of the LRA with the more extensive provisions of section 6(2) of 
PAJA and decided that PAJA extended the available remedies to parties to CCMA arbitrations; 
superseding the specialised enactment of the LRA. The Court explained its finding as follows:726 
 
“At the time the LRA was enacted, the interim Constitution required that administrative action 
be ‘justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it’. For the reasons set out in Carephone, this 
right suffused the interpretation of s 145(2). When the administrative-justice provisions of the 
                                                 
724 Para 29. 
725 2004 8 BLLR 822 (LC) para 20. 
726 Para 26. 
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Constitution, as embodied in PAJA, superseded those of the interim Constitution, it could not 
have been intended that parties to CCMA arbitrations should enjoy a lesser right of 
administrative review than that afforded under the interim Constitution. The repeal of the 
interim Constitution and its replacement by the Constitution did, in other words, not diminish 
the review entitlement under s 145(2). Section 6(2) of PAJA is the legislative embodiment of the 
grounds of review to which arbitration parties became entitled under the Constitution.” 
 
Had this been the end of the matter, the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment would have had the 
effect that CCMA arbitrations would henceforth be subject to the PAJA grounds of review, 
including being reviewable if not rationally connected to the information before the 
commissioner and the reasons for it.727 This was however not the end of the matter and in a 
further appeal to the Constitutional Court, that court was called upon to establish the correctness 
or otherwise of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision. 
 
In its reasoning process, the majority of the Constitutional Court (per Navsa AJ) agreed with the 
Supreme Court of Appeal that the CCMA was not a court of law and that a commissioner, 
conducting a CCMA arbitration, was performing an administrative function.728 The Court 
reasoned that CCMA commissioners, when adjudicating dismissal disputes in terms of the LRA, 
exercised public power impacting on the parties to an arbitration, and the CCMA could therefore 
properly be described as an administrative body exercising a quasi-judicial function.729 The Court 
however also reasoned that PAJA was not the exclusive legislative basis for administrative 
review730 and that section 145 of the LRA constituted national legislation in respect of 
administrative action within the specialised labour law sphere; alongside general legislation in the 
form of PAJA.731 The Court also found it significant that the legislature clearly intended that the 
Labour Court should, subject to the 1996 Constitution, have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of 
labour matters and that, if PAJA were to apply to the review of CCMA decisions, section 6 of 
                                                 
727 Para 1. 
728 Para 88. See also the concurring judgement of O’Regan J par 135-139. The court reasoned that the CCMA is not a 
court of law and should not be treated as one amongst others because: 1) a commissioner is empowered in terms 
of section 138(1) of the LRA to conduct an arbitration in any manner that he or she considers appropriate to 
determine the dispute fairly and quickly, with the minimum legal formalities; 2) there is no blanket right to legal 
representation before the CCMA; 3) the CCMA does not follow a system of binding precedents; and 4) 
commissioners do not have the same security of tenure as judicial officers. 
729 Para 88. 
730 Para 91-92. 
731 Para 89-90. 
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PAJA would not allow for the intended exclusivity of the Labour Court, but enable the High 
Courts to review CCMA arbitrations.732 
 
The Constitutional Court then referred to R v Gwantshu,733 which approved of the approach 
adopted by the English Privy Council in Barker v Edger and others,734 and confirmed the 
principle that general legislation, unless specifically indicated, did not derogate from special 
legislation.735 According to the Court, this conclusion was further supported by section 210 of the 
LRA, which confirmed the applicability of this Act in the case of a conflict between its 
provisions and that of any other piece of legislation. It is submitted that such reasoning is above 
reproach; taken into consideration also what was contended before in respect of special statutory 
review.736In the circumstances, the Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
had erred in holding that PAJA was applicable to the review of CCMA arbitration awards. The 
Constitutional Court did however acknowledge that any specialised legislative regulation of 
administrative action had to comply with the prescripts of section 33(1) of the 1996 
Constitution.737 This was accordingly not the end of the enquiry and the Constitutional Court also 
explored the proper standard of review to be applied under the LRA. 
 
5 5 2 Justifiability or reasonableness 
 
In determining whether section 145 of the LRA was constitutionally compliant, the 
Constitutional Court indicated that it was not oblivious to the undesirability of having extensive 
grounds of review. In a separate judgment, Sachs J specifically commented that, in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, it would be inappropriate to 
restrict the review of a commissioner’s decision to the narrow grounds of procedural misconduct 
that a first reading of section 145(2) would suggest.738 At the same time, Sachs J acknowledged 
that the labour-law setting, requiring a speedy resolution of disputes with the outcome basically 
                                                 
732 Para 96-97. See section 157(1) which provides: “Subject to the Constitution and section 173, and except where 
this Act provides otherwise, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in 
terms of this Act or in terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court.” 
733 1931 EDL 29 at 31. 
734 1898 AC 748 754. 
735 Para 102. 
736 See para 5 3 5 above. 
737 Para 89. 
738 Para 158. 
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limited to dismissal or reinstatement, made it inappropriate to apply the full PAJA-type 
administrative review on substantive as well as procedural grounds. 
 
In seeking to read section 145 in a manner that took into consideration the requirements of 
section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution,739 the Court in the majority judgment referred to the pre-
PAJA case of Carephone.740 The Court noted that the justifiability test adopted in Carephone was 
substantive, involved greater scrutiny than the rationality test set out in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association and was formulated on the basis of the wording of the administrative 
justice provisions of the 1993 Constitution, namely that an award must be justifiable in relation to 
the reasons given for it. 
 
 The Court next noted that, as opposed to the 1993 Constitution, applicable at the time of 
Carephone, the 1996 Constitution required administrative action that was lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.741 The Court accordingly drew a distinction between the justifiability test as 
enunciated in Carephone and that of reasonableness:742 
 
“Carephone held that section 145 of the LRA was suffused by the then constitutional standard 
that the outcome of an administrative decision should be justifiable in relation to the reasons 
given for it. The better approach is that section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. That standard is the one explained in Bato Star: Is the decision 
reached by the commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?” 
 
Bato Star Fishing,743 relied on by the Court in Sidumo in the above extract, was a case that 
previously served before the Constitutional Court in relation to the lawfulness of administrative 
action in the allocation of fishing quotas within the context of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA. That 
section provided that a decision was reviewable “if it was so unreasonable that no reasonable 
person could have exercised the power”. In that case, the Constitutional Court had found that the 
wording of section 6(2)(h) drew directly on the language of the well-known decision of the 
                                                 
739 Para 105. 
740 Para 106. 
741 Para 105-106. 
742 Para 110. 
743 See chapter 2 para 2 2 2 and 2 4 4 1. 
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English Court of Appeal in Wednesbury Corporation.744 Bato Star Fishing was a landmark 
decision in South Africa which laid down the standard of unreasonableness required of public 
body decisions in order for it to be quashed on judicial review.745  
 
With reference to this decision, the Court accordingly found that section 6(2)(h) of PAJA had to 
be construed consistently with the 1996 Constitution and in particular section 33 which required 
administrative action to be “reasonable”.746. On this basis, the Court held an administrative 
decision would be reviewable in terms of section 6(2)(h) if it was one that a reasonable decision-
maker could not reach. Whether the decision indeed “was one that a reasonable decision-maker 
could not reach” was the test used to establish whether or not the decision was reviewable for 
lack of reasonableness as contemplated in section 6(2)(h). 
 
The Constitutional Court in Sidumo in other words relied directly on Bato Star Fishing, and 
indirectly also on Wednesbury Corporation, in order to conclude that unreasonableness in 
relation to section 145 of the LRA entailed asking whether the decision reached by the 
commissioner was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.  
 
The Court then proceeded to give content to this concept of reasonableness in two ways. First it 
recognised that, in so far as it was impossible to separate the merits from the remainder of the 
enquiry, the scrutiny of an administrative decision based on reasonableness introduced a 
substantive ingredient into review proceedings.747 According to the Court such scrutiny was 
qualified by the fact that administrative decision-makers acting reasonably could reach different 
conclusions748 and that a review court was tasked with ensuring only that the decisions taken by 
such decision-makers fell within the bounds of reasonableness as required by the 1996 
Constitution.749 The Court secondly identified factors that could assist in any enquiry seeking to 
                                                 
744 1948 1 KB 223 (CA). Discussed in chapter 3. 
745 In that case, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that a reasonable decision required an equilibrium to be 
struck between a range of competing interests or considerations. These included the nature of the decision, the 
identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for 
the decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-
being of those affected. 
746 Para 44. 
747 Para 108. 
748 The LRA has given that decision-making power to a commissioner. 
749 Para 109 and 119. 
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determine whether or not a decision was one made by a “reasonable decision-maker”. These 
factors included among others considering the impartiality of the decision-maker,750 the validity 
or reasonableness of the rule alleged to be breached,751 the importance of the rule alleged to be 
breached,752 the totality of the circumstances,753 the reasons for imposing a particular sanction,754 
the harm caused by the employee’s conduct and the basis of any challenge to an employer’s 
decision. Although specifically mentioned in the context of a sanction review in an unfair 
dismissal dispute, it is submitted that these guidelines of the Constitutional Court could 
nevertheless serve as an indication of what the word “reasonable” would mean within the context 
of review applications in general. The Court furthermore identified other more general 
considerations pertaining to the method or conduct of the proceedings, including whether the 
outcome of the arbitration process fell outside the bounds of reason755 and whether the decision-
maker applied his or her mind to the material merits and dealt with the substantial merits of the 
dispute – the rationale being that there must be a reasonably sustainable fit between the evidence 
and the outcome.756 It is an interesting observation that several of these guidelines as to 
unreasonableness bear a striking resemblance to the grounds of review of misconduct, gross 
irregularity and excess of power; suggesting that there might be a connection or interplay 
between the section 145 grounds of review and the concept of unreasonableness. 
 
However, as was done in Carephone with justifiability, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo did 
not venture as far as to hold expressly that unreasonableness was an independent ground of 
review. It is submitted that it is clear from the discussion above that the Constitutional Court, as 
in Bato Star Fishing, construed section 145 consistently with the 1996 Constitution, and section 
33(1) in particular, in holding that “section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness”.757 According to the ordinary dictionary meaning of “suffuse”, reasonableness is 
“spread over” or “covering” the section 145 grounds for review.758 Lending support to such an 
                                                 
750 Para 61. 
751 Para 62. 
752 Para 78. 
753 Para 78. 
754 Para 78. 
755 Para 158. 
756 Para 265 and 267. 
757 Para 106. 
758 See explanation for “suffuse” in Oxford Paperback Thesaurus 2 ed (2001) 218.  
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interpretation is the Constitutional Court’s continuous referral to the “standard for review” rather 
that the “ground of review”.  
 
Further support for this contention is found in the concurring judgment of Sachs J. Sachs J did 
not hold that unreasonableness was an independent ground of review but interpreted Navsa AJ’s 
finding in relation to unreasonableness as a reading of section 145 of the LRA “…in a broad 
manner…”,759 holding further that:760 
 
“[T]he key to the present case is to interpret and apply section 145 in a manner that is 
compatible with the values of reasonableness and fair dealing that an open and democratic 
society demands.” 
 
Ngcobo J did not agree with the majority of the Constitutional Court that the conduct of CCMA 
arbitration proceedings constitute administrative action within the meaning of section 33 of the 
1996 Constitution. Albeit in a minority judgment, Ngcobo J nevertheless made some interesting 
observations in relation to an interpretative construction of section 145 of the LRA in conformity 
with the 1996 Constitution. According to him, any such action did not require the courts to 
sideline the section 145(2) grounds of review and introduce an additional, constitutional basis for 
review. According to Ngcobo J, this was one of the “unintended consequences” of Carephone761 
and the proper approach (absent a constitutionality challenge) required respecting and giving 
effect to the legislature’s choice to permit reviews on the grounds in section 145(2)(a). 
 
As a result, Ngcobo J considered it prudent to deal with the review application in Sidumo having 
regard to the three grounds of review provided for in section 145(2)(a) and alleged by the 
employer to be applicable in its review papers.762 Ngcobo J was not persuaded by the argument 
raised in court that unjustifiability, alternatively irrationality, would find application without 
reference to any of the specific grounds of review set out in section 145(2)(a). Having done so, 
Ngcoco J concluded:763 
                                                 
759 Para 144. 
760 Para 158. 
761 Para 247. 
762 Para 256. 
763 Para 289. 
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“I am unable to find that the commissioner ignored any material factor in evaluating the fairness 
or otherwise of the sanction imposed by the employer. In the result I cannot say that the 
employer did not have a fair trial before the commissioner with the result that a gross 
irregularity in the proceedings occurred. Nor can I, in all the circumstances of this case, 
conclude that the award made by the commissioner was manifestly unfair to the employer. It 
follows from these conclusions that the commissioner did not exceed his powers under the LRA. 
Nor can I say that the commissioner committed a misconduct. 
 
In the event none of the grounds of review have been established. For these reasons I concur in the 
order proposed in the judgment of Navsa AJ.” 
 
It is submitted that such an interpretation ought to be accepted as correct in law. If the section 
145(2) grounds of review were read so as to conform to the constitutional right to reasonable 
administrative action, it would amount to an indirect application of the 1996 Constitution. In 
terms of section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution, courts are specifically required to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This does however not mean that the LRA and 
section 145 are allowed to be circumvented by virtue of a direct reliance on the 1996 
Constitution. Ngcobo J acknowledged this when he held that:764 
 
“[W]here the legislation which is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right specifies the 
grounds upon which decisions of tribunals giving effect to that legislation may be reviewed, a 
court reviewing the decision of that tribunal should start with the interpretation of the statutory 
provision in question. And of course the provision under consideration must be construed in 
conformity with the Constitution.” 
 
 Accordingly, it is submitted that the Constitutional Court only deviated from Carephone in so far 
as it held that the test or judicial threshold for interference on review was now reasonableness 
rather than justifiability. However, other than holding that section 145 was suffused by 
reasonableness, the court omitted to express an opinion as to how reasonableness was to be 
practically applied in relation to the section 145(2) grounds of review. Unlike in Carephone, the 
                                                 
764 Para 249; Own emphasis added. 
158 
 
Constitutional Court did not hold that reasonableness was capable of being deduced from section 
145(2)(a)(iii).  
 
5 5 3 Standard of reasonableness applied 
 
Another question that arose in Sidumo was whether an arbitration award was reviewable because 
of a defective process of reasoning if the conclusions reached by the commissioner were 
nevertheless reasonable in relation to the evidentiary material before him as demonstrated from 
reasons other than those relied on by him. The Supreme Court of Appeal answered this question 
in the positive. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal the question on review was not 
whether the record revealed relevant considerations that were capable of justifying the outcome, 
but whether the decision maker properly exercised the powers entrusted to him or her. In this 
regard the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the focus was on the process and the way in 
which the decision maker came to the challenged conclusion rather than on whether the decision 
was right or wrong. 765 
 
A study of the subsequent Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo shows that, although the 
court did not expressly approve of the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal, it also did not 
summarily reject it. It is submitted that such a conclusion is supported by the following: The 
Constitutional Court noted that the commissioner had basically advanced three reasons why the 
sanction of dismissal was unfair: firstly, no losses were sustained, secondly, the misconduct was 
unintentional or a mistake and lastly, there was no dishonesty.766 However, although the 
Constitutional Court accepted that there was no evidence that losses had flowed from Mr 
Sidumo’s neglect and that the commissioner was accordingly correct in his conclusion in that 
regard, the Constitutional Court found that the commissioner had erred in his remaining two 
reasons for finding the sanction of dismissal unfair. More particularly, Navsa AJ held that:767 
 
“In respect of the commissioner’s finding that that the misconduct was unintentional or a 
mistake, it was correctly pointed out on behalf of Mr Sidumo that it was Mr Botes, in his 
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767 Para 116; own emphasis added. 
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evidence before the commissioner, who characterised his misconduct as ‘mistakes’. It is true that 
Mr Sidumo did not conduct individual searches which were his main task. Therefore, to describe 
his conduct as a ‘mistake’ or ‘unintentional’ is confusing and, in this regard, the commissioner 
erred.” 
 
Likewise, Navsa AJ held that:768 
 
“In respect of the absence of dishonesty, the Labour Appeal Court found the commissioner’s 
statement in this regard ‘baffling’. In my view, the commissioner cannot be faulted for 
considering the absence of dishonesty a relevant factor in relation to the misconduct. However, 
the commissioner was wrong to conclude that the relationship of trust may have not been 
breached. Mr Sidumo was employed to protect the Mine’s valuable property which he did not 
do. However, this is not the end of the inquiry. It is still necessary to weigh all the relevant 
factors together in light of the seriousness of the breach.” 
 
Despite the erroneous findings made by the commissioner, the Constitutional Court concluded 
that it could not be said that his conclusion was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not 
reach. According to the Court, Mr Sidumo’s case was one of those where different decision-
makers acting reasonably may reach different conclusions.769 The Court based this conclusion on 
the fact that the commissioner carefully and thoroughly considered the different elements of the 
Code and properly applied his mind to the question of the appropriateness of the sanction. In this 
regard, the Court specifically agreed with the commissioner that the absence of dishonesty, the 
employee’s clean and lengthy service and the fact that no losses were suffered were significant 
factors in favour of the application of progressive discipline rather than dismissal.770 
 
From the Constitutional Court’s judgment it can be deduced that when a commissioner makes a 
value judgment as to whether dismissal is unfair or too harsh a sanction in the circumstances, he 
or she must consider all materially relevant factors. It is further submitted that the value judgment 
will be considered reasonable where the materially relevant considerations in favour of the 
decision outweigh the materially relevant considerations against the decision. Ray-Howett 
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contends that, by the Constitutional Court so applying the reasonableness test to the facts, the 
Constitutional Court actually adopted the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal:771 
 
“If one reads the judgment, it becomes evident that in assessing whether the commissioner’s 
decision was reasonable, the court analysed the reasoning process followed by the commissioner 
and decided that it was not unreasonable primarily on the basis that while the commissioner’s 
reasoning process was defective in one or two instances, these defects were not sufficiently 
serious to warrant a review of the ultimate decision.” 
 
Having regard to the above, it can thus be submitted that, because the erroneous reasons of the 
commissioner did not amount to a defect in terms of section 145(2), the decision was not 
reviewable. In this sense, Sidumo can accordingly be described as authority for the view that an 
award would not be reviewable merely because a commissioner advanced erroneous reasons for 
his finding; at best the erroneous reasons will serve as evidence of a reviewable ground that will 
in conjunction with other considerations have to be sufficiently compelling to justify an inference 
that the decision is unreasonable.772  
 
On the other hand, a commissioner’s failure to consider all materially relevant factors can result 
in his decision being set aside on review, not because the decision itself is unreasonable, but 
because it does not reflect the outcome of a weighing-up of all of the materially relevant factors – 
the focus always being on the way in which the commissioner came to his decision. 
 
While it may thus be inferred from the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo that review 
courts should confine themselves to examining the record of the arbitration proceedings and the 
outcome of the arbitration, the judgment did not limit review courts to this approach. Section 145 
of the LRA and reasonableness also invites scrutiny of the process by which commissioners make 
their findings and reach their conclusions. This means that review courts must satisfy themselves 
that commissioners have applied their minds to the evidence before them and have drawn rational 
                                                 
771 Ray-Howett Is it reasonable for CCMA commissioners to act irrationally? 2008 29 ILJ 1629. 
772 See RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) v Grogan & others 2008 2 BLLR   
     184 (LC) para 50; Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd v Diversified Health Systems (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2002 4 SA 
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conclusions from that evidence. If they have not, the award is liable to be set aside regardless of 
the outcome of the arbitration process. 
 
5 6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it has been established that before and after the landmark decision in Carephone 
there was much controversy as to whether or not the issuing of an arbitration award by a 
commissioner in terms of the LRA constitutes administrative action, subject to a concept of 
rationality or justifiability review. This included the questions whether rationality or justifiability 
was an independent ground of review or whether it was subsumed within the section 145(2) 
grounds themselves and whether a rational connection was required between the evidence and the 
reasons as well as the reasons and the award. 
 
In the context of an appeal against a discretionary condonation ruling, the Labour Appeal Court 
in Carephone found that the CCMA was an organ of state and that the making of an arbitration 
award was as an administrative act, subject to the constitutional imperatives of the administrative 
justice provision contained in the 1993 Constitution. The latter provision required administrative 
decisions to be justifiable, coherent and capable of being reasonably sustained, having due regard 
to the reasons for the decisions.773 On this interpretation, it was obligatory for arbitration awards 
to comply with the requirement of justifiability. Although the section 145(2) grounds of review 
did not make express reference to substantive justifiability or irrationality in the merit or outcome 
constituting a defect in arbitration awards which would render it reviewable, the Court found that 
the restrictive scope of section 145 did not fall foul of this constitutional right. Rather, the Court 
reasoned that, when reading section 145 in light of the constitutional right to administrative 
justice, the alleged misconduct, gross irregularity, exceeding of powers or impropriety as the case 
may be need to be measured against the constitutional imperatives of the administrative justice 
right in order to ensure constitutional consistency; justifiability or rationality in particular. So 
construed, the Labour Appeal Court extended the grounds of review by holding that an 
arbitration award would be reviewable if the reviewing court is able to conclude that the 
commissioner has exceeded his or her powers in terms of section 145(2)(iii) of the LRA because 
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there was no rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative 
decision-maker between the material properly available to him or her and the conclusion he or 
she eventually arrived at. 
 
Subsequent to Carephone, case law dealing with the review of discretionary decisions was not 
consistent. The Labour Appeal Court initially appeared to prefer supporting an interpretation of 
Carephone that did not hold justifiability as an independent ground of review: In County Fair 
Foods, the Court found that non-compliance with the constitutional imperative of justifiability 
referenced in Carephone could amount to misconduct in terms of section 145(2)(a)(i) or a 
procedural irregularity in terms of section 145(2)(a)(ii) in addition to an excess of power as per 
Carephone;774 and in Radebe, the Court expressed doubts as to whether justifiability constituted 
an independent ground upon which an award could be set aside on review; considering this for all 
intent and purposes to amount to an appeal.775 However, in Ramdaw,776 the Labour Appeal Court 
again appeared to adopt rationality as a ground of review that was severable from the grounds 
specifically mentioned in section 145(2); reasoning that Carephone found justifiability to fall 
within section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA for purposes of the time limit set out in section 145 only.  
 
Despite their differences as to the proper position of justifiability or rationality, the courts were 
however all in agreement that the distinction between appeals and reviews remained intact: 
reviews were primarily concerned with the manner in which the CCMA came to its conclusion as 
opposed to the result itself; whereas appeals were concerned with the correctness of the result. 
Whilst the constitutional prescript that administrative action must be justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it introduced a requirement of rationality in the merit or outcome of the 
administrative action, it was not considered to disturb this essential distinction because it simply 
required that the commissioner’s decision must be supported by the facts and the applicable law 
and did not also require that the decision must be correct. The approach of the review and 
appellate courts in dealing with challenges relating to the exercise of discretionary powers by 
original decision-makers does however appear fairly similar. In both instances, it is accepted that 
the court cannot interfere simply because it would have made a different decision. The test is not 
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whether the exercise of a discretionary power is correct, but whether it is so inappropriate or 
unjustifiable that the inference can be drawn that the decision-maker has not properly and 
judiciously exercised his or her discretion. In relation to findings of fact, the test for interference 
is also stricter because it is accepted that the original decision-maker has had the advantage of 
seeing and hearing the witnesses and in being steeped in the atmosphere of the proceedings; 
placing him or her in a better position than the review or appeal court to estimate what is 
probable or improbable in relation to the particular people whom he or she has observed during 
the proceedings.777 
 
Against this background, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo was subsequently called upon to 
adjudicate whether reasonableness, as part of the right to just administrative action as prescribed 
in the 1996 Constitution, was in some form or another applicable to arbitration award reviews. In 
doing so, the Court confirmed that CCMA arbitration proceedings constitute administrative 
action. The Court however also confirmed that PAJA was not the exclusive legislative basis for 
administrative review778 and that section 145 of the LRA constituted national legislation in 
respect of administrative action within the specialised labour law sphere.779 As a result of such an 
interpretation, the LRA, and section 145 in particular, was found to be applicable to arbitration 
award reviews and not PAJA. The Court did however acknowledge that any specialised 
legislative regulation of administrative action (like the LRA) had to comply with the prescripts of 
section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution. In establishing how, the Court referred to Bato Star 
Fishing, which dealt with the reasonableness requirement in administrative law, and confirmed 
that a review court was required to determine whether the administrative decision was one that a 
reasonable decision-maker could not reach. In engaging in such an exercise, it was established 
that the review court had to take into account that different administrative decision-makers acting 
reasonably could reach different conclusions and that the decision under review only had to fall 
within the boundaries of what was required by the concept of reasonableness. According to the 
Court, this constitutional standard of reasonableness so introduced to arbitration award reviews 
informed and suffused the ambit of the grounds of review under section 145(2) of the LRA780 and 
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introduced a substantive (as opposed to procedural) reasonableness requirement from 
administrative decision-makers in the merit or outcome of the decisions concerned. 
 
It was also established that the Constitutional Court has given further content to the concept of 
reasonableness by identifying indicators of unreasonableness that could assist in any enquiry 
seeking to determine whether or not a decision was one made by a “reasonable decision-maker”. 
These factors include the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, 
the range of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the 
competing interests involved and the impact of the decision of the lives and well-being of those 
affected.781 Although questions as to the applicability of proportionality to arbitration award 
reviews has not been raised, factors like that pertaining to the “impact of the decision”, “the range 
of factors relevant to the decision” and “the nature of the competing factors involved” do appear 
to invite some form of a proportionality inquiry into the reasonableness question. It was also 
established that reasonableness requires not only a consideration of all materially relevant factors, 
but that the materially relevant considerations in favour of the decision must outweigh the 
materially relevant considerations against the decision. 
 
The Constitutional Court did however not go as far as to hold that unreasonableness was an 
independent ground of review in addition to those listed in section 145(2) of the LRA. The Court 
described reasonableness as a standard against which the reviewability of a decision was to be 
tested. In applying the standard of reasonableness, the Court directed review courts to pose the 
question whether the decision, alleged to have been made by the commissioner as a result of the 
occurrence of one or more of the section 145 grounds of review, was one that a reasonable 
decision-maker could not reach.  
 
In giving content to this concept of reasonableness, the Constitutional Court further confirmed 
that erroneous reasons for decisions did not per se render awards reviewable. According to the 
Court, the focus was always to be on the manner in which the commissioner came to the decision 
and whether the erroneous reasons were materially relevant thereto. In other words, the question 
was not whether the reason was satisfactory or correct but whether it served as evidence of a 
                                                 
781 Para 45. 
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reviewable ground that would alone or in conjunction with other considerations be sufficiently 
compelling to justify an inference that the decision was unreasonable. 
 
To this end, it was found that the nature of the erroneous reasons would have to be scrutinised by 
have regarding to the award and the record of the arbitration proceedings. Likewise, the party 
launching the review application would be able to substantiate his allegation that an award is 
reviewable with reference to the award and the record of the arbitration proceedings. It is 
however not the result of the award per se that should be challenged on review. 
 
How the Constitutional Court’s exposition of the content of the reasonableness standard is to be 
applied remains to be seen from the judgements of the courts charged with interpreting and 
applying Sidumo. It can however be deducted from the Constitutional Court’s judgment, and 
more particularly its referral to a “range of reasonableness”, that various findings made by a 
commissioner can and will fall with the ambit of what is to be perceived as reasonable; reducing 
the possibility of awards being set aside on review. This more than anything else confirms that 
the focus on review will remain on the manner in which the commissioner arrived at the decision 
and not the correctness of the outcome of the award, cementing the distinction between an appeal 
and review. 
 
However, as a result of the Constitutional Court’s reliance on English administrative law, and 
International Trader’s Ferry Ltd in particular, to introduce reasonableness to arbitration award 
reviews, it is proposed that the role of reasonableness in English administrative law should be 
examined, and the courts’ interpretation discussed, in more detail in order to determine whether 
the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of it is correct and whether such reliance is warranted. 
This will follow after an exposition of the interpretation and application of Sidumo by South 
African courts in subsequent cases. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SIDUMO REASONABLENESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE LAW ANALYSIS  
 
6 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the judgement in Sidumo was handed down in October 2007, questions and differences of 
opinion have arisen in relation to its interpretation and application for the purpose of future 
review applications.782 Labour practitioners have in consequence turned to the courts for 
direction. Prominent in its emphasis, was the question pertaining to the bounds of reasonableness 
applicable to the review of CCMA arbitration awards. This has resulted in case law which 
reflects developments in the South African review jurisprudence and serves to illustrate and 
clarify the operation of the various grounds of review in different contexts.  
 
This chapter will in the main focus on certain key judgments which have interpreted and applied 
Sidumo. In doing so, specific questions that have arisen in the judgments will be highlighted and 
discussed. Firstly, it will be established whether the courts have interpreted unreasonableness as a 
test or ground of review. Secondly, it will be considered whether the reasonableness concept is 
result-based, outcome-focussed or process-related. The impact of reasonableness on value 
judgments, inclusive of findings of guilt, the appropriate sanction and procedural fairness, will 
also be discussed. Special consideration will then be afforded to the question whether review 
courts are entitled to rely on reasons other than those provided for by commissioners in their 
awards to determine the reasonableness of their decisions. In addition, it will be considered 
whether the answer to the previous question is influenced by the classification of review 
proceedings as process or outcome focused. Finally, following a discussion of the duty to 
consider materially relevant factors when making value judgments, the influence of 
reasonableness on jurisdictional reviews will be contemplated. 
 
                                                 
782 See J Grogan “Groping for a reasonable standard” (2008) 24(6) Employment Law 2; J Grogan “In the shadow of 
Sidumo: applying the ‘reasonable commissioner’ test” (2008) 24(6) Employment Law 3. These articles mention 
that, although the Sidumo judgement was a defining moment in South African labour law, early indicators are 
that the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court have subsequent thereto encountered difficulties in constructing 
the standard of “reasonableness” that can serve as a yardstick for employers, employees and commissioners. 
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6 2 REASONABLENESS: TEST OR GROUND 
 
6 2 1 Recapping Sidumo with reference to subsequent case law 
 
In chapter 5, the Sidumo judgment was discussed in detail. A repeat of the discussion is not 
intended, but it is prudent for the purpose of this section to once more emphasis the following 
important findings of the Constitutional Court: 1) that section 145 must be read to ensure that 
administrative action by the CCMA, including the making of arbitration awards, is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair; 2) that the constitutional standard of reasonableness should 
suffuse section 145 of the LRA; and 3) that the reasonableness enquiry requires the applicant on 
review to establish that the result of the arbitration award falls outside of a range of 
reasonableness, having regard to the reasoning of the commissioner and the material before him 
or her, rather than requiring a correct decision.783  
 
In chapter 5 it was also reasoned that the above-mentioned findings of the Constitutional Court 
suggested a preference for reasonableness as a test on review.784 It was submitted that, although 
Sidumo did not explicitly apply a reasonableness test to any particular statutory ground of review, 
the Court seemingly contemplated this when it held that the reasonableness standard should 
suffuse section 145 of the LRA. This interpretation is supported by the Court’s reliance on 
Carephone. In that case, the Labour Appeal Court had held that commissioners would exceed 
their powers in terms of section 145(2)(a)(iii) if their actions were not justifiable in terms of the 
reasons given. Sidumo consistently describe reasonableness as a standard rather than a ground of 
review and also made it clear that it was only deviating from Carephone to the extent that 
“justifiability” was replaced by “reasonableness”.785 Sidumo did however not expressly and 
conclusively determine that the concept of justifiability, as it was then, and reasonableness as it is 
now, should constitute a “test” on review as opposed to an independent “ground” of review.786 In 
seeking to clarify the situation, a discussion of case law, purporting to interpret and apply Sidumo  
                                                 
783 Para 119. 
784 See Chapter 5. See also Myburgh A “Sidumo v Rustplats: How Have the Courts Dealt with It” (2009) 30 ILJ 1.  
785 Para 110. “To summarise, Carephone held that section 145 of the LRA was suffused by the then constitutional 
standard that the outcome of an administrative decision should be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it. 
The better approach is that section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness.” 
786 See chapter 5. 
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reasonableness, is therefore warranted. 
 
The proposed starting point is the Labour Appeal Court’s exposition of Sidumo in Fidelity Cash 
Management Services v CCMA & others.787 This judgment followed shortly after Sidumo, but 
rather than having clarified the position, it caused greater confusion. Referring to Sidumo, Zondo 
JP noted that Carephone’s rational justifiability no longer found application, suggesting that there 
is a difference between that and reasonableness, and described the latter as a “ground for review” 
and a “test on review” interchangeably.788 On the one hand, Zondo JP explained that CCMA 
awards were required to be reasonable, as opposed to grossly unreasonable, and that non-
compliance would entitle the court to review and set it aside as a ground of review.789 On the 
other hand, Zondo JP described reasonableness as the “test on review” and a “stringent test” that 
precluded too much court interference790 by requiring the outcome of the award to be incapable of 
reasonable justification (even for reasons not relied on by the commissioner).791 In this regard, 
the Court emphasised that the reasonableness of a decision did not depend solely on the reasons 
given, but that other reasons, not relied upon, could assist in determining the reasonableness of a 
decision – suggesting that both the reasons and the result had to be challenged on review.792  
 
The Labour Court engaged in similar conduct when, in Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & others,793 
it described reasonableness as a “threshold” and “standard” on review. It first held that Sidumo 
confirmed that an award, reviewed under section 145 of the LRA, had to meet the reasonableness 
standard as set out in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution.794 However, subsequently the Court 
concluded, similar to Fidelity Cash Management Services, that the award was to be reviewed and 
set aside “on the basis of the first ground”, that is that a reasonable commissioner could not have 
found that there was a constructive dismissal at all.795 
                                                 
787 2008 3 BLLR 197 (LAC). 
788 Para 92 and 102. The Court indicated that there was a difference between the Carephone approach and the 
approach enunciated in Sidumo. 
789 Para 92, 99 and 102. 
790 Para 99-100. The Court did not explain how this the balance was to be struck when applying this test. 
791 Para 86 and 102. According to the Court, the review court is entitled to take alternative reasons into account when 
assessing the reasonableness of CCMA arbitration awards. 
792 See Myburgh “Sidumo v Rustplats” 2. 
793 2011 10 BLLR 1024 (LC). 
794 Para 38-39. 
795 Para 52, 54 and 55. 
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In another judgment of the Labour Appeal Court, namely that of Ellerine Holding Limited v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration,796 the Court reasoned that Carephone 
had given broad content to section 145(2)(a)(iii) by reading into the provision an administrative 
law test of reasonableness.797 The Court then examined the Sidumo judgment;798 holding that it 
was obliged to adopt a Carephone type test when dealing with the question whether the 
commissioner had exceeded her powers as contemplated in section 145(2).799 Described as an 
outcome based enquiry, the Court did however not contemplate reasonableness to be a fourth 
ground of review.800 Rather, the Court examined whether the commissioner had perpetrated a 
defect in terms of section 145 of the LRA; accepting that one could distinguish between the 
process by which a decision was taken and the content of the decision itself. Seemingly in line 
with Fidelity Cash Management Services, the Court agreed with submissions to the effect that a 
court should avoid formalistically passing through an award and sustaining a review application 
simply because an irregularity was found to be present. The Court was in favour of a more 
substantive overall framework to review, having regard to the nature and role of the CCMA 
within the broad framework of labour relations, the role played by commissioners and the 
substance of decisions, both in terms of the conclusions and the reasoning which underpinned 
it.801 In the present case, the Court found that, whilst irregularities in the commissioner’s decision 
were identified, it was not of such a gross nature that it prevented the aggrieved party from 
having its case fully and fairly determined.802 Strangely, the Court then stated that, as the award 
did not reveal a gross irregularity, assessing its substantive reasonableness would not assist the 
respondents.803  
 
This judicial inconsistency is further demonstrated in Fidelity Supercare Cleaning (Pty) Ltd v 
Busakwe NO & others.804 In this case, the Labour Court considered whether the commissioner 
                                                 
796 2008 JOL 22087 (LAC). Per Davis JA. 
797 Para 9. See also Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 2010 5 BLLR 577 (LC). 
798 Misconduct, gross irregularity and exceeding of commissioner’s powers. 
799 This echoes the Carephone decision. In Fidelity Cash Management Services, the Court however found that 
Carephone was no longer applicable. 
800 Para 11. 
801 Para 11. With reference to the reasonableness test in Sidumo, the Court determined that it was not unfair to refuse 
compensation to an employee on the Johnson formula where that employee had been found guilty of theft. 
802 Para 11. 
803 Para 11. 
804 2010 3 BLLR 260 (LC). 
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had acted unreasonably in finding that the third respondent’s employment contract had not 
terminated by operation of law, but that she was dismissed for operational reasons; entitling her 
to severance pay. In dismissing the review application, the Court appeared to treat reasonableness 
as a ground of review. The Court held that it could not find that the commissioner had committed 
a gross irregularity in determining that the employee was not employed on a fixed-term contract 
or that the decision was not one a reasonable decision-maker could have reached.805 The Court 
reasoned that the commissioner’s award was not unreasonable in the light of the material before 
him and that the outcome and the process of the arbitration could not be faulted. Similarly, in 
Super Group Autoparts t/a Autozone v Hlongwane NO & others,806 the Labour Court held that 
the permissible grounds of review were wider than the grounds provided for in section 145(2) of 
the LRA.807 The Court suggested that, for a review application to succeed, the decision must be 
shown to be irrational, in the sense that it does not accord with the premised reasoning or the 
reasoning is so flawed as to elicit a sense of incredulity, and unjustifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it.808 Then, describing Sidumo reasonableness as the “better approach”, the 
Court proposed testing whether, in the light of the evidence advanced and having due regard to 
considerations of equity, the commissioner's decision was one that could properly be said to be 
reasonable.809  
 
Sidumo reasonableness was subsequently also considered by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
NUM & another v Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) & others810 and Herholdt v Nedbank 
Ltd.811 In overruling the Labour Appeal Court judgment that the award was reviewable,812 the 
Court (per Nugent JA) in Samancor referred to Sidumo and accepted that an award may be set 
aside on review for one or other defect stated in section 145(2) and if the award is one that a 
                                                 
805 Para 26 and 28. 
806 2010 JOL 24895 (LC). 
807 Para 7. 
808 See para 10. The Court referred to reasonableness, rationality and justifiability interchangeably. 
809 Para 11. To Court was of the opinion that this construction of reasonableness would avoid blurring the line 
between reviews and appeals. 
810 2011 11 BLLR 1041 (SCA). In the present case, the employee was dismissed for incapacity after he had been 
incarcerated for ten days. 
811 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae) 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA). 
812 Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome v MEIBC & others 2010 8 BLLR 824 (LAC).  
171 
 
reasonable decision-maker could not reach.813 As in Fidelity Supercare Cleaning, the Court in 
Samancor equated reasonableness with the review grounds contained in section 145(2). The 
Court therefore accepted that reasonableness was a defect in the same manner than the section 
145(2) grounds of review constituted defects, albeit introduced by the Constitutional Court and 
not the LRA. Then, in considering whether the award was so defective that a reasonable decision-
maker could not reach it, the Court commented that error was not by itself a proper basis for 
reconsidering an award.814 Thus, whilst the Labour Appeal Court construed the commissioner’s 
erroneous categorisation of the reason for the dismissal as sufficient ground to interfere with the 
award, the Court did not consider this sufficient material to find that “no reasonable arbitrator” 
could have made the award. According to the Court, the commissioner’s reasoning showed that 
he would have reached the same conclusion however the dismissal was categorised.815 In 
Herholdt, the Court also confirmed the availability of the review remedy in terms of the section 
145(2) grounds of review and the unreasonable test; concluding that a commissioner must 
misconceive the nature of the inquiry or arrive at an unreasonable result for a defect in the 
conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross irregularity.816 
 
That an award will only fall short of the reasonableness requirement if it is truly incapable of 
being justified was well expressed by the Labour Appeal Court in Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd 
& others.817 Although the Court acknowledged that Sidumo reasonableness superseded 
Carephone’s rational justifiability, it nevertheless found its test helpful to illustrate the nature of 
the test.818 The Court then emphasised that the ultimate principle upon which a review was based 
was the justification for the decision. According to the Court, whatever it might have considered 
to be the correct decision was irrelevant to a review as opposed to an appeal.819  
                                                 
813 Para 5. According to the Court, the question before the Labour Court – and subsequently before the Labour 
Appeal Court – was whether the award was so defective as to fall within the category of an award that a 
reasonable decision-maker could not reach. 
814 Para 8. 
815 Para 12. 
816 Para 14 and 25. 
817 2011 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) para 18. In this case it was contended that the decision was not supported by evidence 
that could reasonably justify the decision or, alternatively, that the finding was made in ignorance of evidence 
that remained uncontradicted. 
818 Para 17. 
819 In doing so, the Court referred to Bernard Schwartz Lions over the Throne: The Judicial Revolution in English 
Administrative Law (1987) at 133. In the context of a review, a court deals with a test of: “reasonableness, not the 
rightness of agency findings of fact. The question under it is whether the evidence is such that the reasonable 
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Having regard to the above-mentioned cases, it is submitted that the term “ground” and “test” 
should not be used interchangeably. On the contrary, it should be established whether Sidumo 
reasonableness is intended to be the one or the other. In addition to inconsistencies in case law, 
this submission is also founded on the ordinary English language precept that “ground” and “test” 
have different meanings. Specifically focusing on its meaning for purpose of review applications, 
it is submitted that, as a “ground” of review, reasonableness would constitute a reference to the 
reason for the review application.820 In other words, parties to a dispute will launch a review 
application on the basis of an allegation that the award is unreasonable per se, which may by 
implication extend the scope of review. On the other hand, as a “test” on review, reasonableness 
may not necessarily extend the section 145(2) grounds for review, but would rather be a measure 
employed to examine whether the ground for interference on review, as captured in section 
145(2), exists.821 Moreover, to the extent that section 145(2) of the LRA prescribes the statutory 
grounds of review without specific reference to unreasonableness, it is submitted that it is not for 
the courts to introduce unreasonableness as an independent (statutory) ground of review. To 
position such a development, the legislature would need to amend section 145. Alternatively, it is 
submitted that litigants will have to challenge the constitutionality of section 145 of the LRA by 
alleging that the review remedy as provided for therein is inadequate822 or does not give proper 
effect to the constitutional right to just administrative action. The court will then be called upon 
to determine whether section 145 infringes the constitutional right to just administrative action 
and, if so, whether such infringement can be justified as a permissible limitation in terms of 
section 36 of the 1996 Constitution, failing which section 145 would be capable of being declared 
unconstitutional.823 It is important to note that the constitutionality of section 145 was not 
challenged in Sidumo and that this aspect was accordingly not considered by the Constitutional 
Court in its judgment.824  
                                                                                                                                                              
person acting reasonably could have reached the decision from the evidence and the inferences.” Cited at para 16 
and 18.  
820 Waite The Oxford Paperback Thesaurus 2 ed (2001) 383. 
821 Waite Thesaurus 870. 
822 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 32. 
823 See also South African National Defense Union v Minister of Defense Chief of the South African National 
Defense Force 2007 9 BLLR 785 (CC). See J Grogan “Enter the PAJA Administrative justice in labour matters” 
(2004) 20(5) Employment Law 12 17. 
824 See C Botma & A van der Walt “The role of reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards (Part 2)” 
2009 Obiter 530 535. 
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Unfortunately, the case law referred to above demonstrates that the courts have relied on both 
interpretations of reasonableness to dispose of review applications. In addition, for purposes of 
review at least, the terms rationality, justifiability and reasonableness appear to be used 
interchangeably. Whilst rationality and justifiability have been described as sufficiently similar in 
meaning;825 Sidumo reasonableness has also been described as essentially and conceptually no 
different from Carephone’s rational justifiability.826 Whether all three terms have the same 
meaning is however questionable.827 In Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd, 
the Court held that the right to reasonable administrative action is a variable but higher standard, 
which in many cases will call for a more intensive scrutiny of administrative decisions than 
would have been competent under the 1993 Constitution.828 As such, the threshold of 
reasonableness incorporates and expands upon rationality.829 It is clear from the aforementioned 
that, whatever future direction is taken by the courts in this regard, it will have important 
implications for the review of CCMA arbitration awards. As indicated from the outset, this partly 
serves to justify the need for a comparative study of English law. 
                                                 
825 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and others 2001 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). See also United National 
Breweries (SA) v CCMA & others 2006 JOL 17485 (LC) where the Court described the Carephone test as a 
rationality test and UASA v Impala Platinum Ltd & others 2010 9 BLLR 986 (LC) para 45 where the Court again 
described Sidumo reasonableness as a rationality test. See Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v 
CCMA and others 2007 1 All SA 164 (SCA) para 32. The Court equated Carephone’s justifiability with PAJA’s 
formulation whether the connection made is rational. 
826 See Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and others 2010 1 BLLR 1 (SCA) para 16 also referenced in Matsekoleng v 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2013 JOL 29789 (LAC) para 36. In Afrox Healthcare Limited v CCMA & others 
2012 JOL 28779 (LAC) the Sidumo reasonable decision-maker test was described as being none other than that 
rational justifiability.  Also consider Trinity Broadcasting, Ciskei v Independent Communications Authority of SA 
2003 4 All SA 589 (SCA) para 19-21, where the Court approved and applied Carephone’s justifiability test in the 
light of PAJA’s formulation whether the connection made is rational. The Court however distinguished 
rationality from substantive reasonableness, but commented that the test of perversity or utter irrationality may be 
appropriate to the standard set by section 6(2)(h) of PAJA. See also Bel Porto School Governing Body and others 
v Premier, Western Cape and Another 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) at 282-283. The same factual considerations which 
were fully canvassed in respect of the argument relating to irrationality are foundational to the question of 
justifiability. The requirement that a decision must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given as per the 1993 
Constitution in substance sets rationality as the review standard. In Commercial Workers Union of SA v Tao Ying 
Metal Industries & others 2009 1 BLLR 1 (CC) para 150, the court referred to Sidumo, but found that the award 
was deprived of rationality. Likewise in Afrox Healthcare Limited v CCMA & others 2012 JOL 28779 (LAC) the 
Sidumo reasonable decision-maker test was described as being none other than that rational justifiability.   
827 The Court in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 106 
described the Carephone test as substantive and involving greater scrutiny than the rationality test set out in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & another In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the RSA 
2000 JOL 6158 (CC). The Court in Samson v CCMA & others 2009 11 BLLR 1119 (LC) was critical of the 
applicant’s use of the pre-Sidumo language of rational justifiability; considering it the incorrect test. 
828 2006 JOL 15636 (CC); 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC). According to the Court, this development sets on the one hand a 
lower threshold for review and on the other hand, a higher standard for administrative action than was the case 
under the 1993 Constitution. 
829 Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & others 2011 10 BLLR 1024 (LC). 
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6 2 2 Reasonableness is not encompassing 
 
A key question that has arisen following Sidumo is whether the grounds of review contained in 
section 145(2) have become obsolete in that an arbitration award will only be reviewable if it is 
found to be unreasonable.830 In Fidelity Cash Management Services, the Labour Appeal Court 
held that Sidumo has not obliterated the section 145(2) grounds of review, but that the grounds 
were suffused by reasonableness.831 According to the Court, awards could therefore be reviewed 
on the grounds, for example, that the CCMA had no jurisdiction in a matter, that the CCMA had 
made a decision that was ultra vires its powers or on any of the other grounds specified in section 
145 of the LRA, without questions arising as to the reasonableness of such decisions.  
 
Maepe v CCMA & another is an example of a judgment where an arbitration award was set aside 
on the basis that the commissioner had fallen foul of a section 145(2) review ground without 
having regard to Sidumo reasonableness.832 In this case, the Court considered whether the 
commissioner had committed a gross irregularity in failing to take into account that the appellant 
had given false evidence under oath at arbitration. Without referring to reasonableness, the Court 
held that the commissioner’s failure to take account of the appellant’s conduct when he 
considered the issue of relief constituted a gross irregularity which justified setting aside the 
commissioner’s reinstatement order.833 Similarly, in SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & 
others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd & others; SA Rugby Pty Ltd v SARPU & another834 and Group Six 
Security Services (Pty) Ltd & Andrew Masters v R Moletsane, CCMA & Dean Weller,835 the 
Court dealt with the question of a reviewable excess of power and misconduct respectively 
without considering the impact of reasonableness on the determination. In SARPA, for example, 
Tlaletsi AJA accepted that the question before the court a quo was whether, on the facts of the 
case, a dismissal had taken place and not whether the commissioner’s finding that there had been 
a dismissal was justifiable, rational or reasonable. According to the Court, the CCMA was a 
                                                 
830 See Darcy Du Toit “Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Has section 145 become academic?” Papers presented 
at the 13th Annual SASLAW Conference, Vineyard Hotel, Cape Town (22 October 2010) at 4 accessed on 6 
September 2013 at 07h09 at http://www.saslaw.org.za/oldsite/resources.html#conf2010.  
831 Para 101. 
832 2008 8 BLLR 723 (LAC). 
833 Para 22. 
834 2008 9 BLLR 845 (LAC). 
835 Unreported Labour Appeal Court judgment; JA77/05 (26 February 2009). 
175 
 
creature of statute that, as a general rule, could not decide its own jurisdiction, but could only 
make a ruling for convenience. In the circumstances, the Court found that it was for the Labour 
Court to decide whether, objectively speaking, the facts existed which would give the CCMA 
jurisdiction. If the facts did not exist, the Court reasoned that the CCMA would have no 
jurisdiction irrespective of its finding to the contrary.836 Consistent with this, Van Niekerk J held 
in Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others837 that the Court was not precluded 
from scrutinising the process in terms of which the decision was made by the requirement that the 
outcome of CCMA arbitration proceedings must fall within a band of reasonableness.838  
 
On the other hand, the courts have linked reasonableness to the section 145(2) grounds of review 
by, for example, finding that a commissioner had committed a gross irregularity and that the 
irregularity rendered the result unreasonable. This suggests that the courts are not all convinced 
as to the non-encompassing role of reasonableness. Specific reference is made to Mollo v Metal 
& Engineering Industries Bargaining Council & others839 and Zilwa Cleaning & Gardening 
Services CC v CCMA & others.840 In the former case, Nyathela AJ concluded that the 
commissioner had committed a gross irregularity when he presided over a matter that was part 
heard and disallowed witness testimony on the basis that it was unnecessary. Seemingly 
recognising an overlap or link between the section 145 grounds of review and reasonableness, the 
Court found that, given the irregularities, the commissioner’s decision was not one which a 
reasonable decision-maker could have reached on the materials which were before him.841 In the 
latter case,842 the Court found that the remedies granted in the arbitration award must be set aside 
in so far as the commissioner had committed a gross irregularity and exceeded his powers as 
envisaged in section 145 of the LRA by failing to apply his mind to relevant facts and applicable 
legal principles.843 According to the Court, the commission of the defects also caused the 
commissioner to come to a decision which a reasonable commissioner could not have come to.844 
                                                 
836 Para 40-41. 
837 2009 11 BLLR 1128 (LC). 
838 Para 17. 
839 2009 JOL 24323 (LC). 
840 2010 31 ILJ 780 (LC) para 25.     
841 Para 34. 
842 Para 24. 
843 In this instance, the commissioner had failed to consider whether reinstatement was practicable taking into 
consideration evidence that the cleaning contract had expired and that the employee’s employment might have 
come to an end on the expiry of that contract. The commissioner also awarded both reinstatement and the 
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Notwithstanding these decisions, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Samancor accepted that the 
Labour Court can interfere with arbitration awards on the basis of one or more of the defects 
stated in section 145(2) of the LRA and when the award is one that a reasonable decision maker 
could not reach.845 The same was confirmed in Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi 
and others846 and more recently in Herholdt.847 In Gold Fields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
(Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and others, the Labour Appeal Court again held that a decision is not 
automatically reviewable on the basis of section 145(2)(a) and (b) unless the outcome is 
unreasonable.848 
 
The majority of judgments therefore demonstrate that CCMA awards can be reviewed in terms of 
the grounds set out in section 145(2)(a) and (b) of the LRA and on the basis of Sidumo 
reasonableness. This means that, where an applicant on review has established that a 
commissioner had committed misconduct, a gross irregularity and/or had exceeded his powers, 
the award can be set aside on review on those grounds without reasonableness necessarily 
coming into play. It is nevertheless possible that the commission of a defect as per section 145(2) 
may also lead to an unreasonable and hence reviewable result; suggesting that the grounds of 
review are not tightly separated from one another, but may overlap. This does however not mean 
that one would by necessity have to test whether an established gross irregularity has led to an 
unreasonable outcome.849 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
payment of compensation contrary to section 193(1) of the LRA which made it clear that compensation and 
reinstatement were mutually exclusive remedies. 
844 Para 25. See also PAWUSA obo Skosana & others v Public Health & Social Development Sectoral Bargaining 
Council & others 2011 11 BLLR 1079 (LC); Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others 2011 4 
BLLR 404 (LC). In this case, it was alleged that the commissioner had committed a gross irregularity and that as 
a result, he reached a conclusion which no reasonable decision-maker could reach. 
845 See para 6 1. See para 5. See also National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Myers & others 
2012 JOL 28980 (LC). In that case the Court noted that Sidumo reasonableness does not replace the grounds of 
review contained in section 145(2) of the LRA and that they still remain relevant. 
846 2013 JOL 29935 (LAC). However, the Labour Court in Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 
2011 3 BLLR 241 (LC) para 21 and 28, initial held that the applicant had relied on grounds of review that were 
no longer part of South African law.  
847 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae) 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA) 
para 14. 
848 Unreported Labour Appeal Court judgment, (JA 2/2012) [2013] ZALAC 28 (4 November 2013). 
849 See chapter 2 para 2 6 1 2. An irregularity is reviewable if it is material and of such a serious nature that it 
resulted in the aggrieved party not having its case fully and fairly determined. 
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6 2 3 Reasonableness of outcome or process 
 
The essential difference between an outcome-focussed or process-focussed approach turn around 
the role that commissioners’ reasoning process plays in the assessment of the reasonableness of 
their decisions. Under the process-focussed approach, commissioners’ process of reasoning is 
determinative of the reasonableness of their decisions.850 As such, it is descriptive of defects in 
the reasoning process which may have influenced the outcome of the awards in question.851 By 
contrast, under the outcome-focussed approach, the reasoning process is of secondary importance 
and the reasonableness of the decision depends primarily on the relationship between the 
evidentiary material properly before the commissioner and the conclusion reached by the 
commissioner.852 In other words, one asks whether the decision is one to have been made from 
the factors, values and standards used in support thereof. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Fidelity Cash Management Services approved of an outcome-
focussed approach to Sidumo reasonableness. In terms thereof, an arbitration award should not be 
set aside on review on the basis that a commissioner’s process of reasoning was unreasonable if 
the court is able to find that the commissioner’s conclusion is reasonable in relation to the 
evidentiary material before him or her, albeit for reasons other than those relied on by the 
commissioner. The focus is therefore not on the way in which commissioners arrive at their 
conclusions, but on the relationship between the conclusions and the evidence as a whole. This 
approach entitles the court to rely on reasons and/or evidence, not relied upon by commissioners, 
to determine whether their findings are reasonable.853 The Court approved of this outcome-
focussed approach because: 1) the constitutional imperative, which required administrative action 
                                                 
850 See Myers v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and others 2013 JOL 30564 (SCA). The 
Court held that: 1) Sidumo reasonableness requires one to look at the decision and how the decision-maker came 
to his or her conclusion; 2) it is important to bear in mind at all times that one is not dealing with an appeal but a 
review; and 3) one is concerned with how the decision was arrived at rather than the conclusion. 
851 The question is whether the award is rationality related to the reasons given by the commissioner. The award will 
be set aside on review if it is found to be appreciably or significantly based on flawed reasons; regardless whether 
it is otherwise sustainable on the material in the record. See Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) 
v CCMA and others 2007 1 All SA 164 (SCA) para 33-34. 
852 G Ray-Howett “Is it Reasonable for CCMA Commissioners to Act Irrationally?” 2008 29 ILJ 1621-1622. The 
reasoning process of the commissioner assists the review court in determining whether the award is one that 
could not reasonably have been reached. The award is not set aside on review as a result of a flaw in the 
commissioner’s reasoning, but as a result of the award being one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have 
reached in light of the issues and the evidence. 
853 Para 103. 
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to be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, had fallen away; 2) the substantive test for 
review was an objective one and evaluating the decision-maker’s process of reasoning 
inappropriately required a subjective enquiry; and 3) a more stringent approach to reviews 
advanced the LRA objective of promoting the effective resolution of labour disputes.854  
 
Ray-Howett however advocates a reasonableness concept that is both outcome and process-
focussed; contending that: 1) although the commissioner’s process of reasoning is subjective, the 
criteria used to evaluate and test the reasoning process is not; 2) expediency should not override 
the general constitutional principle that public power must be exercised rationally; and 3) 
commissioners will not be held accountable for the proper exercise of their powers if their 
decisions are allowed to stand notwithstanding the fact that their reasoning process was fatally 
flawed.855 There is also the risk that an outcome-focussed approach would blur the distinction 
between the appeal and review processes by inviting the review court to substitute its own view 
of what the correct decision is. This potential danger was recognised by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Sidumo in its criticism of Fidelity Cash Management Services.856 The Court described 
the test adopted in Fidelity Cash Management Services as more akin to an appeal process than a 
review. The Court reasoned that it inexorably drew the court into stepping into the shoes of the 
commissioner by compelling the review court to try to find its own reasons to justify the 
arbitrator’s findings and substituting the commissioner’s reasoning process with that of its own. 
 
Despite this criticism, nothing said in Sidumo automatically counted the outcome-focussed 
approach as unconstitutional or inconsistent with the reasonableness test. This judgment only 
served to establish that: 1) erroneous reasons for decisions would not per se render awards 
reviewable; 2) the reviewability of decisions depended on whether or not the erroneous reasons 
demonstrated a defect in the arbitration proceedings as contemplated by section 145 - as suffused 
by reasonableness; and 3) the presence or absence of reviewable defects was to be established 
from a perusal of the award and the record of proceedings forming the subject-matter of the 
                                                 
854 Para 100-103.See also Specialised Belting & Hose (Pty) Ltd v Sello NO & others 2009 7 BLLR 704 (LC) para 21. 
The Court may be inclined to find that the ultimate decision arrived at is one that no reasonable commissioner 
could have arrived at if the commissioner flagrantly disregarded relevant or crucial evidence or where the 
reasoning was fatally flawed or incorrect legal principles was applied.   
855 Ray-Howett ILJ 1627-1630. 
856 Ray-Howett ILJ 1631; see also para 2 2. 
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review. Whether an outcome, process or outcome and process-focussed approach is thus to be 
preferred is to be ascertained from the courts’ subsequent interpretation of the constitutional 
standard or test of review. 
 
In Edcon Ltd v v Pillemer NO & others,857 the central issue before the commissioner was whether 
the employee’s conduct had breached the trust relationship taking into account the employee's 
length of service, her previous unblemished record and that she was two years away from 
retirement. The commissioner ruled the dismissal substantively unfair; finding that no evidence 
was led on the employer’s behalf regarding dismissal as appropriate sanction. In the ensuing 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Court emphasised that the reasonableness of the 
award was determined having regard to the material before the decision-maker and the 
conclusion arrived at.858 The Court accepted that it was inevitable that a court, in determining the 
reasonableness of an award, would have to make a value judgment as to whether a 
commissioner’s conclusion was rationally connected to his or her reasons taking account of the 
material before him or her.859 In doing so, the Court found that the commissioner could not be 
reproached for finding that the employer had led no evidence showing the alleged breakdown in 
the trust relationship. In the absence of such evidence, and based on the material available to her, 
the Court reasoned that the commissioner’s conclusion was rationally connected to the reasons 
she gave and ruled that the dismissal was correctly found to have been unfair. The Court 
seemingly held that despite procedural irregularities in the commissioner’s award, the outcome 
was reasonable and should not be set aside. 
 
In Senama v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration,860 Molahlehi J held that a  
reasonable decision was reached when a commissioner, in performing his or her functions as an 
arbitrator, applied the correct rules of evidence and weighed all the relevant factors and 
circumstances of the case before him or her. Having regard to these principles, the Labour Court 
                                                 
857 2010 1 BLLR 1 (SCA). 
858 Para 15-16. 
859 Para 23.  
860 2008 9 BLLR 896 (LC) para 18-19. In this case, the employee was dismissed for removing the employer’s stock 
from its premises without authority after a vehicle registered in his name was identified as having entered the 
employer’s warehouse. At arbitration, the commissioner rejected the employee’s claim that he had been on leave 
at the time and confirmed the substantive fairness of the dismissal. In doing so, the commissioner drew an 
adverse inference against the employee due to his failure to provide a plausible explanation as to why he only 
disclosed his ownership of the vehicle at arbitration.  
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found that the applicant had failed to establish a basis for interference because the 
commissioner’s decision was based on a proper evaluation of the circumstances and the evidence 
that was led during the arbitration hearing. A similar approach was adopted in Karen Beef (Pty) 
Ltd v Bovane NO & others.861 In setting aside the commissioner’s decision, Molahlehi J agreed 
with the findings of Van Niekerk AJ in Sil Farming CC t/a Wigwan v CCMA862 that a decision 
was one which no reasonable maker could reach if the decision was unsupported by any evidence 
or by evidence that was insufficient to reasonably justified a decision arrived at or where the 
decision maker ignored uncontradicted evidence. In the present case, the Court found that the 
commissioner’s conclusion was unsupported by the evidence or the evidence before her was 
insufficient to support the conclusion she reached.863 According to the Court, it was apparent that 
the commissioner had based her determination on the subjective submission of the applicant 
employee and not on the objective assessment of the evidence before her. In determining whether 
the commissioner had issued an award that was not justifiable on the facts, the Labour Court in 
RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) v Grogan & others864 
again found that the commissioner’s use of incorrect criteria to identify the guilty employees 
from the innocent ones was based on a mistake of fact that was “foundational to his reasoning” 
and amounted to an irregularly and unjustifiably exculpation of the reinstated employees.865  
 
Explicit support for process-related reasonableness is found in Southern Sun Hotel Interests. Van 
Niekerk J dismissed the suggestion that it might be inferred from Sidumo that process-related 
conduct by a commissioner was irrelevant to a review brought under section 145 of the LRA and 
                                                 
861 2008 8 BLLR 766 (LC). In this case, the employee was dismissed for being drunk on duty after having failed a 
breathalyzer test. At arbitration, the commissioner found that the employee’s dismissal was substantively unfair 
because a second breathalyzer had yielded a negative result. The commissioner also found the dismissal to be 
procedurally unfair because the chairman of the disciplinary enquiry was biased, in that, on the day of the 
incident, he had refused to speak to the employee. On review, the employer contended that the commissioner had 
failed to have proper regard to the evidence when deciding on the employee’s guilt and had misconstrued the test 
for bias when assessing the fairness of the pre-dismissal procedure. More specifically, it was submitted that the 
commissioner had failed to appreciate that the chairperson’s response was aimed precisely at obverting an 
allegation of bias. 
862 Unreported Labour Court judgment, JR3347/2005. 
863 Para 20. 
864 2008 2 BLLR 184 (LC). 
865 Para 50. The commissioner had distinguished the guilty employees from the innocent ones by: 1) setting March 
2000 as the end of the period during which sample was discarded. The evidence however showed that the 
dumping continued until May 2002; and 2) the employees’ motive. The commissioner relied only on the financial 
motive of the employees (payment for overtime and a potential bonus if the employees eased the backlog) 
without considering a non-financial motive proffered by the employer (discarding the sample reduced the 
unpleasant workload, made work easier and allowed the employees more time to relax). 
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that the review court should only be concerned with the record of the arbitration proceedings and 
its result.866 According to the Court, section 145 of the LRA invited a scrutiny of the process by 
which the result of an arbitration proceeding was achieved and a right to intervene if the 
commissioner’s process-related conduct was found wanting. The Court also commented that 
reasonableness was not irrelevant to this enquiry as the reasonableness requirement was relevant 
to both process and outcome. In support thereof, the Court referred to CUSA v Tao Ying Metal 
Industries & others wherein the Constitutional Court had previously considered the role of 
commissioners and their process-related obligations when conducting arbitrations. In that case, 
the Court had found that commissioners were acting unlawfully and/or unreasonably (in breach 
of the right to administrative justice) if they failed to apply their minds to the issues in a case.867 
In consequence, the Court concluded that it was not precluded from scrutinising the process in 
terms of which the decision was made. If a commissioner failed to take material evidence into 
account, had regard to evidence that was irrelevant, committed misconduct or a gross irregularity 
during the proceedings under review, and a party was likely to be prejudiced as a consequence, 
the commissioner’s decision was capable of being set aside. According to the Court, this 
principle applied regardless of the result of the proceedings or whether on the basis of the record 
of the proceedings, that result was nevertheless capable of justification. 
 
In SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v Blackburn & others868 the Labour Court again accepted that Sidumo 
established a result based test in terms of which an award will only be reviewable if the result 
was incapable of justification on all the material before the commissioner. However, referring to 
the judgment of Ngcobo J in Minister of Health & another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & 
others (Treatment Action Campaign & another as amici curiae),869 the Court noted the findings 
that: 1) there was an obvious overlap between the ground of review based on a failure to take into 
consideration a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of the decision; 2) a 
consideration of the factors that a decision maker was bound to take into account was essential to 
a reasonable decision; and 3) if a decision-maker failed to take into account a factor that he or she 
was bound to take into consideration, the resulting decision could not be said to be that of a 
                                                 
866 2009 11 BLLR 1128 (LC) para 14. 
867 2009 1 BLLR 1 (CC). 
868 2010 3 BLLR 305 (LC). 
869 2006 JOL 15636 (CC). 
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reasonable decision-maker.870 Against this background, the Court then held that an arbitration 
award would also be reviewable for process-related unreasonableness if the commissioner 
committed a material error of law or failed to apply his or her mind to materially relevant factors. 
In this instance, the Court held that the applicant on review did not have to prove that the result of 
the award was unreasonable871 but rather than the result might have been different if the 
commissioner had acquitted him- or herself properly.872 The Court did not explain whether 
process-related unreasonableness was distinguishable or the equivalent of a gross irregularity. 
 
The practical application of process-related reasonableness is demonstrated in MEC for 
Education, Gauteng v Mgijima.873 In this case, the employer learned that the employee, despite 
having been offered an opportunity at her pre-appointment interview, had neglected to disclose 
that she had resigned from her previous employer in exchange for the withdrawal of misconduct 
charges leveled against her. At the pre-dismissal arbitration, the commissioner found that the 
employee was not obliged to disclose that she had been suspended pending disciplinary action 
and that the employer could not rely on non-disclosure of charges which had not been proved. In 
the subsequent review application, Van Niekerk J found that the commissioner was manifestly 
wrong to have relied on the presumption of “innocent until proven guilty” in the context of 
proceedings relating to fair administrative action. According to the Court, the crucial issue before 
the commissioner was not whether the employee was guilty of the offences brought against her, 
but the non-disclosure of information at the time of the interview. The Court reasoned that the 
employee’s non-disclosure of material information in response to an express invitation to do so 
deprived the employer of the opportunity to make an informed decision as to the effect, if any, of 
the suspension and pending charges on the contemplated employment relationship. As a result of 
the commissioner’s failure to apply his mind properly to the issue before him, the Court found 
that the award was to be set aside for being unreasonable. Similarly, in Clarence v National 
Commissioner: SAPS,874 Afrox Healthcare Ltd v CCMA & others875 and Gaga v Anglo Platinum 
                                                 
870 Para 511. 
871 I.e. incapable of justification. 
872 Para 21. 
873 2011 3 BLLR 253 (LC). 
874 2012 2 BLLR 99 (LAC). The Court criticised the commissioner’s award primarily on the basis of his inadequate 
appraisal of relevant criminal law principles before finding the dismissal unfair.  
875 2012 JOL 28779 (LAC). The Court found that the commissioner had failed to apply his mind to material 
evidence. This impacted on the ultimate decision; causing the result of the award to be unreasonable. 
183 
 
Ltd and others876 the Labour Appeal Court accepted that a commissioner’s irrational way of 
deciding the issue could cause the commissioner to reach an unreasonable decision.877 Along this 
line of reasoning, Sidumo reasonableness has also been stretched to incorporate deficiencies in 
reasoning;878 a failure to properly assess evidence;879 failing to conceive the issue to be 
determined;880 and/or defect in logic.881 
 
It is however in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd that the Labour Appeal Court dealt most 
comprehensively with the question of process-related reasonableness.882 Referring to the Labour 
Court’s judgment in Southern Sun Hotel Interests, the Court endorsed its finding that awards will 
be reviewable if it suffered from process-related unreasonableness or was substantively 
unreasonable in its outcome.883 The Court went on to find that this standard recognised that 
dialectical and substantive unreasonableness were intrinsically inter-linked and that latent process 
irregularities carried the inherent risk of causing an unreasonable substantive outcome. In terms 
of the test for substantive unreasonableness, the Court confirmed that the ultimate decision was to 
be assessed with regard to the sufficiency and cogency of the evidence to determine if it was 
reasonably supportable. The Court accepted that, by necessity, this involved a consideration of 
substance and merits in relation to the outcome, but allowed a measure of legitimate diversity and 
deviance from the correct or perfect decision. According to the Court, an applicant must therefore 
not only establish that the commissioner’s reasons were unreasonable, but that there existed no 
good reasons on all the material before the commissioner to justify the award.884 
                                                 
876 2012 3 BLLR 285 (LAC). 
877 There is an overlap between gross irregularities and reasonableness. In this case, the Court held that where 
commissioners fail to properly apply their mind to material facts and unduly narrow the inquiry by incorrectly 
construing the scope of an applicable rule, they cannot be said to have fully and fairly determined the case before 
them. The ensuing decision is inevitably tainted by dialectical unreasonableness, which characteristically results 
in a lack of rational connection between the decision and the evidence and most likely an unreasonable outcome 
(substantive unreasonableness). There may often be an overlap between the ground of review based on failure to 
consider a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of a decision. If commissioners do not take into 
account factors they are bound to consider, their decisions will invariably be unreasonable. The flaw in the 
process will alone usually be sufficient to set aside the award on the grounds of it being a latent gross irregularity, 
permitting review in terms of section 145(1) read with section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA.   
878 Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others 2011 10 BLLR 963 (LAC). 
879 SA Post Office Ltd v CCMA and others 2012 1 BLLR 30 (LAC). 
880 Trident Steel SA (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council 2012 1 BLLR 93 (LC). 
881 See J Grogan “The chimera of reasonableness The LAC’s latest thoughts on review” (2013) 29(1) Employment 
Law 12. 
882 2012 9 BLLR 857 (LAC). 
883 Para 33 and 36. 
884 Para 35. 
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Turning to process-related unreasonableness, the Court accepted that it would constitute a gross 
irregularity should a commissioner fail to have regard to material facts because the commissioner 
would have unreasonably failed to perform his or her mandate and would thereby have prevented 
the aggrieved party from having his or her case fully and fairly determined. The Court reasoned 
that a proper consideration of all relevant and material facts and issues was indispensable to 
reasonable decisions and if decision-makers failed to take account of relevant factors which they 
were bound to consider or did not apply their mind to the issues in a case, the resulting decisions 
would not be reasonable in the dialectical sense.885 The Court rejected the submission that the 
target on review was the result or outcome rather than the process and that the award should not 
be interfered with if the result was reasonable. According to the Court, the weight of authority 
favoured greater scrutiny and section 145(2) of the LRA expressly permitted the review of 
awards on the ground of irregularity. Then, considering the threshold for interference in the case 
of an irregularity, the Court found that there was no requirement that the commissioner must have 
deprived the aggrieved party of a fair trial by misconstruing the whole nature of the enquiry. 
According to the Court, it was sufficient that the commissioner had failed to apply his or her 
mind to certain of the material facts or issues before him or her, that there was a potential for 
prejudice and the possibility that the result may have been different. This aspect of the Labour 
Appeal Court judgment was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal on the basis 
that: 1) it set a lower threshold for interference than that established in Sidumo because the mere 
possibility of prejudice sufficed; and 2) it rendered it immaterial whether the result reached was 
one that could reasonably have been reached on the material before the commissioner.886 
According to the Court, a defect in the conduct of the proceedings constituted a gross irregularity 
only if the commissioner had misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable 
result. Whilst the rejection of a relaxed review is applauded, it is questionable whether 
substantive reasonableness would sit comfortably within section 145(2)(a)(ii). Fergus has pointed 
out that section 145 was cast in a procedural light with lawfulness in mind and that its enduring 
                                                 
885 “Rationality” and/or “rational justifiability” seemingly relate to “dialectical” unreasonableness only. See Kotze v 
Minister of Health 1996 3 BCLR 417 (T) 425. The Court noted that “justifiable” means that the decision must be 
“capable of being justified or shown to be just” or “regverdigbaar”. The Court made it clear that the words 
denote something that can be defended; the reasons advanced for the administrative action must show that the 
action is adequately just or right. To succeed on review, the court must be satisfied that the reasons advanced for 
the action under review are not supported by the facts or the law or both. 
886 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae) 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA) 
para 17 and 25. 
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relevance lies in protecting the aspects of the right to administrative justice aside from 
reasonableness.887 
 
On the one hand, there is thus Fidelity Cash Management Services, Ellerine Holding Limited and 
Herholdt which advocate a more substantive approach. In terms thereof, an award should not be 
set aside on review as unreasonable because of the commissioner’s defective process of reasoning 
if the conclusion is nevertheless reasonable in relation to the evidentiary material generally before 
the commissioner. On the other hand, there are a host of authorities that draw a distinction 
between substantive and process-related unreasonableness.888 In terms of the latter, 
commissioners’ failure to apply their minds and consider all materially relevant facts and 
considerations or ignore irrelevant factors itself constitute unreasonable conduct susceptible to 
review. This process-related reasonableness appears to be similar to and/or overlap with a latent 
irregularity. As mentioned in chapter 2, a latent irregularity takes place in the mind of the 
commissioner and is evident from the commissioner’s flawed reasoning. It also includes a failure 
to take material evidence into account or having regard to evidence that is irrelevant. However, 
the courts seem to have imposed a lighter test on review for process-related reasonableness. 
Whereas latent irregularities call for an enquiry into whether it prevented a fair trial of the issues, 
process-related reasonableness simply enquires whether a party to the proceedings was likely to 
be prejudiced as a consequence. In other words, it is sufficient that the decision might have been 
different but for the process-related unreasonableness of the decision. However, although the 
foregoing appears to be a contradiction in terms, it is submitted that it is not one that is 
irreconcilable in practice.  
 
Substantive unreasonableness is not readily identifiable by a commissioner’s failure to consider 
materially relevant factors or by a consideration of irrelevant factors, but raises the question 
whether the ultimate ruling is reasonably supported having regard to the evidence, arguments and 
                                                 
887 E Fergus “From Sidumo to Dunsmuir: The Test for Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards” (PhD Thesis, 
University of Cape Town, February 2013) 148. 
888 Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others 2009 11 BLLR 1128 (LC); Gaga v Anglo Platinum 
Ltd and others 2012 3 BLLR 285 (LAC); Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others 2011 10 BLLR 963 (LAC); 
SA Post Office Ltd v CCMA and others 2012 1 BLLR 30 (LAC); Trident Steel SA (Pty) Ltd v Metal and 
Engineering Industries Bargaining Council 2012 1 BLLR 93 (LC). 
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considerations objectively recognised as valid. In this instance, the reasonableness of a 
commissioner’s decision does not depend exclusively upon the adequacy of the reasons that the 
commissioner gives for the decision, but where other reasons upon which the commissioner did 
not rely to support his or her decision can render the decision reasonable. Opposed thereto, where 
the reasoning process of the commissioner demonstrates a latent gross irregularity, the ultimate 
decision should be set aside on review regardless of the substantive reasonableness thereof. As 
such, process-related unreasonableness (inadequate reasoning) may be construed as evidence of a 
gross irregularity.889 In other words, the question is whether the process-related unreasonableness 
is so manifest that it is indicative of a gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings. If not, 
substantive reasonableness will only excuse defects in decision-makers’ reasoning process in 
limited circumstances. This approach ensures that commissioners are held accountable for the 
proper exercise of their powers. Where the commissioner’s reasoning process is fatally flawed, 
the decision will not be allowed to stand. Interestingly, in all the cases discussed above, the 
commissioners’ decisions were not sustainable on the evidentiary material before the 
commissioners in the case of process-related unreasonableness because the mistake or error on 
the part of the commissioner was material or foundational to the decision. It is therefore 
submitted that the question should be whether the alleged error on review is foundational or 
material to the reasoning of the award. As case law suggests, the materiality of an error should be 
determined having regard to the evidence before the commissioner and the conclusion arrived at. 
So construed, the question will thus be whether the conclusion is sensibly connected to the 
reasons taking into account the material (or evidence) before the commissioner or alternatively, 
whether the commissioner’s “bad” reasons or errors serve as evidence of the occurrence of one or 
more of the section 145(2) grounds for review as suffused by reasonableness. In this manner, the 
concerns expressed in Fidelity Cash Management Services and Ellerine Holding Limited is 
addressed. Parties would not be able to succeed in a review application by merely formalistically 
passing through an award and alleging reviewability on the basis of a mere irregularity. Such an 
                                                 
889 See Maepe v CCMA & another 2008 8 BLLR 723 (LAC). The Court held that although a commissioner is 
required to give brief reasons for his or her award in a dismissal dispute, he or she can be expected to include in 
his or her brief reasons those matters or factors which he or she took into account which are of great significance 
to or which are critical to one or other of the issues he or she is called upon to decide. The Court reasoned that 
while it was reasonable to expect a commissioner to leave out of his reasons for the award matters or factors that 
are of marginal significance or relevance to the issues at hand, his or her omission in his or her reasons of a 
matter of great significance or relevance to one or more of such issues can give rise to an inference that he or she 
did not take such matter or factor into account. 
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approach will require scrutiny of the nature of the “errors” or “bad reasons”. On the one hand, if 
it constitutes proof that the decision was reached as a result of the occurrence of one or more of 
the section 145(2) grounds for review, it should be set aside on review regardless of the fact that 
the decision may potentially be sustained by other reasons identified in the record. This would 
apply for example where commissioners fail to take account of material facts or to apply their 
minds to the issues. This is because the focus on review should always be the process leading to 
the decision and not the decision itself.890 On this basis it does not matter whether the outcome 
may be sustained by good reasons identified in the record. On the other hand, if the “bad reasons” 
or “errors” amount to an incorrect factual finding, as in the Sidumo case, which, as discussed 
above is not per se a ground for review, the award would not be reviewable unless it is 
unsupported by any evidence or by evidence that was insufficient to reasonably justify the 
decisions arrived at in order to come to the conclusion that the decision is one which no 
reasonable decision-maker could have reached. It is submitted that this is a different way of 
saying that the ultimate ruling is not reasonably supported having regard to the evidence, 
arguments and considerations because the “defective” reasons for the ultimate ruling outweighs 
the “good” reasons. This would be in harmony with the distinction between an appeal and 
review.891 This would also be in line with the finding in Ramdaw that the dispute resolution 
system prescribed by the LRA does contemplate that there will be arbitration awards which are 
unsatisfactory in many respects, but must nevertheless be allowed to stand because they are not 
so unsatisfactory as to fall foul of the applicable grounds of review.892  In other words, the 
commissioner’s award cannot be said to be unjustifiable when having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case and the material before the commissioner. The Court reasoned that, 
without such contemplation, the LRA’s objective of the expeditious resolution of disputes would 
have no hope of being achieved. 
 
6 3 APPLYING REASONABLENESS IN VALUE JUDGEMENTS 
 
A study of case law is invaluable in establishing how reasonableness must be applied in practice. 
In what follows, recent judgments, applying reasonableness in various different contexts, will be 
                                                 
890 See chapter 2 para 2 3.  
891 See chapter 2 para 2 3. 
892
 Para 7-8. 
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considered in more detail. As an introduction however, reference should be made to the finding in 
Fidelity Cash Management Services that: 1) a review court should not interfere with a 
commissioner’s finding merely because it would have dealt with the matter differently;893 and 2) 
on review, the test is not whether the dismissal is fair or unfair but whether the commissioner’s 
decision, one way or another, is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach in all the 
circumstances of the case. Zondo JP warned that the Sidumo reasonableness test was a stringent 
test that would ensure that awards are not lightly interfered with, but are final and binding as per 
the objectives of the LRA as long as it could not be said that such an award was one that a 
reasonable decision-maker could not have made in the circumstances of the case.894 Likewise, in 
Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetam & others,895 a differently constituted Labour Appeal Court 
ruled that the compass of reasonableness was narrow and simple.896 According to the Court, 
Sidumo did not only shift away from any degree of deference towards employers, but also 
reduced the scope for a dissatisfied employee to take his or her dispute further; and reduced the 
potential for the review court to exercise scrutiny over the decisions of commissioners who were 
appointed to arbitrate in terms of the LRA. Along the same lines, the Labour Appeal Court 
emphasised in Bestel that a review was ultimately based upon the principle of justification and 
that the correctness of a decision was irrelevant to review proceedings.897 Although the scope of 
section 145 has therefore been extended by the suffusion of section 145 with Sidumo 
reasonableness, this selection of cases confirms that reasonableness is not recognised as an 
extensive ground of review but that it has stringent requirements that should substantially reduce 
its application. It is submitted that such an interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s 
purpose of finally and expeditiously resolving disputes at arbitration level.898 
   
6 3 1 Dismissal for misconduct: findings regarding sanction and penalty reviews   
 
In Sidumo the Constitutional Court confirmed that a commissioner was required to determine the  
                                                 
893 Para 99. 
894 Para 100. 
895 2008 6 BLLR 553 (LAC). 
896 Para 6. The review court must defer (but not in an absolute sense) to the decision of the commissioner. 
897 Para 18. 
898 See chapter 2. 
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fairness of a dismissal in accordance with his or her own sense of fairness.899 However, fairness 
is an elusive concept and, in deciding whether the sanction of dismissal is fair, a commissioner is 
basically making a value judgment.900 Taking into account that there exists a permissible range of 
reasonableness,901 it is submitted that it will be rare for a commissioner’s finding as to the 
fairness of a dismissal to be regarded as falling foul of the requirement of reasonableness. On the 
other hand, Sidumo also held that a commissioner must consider all relevant circumstances902 and 
identified a non-exhaustive list of factors that were to be taken into account when making such a 
value judgment. This included the importance of the rule breached, the reason why the employer 
imposed the sanction of dismissal, the basis of the employee’s challenge to the dismissal, the 
harm caused by the employee’s conduct, the effect of dismissal on the employee and the 
employee’s service record.903 In Fidelity Cash Management Services, the Labour Appeal Court 
referred to the foregoing factors and held that, once a commissioner has considered all these 
factors and others not mentioned herein, he or she would have to use his or her own sense of 
fairness to determine whether dismissal was, in all of the circumstances, a fair sanction. In doing 
so, the Court reasoned that the commissioner was not at liberty to act arbitrarily or capriciously 
or to be mala fide, but to make a finding that is reasonable. The Court in other words confirmed 
that commissioners could only reasonably exercise a value judgment as to whether dismissal was 
a fair sanction in the circumstances once they had considered all materially relevant factors. 
Absent such a consideration, an award would be reviewable for lack of reasonableness.904 
 
This principle was reaffirmed in Hulett Aluminium (Pty) Ltd v Bargaining Council for the Metal 
Industry & others.905 In this case, the employee was dismissed for dishonesty after she arranged 
for a parcel, containing material belonging to her employer, to be delivered to her daughter. The 
employee claimed that the sanction of dismissal was unfair and inconsistent because the 
employee to whom she had handed the parcel had only received a final written warning and a 
                                                 
899 Para 75-76. 
900 See NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & others 1996 6 BLLR 697 (A). 
901 Sidumo para 109. 
902 Para 79. 
903 Para 78. See also Motsamai v Everite Building Products (Pty) Ltd 2011 2 BLLR 144 (LAC) para 22. According to 
the Court, the commissioner must decide what is the appropriate sanction having regard to all of the evidence 
presented to him or her; the company’s code of conduct; and the nature and seriousness of the misconduct. The 
decision is not made in a vacuum. 
904 Para 95.  
905 2008 3 BLLR 241 (LC). 
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suspension for a specified period. At arbitration, the commissioner agreed that dismissal was too 
harsh a sanction among others because of inconsistency. In the subsequent review application, the 
Labour Court referred to Sidumo and noted that in determining the fairness of dismissals, 
commissioners were required to exercise a value judgment taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case. The latter included the importance of the rule breached, the 
circumstances of the infringement, the reasons why the employer imposed the sanction of 
dismissal and the employee’s inputs.906 Taking this into consideration, the Court held that it was 
required to determine whether a reasonable decision-maker, based on the evidence and material 
before him or her, would have derived at a different decision. In applying this standard, the Court 
concluded that the award was, objectively speaking, unreasonable and constituted a 
misapplication of the principles of parity. According to the Court, a reasonable decision-maker 
would have taken into account existing precedent on the issue of parity as well as recognised that 
fairness would not dictate that the employee’s case and that of the other employee be treated alike 
because the two cases had different features.907 
 
The matter of Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and others further demonstrates the relevance of 
reasonableness in relation to arbitration findings as to sanction.908 In this instance, the employee 
was dismissed for dishonesty after having failed to report that her company car had been involved 
in an accident while being driven by her son. Having been under the mistaken impression that her 
son was prohibited from driving the car, the employee had arranged for the car to be fixed at her 
husband’s workshop and had thereafter kept the accident a secret. At arbitration, the 
commissioner found dismissal unfair having regard to the circumstances of the matter, the 
employee’s seventeen years of service and clean record and the fact that she was only two years 
away from retirement. A review application, following the employee’s reinstatement without 
back pay, was dismissed. On appeal to the Labour Appeal Court, Sangoni AJA held that the 
relevant factors and the circumstances of each case, objectively viewed, informed the element of 
reasonableness.909 On this basis, the Court found that the commissioner’s conclusion and the 
facts of the case were such that it could not be found that that a reasonable decision-maker in the 
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commissioner’s position could not reach the conclusion which she did. In a subsequent appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, the commissioner’s decision was also found to be beyond reproach 
and the appeal dismissed.  
 
The perception that sanction reviews are not easily susceptible to review is therefore subject to 
the proviso that awards must reflect a consideration of all materially relevant factors, the absence 
of misdirection on the part of commissioners and an application of their minds to the facts and 
the law. This is also demonstrated in the matter of NUMSA & another v Trentyre (Pty) Ltd.910 In 
this case, the employee was dismissed for being under the influence of alcohol at work on an 
isolated occasion. The commissioner found the employee’s dismissal unfair and ordered his 
reinstatement on a final written warning with the forfeiture of back pay. In the ensuing review 
application, the employer managed to have the award overturned and replaced with an order that 
the employee’s dismissal was substantively fair. On a further appeal to the Labour Appeal Court, 
the Court again reversed the decision of the Labour Court and restored the award. The Court 
found that, on the evidence before the commissioner and taking into consideration his rejection of 
the evidence of the employer’s witnesses of the extent to which the employee was under the 
influence, the only conclusion open to the commissioner to reach was that the employee was 
under the influence but not to the extent that he could not perform his duties. 
 
In light of the aforementioned case, the findings in Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetam & 
others911 are very interesting. The appellant employee was dismissed after a random alcohol test 
indicated that, contrary to a workplace rule, he had more than 0.05 grams of alcohol per 100ml of 
blood while on duty. At arbitration, the commissioner found that the dismissal was both 
substantively and procedurally fair. In an ensuing review to the Labour Court, the 
commissioner’s decision was substituted with an order that the dismissal was substantively 
unfair. The Court reasoned that the commissioner had erred by adopting an inflexible approach 
and failing to take into account that: a) the employee had had eight years’ service with the 
appellant; b) no one was endangered by the employee’s conduct; c) the employee was not visibly 
                                                 
910 Unreported Labour Appeal Court judgment JA49/05 (27 March 2008). 
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intoxicated; and d) the employee was 58 years old and a first offender.912 The Court accordingly 
set aside the award and ordered the employer to pay the employee compensation.  
 
It is submitted that, in line with Sidumo, the Court had held that the award was reviewable, not 
because the commissioner’s value judgment was wrong, but because, in making his value 
judgment, the commissioner had failed to consider and weigh all materially relevant facts. 
However, on a further appeal to the Labour Appeal Court, the appellant argued that its strict 
policy on alcohol was operationally justified and that discipline had to be consistently applied. As 
a result, the commissioner’s award was restored. In doing so, Willis JA, with reference to 
Sidumo, held, despite the fact that decision-makers, acting reasonably, may reach different 
conclusions, the LRA has given the decision-making power to the commissioner and there it 
rested, unless it be concluded that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach such a 
conclusion.913 According to the Court, Sidumo, when read together with Bato Star Fishing, had 
the effect that the courts must defer (but not in an absolute sense) to the decision of a 
commissioner. Although concurring with the judgment of Willis JA, Patel JA wrote a separate 
judgment, confirming that it was permissible for the decisions of different decision-makers to 
lead to different results.914 Except for this, the Court did not address the correctness or otherwise 
of the Labour Court’s finding that the award was reviewable because the commissioner had failed 
to consider materially relevant factors.  
 
Myburgh submits that a comparison between Trentyre and Palaborwa Mining is a good 
illustration of the unpredictable operation of Sidumo reasonableness in the context of sanction 
reviews.915 In Trentyre, the Labour Appeal Court found it unfair to dismiss an employee for an 
isolated incident of alcohol whereas in Palaborwa Mining the Labour Appeal Court found it to be 
fair. In both cases, the Court however found that the decision of the commissioner passed the 
Sidumo test – Trentyre, because dismissal was unfair taking into account all relevant factors and 
Palaborwa Mining, because the sanction did not fall outside the range of reasonableness. 
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That the courts are not readily prepared to set aside a decision on sanction is further evident from 
the judgments in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others916 and Mutual Construction 
Company Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO & others.917 In Shoprite Checkers, an employee with a 
previously clean disciplinary record and thirty years of service was dismissed for unauthorised 
consumption after having been captured on video tape eating in an area where the consumption of 
food was prohibited. The commissioner found dismissal unfair and reinstated the employee on a 
final written warning without backpay. Although the Labour Court set the award aside on 
account of the absence of an arbitration record, the Labour Appeal Court, in a subsequent appeal, 
found that the commissioner had reasonably reasoned that dismissal was too harsh a sanction. In 
fact, the Court went as far as to hold that there was no prospect that a reasonable decision-maker 
could on the facts of the case have found that dismissal was a fair sanction. In Mutual 
Construction, an administrative clerk was again dismissed for having falsely recorded the amount 
of hours worked by him; claiming more remuneration that would otherwise have been due to 
him. At arbitration, the commissioner found the dismissal substantively unfair on the basis that 
the employer had failed to prove its case and ordered the employee’s reinstatement.918 The 
ensuing review application was dismissed by the Labour Court.  On appeal, the Labour Appeal 
Court (per Ndlovu AJA) found that it was severely detrimental to the employer’s operational 
requirements and hence inappropriate to retain the employee in the employer’s employment when 
that employee admitted to committing misconduct which involved gross dishonesty.919 In the 
circumstances, the Court concluded that it was reasonable to conclude that a continued working 
relationship between the employer and employee was rendered intolerable as a result of the 
breach of the trust relationship. 
 
In the matter of Miyambo v CCMA & others,920 a security guard was dismissed after he was 
found in possession of scrap metal that he had removed from the factory to repair his stove at 
home. The commissioner found that dismissal was too harsh a sanction and ordered the 
                                                 
916 2008 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC). However, see Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 2009 7 BLLR 619 
(SCA) where the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the Labour Appeal Court’s decision to alter the award of 
non-retrospective reinstatement to reinstatement with full retrospective effect amounted to a misdirection because 
no ground existed for interference with commissioner’s decision. 
917 2010 JOL 24970.  
918 Para 21. 
919 Para 38-39. 
920 2010 10 BLLR 1017 (LAC).  
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employee’s reinstatement on a final written warning. On review, the award was set aside by the 
Labour Court. In an ensuing appeal, the Labour Appeal Court (per Patel JA) referred to various 
authorities that have held that dismissal was warranted in theft cases and concluded that the 
award was reviewable in so far as it was not justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.921 
On the basis of the factual findings made by the commissioner, the dismissal of the employee 
was accordingly found to be justified for operational reasons and fair.922    
 
MEC for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal & another v Dorkin NO 540 & another is an example of a 
case where the Labour Appeal Court decided to set aside a decision on sanction based on 
reasonableness considerations.923 In this case, a director of the KwaZulu-Natal Department of 
Education was charged with misconduct involving the granting of student bursaries in excess of 
authorised amounts, the unauthorised purchase of goods for the department and the loss of assets 
under his control; resulting in a loss to the department of approximately R1.2 million. The 
disciplinary enquiry chairperson found the employee guilty on all counts and directed that he be 
given a final written warning. On appeal to the Labour Appeal Court, Zondo JP held that the 
chairperson’s conclusion that a final written warning was the appropriate sanction could only be 
reached by someone who did not exercise any discretion or who acted arbitrarily and did not 
apply his mind at all.924 In concluding that the decision was one that no reasonable person could 
reach on the facts of the case, the Court found that not even the employee’s twenty-one years of 
service and clean disciplinary record could save him from the sanction of dismissal. In Boxer 
Superstores (Pty) Limited v Zuma and others,925 an award for compensation was again found 
irrational because the commissioner had failed to provide reasons for awarding compensation 
instead of the default remedy of reinstatement in circumstances where the employer was found to 
have failed to discharge the onus of proving the substantive fairness of a dismissal. 
 
On the other hand, Department of Labour v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council  
                                                 
921 Para 21. 
922 The factual findings included among others that the company had a consistent policy of zero tolerance for theft 
that had been clearly conveyed to all the employees and that the employee had undoubtedly breached the 
relationship of trust built up over many years of honest service.   
923 2008 6 BLLR 540 (LAC).  
924 Para 18. 
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& others926 constitutes a judgment in which a commissioner’s decision on sanction was found to 
meet the reasonableness requirements. In this case, the commissioner had found dismissal to be 
the appropriate sanction for sexual harassment despite the appellate employer having offered the 
respondent employees the option of accepting a sanction short of dismissal. In the subsequent 
review application, the Court reasoned that the offer of an alternative sanction was an attempt to 
implement corrective discipline and an opportunity to the employees to correct their behaviour 
and to rehabilitate themselves.927 According to the Court, it was illogical to argue that alternative 
sanction considerations in compliance with a disciplinary code meant that the employment 
relationship was not intolerable and that the appellant employer showed some trust in the 
respondent employees. The Court reasoned that the alternative sanction was a form of 
punishment which had its own conditions which would, if successful, repair the respondent 
employees’ relationship with the appellant employer. The Court noted that the respondent 
employees were required to consent to a suspension from duty for a period of three months 
without pay as per the collective agreement as a measure of cooperation. According to the Court, 
it was clear from the judgment of the Labour Court that these factors were not considered when it 
made an order to review and correct the award rendered by the commissioner. In the 
circumstances, the Court concluded that the decision by the commissioner was not a decision that 
a reasonable decision maker could reach and the appeal succeeded.928 
 
In Motsamai v Everite Building Products (Pty) Ltd,929 the Labour Appeal Court again dealt with a 
penalty review in relation to a dismissal for sexual harassment. In this case, the commissioner 
had found the sanction of dismissal unfair and had ordered the re-employment of the employee. 
The Labour Court found no ground for reviewing the commissioner’s finding that the appellant 
was guilty of sexual harassment, but set aside the relief granted and substituted it with the 
sanction of dismissal. On the appeal of the review application, the Labour Appeal Court (per 
Waglay DJP) found it difficult to comprehend on what basis the employee could have escaped 
dismissal having regard to the following facts and circumstances: 1) the commissioner wrongly 
reduced the seriousness of the misconduct in the context of determining the appropriate sanction; 
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2) the commissioner wrongly found that the company’s failure to convene a meeting between the 
employee and the complainant as provided for in the employer’s disciplinary code could serve as 
a mitigating factor; 3) the relief granted by the commissioner of re-employment in an unspecified 
position on new terms and conditions was not based on evidence that would justify it; and 4) the 
employee was found to have committed serious misconduct without repentance.930 Although the 
Court was mindful of the fact that its opinion as to the appropriate sanction was irrelevant, the 
Court found that any person in the position of the commissioner could not reasonably arrive at a 
decision other than the one that the dismissal was fair having regard to all the facts and 
circumstances as set out above.931 This judgment therefore gave substance to the principle - laid 
down in Mutual Construction, Miyambo and Department of Labour - that a sanction of dismissal 
must be justified by sound reasoning to escape reasonableness review. It did this by clearly 
demonstrating that, where a commissioner went wrong in his or her appreciation of the severity 
of the misconduct, made findings in mitigation which were not sustainable or did not have proper 
regard to the relevant facts in the determination of a penalty, the decision on sanction would be 
susceptible to reasonableness review.  
 
It is submitted that the authorities discussed above demonstrate that a review directed at sanction 
or penalty will not easily be susceptible to a finding of unreasonableness. This is primarily due to 
the fact that penalty decisions constitute discretionary decisions which the courts recognise may 
differ from one decision-maker to the other without being labelled as unreasonable. To succeed in 
establishing that the relevant decision thus fall outside the recognised range of reasonableness, 
the applicant on review will have to prove that the decision is one that a reasonable decision-
maker could not reach – put differently, that dismissal was the only conceivable sanction. As the 
cases demonstrate, it is only in exceptional cases that a sanction decision will foul fall of the 
reasonableness requirement – for instance where the decision is not justifiable in its reasoning to 
uphold a sanction of dismissal. Alternatively, there is authority for the view that a decision will 
also be reviewable for lack of reasonableness in instances where the decision-maker has failed to 
consider all materially relevant factors or have otherwise misdirected himself in making the 
decision subsequently challenged on review.  
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6 3 2  Findings in respect of relief 
 
Transnet Ltd v CCMA & others932
 
illustrates that a compensation award is also subject to the 
reasonableness qualification. In this instance, a senior managerial employee was dismissed after 
he had assaulted his wife at the workplace in such a manner that she suffered serious bodily 
harm. In arbitration proceedings before the CCMA, the commissioner found the dismissal 
substantively fair but procedurally unfair and awarded the employee six months’ remuneration as 
compensation. Upon review, Basson J found that the commissioner had failed to consider the 
seriousness and the highly offensive nature of the employee’s misconduct in arriving at the 
quantum of compensation. According to the Labour Court, a reasonable decision-maker would 
not have allowed the employee to benefit from his reprehensible actions, but would have 
concluded that it was not just and equitable to award compensation because the reprehensible 
nature of the misconduct outweighed any consideration of compensation.933 Similarly, in 
Shoprite Checkers the Labour Appeal Court allowed a cross-review because the commissioner’s 
non-retrospective order of reinstatement was found unreasonable.934 The Court reasoned that: 1) 
it was unable to reconcile the commissioner’s finding that the employee should forfeit more than 
two years’ worth of backpay with his finding that the employee should not have been dismissed 
and 2) the amount with which the employee had effectively been penalised bore no relation to the 
value of the food he had consumed.935 As is the case with penalty reviews, reviews against relief 
are therefore not easily assailable but requires something specific to challenge the decision based 
on reasonableness. Based on Transnet Ltd and Shoprite Checkers it is submitted that it can be 
contended that the decision just does not make sense having regard to all the circumstances 
before the decision-maker. 
 
6 3 3 Findings of procedural unfairness  
 
The role of reasonableness in procedural challenges on review is evident from Mutual 
Construction.936 In this case, the Labour Appeal Court (per Ndlovu AJA) considered whether a 
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933 Para 29. 
934 2008 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) para 26. 
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936 Mutual Construction Company Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO & others 2010 JOL 24970. See para 6 3 1 above. 
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dismissal was procedurally unfair in so far as the employer had failed to specify in the charge 
sheet the alleged fraudulent entries recorded by the employee in its time sheets. The Court 
acknowledged that the charge sheet did not specify with any certainty what it was that the 
employee was alleged to have done in support of the charges preferred against him, but found 
that this procedural flaw was not so gross and of such a nature as to justify the vitiation of the 
process. According to the Court, it was clear from the employee’s evidence and the nature of his 
defence that he understood the nature and import of the charges he was required to answer and 
that this were also made clearer in the subsequent arbitration proceedings.937  
 
In Brolaz Projects v CCMA938 the commissioner found the employee’s dismissal procedurally 
unfair because the employer had tainted the consultation process by unreasonably withdrawing a 
mala fide offer of alternative employment once the employee had accepted it. On review, Basson 
J however disagreed and found that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the offer was 
not made in good faith. The Labour Court then criticised the commissioner’s disregard of the 
employee’s short nine month period of employment and appalling performance record in coming 
to the conclusion to award him twelve months’ compensation. In the Court’s view the conclusion 
reached by the commissioner in respect of compensation was not one that a reasonable 
commissioner would have reached having regard to all the relevant factors, his own factual 
findings and the applicable case law. 
 
It is submitted that it can be deduced from the two judgments above that awards would be 
susceptible to review because it is unreasonable where commissioners impose too high a standard 
of procedural fairness or fail to have regard to all relevant factors, the factual findings and the 
applicable case law. 
 
6 4 REVIEWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW 
 
6 4 1 Dismissal for misconduct: findings regarding guilt  
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In an earlier judgment of the Labour Appeal Court, namely that of Sil Farming CC t/a Wigwam v 
CCMA,939 the Court commented that a commissioner will arrive at a decision which no 
reasonable decision maker could reach if the decision was unsupported by any evidence, or by 
evidence that was insufficient to reasonably justify a decision arrived at or where the decision 
maker ignored uncontradicted evidence.940 
 
In Senama,941 the Labour Court also had an opportunity to comment on the role of reasonableness 
where the substantive fairness of a dismissal was upheld by the CCMA. In this instance it was 
alleged that the commissioner had confirmed a guilty finding because he failed to apply his mind 
to relevant evidence; considered evidence not placed before him; failed to attach sufficient 
weight to certain evidence and made findings that were not justifiable on the material before 
him.942 In dismissing the review application, the Labour Court held that the commissioner’s 
finding was based on a proper evaluation of the circumstances and the evidence that was led 
during the arbitration hearing and the commissioner had given reasons for accepting the version 
of the employer and rejected that of the employee.943 
 
In NUM & others v CCMA,944 the employees were dismissed after being found guilty of selling 
diesel from a company vehicle at a squatter camp as well as steel belonging to the employer to 
one of its competitors for their own profit. Although both employees denied that they were guilty 
of any wrongdoing, the commissioner found that the employer has proved its case and upheld 
their dismissals. On review, the employees contended that the commissioner had not explained 
why he had found them untruthful, that he had relied on hearsay evidence and that he had ignored 
the true reason for their dismissals, which was that the employees had recently joined a trade 
union. The Labour Court found that there was no basis on which the commissioner’s assessment 
of the evidence could be faulted for unreasonableness, both in respect of the assessment of the 
probabilities and credibility and the manner in which he approached the hearsay evidence 
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presented by the employer.945 According to the Court, the commissioner had relied on such 
evidence in keeping with the provisions of the section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act. In the circumstances, the Court found that the commissioner had not act 
unreasonably, but had applied his mind to the issue of the hearsay evidence which had been 
presented and had recognised that he was vested with the discretion in the interests of justice 
whether or not to accept such hearsay evidence.946 
 
Subsequently, in Bestel,947 the Labour Appeal Court had to determine whether the commissioner, 
in being confronted with two conflicting versions of events, had made a finding that was not 
supported by evidence that could reasonably justify the decision or, alternatively, made a finding 
in ignorance of evidence that remained uncontradicted. Having analysed the factual findings 
made by the commissioner in support of his conclusion that the employee was not guilty of 
dishonesty, the Court (per Davis JA) held that the appellant’s critical contentions of the 
commissioner’s construction of the evidence were insufficient to justify a conclusion that the 
commissioner’s findings on the facts supported by the evidence was insufficiently reasonable to 
justify his decision or made in ignorance of uncontradicted evidence.948 According to the Court, 
there was no thus basis by which the commissioner’s award should have been set aside on the 
Sidumo test for review. 
 
In the matter of Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers (Pty) Ltd949 the employee had been 
dismissed for among others impersonating an attorney and bringing his employer’s name into 
disrepute. At arbitration, the commissioner found that the employee’s dismissal was unfair and 
ordered his reinstatement principally on the basis that the employee had not acted wilfully and 
had no intention of bringing his employer into disrepute. In upholding the decision of the Labour 
Court to set aside the award on review, the Labour Appeal Court (per Davis JA) found that the 
test as to whether an employee had brought an employer’s name into disrepute was an objective 
test as opposed to the subjective one incorrectly applied by the commissioner.950 According to the 
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Court, an objective test enjoined an examination, in all the circumstances, of the nature of the 
conduct, evaluating the turpitude and the seriousness thereof and then making an evaluation as to 
whether the charges could be sustained.951 The importance of this judgment lies in the finding by 
the Court that an erroneous legal approach to the determination of a charge of misconduct will 
render an award susceptible to review for want of reasonableness.952 Interestingly, the Court 
found that, had a reasonable decision-maker adopted an objective test to the facts of this case, 
there was no doubt that a conclusion opposite to that reached by the commissioner would have 
been sustained. Again this supports the submission that the error on the part of the decision-
maker must be foundational to the decision that was made. 
 
It is submitted that the abovementioned judgments of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court 
give content to the concept of reasonableness as introduced by Sidumo, particularly in the context 
of factual findings relating to whether or not an employee is guilty of misconduct. In summary: a 
commissioner’s finding on the facts will be considered reasonable provided the following 
conditions are met: (a) it is supported by the evidence; (b) all relevant factors and circumstances 
of the case have been weighed and taken into account; (c) the decision-maker has applied the 
correct rules of evidence and did not deviate therefrom in such a nature that it materially denied a 
party a fair hearing; (d) the evidence is sufficient to reasonably justify the decision arrived at; (e) 
the decision-maker has taken into account the uncontradicted evidence; (f) adopted the correct 
legal approach in its application of the law to the facts in a charge of misconduct; and (g) the 
decision-maker has given reasons for his decision. 
 
6 4 2 Findings as to jurisdiction 
 
For the CCMA, as a creature of statute, to entertain a dispute, it must have the necessary 
jurisdiction in terms of the LRA to hear the matter. If a jurisdictional challenge is therefore raised 
and argued, the CCMA is obliged to determine the jurisdictional point before proceeding with a 
finding on the matter on the merits – hence the existence of jurisdictional rulings. In limine points 
range from allegations of improper service and late referrals due to a failure to comply with 
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prescribed time limits to points that the referring party is not an “employee” as defined by section 
213 or has not been “dismissed” for the purposes of section 186.953 The question that arises is 
whether these findings qualify as jurisdictional rulings that are subject to review based on 
reasonableness. This very question was considered by the Labour Appeal Court in Fidelity Cash 
Management Services. The Court ruled that Sidumo have not obliterated the right to review 
CCMA’s awards on the grounds that the CCMA has no jurisdiction in a matter or any of the other 
grounds specified in section 145 of the Act. According to Zondo JP, questions as to the 
reasonableness of a decision would not arise if the CCMA had no jurisdiction in a matter or if the 
CCMA made a decision that exceeded its powers in the sense that it was ultra vires its powers.954 
 
From the foregoing judgement it appears as if the judicial review of jurisdictional findings by the 
CCMA are unaffected by the requirement of reasonableness. Such a conclusion is confirmed by 
the judgment of the Labour Appeal Court in SARPA.955 In that case, the Labour Appeal Court 
considered whether the Labour Court had correctly declined to review an award to the effect that 
the rugby players concerned had been constructively dismissed following a failure to renew their 
contracts on the same terms and conditions despite their reasonable expectation that their 
contracts were going to be renewed.956 In finding that no dismissal had been proved, Tlaletsi AJA 
referred to Benicon Earthworks & Mining Services (Pty) Ltd v Jacobs NO & others957 and noted 
that the erstwhile Labour Appeal Court have held that the validity of the proceedings before the 
Industrial Court was not dependent upon any finding which the Industrial Court might have made 
with regard to jurisdictional facts, but upon their objective existence and that any conclusion to 
which the Industrial Court arrived at on the issue had no legal significance. In the context of the 
present case, the Court accordingly reasoned that it was not for the CCMA to grant itself 
                                                 
953 See Goldfields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA & others 2009 12 BLLR 1214 (LC). 
There are jurisdictional rulings which are suited to be raised at the commencement of conciliation and those that 
better determined after the hearing of evidence at the arbitration phase. The former includes jurisdictional rulings 
which establishes threshold (e.g. condonation for late filling of the referral, whether bargaining council has 
jurisdiction over the parties or whether the dispute is the one contemplated by the Act) and the latter includes the 
determination of whether the applicant is an employee or whether there is a dismissal or not. 
954 Para 101. 
955
 2008 9 BLLR 845 (LAC). 
956 Para 3. 
957 1994 15 ILJ 801 (LAC) 804C–D. 
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jurisdiction which it did not have; nor could it deprive itself of jurisdiction by making a wrong 
finding that it lacked jurisdiction which it actually had.958 
 
According to the Labour Appeal Court,959 the question was therefore not whether the 
commissioner’s finding that a dismissal had taken place was justifiable, rational or reasonable. 
The proper question to ask was whether, objectively speaking, the facts which would give the 
CCMA the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute existed. If such facts did not exist, the CCMA had 
no jurisdiction irrespective of its finding to the contrary.  This effectively meant that the CCMA 
or the bargaining council could not grant itself jurisdiction which it did not have and that the 
Labour Court may review such decisions to determine the existence of the prerequisite 
jurisdiction with reference to the existence of objective facts.960 
 
In the matter of J & J Nfreeze Trust v Statutory Council for the Squid & Related Fisheries of SA 
& others,961 the Labour Court referred to SARPA962 when called upon to review a ruling which 
had effectively dismissed the employer’s jurisdictional point that the CCMA had no jurisdiction 
because the referring party was an independent contractor and not an employee. In this regard, 
the Labour Court held that it was its task to determine whether or not the objective facts provided 
the council with jurisdiction to entertain the unfair dismissal dispute.963 The court applied the 
aforementioned principle and concluded that the commissioner’s finding was “undoubtedly 
correct” as the objective facts of the case revealed that an employer/employee relationship existed 
between the parties.964 
 
Consistent with this approach, the Labour Appeal Court and Labour Court in Solid Doors (Pty) 
Ltd v Commissioner Theron965 and Consol Glass (Pty) Ltd v CCMA966 respectively also 
confirmed that the question of jurisdiction was a factual one that had to be determined objectively 
without reference to the standard of reasonableness.  
                                                 
958 Para 40. 
959 Para 41. 
960 See also Mokhethi v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council and others 2012 JOL 28180 (LC). 
961 2011 11 BLLR 1068 (LC). 
962 Para 21. 
963 Para 22-23. 
964 Para 33.  
965 2004 25 ILJ 2337 (LAC) para 29. 
966 2011 JOL 28051 (LC) para 11. 
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In the more recent matter of Joseph v University of Limpopo & others, the Labour Appeal Court 
however diverted from the principles applied in SARPA, assessing the commissioner’s finding 
that the employee had been dismissed with reference to the reasonableness, rather than the 
correctness, thereof.967 The courts’ divergent attitudes raise the question which approach should 
be preferred. In so far as Joseph discourages interference with CCMA awards in line with the 
LRA, it seems preferable. Yet, notwithstanding the advantages thereof, in University of Pretoria 
v CCMA & others the Labour Appeal Court’s attitude reverted to that evinced in SARPA.968 
 
It is submitted that in terms of the judgments referred to above, the standard in jurisdictional 
reviews is not that of a reasonable decision-maker but whether the objective facts as they exist 
form a basis upon which the CCMA or bargaining council can assume jurisdiction. This requires 
the courts to apply their minds and determine whether the objective facts as presented gave the 
commissioner the jurisdiction upon which to entertain the dispute. According to Myburgh, this 
effectively means that applicants on review need to establish that the jurisdictional finding was 
wrong in order to succeed with the application.969 Such a conclusion however seems contrary to 
Sidumo when it is considered that the Constitutional Court has held that a commissioner, 
conducting a CCMA arbitration, was performing an administrative function970 and that such 
function was to be exercised reasonably. The Court did not stipulate that reasonableness was only 
applicable in the case of value judgments;971 nor did the Court hold that different requirements 
were to be applied depending on the nature of the dispute at arbitration. This was recognised by 
Ngalwana J in Elston v McEwan NO and others.972 The Court did not support the contention that 
Sidumo unreasonableness could not be relied upon because the present matter was not concerned 
with the unfairness of a dismissal but rather with a finding on a jurisdictional fact. According to 
the Court, there was nothing either in section 145(2) of the LRA or in the Sidumo judgment that 
confined the application of the review standard only to unfair dismissal cases. In the Court’s 
view, the standard in Sidumo was clearly the overarching standard of general application to all 
review cases outside those falling within the purview of PAJA. 
                                                 
967 2011 32 ILJ 2085 (LAC). 
968 2012 2 BLLR 164 (LAC). 
969 Myburg A “Sidumo v Rustplats” ILJ 11. 
970 Para 88. 
971 E.g. sanction and relief. 
972 Unreported Labour Court judgment, C662/07 (9 January 2009) para 19 found at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALC/2009/24.html on 16 February 2012 at 20h26. 
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In addition to the foregoing, any requirement that implies that the applicant on review must show 
that the commissioner’s finding was “wrong” in order to have it set aside, also creates the risk of 
blurring the distinction between an appeal and review. It also does not take cognisance of the two 
different categories of jurisdictional facts identified by Corbett J in SA Defence & Aid Fund v 
Minister of Justice973 and approved of by Zondo JP in Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Epstein NO & others.974 In the former case the Court has held that:975 
 
“Upon a proper construction of the legislation concerned, a jurisdictional fact may fall into one 
or other of two broad categories. It may consist of a fact, or state of affairs, which, objectively 
speaking, must have existed before the statutory power could validly be exercised. In such a 
case, the objective existence of the jurisdictional fact as a prelude to the exercise of that power in 
a particular case is justiciable in a court of law. If the court finds that objectively the fact did not 
exist, it may then declare invalid the purported exercise of the power (see eg Kellerman v 
Minister of Interior 1945 TPD 179; Tefu v Minister of Justice and Another 1953 (2) SA 61 (T)). 
On the other hand, it may fall into the category comprised by instances where the statute itself 
has entrusted to the repository of the power the sole and exclusive function of determining 
whether in its opinion the pre-requisite fact, or state of affairs, existed prior to the exercise of the 
power. In that event, the jurisdictional fact is, in truth, not whether the prescribed fact, or state of 
affairs, existed in an objective sense but whether, subjectively speaking, the repository of the 
power had decided that it did. In cases falling into this category the existence of the fact, or state 
of affairs, is not justiciable in a Court of law. The Court can interfere and declare the exercise of 
the power invalid on the ground of a non-observance of the jurisdictional fact only where it is 
shown that the repository of the power, in deciding that the pre-requisite fact or state of affairs 
existed, acted mala fide or from ulterior motive or failed to apply his mind to the matter. (See eg 
Minister of the Interior v Bechler and others (supra); African Commercial and Distributive 
Workers’ Union v Schoeman NO and Another 1951 (4) SA 266 (T); R v Sachs, 1953 (1) SA 392 
(AD).” 
 
Commissioners are entrusted with the function of determining whether they have jurisdiction in a 
                                                 
973 1967 (1) SA 31 (C). 
974 2000 12 BLLR 1389 (LAC). 
975 34H-35D. 
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particular case.976 It is accordingly submitted that in the review of commissioners’ findings that 
they have the prerequisite jurisdiction to exercise their arbitration function, an alternative 
argument exists that the focus should be on the commissioner’s subjective reasons for his 
findings rather than the jurisdictional fact’s objective existence. The rationale for such an 
approach is evident from SARPA. The commissioner ruled that in his opinion the rugby players 
had had a reasonable expectation that their contracts would be renewed, that the contracts had not 
been so renewed and that the failure to renew those contracts constituted a constructive dismissal. 
It is submitted that it is difficult to perceive how these facts would be capable of being purely, 
objectively determined. The same principle will apply in any other instance where a value 
judgment has to be made or a discretionary power has to be exercised. It is further submitted that 
a court on review will only be able to review a decision following upon the non-observance of a 
jurisdictional fact if the commissioner, in deciding that the jurisdictional fact existed, committed 
one or more of the section 145 grounds for review (now suffused by reasonableness). Within the 
context of such an interpretation the court on review will also be entitled to ask whether a 
jurisdictional finding was one that a reasonable commissioner could make.   It is partly also as a 
result of this uncertainty that a comparative study with English law is proposed.  
 
6 5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it has been established that there is inconsistency among the courts as regards the 
nature and application of reasonableness. On the one hand, Fidelity Cash Management Services, 
Value Logistics Ltd, Ellerine Holding Limited and Gold Fields Mining support reasonableness as 
a standard or test on review. On the other hand, Fidelity Cleaning (Pty) Ltd, Super Group 
Autoparts and Samancor prefer to treat reasonableness as a ground of review in addition to the 
section 145(2) grounds of review. Having regard to the above mentioned cases, it was however 
concluded that the terms “ground” and “test” should not be used interchangeably, but that it 
should be established whether reasonableness is intended to be the one or the other; having regard 
also to the ordinary English language meaning of “ground” and “test”. Specifically focusing on 
                                                 
976 See Rule 22 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA. The question whether an employment 
relationship exists, also requires the resolution of factual disputes, the leading of oral evidence and a 
determination of questions of mixed law and fact on matters that are bound up with the substantive merits of the 
dispute and left for the CCMA’s final determination subject to review. See Eoh Abantu (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & 
another 2008 7 BLLR 651 (LC) para 24. 
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its meaning for purpose of review applications, it was determined that, as a “ground” of review, 
reasonableness would constitute a reference to the reason for the review. In other words, parties 
to a dispute will launch a review application on the basis of an allegation that the award is 
unreasonable per se. This would have the effect of widening the scope of review as provided for 
in section 145(2) of the LRA. On the other hand, as a “test” on review, reasonableness would not 
necessarily extend the section 145(2) grounds for review, but may potentially narrow it. When 
applied in the latter sense, the court will effectively review and set aside an award if the decision, 
alleged to be arrived at as a result of the occurrence of one or more of the grounds for review 
contained in section 145(2) of the LRA, is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have 
made in all the circumstances of the case. In other words, it would constitute a measure employed 
to determine whether the conditions for interference on review, as captured in section 145(2), 
have been met.  
 
However, be that as a standard or ground of review, it was established that reasonableness is not 
encompassing and that the section 145(2) grounds of review have not been superseded as a result 
of reasonableness “suffusing” section 145 of the LRA.977  
 
In seeking further clarity on this reasonableness issue, the question was posed whether 
reasonableness was outcome - or processed focus. Reference was made to Fidelity Cash 
Management Services and in particular the finding that a flawed process of reasoning was not 
reviewable if the conclusion reached by the commissioner was sustainable on all the evidence 
before him or her. In this regard, the judgments of Rawdaw, RSA Geological Services and 
Senama were considered. The latter judgments confirmed, contrary to Fidelity Cash Management 
Services, that any error alleged on review must be foundational or material to the reasoning of the 
award in order to render it reviewable. In fact, case law revealed that the materiality of an error 
was determined having regard to the material before the commissioner and the conclusion arrived 
at. To this end, the question that had to be asked and answered was whether or not the conclusion 
was sensibly connected to the reasons taking into account the material (or evidence) before the 
                                                 
977 See Maepe v CCMA & another 2008 8 BLLR 723 (LAC); SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & others v SA 
Rugby (Pty) Ltd & others; SA Rugby Pty Ltd v SARPU & another SARPA 2008 9 BLLR 845 (LAC) and Group Six 
Security Services (Pty) Ltd & Andrew Masters v R Moletsane, CCMA & Dean Weller unreported Labour Appeal 
Court judgment; JA77/05 (26 February 2009). 
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commissioner or alternatively, whether the commissioner’s “bad” reasons or errors served as 
evidence of the occurrence of one or more of the section 145(2) grounds for review as suffused 
by reasonableness. This was recognised as a thin line as the reviewing court should not be 
required to scrutinise material in order to find whether or not the decision was one that a 
reasonable court could not reach. 
 
Based on these case law discussions, it was further argued in harmony with the distinction 
between an appeal and review that, if the error or bad reason constituted proof of the fact that the 
decision was reached as a result of the occurrence of one or more of the section 145(2) grounds 
of review, it should be set aside on review regardless of the fact that the decision could be 
sustained by other reasons identified in the record.978 On the other hand, if the “bad reasons” or 
“errors” amount to an incorrect factual finding, as in the Sidumo case, which, as discussed is not a 
ground of review, the award would not be reviewable unless the incorrect factual findings 
constitute evidence of one or more of the reviewable grounds. However, although the focus 
should always be on the way in which the commissioner arrived at his conclusions, rather than 
the outcome of the process, this does not mean that any defect or error in the reasoning process 
will render a decision reviewable. The reviewability of a decision all depends on whether or not 
the erroneous or “bad” reasons for the decision can be ascribed to one or more of the ground for 
review in terms of section 145(2) of the LRA.  
 
The practical application of reasonableness was also discussed in relation to guilt, sanction and 
relief findings in disputes relating to dismissals for misconduct as well as procedural fairness and 
findings as to jurisdiction. It was established that reviews directed at penalty and/or relief had as 
its subject discretionary decisions, calling for the exercise of a value judgment by the decision-
maker without there necessarily being a single right or wrong answer. As a result, it was 
established that it will not be often that a decision-maker’s decision will be found to fall outside 
the range of reasonableness and thus be reviewable in terms of Sidumo reasonableness. However, 
in Senama, Karen Beef, Hulett Aluminium and Tao Ying Matal Industries, the challenge before 
the court was not the outcome of a discretionary decision, but rather a dispute as to whether or 
not the commissioner had applied his or her mind to all the relevant facts and the law in making 
                                                 
978 The focus on review should always be the process leading to the decision and not the decision itself. 
209 
 
that decision. Herein the court recognised an important qualification to the reasonableness of 
outcome approach which relates to the consideration of materially relevant factors. Essentially it 
provides that an award will be unassailable on the basis of unreasonableness if it is established 
that a commissioner has applied his or her mind to the facts and the law and that he/she has not 
otherwise misdirected him/herself. 
 
In relation to guilty findings challenged on review, it was established that a commissioner’s 
finding on the facts will be considered reasonable provided the following conditions are met: 1) it 
is supported by the evidence; 2) all relevant factors and circumstances of the case has been 
weighed and taken into account; 3) the decision-maker has applied the correct rules of evidence 
and did not deviate from them to such an extent that it materially denied a party a fair hearing; 4) 
the evidence is sufficient to reasonably justify the decision arrived at; 5) the decision maker took 
into account the uncontradicted evidence and/or 6) adopted the correct legal approach in its 
application of the law to the facts in a charge of misconduct. 
 
In relation to sanction findings, it was established that sound reasoning was required in order to 
justify a sanction on a reasonableness review. In fact, it was demonstrated that, where a 
commissioner wrongly appreciated the severity of the misconduct, made findings in mitigation 
which were not sustainable or did not have proper regard to the relevant facts in the 
determination of a penalty, the decision on sanction was susceptible to a reasonableness review. 
Likewise, where a commissioner fails to objectively rationalise his/her finding as to the 
appropriate relief or imposes too high a standard of procedural fairness, the award will be 
susceptible to review because it is unreasonable.  
 
In relation to jurisdictional reviews, Fidelity Cash Management Services, SARPA, J & J Nfreeze 
Trust and University of Pretoria were referred to. These judgments made it clear that the question 
of reasonableness did not arise in relation to jurisdictional reviews. However, in contradiction 
thereto, the courts in SA Defence & Aid Fund and Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd argued that 
the focus in jurisdictional reviews was on the commissioner’s subjective reasons for his findings 
rather than the jurisdictional fact’s objective existence, and hence the reasonableness standard 
was capable of being applied thereto. In Joseph, the Labour Appeal Court also assessed the 
210 
 
commissioner’s finding that the employee had been dismissed with reference to the 
reasonableness thereof.979 On this basis, a court on review will be able to set aside a decision 
following upon non-observance of the jurisdictional fact if the commissioner, in deciding that the 
jurisdictional fact existed, committed one or more of the section 145(2) grounds of review. 
 
Finally, to the extent that section 145(2) of the LRA prescribes the statutory grounds of review, it 
was reasoned that it was not for the courts to introduce reasonableness as an independent 
(statutory) ground of review. It was argued that the proper approach is for litigants to challenge 
the constitutionality of section 145 of the LRA by either alleging that the remedy of review as 
provided for therein is inadequate980 or do not give proper effect to the right to just administrative 
action as contained in the 1996 Constitution. Only in such an instance will the court be able to 
determine whether section 145 infringes the right to just administrative action as contained in the 
1996 Constitution and, if so, whether the infringement can be justified as a permissible limitation 
in terms of the section 36 of the 1996 Constitution, failing which section 145 would be capable of 
being declared unconstitutional.981 The only alternative is for the legislature to intervene and 
amend section 145(2) to include reasonableness as a ground of review. 
 
This chapter indicates that in the five years since the Sidumo judgment was handed down, the 
courts have made significant strides in interpreting and applying reasonableness and have 
produced a reasonably consistent jurisprudence dealing therewith. Although reasonableness is 
now better understood than before these judgments were made available - as this chapter reflects 
- there are still a number of key issues that have yet to be finally settled. It is for the purpose of 
seeking clarification as well as guidance and direction in the interpretation of the role, nature, 
impact and content of reasonableness in South African law that a proposal has been made for a 
comparative study with English law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
979 2011 32 ILJ 2085 (LAC). 
980 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 32. 
981 See also South African National Defense Union v Minister of Defense Chief of the South African National 
Defense Force 2007 9 BLLR 785 (CC). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
A COMPARISON 
 
7 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the similarities and differences between the role of reasonableness in English 
administrative and employment law compared to the role in South African employment law are 
identified and highlighted. This will be done in order to construct a foundation for making 
recommendations suitable for implementation in the South African employment law setting. 
 
7 2 THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND ENGLISH 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM  
 
Judicial review in England and South Africa is a procedure whereby the courts may exercise 
supervision and control over the exercise of power by public authorities.982 In South Africa, a 
distinction is drawn between judicial review under the common law - and constitutional 
dispensation.983 At common law, judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions was possible via 
the High Courts’ inherent power of judicial review. With no statutory framework from which to 
operate, the courts developed administrative law principles on a case by case basis; having regard 
to English administrative law. The South African principles of common law review were 
therefore strongly influenced by the English doctrines and grounds of review. The courts, for 
example, accepted that a review ground was only established once it was shown that the decision-
maker had failed to apply his or her mind to relevant matters in accordance with the applicable 
statutory requirements and the principles of natural justice. Unreasonableness review was also 
very narrowly circumscribed. The substantive unreasonableness of a decision was not regarded as 
an independent ground of review. Unreasonableness only became relevant if it was of such a 
degree that it was symptomatic984 of another ground of review like mala fides, ulterior motive or 
                                                 
982 See chapter 2 para 2 2 1. 
983 See chapter 2 para 2 2 1 1 and 2 2 1 2. 
984 This descriptive term was coined by Jerold Taitz “But ‘Twas a famous victory” 1978 Acta Juridica 109 111. He 
gave the example where the consequences of an administrative act were unreasonable but the unreasonableness 
212 
 
the failure of a decision-maker to apply his or her mind to the matter concerned.985 This played an 
important role in delineating the scope of review and unreasonableness review in particular. 
 
Under the constitutional dispensation, parliamentary sovereignty was rejected; the rule of law 
was recognised as one of the founding values of the constitutional regime and the courts were 
empowered to review legislation and conduct inconsistent with the 1996 Constitution.986 As 
custodian of the fundamental rights entrenched in the 1996 Constitution, the courts’ role has 
developed to include giving content and meaning to the values and principles contained in the 
1996 Constitution and to ensuring that the exercise of powers is authorised and complies with the 
law. One of the fundamental rights is the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
administrative action provided for in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. The right to fair 
administrative action has been given statutory effect to by means of PAJA. Section 6(2)(a) to (i) 
of PAJA provides for the review of administrative action on a non-exhaustive list of grounds, 
including irrationality and unreasonableness. These grounds are viewed as a codification of the 
common law grounds. Unless inconsistent, the common law meaning of the grounds continue to 
find application.987 PAJA does not distinguish between reviewable and non-reviewable errors of 
law, but every material error of law permits judicial review.988   
 
In terms of the English legal tradition, parliament is sovereign. Administrative decision-makers 
are primarily responsible for exercising administrative powers and making administrative 
decisions on the merits of a matter. The role of the review court has traditionally been limited to 
deciding whether administrative decision-makers had stayed within the bounds of their powers, 
expressly or impliedly conferred upon them by Parliament. Decision-makers stayed within the 
bounds of their powers by properly interpreting the law, not infringing the public law recognised 
                                                                                                                                                              
could not be traced back to non-compliance with any of the specific requirements for the validity of 
administrative action. 
985 See Chapter 2 para 2 2 1 1; see also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
and others 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 43;Union Government v Union Steel Corporation Limited 1928 AD and 
Northwest Township (Pty) Ltd v The Administrator, Transvaal 1975(4) SA 1 (T). 
986 See chapter 2 para 2 2 1 2. 
987 See chapter 2 para 2 2 2. Common law administrative law remains relevant in so far as its principles that had 
previously provided the grounds for judicial review have been included therein to the extent that it is not 
inconsistent with it. Inconsistencies aside, what is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair under the 1996 
Constitution is therefore considered to have the same meaning as provided for in terms of the common law. 
988 See section 6(2)(d). 
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principles that govern the exercise of discretionary powers and following a fair procedure.989 As 
such, judicial review was based upon an appraisal of the manner of decision-making only to 
determine its lawfulness. It did not empower the review court to substitute its own decision for 
the decision of the administrative decision-maker. A decision that was properly made within the 
boundaries of the administrative power could not be challenged. 
 
A changing philosophy however appears to have permitted greater scope for review. Judicial 
review is presently provided for in English administrative law in terms of section 31 of the Senior 
Courts Act 1981 on the ground of a (statutorily undefined) error of law. Since Anisminic 
Limited990 as expounded in Pearlman991 and ex parte Page,992 the English courts do not in 
principle distinguish between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law to determine the 
scope of review, but view almost all errors of law as jurisdictional errors.993 In the normal course, 
questions of fact are not reviewable. There is growing support for the proposition that a material 
finding of fact will be reviewable if it was made in the absence of evidence to support that 
finding, in consequence of failing to take account of a relevant consideration or upon taking into 
account an irrelevant consideration.994 These developments have challenged the traditional 
position that the courts do not engage in some form of merits review. Provision has also been 
made for the review of non-statutory and/or prerogative powers that cannot be justified purely 
with reference to vires, intention and statutory construction.995 Unreasonableness has also been 
recognised as an independent ground of review rather than evidence that a decision-maker had 
misunderstood the relevant law or overlooked a critical and required criterion.996 Guided by the 
Wednesbury formation of unreasonableness, the courts accept that they do not interfere with a 
discretionary decision unless it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have 
come to it. The Wednesbury formation of unreasonableness has been labelled practically 
                                                 
989 See chapter 3 para 3 2. 
990 1969 2 AC 147. 
991 1979 QB 56. 
992 1993 AC 682. 
993 See chapter 3 para 3 3 1. In the event of a jurisdictional error of law, the decision-maker embarks upon an 
unauthorised inquiry. In the event of a non-jurisdictional error of law, the decision-maker embarks upon an 
authorised inquiry, but exercise his or her powers in an unauthorised manner.  
994 See Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 2. 
995 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 1984 3 All ER 935 in chapter 5. 
996 See Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. See also S Felix “Engaging Unreasonableness and Proportionality as Standards of 
Review in England, India and Sri Lanka” Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth (2008) 
95 101. 
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inadequate due to its vagueness and deferential nature, leading to frequent attempts at redefinition 
by the English courts. The unreasonableness standard has caused similar uncertainty in South 
Africa.997  
 
Although England is not a constitutional state that allows judicial review of the lawfulness of acts 
of parliament, section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that all legislation in the United 
Kingdom must be interpreted, as far as possible, in accordance with the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Where this is not feasible, the courts may issue a declaration of incompatibility. 
Section 6 of the same Act recognises that public authorities have a duty to act in accordance with 
the fundamental rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. This means that 
public authorities may be subject to judicial review on the ground that they have unlawfully 
breached one or more of the convention rights. The grounds of review are therefore considered to 
encompass fundamental rights in addition to the orthodox process-oriented rights.998  
 
Taking the above considerations into account, the distinction between parliamentary sovereignty 
in England and constitutional supremacy in South Africa is not considered a hindrance to a 
comparison between English and South African law for the purpose of interpreting the role of 
reasonableness in judicial review in South African employment law. 
 
7 3 JUDICIAL REVIEW DISTINGUISHED FROM APPEAL999 
 
In South Africa and England the validity of administrative decisions can be challenged in court 
by means of review or appeal.1000 Theoretically, the maintenance of the distinction between the 
                                                 
997 See chapter 4 para 4 3.  
998 M Elliot The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (2001) 4. See also A Freckelton The Concept of 
Deference in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions in Four Common Law Countries Degree of Master 
of Laws University of British Colombia (2013) 97. The Human Rights Act 1998 has incorporated the European 
Convention of Human Rights into law in the United Kingdom. As a result, the substantive review of 
administrative decision-making differs depending on the kind of law in question: 1) the courts undertake a 
proportionality review when considering European Union laws applicable or expressly implemented in England; 
and 2) in cases not involving any form of European Union law, the courts use a “sliding scale” of reasonableness. 
999 See Chapter 2 para 2 3. 
1000 M Wiechers & Y Burns “Administrative Law” in LAWSA 1 2ed (2003) para 158. South Africa does not have a 
general administrative appeals tribunal; instead legislation on an ad hoc basis makes provision for appeals from 
administrative bodies to a wide range of officials, boards, tribunals and courts. 
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two processes is one of the fundamental principles in South African and English administrative 
law generally and in judicial review in particular. The differences are briefly repeated here. 
 
Whilst the reasoning behind the institution of an appeal or review is usually the same – namely to 
have the administrative decision set aside - England and South Africa distinguish between the 
two processes on the basis that they reconsider decisions in different ways and perform different 
functions.1001 Firstly, in England, the right of appeal from administrative decisions exist only 
where it is provided for by statute. Depending on the provision, the scope of an appeal may be 
extended to matters of fact or law or both.1002 Where a statute does not restrict the grounds of 
appeal, an appeal may be utilised to challenge a decision on the basis that the decision-maker 
came to the wrong conclusion on the facts or the law.1003 As the challenge in these circumstances 
requires a fresh decision on the outcome, the appellate court is entitled to re-examine the dispute, 
including the arguments of fact. The appellate body may enquire whether another decision-maker 
could have come to a different conclusion and, depending on the answer, to declare the original 
decision incorrectly determined.1004 In South Africa, legislation makes provision on an ad hoc 
basis for administrative appeals. The scope and power of the appeal as well as the procedure to be 
adopted vary in accordance with the provisions of the constitutive legislation.1005 Irrespective 
whether the administrative appeal is limited to the record of the initial proceedings or constitutes 
a hearing de novo,1006 the administrative appeal is concerned with the actual merits of the 
decision and if the decision reached was correct. 
 
Opposed thereto, judicial review in England and South Africa originate from the courts’ inherent 
power under the common law to determine whether an administrative act or omission was lawful. 
Viewed as a supervisory jurisdiction, review courts are not concerned with the correctness of the 
                                                 
1001 Chapter 2 para 2 3 and chapter 3 para 3 2 1. 
1002 Chapter 2 para 2 3. See P Cane Administrative Law 43. D Pollard, N Parpworth & D Hughes Constitutional and 
Administrative Law: Text with Materials 4 ed (2007) 475. 
1003 For example an appeal against conviction or sentence in the Criminal Appeals Act 1968. 
1004 Chapter 2 para 2 3. 
1005 L G Baxter “Administrative Institutions and the Administrative Process” (1984) Annual Survey of SA Law 32 33;  
Hoexter Administrative Law 64. For example, the Lands Claims Court by section 22 of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994; Competition Appeal Court by section 37 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998; 
Commissioner of Patents by section 75 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978; Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court by 
sections 151, 158, 167 and 174 of the LRA. See also South African Law Reform Commission Project 24 
Investigation into the Courts’ Powers of Review of Administrative Acts (1992) (Project 24) 106. 
1006 Tikly v Johannes NO 1963 2 SA 588 (T) 590F-591A. Hoexter Administrative Law 66. 
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primary decision, but with the manner in which the decision was reached. The review court must 
establish whether the outcome could be sustained on the facts found and the law applied by the 
original decision-maker. The review court does not embark upon a fresh assessment of the 
merits, based upon the evidential material before the decision-maker, and exercise its own 
discretion as to what is fair and reasonable.1007 Where the objection relates to the method 
whereby the result was obtained, the review court typically scrutinises the conduct of the 
proceedings to determine the correctness of the procedure that was followed. The considerations 
which are taken into account are process-related.1008 The review court does not consider in 
principle whether the record reveals relevant considerations that are capable of justifying the 
outcome. In this manner, the review courts are not usurping the inherent discretionary or 
decision-making powers of the executive, but are maintaining the requisite checks and balances. 
 
The remedies available on appeal and review also differ. Where a statute does not restrict the 
grounds of an appeal and it is established that the original decision was incorrectly determined, 
the administrative appeal body may set aside the original decision and make another decision in 
substitution.1009 By contrast, South African and English law recognise that the characteristic 
judicial review remedy is to set aside the original decision and remit it to the original decision-
maker for reconsideration. It is only in exceptional cases that the original decision will be 
substituted or varied.1010 In English administrative law, the primary judicial review remedies are 
aimed at ensuring that the original decision-maker makes a lawful decision. The primary judicial 
review remedies do not intend the review court to step into the shoes of the original decision-
maker and make a decision in its stead.1011 Similarly, South Africa’s preferred remedy in terms of 
PAJA entails setting aside the administrative action and remitting the matter for reconsideration 
by the administrative decision-maker, with or without directions.1012  
                                                 
1007 See the South African cases of Lekota v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1998 10 BLLR 1021 (LC); Coetzee v 
Lebea NO 1998 JOL 3657 (LAC) and the English case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p 
Launder 1997 1 WLR 839 847 referred to in chapter 2 para 2 3. 
1008 The courts apply general legal principles of legality, rationality or procedural propriety. 
1009 In England, for example, the Upper Tribunal (in an appeal from the First Tier Tribunal) can substitute its 
decision for that of the decision-maker based on it being the wrong decision. In South Africa, the appellate body 
is allowed to step into the shoes of the original decision-maker and decide the matter anew. See Hoexter 
Administrative Law 63. 
1010 An example is S8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA. It recognises that the court may make any order in exceptional cases – 
substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a defect resulting from the administrative action. 
1011 Chapter 3 para 3 2 1. I.e. a mandatory, prohibitory or quashing order or an injunction or declaration. 
1012 See section 8 of PAJA. 
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Despite the theoretical differences detailed above, the term “appeal” and “review” in practice 
continue to be difficult to define.1013 The focus of judicial review frequently falls on the merits of 
the decision as opposed to the decision-making process.1014 An example is unreasonableness 
review. In some matters it is impossible to separate the merits from the rest of the matter, since 
the court must consider the merits to effectively judge the legality of the decision.1015 A clear 
distinction between appeal and review is further complicated because of an overlap between the 
processes that brings into question the authenticity of the distinction. Firstly, in some instances a 
statutory appeal process may be available as an alternative to judicial review proceedings.1016 
Secondly, not all appeals are on “the merits”, but an appeal may be limited to points of law as 
well.1017 In those instances, the grounds for intervention are the same as those in a claim for 
judicial review.1018 The appeal body does not reconsider the disputed decision on the merits. The 
appeal body identifies and corrects substantive and procedural errors of law with reference to 
general principles of law, jurisdiction, legality and natural justice. An example is section 21(1) of 
the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 in England.1019 Limited to errors of law, the Appeal 
Tribunal does not in principle re-examine disputes of fact to determine whether the Tribunal 
decision was incorrect, but ensures that the correct and consistent interpretation of the law has 
been applied. Compatible with English judicial review, it is only in exceptional circumstances 
that errors of fact provide grounds for a successful claim on appeal on a point of law.1020 Both 
processes only allow for the setting aside and substitution of the original decision in exceptional 
                                                 
1013 See G C Armstrong Administrative Justice and Tribunals in South Africa: A Commonwealth Comparison Degree 
of Master of Laws University of Stellenbosch (2011) 32-33. 
1014 See Chapter 2 para 2 3. Hoexter Administrative Law 106. 
1015 Hoexter Administrative Law 106. These include whether sufficient weight was given to a relevant consideration, 
whether an ulterior purpose or motive was pursued by the decision-maker, whether the decision was dictated by 
an unauthorised person or body or whether the decision-maker adhered rigidly to a policy or precedent. 
1016 In South Africa, the Competition Appeal Tribunal for example functions as both a court of appeal and review in 
respect of decisions of the Competition Tribunal. In England, a special appeal tribunal for example exists to deal 
with challenges to decisions of the disability tribunal; albeit it being an administrative decision. See Moyna v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 2003 UKHL 44. 
1017 D Feldman English Public Law 2 ed (2009) 866. In South African criminal procedure, the powers of the court are 
on appeal the same as on review, with the addition that a sentence can be increased. See section 304(2)(c) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 applied to appeals by section 309(3). The prosecution may for example 
appeal against the granting of bail, an acquittal on a legal ground and also against an inadequate sentence. The 
prosecution does however not have a right to appeal against a finding of not guilty in relation to the facts of the 
case - the so-called appeal on the merits. See section 310 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In England, 
see Bangs v Connex South Eastern Ltd 2005 EWCA Civ 14 para 8. 
1018 P Cane Administrative Law182. 
1019 See Chapter 4 para 4 3. 
1020 Chapter 4 para 4 4. 
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circumstances: on appeal to the Appeal Tribunal, where the decision is plainly and unarguably 
wrong and on review in England,1021 where there is only one decision that could have been 
reached, but for the error.1022 Thirdly, a statute may recognise grounds of appeal that encompass 
judicial review grounds. An error of law in appeal proceedings may therefore also constitute an 
error of law on review.1023 In England, the illegality ground of review for example reflects the 
ground of appeal in English employment law that the decision was not in accordance with the 
law. Both processes require decision-makers to interpret the law correctly, exercise a power for 
the purpose imposed, consider relevant factors and ignore irrelevant factors.1024 The similarity in 
grounds is further demonstrated with reference to the concept of unreasonableness in England. 
The appellate courts refer to the interpretation of unreasonableness in judicial review proceedings 
in the administrative law context to establish the meaning of perversity in appeal proceedings.1025 
 
This similarities and differences between appeal and review are important because, as is evident 
from the discussions in chapter 3 and 6, section 145 of the LRA in South Africa affords a special 
statutory power of review to the Labour Court in order to scrutinise CCMA awards. On the other 
hand, in England, section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 specifically allows for an 
appeal against a Tribunal finding to the Appeal Tribunal on the basis of a question of law only. 
 
7 4 REASONABLENESS IN ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
As mentioned above, English public law traditionally based judicial review upon procedural 
standards. The determination of evidential or factual questions remained the ultimate 
responsibility of the original decision-maker. Focused on the manner in which a decision was 
taken,1026 judicial intervention did not require freshly reassessing the matter to determine whether 
the court preferred a decision different to the one made by the original decision-maker. It was, 
however, also recognised that there should be a measure of judicial control over the exercise of 
                                                 
1021 Chapter 4 para 4 3. 
1022 Chapter 3 para 3 2 1. 
1023 See Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 1969 2 AC 147. 
1024 Chapter 3 and 4. 
1025 See Dobie v Burns International Security 1984 ICR 812. 
1026 See Chapter 2 para 2 3 and Chapter 3 para 3 2 1. See also Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans 
1982 3 ALL ER 141, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 1984 3 All ER 935 and R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Launder 1997 1 WLR 839 847. 
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discretionary decisions; without it causing a substitution of judgment or too great an intrusion on 
the merits. It was therefore accepted that administrative decisions could be challenged on the 
basis of unreasonableness, but only by having recourse to the principle of an inferred but 
unidentified error of law attributable to the decision-maker.1027  
 
In the seminal decision in Wednesbury Corporation, the Court envisaged unreasonableness as 
having a twofold meaning.1028 Unreasonableness was firstly used as a heading for the various 
grounds of challenge pertaining to legality when decision-makers exercise discretionary 
powers.1029 Decisions were required to be properly reasoned and based on relevant considerations 
and material evidence. Unreasonableness embraced a variety of defects including misdirection in 
law, an improper purpose, disregard of relevant considerations and advertence to immaterial 
factors.1030 If a decision was made outside the terms of the powers conferred upon the decision-
maker by the legislature, the courts were allowed to intervene. Secondly, unreasonableness, 
regarded as a synonym for irrationality, was afforded a substantive meaning in its own right 
distinct from illegality and/or procedural impropriety.1031 Whilst a decision-maker may have 
acted within the scope of the powers conferred upon him or her, interference on the basis of 
substantive unreasonableness was warranted if the decision was so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority, properly directing and applying his or her mind to the question to the 
decided, could ever have come to it.1032 In terms of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the courts 
presumed that the decision was unlawful. Wednesbury unreasonableness was considered to be an 
objective measuring stick that imposed limits on which outcomes could not be pursued without 
dictating the specific outcomes that should be reached. Prevalent in the review of matters of 
substance such as fact-finding, weighing of factors, judgment and the exercise of discretion by 
administrative decision-makers, Wednesbury unreasonableness prevented the courts from 
overstepping their proper bounds and interfering too greatly in the merits of a matter.1033  
 
                                                 
1027 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 1984 3 All ER 935. See Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1028 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 and R v Chief 
Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd. 
1029 228-231; Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1030 A broader unreasonableness. 
1031 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1032 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. I.e. the irrationality is apparent from the decision itself and there is no need to examine the 
factors considered, or the motivations for, reaching the decision.   
1033 Chapter 3 para 3 6. 
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The Wednesbury unreasonableness standard required the unreasonableness of a decision to be 
readily apparent and indefensible from the decision itself. Over time, the Wednesbury 
unreasonableness standard has been relaxed. The courts query whether the exercise of discretion 
was reasonable. In International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, the Court questioned whether the decision 
was one that a reasonable authority could have reached.1034 In ex parte Smith, the Court again 
enquired whether the decision was beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-
maker.1035 The requirement that the exercise of a discretion must be reasonable imposed an 
obligation on the judiciary to identify and articulate the basis for finding that a discretionary 
decision was one which could not reasonably have been made.1036 
 
In an unreasonableness review, the courts therefore comment on the reasonable or logical 
connection between the evidence thought by the court to be true and the reasoning or purposes 
supporting the decision that was made. An unreasonableness review is effectuated on the basis of 
the substantive quality, intelligibility and/or justification of the decision underlying the manner in 
which the discretion itself was exercised.1037 Unreasonableness review constitutes a deviation 
from the general principle that judicial review is concerned with the legitimacy of the original 
decision rather than the accuracy thereof. Decision-makers must apply logical or rational 
principles in their decision-making process so as to make a competent decision based on the 
available facts.1038 Unlike an illegality and/or procedural impropriety challenge, an 
unreasonableness allegation cannot be tested against a correctness standard. By its very nature, a 
discretionary choice recognises that there is room for legitimate disagreement and a right to 
choose between more than one possible course of action.1039 A discretionary choice excludes 
from the ambit of unreasonableness review differences of opinion that may exist among 
reasonable persons.1040 The question is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable person 
could have reached the decision from the evidence and the inferences. A decision would, for 
example, be unreasonable where the evidence, reasonably viewed, is incapable of supporting the 
                                                 
1034 Chapter 3 para 3 5 1. 
1035 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly 2001 2 AC 532 
549. 
1036 Chapter 3 para 3 5 2 and 3 6. 
1037 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3 and 3 5.  
1038 See Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1039 See Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 1977 AC 1014; 
Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1040 See Re W (An Infant) 1971 AC 682. See chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
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decision made1041 because it is inconsistent with adopted guidelines or policy and that 
inconsistency is not adequately explained. A mistaken exercise of judgment must contain an 
element of perversity, arbitrariness or absurdity to be reviewable.1042  
 
Other than the moral element evident in the courts’ formulation of the test, unreasonableness does 
not identify further factors that would assist a review court in identifying an unreasonableness 
decision.1043 The courts have, however, accepted that unreasonableness requires decision-makers 
to consider and balance all relevant considerations;1044 disregard irrelevant information and make 
decisions that are logical and/or comprehensibly justifiable1045 and founded upon probative 
evidence. Decisions should also not demonstrate inconsistency; discord between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be attained or create legal uncertainty. Nonetheless, the task of 
the review court remains supervisory and the review court is in principle not entitled to substitute 
the original decision with its own unless, without the error, there would have been only one 
decision which the decision-maker could have reached. In the end, the test for reasonableness 
requires the courts to make a secondary decision, with the primary decision about the merits of 
the matter being left to the public authorities.1046  
 
The role of unreasonableness is prominent when distinguishing between an error concerning the 
law that demarcates the decision-maker’s powers1047 and a mistake in the application of the 
statutory criteria to the facts of a particular case.1048 In the first instance, the willingness of the 
review court to substitute its own judgment for that of the original decision-maker varies with the 
nature of the jurisdictional, statutory term in question. Where the jurisdictional precondition 
requires objective verification (in that there is only one correct answer), the court must determine 
as ultimate arbiter whether the jurisdictional precondition exists or prescribe what it perceives to 
                                                 
1041 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Eshetu 1999 HCA 21. 
1042 G L Peiris “Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Expanding Canvas” (1987) CLJ 53-56. 
1043 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 1984 3 All ER 935; Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1044 See Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex p BT3G Ltd 2001 Eu LR 325 and West Glamorgan County 
Council v Rafferty and others 1987 1 All ER 1005 discussed in chapter 3 para 3 4 1 1. 
1045 I.e. require rational connection between objective and the measure designed to further the objective. See The 
Association of British Civilian Internees – Far East Region v Secretary of State for Defence 2003 EWCA Civ 
473; 2003 QB 1397 discussed in chapter 3 para 3 4 1 1. 
1046 Chapter 3 para 3 6. 
1047 I.e. a question of statutory interpretation; may the statutory power be exercised? 
1048 I.e. the question whether the interpretation of a statutory term is satisfied by the evidence before the decision-
maker - if the statutory power may be exercised, should it be exercised? 
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be the correct meaning of the relevant statutory term. The original decision-maker enjoys no 
discretion.1049 Where the precondition is not objectively verifiable but dependent on an exercise 
of judgment by the original decision-maker, the review court demonstrates greater deference to 
the original decision-maker’s choice among a range of permissible considerations. The courts 
only lay down the limits of permissible meanings.1050 However, having satisfied itself that the 
jurisdictional precondition has been met, the question arises whether the jurisdictional power 
should be exercised having regard to the evidence before the decision-maker. This inquiry 
involves an assessment of the merits of the particular matter; the conclusion which is ultimately 
for the original decision-maker, and not the review court, to determine. Nevertheless, in 
addressing the merits of the matter, the original decision-maker needs to conform to the 
underlying public law principles of rationality. A failure to do so amounts to a transgression of 
the limits placed upon the exercise of the administrative power. If a decision is pre-eminently a 
matter for the original decision-maker and the decision-maker reaches a decision that is outside a 
range of rational or reasonable decisions, the review court may therefore intervene on the basis of 
an error of law.1051 
 
Wednesbury unreasonableness has however been described as defective because it gives rise to 
uncertainty,1052 is unrealistic1053 and depicts a requirement of particularly extreme behaviour.1054 
The courts have therefore loosened the restraints of Wednesbury reasonableness, varying the 
depth of judicial scrutiny in accordance with the nature and gravity of the subject matter 
concerned, and introduced a spectrum of reasonableness review.1055 Evidence of light-touch 
review and anxious scrutiny is prominent in decisions involving policy and fundamental rights 
respectively.1056 Whereas the courts are hesitant to scrutinise polycentric decisions,1057 the courts 
                                                 
1049 Chapter 3 para 3 3 1. See Pearlman v Keepers & Governors of Harrow School 1979 QB 56. 
1050 I.e. “If the Secretary of State thinks fit”. See Pulhofer v Hillington London Borough Council 1986 UKHL 1; R v 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p South Yorkshire Transport 1993 1 WLR 23. 
1051 See chapter 3; R v Tower Hamlets LBC Ex p Begum 1993 AC 509; 1986 AC 484 and Rolls v Dorset CC 1994 
COD 448. 
1052 Wednesbury reasonableness does not provide sufficient justification for judicial intervention or the reasons why 
decisions are considered unreasonable. 
1053 I.e. unreasonable decisions often follow a rational decision-making process. 
1054 For example bad faith and/or perverse or absurd decisions. Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1055 Chapter 3 para 3 5. 
1056 Chapter 3 para 3 5 1 and 3 5 2. Budgaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department 1987 AC 514 531. The 
level of scrutiny should be commensurate with the importance of the right involved. The more important the 
right involved, the more carefully scrutinised an administrative decision will be. 
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are more willing to engage in deeper scrutiny when fundamental rights are concerned. This is 
illustrated in Brind where the Court began its inquiry from the premises that only a compelling 
public interest would justify the invasion of rights.1058 Similarly in ex parte Smith, the Court 
confirmed that the greater the interference with human rights, the more would be required by way 
of justification. The more intensive approach to unreasonableness requires decision-makers to 
articulate their weighing process and enables the courts to enter into a more in depth 
unreasonableness debate. Context is therefore important in determining whether the decision-
maker has exceeded the reasonableness margin of appreciation in a particular case.1059  
 
There has also been increasing support for Wednesbury unreasonableness to be replaced with 
proportionality as the general standard in the substantive review of administrative law.1060  
Proportionality is utilised in European Union law as a review criterion and the proportionality test 
is also applied under the Human Rights Act.1061 In ex parte Daly, the court confirmed that there 
was a difference between the two concepts in so far as: 1) proportionality could require the 
review court to assess the balance which the decision-maker had struck and not merely whether it 
was within the range of reasonable decisions; and 2) proportionality could require a court to 
consider the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations in a manner not generally 
done under reasonableness review.1062  
 
The future of Wednesbury unreasonableness was most directly addressed by the Court of Appeal 
in R (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for 
Defence.1063 The Court accepted that: 1) the strictness of Wednesbury unreasonableness had been 
relaxed over time; 2) Wednesbury unreasonableness was moving closer to proportionality and 3) 
in some cases it was impossible to see the difference between the two tests. Whilst the Court had 
                                                                                                                                                              
1057 See for example Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment 1986 2 AC 240 248 
in the context of matters involving the raising and spending of public revenue. See also R v Chief Constable of 
Sussex, ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd 1999 2 AC 418 in the context of exercising wide discretionary 
powers. 
1058 1991 1 AC 696 748-749. 
1059 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly 2001 UKHL 26. 
1060 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1061 It involves a three part analysis: 1) whether the measure was necessary to achieve the desired objective; 2) 
whether the measure was suitable to achieve the desired objective; and 3) whether the measure nonetheless 
imposed excessive burdens on the individual (i.e. the measure must not be disproportionate). 
1062 2001 UKHL 26. Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. See also Doherty v Birmingham City Council 2009 1 AC 367 para 135. 
1063 2003 EWCA Civ 473; 2003 QB 1397. 
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some difficulty discerning a continuing justification for the retention of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, it reluctantly concluded that it was not for it to “perform its burial rites”.1064 In 
England, the courts continue to distinguish between a Convention right based claim, where 
proportionality review is available, and a traditional judicial review claim, where only 
unreasonableness review is available. 
 
7 5 REASONABLENESS IN ENGLISH EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
The Tribunal is an independent judicial body designed to provide an accessible, more informal 
and speedy resolution of employment disputes.1065 Described as an industrial jury, decisions as to 
the merits of the dispute are final; subject only to an appeal on a point of law to the Appeal 
Tribunal.1066 What constitutes a point of law is not statutorily defined. A point of law has been 
interpreted by the courts to include: 1) an error of law on the part of the Tribunal in exercising its 
powers or performing its functions;1067 2) a breach on the part of the Tribunal of the common law 
rules of natural justice or procedural fairness or a failure to comply with a statutory procedural 
obligation;1068 or 3) a perverse decision and/or a decision not justified by the evidence.1069 The 
Appeal Tribunal will not interfere with a properly reached judgment of the Tribunal on the facts 
of the case.1070 The Tribunal’s conclusion that an employee was fairly dismissed, that witnesses 
were not credible or that a reinstatement order was appropriate on the facts of a particular case 
would generally be unassailable on appeal, subject to one exception. It would be appealable as a 
question of law on the basis of reasonableness and/or perversity if the Tribunal: 1) has reached a 
finding of fact without any evidence to support it and that fact forms part of the reasoning for the 
                                                 
1064 Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 1. 
1065 Chapter 4 para 4 1. 
1066 Chapter 4 para 4 3 and 4 4. See section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. 
1067 For example: 1) defining a constructive dismissal on the basis of the employer acting unreasonably instead of the 
employer fundamentally beaching the employment contract; 2) failing to follow binding authorities; 3) applying 
the burden of proof wrongly or not applying it at all. 
1068 For example by denying a party the right to a fair trial or creating a real apprehension of bias.  
1069 Chapter 4 para 4 4 3. A question of law is not confined to misconstruing or misapplying substantive law in the 
decision itself. It may also arise from a procedural error or irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings before 
the tribunal, which, depending on the nature and gravity of the error or irregularity, may lead to a successful 
appeal and even to an order for the case to be re-heard by another tribunal. 
1070 I.e. the reasonableness and/or perversity ground of appeal. The Tribunal must make a decision which no Tribunal 
properly directing itself as to the relevant law could reasonably have reached on the material before it. 
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decision; or 2) the decision is "perverse" in the sense that it is outside the ambit within which 
reasonable disagreement is possible.1071  
 
Perversity is recognised as a separate, albeit very narrow, ground on appeal to challenge factual 
findings of the Tribunal or inferences drawn from the evidence presented. Influenced by English 
administrative law and unreasonableness review in particular, perversity does not apply to 
decisions where the Appeal Tribunal would have come to a different conclusion. Perversity 
relates to decisions that are unarguably wrong on the evidence before the Tribunal. In challenging 
an unfair dismissal finding for example, it is not enough that the Tribunal misunderstood or 
misapplied facts falling short of perversity or that a differently constituted Tribunal would have 
come to a different conclusion. It is also not enough that the finding was contrary to the weight of 
the evidence or that the Tribunal heard evidence that was hard to believe.1072 Applied to value 
judgments, it is accepted that different tribunals may reach opposite conclusions on, or drawn 
different inferences from, the same set of facts without those findings being perverse. Akin to the 
meaning ascribed to unreasonableness in Wednesbury Corporation,1073 the Appeal Tribunal is 
asked to presume that, although the Tribunal had not expressed a detectable error of law, the 
Tribunal must have made one because the decision makes no sense and/or is illogical and 
therefore amounts to a judgment or order which no reasonable Tribunal could have reached. 
 
Perversity applies to discretionary decisions for which there may be more than one reasonable 
answer. Firstly, perversity may come into play because there is a reasonable dispute about 
whether the finding of fact is sufficiently supported by the evidence. Secondly, a decision may be 
perverse if, despite it not being linked to a misdirection of law or the absence of evidence, it is 
evident to the Appeal Tribunal that the conclusion of the Tribunal on the evidence before it 
                                                 
1071 Chapter 4 para 4 4. See T Redman & A Wilkinson The Informed Student Guide to Human Resource Management 
(2002) 74; S Honeyball Honeyball and Bowers' Textbook on Employment Law 12 ed (2012) 165. It is not enough 
if the decision is considered to be a permissible option in the circumstances. The decision is only perverse if the 
Tribunal made a factual finding or drew an inference from the evidence presented to it that was wholly 
unreasonable – so unreasonable that no tribunal aspiring to the standard of reasonableness could possibly have 
reached the same determination. 
1072 Chapter 4 para 4 4 3. See also Chiu v British Eurospace plc 1982 IRLR 56. See G Mansfield, J Bowers QC, D 
Brown, S Forshaw, A Korn, J Palca & D Reade QC Blackstone's Employment Law Practice 2012 (2012) 18.21. 
1073 See chapter 3 para 3 3 3. In exercising this extended jurisdiction, the appellate bodies have been guided by the 
review courts’ interpretation of Wednesbury unreasonableness in English Administrative law. See W M 
Morrison Supermarkets PLC v Mr G Talbot 1997 UKEAT 237_96_2102. 
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offended reason and/or was certainly wrong in that no Tribunal, properly directed, could have 
reached such a conclusion.1074 A finding of perversity would be rare, particularly in deciding 
unreasonableness in unfair dismissal disputes, given that the Tribunal must assess objectively 
whether the dismissal fell within the range of reasonable responses available to the employer in 
the circumstances.1075  
 
Perversity sets a high threshold for interference. The conclusion must be: 1) certainly wrong in 
that it is one to which no reasonable tribunal could have come; 2) an impermissible option in that 
it is unsupported by any evidence or amount to a clear misdirection in law by the Tribunal; 3) 
irrational, offend reason, certainly wrong, very clearly wrong, must be wrong, is plainly wrong, is 
not a permissible option, is fundamentally wrong, is outrageous, makes absolutely no sense or 
flies in the face of properly informed logic; and/or 4) of such a nature that the Appeal Tribunal is 
satisfied in the light of its own experience and of the sound practices in the industrial field that 
the decision is not a permissible option. 
 
Because the presence of perverse decisions are identified by examining the evidence and the 
findings of fact and turn on the particular circumstances of the case, perversity has a 
predominately factual element.1076 Perversity includes a misunderstanding of the evidence, 
leading to a crucial finding of fact that is unsupported by evidence or that is contrary to 
uncontradicted evidence.1077 This does not mean that the appellate body may weigh the evidence 
and assess its importance with a view to substitute the decision with its own assessment of the 
evidence. Nor does it mean that the appellate body may overturn findings of fact made by the 
Tribunal because it disagrees with the Tribunal as to the justice of the result, the merits of the 
case or the interpretation of the facts.1078 The substitution of a decision in these circumstances 
will in itself constitute an appealable error of law. The appellate bodies accept that the Tribunal is 
the final arbiter of facts in so far as it has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, 
sensing the atmosphere in the particular workplace, gauging the qualities of the different 
                                                 
1074 See chapter 4 para 4 4 3. 
1075 It would need to be demonstrated that no reasonable Tribunal could possibly have come to the conclusion that a 
reasonable employer could have decided to dismiss. 
1076 See Piggott Brothers and Jackson 1991 IRLR 309; Chapter 4 para 4 4 3. 
1077 Chapter 4 para 4 4 2. 
1078 Chapter 4 para 4 4. 
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personalities and weighing the impact of their effect upon the other.1079 The appellate bodies also 
accept that there are many factual situations in the field of industrial relations in which different 
conclusions could be reached by different tribunals, all within the realm of reasonableness, and 
where there is no correct answer.1080  
 
The scope for an appeal which effectively challenges factual conclusions is therefore limited. 
Appellate bodies will not interfere with the original decisions, even if they reason that they might 
have conducted and decided the cases differently, unless it is able to identify a finding of fact 
which was unsupported by any evidence or demonstrates a clear self-misdirection in law by the 
Tribunal.1081 The question remains whether an overwhelming case has been made out that the 
Tribunal reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the 
evidence and the law, would have reached. In determining whether a claim of perversity ought to 
succeed, the appellate bodies also do not subject Tribunal decisions to microscopic analysis. The 
appellate bodies consider the substance of the Tribunal’s decision broadly and fairly to see if the 
reasons given for the decision were sufficiently expressed to inform the parties as to why they 
won or lost the case and to enable their advisers to identify an error of law that may have 
occurred in reaching the conclusion.1082  
 
7 6 REASONABLENESS IN SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
At common law, unreasonableness was regarded as a controversial ground of review largely 
because an unreasonableness examination tends to: 1) blur the generally perceived distinction 
between review and appeal; 2) impede the finality of administrative decisions and the exercise of 
discretion; 3) prevent administrators from expressing expertise flexibly; and 4) disregard the 
doctrine of separation of powers.1083 The courts initially followed the English symptomatic 
unreasonableness approach in terms of which a decision pointed to being unreasonable if it was 
so gross that mala fides, ulterior motive or a failure on the part of the decision-maker to apply his 
                                                 
1079 See discussion of Royal Society for the Protection of Birds v Croucher 1984 IRLR 425; Chapter 4 para 4 4 3. 
1080 See discussion of Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd 1994 lRLR 443; Chapter 4 para 4 4 3. 
1081 See discussion of Piggott Brothers and Jackson 1991 IRLR 309. 
1082 Chapter 4 para 4 4. See also discussion of Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd 1994 lRLR 443. 
1083 G E Devenish “Reasonableness as a Requirement for the Validity of Administrative Actions” 2000 21(1) Obiter 
86. 
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or her mind to the matter concerned could be inferred from it.1084 Problems accordingly arose 
where the unreasonableness of a decision could not be linked to any of the recognised grounds of 
review.1085 When the 1993 Constitution came into operation, the right to administrative justice 
was entrenched and the unreasonableness ground of review was reformulated to require 
administrative action that is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.1086 Early case law 
recognised that this formulation was one of substantive rationality which required administrative 
decisions to demonstrate a rational objective basis that would justify the connection made 
between the material properly available to the decision-maker and the conclusion he or she 
arrived at.1087 It was accepted that the rational justifiability analysis would require value 
judgments to be made which would involve a consideration of the merits of the matter in some 
way or another. It did, however, not go as far as to allow the review court to substitute its own 
opinion on the correctness thereof.1088 Factors that had to be considered in the rational 
justifiability analysis included the serious objections and alternatives to the decision, including 
plausible reasons for discarding them, as well as the rational connection between the information 
before the decision-maker and the conclusion arrived at. It was not categorically stated that 
reasonableness, rationality and/or justifiability had the same meaning, but case law (similar to 
English law) did equate justifiability with reasonableness1089 and did consider justifiability and 
rationality as sufficiently similar to conclude that rationality could be accommodated within the 
concept of justifiability.1090 On the other hand, rationality has also been described as a minimum 
threshold requirement that regulates the legality of non-administrative action; suggesting that 
administrative action may be susceptible to review on a higher standard.1091 The Constitutional 
Court has however rejected the proposition that justifiability introduced a substantive fairness 
requirement and, referring to rationality and justifiability interchangeably, emphasised that 
rationality only required decisions to be taken lawfully and for a proper purpose. Reminiscent of 
                                                 
1084 Chapter 2 para 2 2 1 1. The courts therefore considered the unreasonable disposition of the decision-maker as 
opposed to the consequence and/or effect of the decision itself. 
1085 See G E Devenish “Reasonableness as a Requirement for the Validity of Administrative Actions” (2000) 21(1) 
Obiter 82. 
1086 Chapter 2 para 2 2 1 2. 
1087 Chapter 5 para 5 4. See Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC); para 31 and 37. 
1088 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC); para 36. 
1089 The dictionary definition of “justifiable” in Carephone equated it with reasonableness. 
1090 Chapter 5 para 5 4. See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others 2001 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) para 21. 
1091 Chapter 5 para 5 5 2. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC). 
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symptomatic unreasonableness, the Court held that unfairness was not reviewable unless it was of 
such a degree that an inference could be drawn from it that the decision-maker had erred in a 
respect that would provide a ground for review and a review court would not interfere if the 
decision was one that a reasonable authority could make.1092  
 
Not yet having established the exact standard of review required by “justifiability”, section 33(1) 
of the 1996 Constitution adopted “reasonableness” as an important component of the right to just 
administrative action as well as a ground of review in terms of PAJA. These developments did 
not expressly confirm the interrelatedness of reasonableness and rationality. Irrationality was 
however recognised as a separate ground of review in section 6(2)(f) of PAJA. On the face of it, 
section 6(2)(h) seemed to only recognise as a narrow ground of review a decision which is “so 
unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power”. Drawing directly on 
the language of Wednesbury Corporation,1093 this formulation of unreasonableness was 
suggestive of the gross unreasonableness test of the common law.  
 
In Bato Star Fishing, however, the Constitutional Court held that it was not the proper 
constitutional meaning of section 6(2)(h) that a decision would rarely if ever be found 
unreasonable. According to the Court, the subsection had to be construed consistently with 
section 33 of the 1996 Constitution which requires administrative action to be “reasonable”. 
Section 6(2)(h) of PAJA was accordingly interpreted to mean that an administrative decision will 
be reviewable if it is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. According to the 
Court, the reasonableness of a decision was to be determined with reference to the nature of the 
decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the 
decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and 
the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those affected.1094 Reasonableness was 
                                                 
1092 I.e. the Constitution did not introduce substantive fairness into South African law as a criterion for judging 
whether administrative action is valid or not. A decision was considered justifiable if it was a rational decision 
taken lawfully and directed to a proper purpose and was one which a reasonable authority could reach. See Bel 
Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 89-90 making reference to R 
v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd 1999 2 AC 418. 
1093 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 
44 making reference to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223. 
1094 Chapter 5 para 5 5 2. 
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not determinative of any particular equilibrium but simply required the relevant decisions to 
strike a reasonable equilibrium between competing interests or considerations. 
 
In progressing from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy in South Africa, there 
have therefore been substantial developments in relation to the concept of reasonableness as a 
standard for evaluating administration action. These developments have given birth to an 
incoherent approach to its interpretation and application, ranging from decisions that hold that 
rationality only required decisions to be taken lawfully and for a proper purpose to decisions that 
hold that an act is reasonable if it could have been reached by a reasonable decision-maker.  
 
7 7 REASONABLENESS IN SOUTH AFRICAN EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
One of the key objectives of the LRA is the effective resolution of labour disputes.1095 To achieve 
this, the LRA utilises the main mechanisms of conciliation and arbitration to resolve matters 
between parties on a voluntary basis or to impose determinations on parties. Administered by the 
CCMA, commissioners are afforded a discretion as to the appropriate form of the proceedings 
and may conduct arbitrations in a manner that they consider appropriate in order to determine 
disputes fairly and quickly as well as deal with the substantial merits of disputes with the 
minimum of legal formalities. Decisions emanating from the CCMA arbitration proceedings are 
final and binding, subject only to judicial review.1096 
 
In the formulation of section 145(2), the legislature was guided by a similar procedure utilised in 
the Arbitration Act; strictly interpreted to be available on the basis of procedural grounds 
only.1097 As a consequence, the grounds of review have been cast in section 145(2) of the LRA in 
similarly narrow terms1098 with no reference to a substantive interpretation. In terms thereof, an 
award may be set aside if the arbitration proceedings suffered from a ‘defect and a ‘defect’ exists 
where: 1) the commissioner committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner 
                                                 
1095 Section 1(d)(iv). See Chapter 1 para 1 1; Chapter 2 para 2 6. 
1096 Chapter 1. 
1097 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
1098 In South Africa, the courts have accepted that the review grounds must be afforded their ordinary meaning in 
accordance with the aims and objects of the LRA, taking into consideration any guidance that may be provided 
by the interpretation of an analogous provision in the Arbitration Act. See Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a 
Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others 1997 12 BLLR 1632 (LC); Chapter 2 para 2 5 3. 
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as an arbitrator;1099 2) the commissioner committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the 
arbitration proceedings;1100 3) the commissioner exceeded his or her powers;1101 and/or 4) the 
award was improperly obtained.1102 The statutory review grounds focus on the conduct of the 
commissioner and/or the parties in the course of the decision-making process, rather than the 
quality of the decision that was made. Findings of fact, even if misconceived, are not reviewable 
in terms of section 1451103 and are only touched upon to the extent required to prove the 
misconduct, gross irregularity, excess of power or improper attainment of an award.  
 
The interpretation of these grounds of review received fresh attention when the Labour Appeal 
Court in Carephone found that the CCMA was an administrative body, bound by the Bill of 
Rights relating to administrative justice, and that commissioners must be fair and unbiased, the 
proceedings must be lawful and procedurally fair and the award must be justifiable in terms of 
the reasons given.1104 Despite the narrow confines of section 145, the Court in Carephone 
accepted that the section was not in conflict with the constitutional administrative justice right, 
but that its interpretation was frustrated because of a misplaced reliance on decisions interpreting 
the corresponding section in the Arbitration Act when there were material differences between 
the two sections: 1) section 146 of the LRA expressly excluded the operation of the Arbitration 
Act in respect of CCMA arbitrations; 2) the Arbitration Act applied to private, consensual 
arbitration in contrast to compulsory arbitration under the LRA; and 3) its provisions were 
assessed and interpreted in a different constitutional context.  
                                                 
1099 Chapter 2 para 2 5 3 1. Misconduct by the commissioner in relation to his or her duties has been interpreted by 
the courts to refer to wrongful or improper conduct by the commissioner. See Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited 
t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others 1997 12 BLLR 1632 (LC). This includes for instance a 
situation where a commissioner has failed to disclose a conflict of interest. See B Jordaan, R Le Roux, M I Van 
Jaarsveld, E Kalula, E M L Strydom Understanding the Labour Relations Act (2009) 137. 
1100 Chapter 2 para 2 5 3 2. Gross irregularities are defined having regard to the way in which proceedings were 
conducted. The question is whether the alleged irregularity prevented a fair trial of the issues. Examples include 
a failure on the part of the commissioner to take all the evidence into account, ignoring or improperly rejecting 
materially relevant evidence; misconstruing the commission’s functions by determining the appropriateness of 
sanction egregiously or not providing a full opportunity for an examination of all aspects of the case. 
1101 Chapter 2 para 2 5 3 3. A commissioner would exceed his or her powers conferred by the LRA when straying 
from the ambit of his or her jurisdiction or making a ruling or award beyond the powers conferred by the LRA. 
This includes for example an award of reinstatement for procedural unfairness in instances where the LRA only 
allows for compensation. 
1102 Chapter 2 para 2 5 3 4. An award is improperly obtained if a party to the arbitration proceedings succeeds in 
obtaining an award in his or her favour through fraud or other improper means, including bribes or false and/or 
fraudulent representations or evidence under oath.  
1103 Lekota v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1998 10 BLLR 1021 (LC) para 16-17; Chapter 2 para 2 3. 
1104 Chapter 5 para 5 2. 
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Nevertheless, the Court held that the constitutional right to administrative justice had broadened 
the scope of judicial review in so far as administrative action must be justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given for it. The Court revised the section 145(2) grounds of review accordingly. It was 
the Court’s interpretation that a failure to act reasonably would constitute an excess of power by 
the commissioner concerned as contemplated in section 145(2)(a)(iii). The rational justifiability 
assessment required the review court to enquire whether there was a rational objective basis 
justifying the connection made by the decision-maker between the material properly available to 
him or her and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at. Justifiability was thus a measure or 
test utilised to determine whether the commissioner had exceeded his or her powers in terms of 
section 145(2)(a)(iii).1105  
 
The Labour Appeal Court has, however, not consistently applied justifiability in relation to 
section 145(2)(a)(iii). In County Fair Foods, the Court held that a decision, not justifiable in 
terms of the reasons given, may also in appropriate circumstances amount to misconduct in terms 
of section 145(2)(a)(i) or a procedural irregularity in terms of section 145(2)(a)(ii). In Radebe, 
the Court was also not convinced that unjustifiability constituted an independent ground of 
review taking into consideration: 1) that justifiability was not included in section 145; 2) that 
there was a difference between appeals and reviews; and 3) the constitutional implications of 
section 145.1106 
 
These matters were brought to the forefront in Sidumo. The Constitutional Court agreed that it 
was inappropriate to restrict the review of a commissioner’s decision to the grounds of procedural 
misconduct that a first reading of section 145(2) would suggest. The Court also acknowledged 
that the labour-law setting, requiring a speedy resolution of disputes with the outcome basically 
limited to dismissal or reinstatement, made it inappropriate to apply the full PAJA-type 
administrative review on substantive and procedural grounds. The Court accordingly referred to 
Carephone’s formulation of justifiability, noting that it was substantive and involved greater 
scrutiny than the rationality test set out in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. The Court 
then ruled that section 145 was now suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness. 
                                                 
1105 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
1106 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
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Mirroring the wording of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA, the question was whether the commissioner’s 
decision was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. This reasonableness standard 
was taken to imply that different decision-makers acting reasonably could reach different 
conclusions. The decision under review was only required to fall within the boundaries of what 
was required by the concept of reasonableness. The Court also acknowledged that it was not 
always possible to separate the merits from scrutiny, but that the danger in such scrutiny was only 
founded in courts setting aside administrative decisions that did not coincide with their own 
opinions. It was reasoned that reasonableness did not side-line the section 145(2) grounds of 
review and introduce an additional, constitutional basis for review. Reasonableness continued to 
respect and give effect to the legislature’s choice to permit reviews on the grounds in section 
145(2)(a). The only difference was that the section 145 grounds of review could no longer be 
interpreted to be purely procedural, but substantive also to the extent that it encapsulated the 
reasonableness requirement from administrative decision-makers in the merit or outcome of the 
decisions concerned. The Court did not expressly hold unreasonableness to be an independent 
ground of review. The Court described reasonableness as a standard against which the 
reviewability of a decision was to be tested.1107  
 
The Constitutional Court’s interpretation has however given rise to an incoherent application of 
unreasonableness as both a standard and a ground of review with no clear indication of the 
connection between unreasonableness and the section 145(2) grounds. Elaborating upon the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of reasonableness, the Court in Fidelity Cash Management 
Services, Value Logistics Ltd and Ellerine Holdings Ltd supported reasonableness as a standard 
or test on review that will only render an award reviewable if it was one that a reasonable 
decision-maker could not have made in the circumstances of the case.1108 On the other hand, in 
Fidelity Cleaning (Pty) Ltd, Super Group Autoparts and Samancor, the Courts preferred to treat 
unreasonableness as a ground of review in addition to the section 145(2) grounds of review in so 
far as: 1) the decision was unsupported by the evidence; 2) the evidence was insufficient to 
support the conclusion reached; or 3) the decision amounted to a failure on the part of the 
decision-maker to apply his or her mind properly to the issue before him or her. Moreover, the 
                                                 
1107 Chapter 5 para 5 5. 
1108 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1. 
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Courts have found commissioner’s decisions to be reviewable on one or more of the section 
145(2) review grounds without any regard to the question of reasonableness at all1109 or have 
linked reasonableness to the section 145(2) grounds of review1110 to the extent that the 
misconduct and/or gross irregularity were of such a nature that the ultimate decision was one 
which a reasonable decision-maker could not have reached.1111 
 
Reasonableness has also been described as a highly deferential standard. In Trentyre, the Labour 
Appeal Court found it unfair to dismiss an employee for an isolated incident of alcohol whereas 
in Palaborwa Mining the Labour Appeal Court found it to be fair. In both cases, the Court 
however found that the CCMA arbitration award passed the Sidumo test – Trentyre, because 
dismissal was unfair taking into account all relevant factors and Palaborwa Mining, because the 
sanction did not fall outside the range of reasonableness.1112 In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & others1113 and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA1114 employees were dismissed for 
consuming food belonging to their employer, without permission and in unauthorised areas of the 
workplace. However, in the first case, the Court found that there was no prospect that a 
reasonable decision-maker could on the facts of this case find that dismissal was a fair sanction 
whilst the second case confirmed a fair dismissal. According to the court the two cases where 
distinguishable from one another in so far as the employee in the first case had an unblemished 
service record of thirty years prior to the misconduct and had not manufactured evidence.1115 
 
Reasonableness has also been found to be applicable to both the process and the substantive 
outcome of a matter.1116 The former is considered to come into play where the commissioner’s 
                                                 
1109 Maepe v CCMA & another 2008 8 BLLR 723 (LAC); SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & others v SA 
Rugby (Pty) Ltd & others; SA Rugby Pty Ltd v SARPU & another SARPA 2008 9 BLLR 845 (LAC); Group Six 
Security Services (Pty) Ltd & Andrew Masters v R Moletsane, CCMA & Dean Weller 2005 11 BLLR 1072 (LC) 
and Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome v MEIBC & others 2010 8 BLLR 824 (LAC). 
1110 Mollo v Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining Council & others 2009 JOL 24323 (LC); Zilwa Cleaning & 
Gardening Services CC v CCMA & others 2010 31 ILJ 780 (LC). 
1111 See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others 2001 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC); discussed in chapter 2. The 
Court found that the ground of review contained in s 145(2)(a)(iii), namely, that a commissioner exceeded his 
powers, incorporated the constitutional requirement that an administrative action must be “justifiable in relation 
to the reasons given for it”. 
1112 Chapter 6 para 6 3 1. 
1113 Unreported Labour Appeal Court judgment, JA46/05 (21 December 2007).   
1114 2008 9 BLLR 838 (LAC). 
1115 Chapter 6 para 6 3 1. 
1116 Chapter 6 para 6 2 3. 
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process of reasoning is alleged to have, for example, resulted in an unreasonable decision 
because he or she took account of irrelevant matters or ignored relevant considerations. In such 
cases, the reasonableness of the reasoning process is objectively considered without the Court 
necessarily agreeing or disagreeing with the ultimate outcome of the matter. Opposed thereto, 
substantive reasonableness establishes whether the ultimate outcome is reasonably supported by 
the sufficiency and cogency of the evidence presented and is not arbitrary. More of a subjective 
enquiry, the focus is directed at the result of the proceedings, rather than the method thereof.  
 
In determining the fairness of the sanction of dismissal, a decision may be reviewable for 
dialectical unreasonableness if the commissioner failed to take account of an employee’s service 
record and length of service. A decision is substantively unreasonable if the evidence and 
material before the commissioner demonstrates that dismissal was a fair sanction, but for some 
reason the commissioner awarded a final written warning only; suggesting that he or she did not 
apply his or her mind to the exercise of his or her discretion, but acted arbitrarily.1117 
 
In labour disputes, determinations typically challenged on review relates to jurisdiction, guilt, 
sanction and/or relief. Where jurisdictional reviews are concerned, the courts have been 
inconsistent in their approach. In some cases, the question whether a dismissal has occurred or 
whether an employment relationship exists has been classified as a jurisdictional fact, subject to 
correctness review. In other cases, the courts have determined that these matters are not 
jurisdictional questions in the true sense of the word and have, for example, dealt with the 
question whether there was a reasonable expectation of a contract renewal as a substantive fact 
question, subject to reasonableness review only. The majority of case law however appear to 
favour the proposition that applicants on review need to establish that the jurisdictional finding 
was wrong in order to succeed with the application. Whilst it is unarguably so that the question of 
reasonableness should not arise where the CCMA has no jurisdiction in a matter (as is the case 
when the referring party referred the dispute outside the statutory prescribed time limit) the courts 
do not appear to distinguish between the existence of jurisdictional facts that are objectively 
determinable and those whose existence may fall within the discretion of the repository of the 
                                                 
1117 I.e. the decision does not make sense having regard to the circumstances before the commissioner. 
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power (like condonation applications) – in which case, the focus should rather be on the 
commissioner’s subjective reasons for his or her findings.1118 
 
Opposed to jurisdictional decisions, courts agree that decisions in relation to penalty and/or relief 
are discretionary decisions, calling for the exercise of a value judgment by the decision-maker, 
and are reviewable in terms of Sidumo reasonableness. However, in Senama, Karen Beef, Hulett 
Aluminium and Tao Ying Matal Industries, the challenge before the court was whether the 
commissioner had applied his or her mind to all the relevant facts and the law in making the 
decision.1119 In the process, the court recognised an important qualification to the reasonableness 
of outcome approach which relates to the consideration of materially relevant factors. This 
demonstrates that a CCMA award will be unassailable on the basis of unreasonableness if it is 
established that a commissioner has applied his or her mind to the facts and the law and that he or 
she has not otherwise misdirected him or herself.1120 
 
A commissioner’s finding of guilt on the facts will also be considered reasonable provided: 1) it 
is supported by the evidence; 2) all relevant factors and circumstances of the case has been 
weighed and taken into account; 3) the decision-maker has applied the correct rules of evidence 
and did not deviate from them to such an extent that it materially denied a party a fair hearing; 4) 
the evidence is sufficient to reasonably justify the decision arrived at; 5) the decision maker took 
into account the uncontradicted evidence and/or 6) adopted the correct legal approach in its 
application of the law to the facts in a charge of misconduct.1121 
 
Also, where a commissioner wrongly appreciates the severity of the misconduct, makes findings 
in mitigation which are not sustainable or does not have proper regard to the relevant facts in the 
determination of a penalty, the decision on sanction will be susceptible to a reasonableness 
review. Likewise, where a commissioner fails to rationalise his or her finding as to the 
                                                 
1118 Chapter 6 para 6 4 2. 
1119 Chapter 6 para 6 3 1 and 6 4 1. 
1120 Chapter 6 para 6 3 1. 
1121 Chapter 6 para 6 4 1. 
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appropriate relief objectively or imposes too high a standard of procedural fairness, the award 
will be susceptible to review because it is unreasonable.1122  
 
Lastly, the courts have also questioned the continued utility of judicial review, as opposed to an 
appeal, and reasonableness. Not only has it been contended that the choice of reviews over 
appeals has not served to avoid lengthy proceedings, lawyers, legalism, excessive delays and high 
costs, but also that wrong decisions are rarely reasonable.1123 
 
7 8 COMPARISON: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In England and South Africa a distinction is drawn between appeal and review for administrative 
law purposes. Subject to statutory restrictions on the grounds of appeal, appeal courts are 
generally specifically authorised to consider whether the decision of the court a quo was correct 
and, depending on the answer, to uphold or vary the decision. In contrast, review courts are not 
concerned with the correctness of decisions and eschew scrutinising its content. The question is 
whether the decision-making process involved a proper interpretation of the law, did not infringe 
any of the recognised public law principles governing the exercise of discretionary powers and 
involved a fair procedure.1124 Depending on whether the decision-maker has exceeded the legal 
limits to his or her powers, the court may uphold or quash the decision. Generally, the review 
court does not also substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the original decision-
maker, but refers the matter back to the original decision-maker to determine afresh. This 
traditional distinction between legality and merits and process and substance has therefore caused 
judicial review to be understood in much narrower terms than appeal.1125  
 
However, in England, as in South Africa, this generalised distinction has become difficult to 
maintain in practice. Judicial review has grown wider in scope and the intensity of review has 
also increased. England and South Africa, for example, no longer distinguish between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law in administrative law to determine the right of 
                                                 
1122 Chapter 6 para 6 3 1 to 6 3 3. 
1123 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2012 9 BLLR 857 (LAC). 
1124 For example legality, rationality and procedural propriety. 
1125 Chapter 2 para 2 3. 
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review.1126 Decision-makers may exceed the legal limits of their authority by making an error of 
law when determining the limits or extent of their powers expressly or impliedly conferred upon 
them. Alternatively, whilst acting within the scope of their authority, decision-makers may 
exceed the legal limits of their authority by making a decision that does not adhere to the public 
law principles of legality, procedural propriety and rationality in England or lawfulness, 
reasonableness or procedural fairness in South Africa. In essence, all errors of law are therefore 
“jurisdictional”. Jurisdictional questions, like that relating to the interpretation of a statutory 
provision or the determination of the applicable legal standard, is generally addressed by means 
of an “appeal test”. These questions must be answered correctly by the original decision-maker. 
No judicial deference is afforded to decision-makers should they answer true jurisdictional 
questions incorrectly. Where the jurisdictional, statutory precondition itself is not objectively 
verifiable but largely dependent on an exercise of subjective judgment by the original decision-
maker, the review courts in England however demonstrate greater deference to the original 
decision-maker’s choice amongst a range of permissible considerations.  
 
It is also not accurate to state that merits or errors of fact are not reviewable without further 
qualification. Judicial review is available where jurisdictional conditions require the existence in 
fact of a certain set of circumstances before a specific power may be exercised. A distinction is 
drawn between factual findings that are objectively verifiable and those that require the exercise 
of a discretion and for which there is strictly speaking no correct answer. In the first instance, the 
review courts in England and South Africa agree that they must examine the merits of the matter 
to satisfy themselves that the set of circumstances actually exist and to substitute the decision if it 
does not.1127 Where the jurisdictional condition is classified as a matter of degree, require an 
exercise of judgment, or is curtailed by its ambiguity, the Courts in England accept that it is not a 
question which the decision-maker has to answer correctly in the view of the court, but a matter 
                                                 
1126 In England, see Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 1969 2 AC 147; R v Lord President of the 
Privy Council, ex parte Page 1992 UKHL 12; Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Horrow School 1979 QB 
56; Re Racal Communications Ltd 1981 AC 3744. In South Africa, see section 6(d) of PAJA as well as Hira v 
Booysen 1992 4 SA 69 (A); J F E Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee 2004 
3 All SA 715 (C).  
1127 Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 2. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja 1984 AC 74. The 
Immigration authorities’ power to remove the appellants only arose if they were actually illegal entrants. In 
South Africa, see Paola v Jeeva 2004 1 SA 396 (SCA). In this case, the power to approve building plans 
depended on the prior recommendation of a building control officer. Because, on the facts, no building control 
officer had been appointed, the decision to approve the plan was set aside. 
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for the decision-maker to determine, subject to a limited right of review on the basis of 
unreasonableness only.1128 In South Africa, where the decision-maker has been entrusted with 
determining the existence of a prerequisite fact, the review court will not be entitled to set the 
decision aside unless the decision-maker’s finding amounted to a transgression of one or more of 
the recognised grounds of review.1129 
 
The review courts are also not confined to reviewing factual findings in the context of 
jurisdictional, statutory criterion. Non-jurisdictional errors of fact may be reviewable in England 
and South Africa provided certain conditions are met. In England, the courts may review errors of 
fact provided: 1) there has been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the 
availability of evidence; 2) the fact or evidence was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; 3) 
the appellant or his advisers have not been responsible for the mistake; 4) the mistake has played 
a material, though not necessarily decisive, part in the decision-maker’s reasoning; and 5) the 
statutory context is one “where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct 
result”.1130 In South Africa, an error of fact is required to be material to the decision that was 
made prior to it being considered reviewable.1131 
 
In administrative law in England and South Africa reasonableness plays an important part in 
ascertaining the limits of judicial intervention over decisions left to the discretion or 
determination of public authorities – jurisdictional or otherwise.1132 Although unreasonableness 
does overlap with other grounds of review like errors of fact, errors of law and the taking into 
consideration of irrelevant considerations or the ignoring of relevant considerations, 
unreasonableness is effectively a ground for challenging a decision that required an equilibrium 
to be struck between competing interests or considerations, which was taken by a decision-maker 
with specific expertise in that area and for which there is strictly speaking no “correct” answer. In 
                                                 
1128 Pulhofer v Hillington London Borough Council 1986 UKHL 1. R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p 
South Yorkshire Transport 1993 1 WLR 23; Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 2. 
1129 See South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Defence 1967 1 SA 31 (C) on jurisdictional facts. 
1130 E v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2004 EWCA Civ 49; Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 2. 
1131 See Pepcor Retirement Fund v Financial Services Board 2003 3 All SA 21 (SCA) referring to the English 
decisions of Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 1977 AC 
1014 and Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex Parte A 1999 2 AC 330 (HL). See also 
Government Employees Pension Fund v Buitendag 2006 SCA 161 (RSA). 
1132 Reasonableness is not confined to decisions made outside the terms of the powers conferred upon decision-
makers, but includes non-jurisdictional decisions made by decision-makers that are repugnant to reason. 
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English law, the orthodox test for determining the reviewability of the decision is whether the 
decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority, properly directing itself, could ever have 
come to it. The strict formulation of unreasonableness has been relaxed by the courts over time. 
The courts enquire whether the decision was one that a reasonable authority could have 
reached1133 or whether the decision was beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable 
decision-maker.1134 A decision may therefore be reviewable not only if the unreasonableness is 
evident and indefensible from the decision itself, but also if the review court is able to identify 
that the decision was preceded by flawed logic. Unreasonableness in England is contextually 
sensitive in so far as the courts apply a variable intensity of unreasonableness review that has a 
less or more intrusive quality – ranging from a rationality type of unreasonableness to a 
proportionality type of unreasonableness - having regard to the nature and gravity of the matter 
concerned.1135 Where human rights are concerned, for example, the courts require a heightened 
scrutiny of compelling public interest,1136 a substantial objective justification1137 or significant 
countervailing considerations justifying interference.1138 Reasonableness is distinguished from 
proportionality in so far as: 1) reasonableness applies to English, domestic law and 
proportionality to European Union laws applicable or implemented in England; 2) proportionality 
can require the review court to assess the balance which the decision-maker had struck and not 
merely whether it was within the range of reasonable decisions; 3) the proportionality query can 
go further than that of reasonableness as it can require a consideration of the relative weight 
accorded to interests and considerations; and 4) even the anxious scrutiny test of reasonableness 
is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights because reasonableness and 
proportionality occasionally yield different results.  
  
In South Africa, the unreasonableness ground of review in section 6(2)(h) of PAJA is couched in 
language similar to Wednesbury unreasonableness; suggesting that the South African legislature 
                                                 
1133 Regina v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Trader's Ferry Ltd 1999 2 AC 418. See chapter 3 para  
       3 5 1. 
1134 R v Minister of Defence ex parte Smith 1996 1 All ER 257; 1996 QB 517. See chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1135 I.e. a sliding scale of reasonableness review ranging from a light-touch unreasonableness review to one of 
anxious scrutiny. See J Laws The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord 187 196. See also P P Craig 
Administrative Law 4 ed 536. See also D R Knight “A Murky Methodology: Standards of Review in 
Administrative Law” 2008 6 NZJPIL 117. 
1136 Brind and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department 1991 UKHL 4; Chapter 3 para 3 5 2. 
1137 R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State 2001 1 WLR 840; Chapter 3 para 3 5 2. 
1138 R v Lord Saville of Newdigate ex p A 2000 1 WLR 1855; Chapter 3 para 3 5 2. 
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has adopted the English orthodox interpretation that requires egregiously unreasonable decisions. 
The Constitutional Court has however preferred the “relaxed” interpretation tendered in 
International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, namely a decision that a reasonable decision-maker could not 
reach. Similar to English law, the Court has accepted that reasonableness in a particular case 
would depend on the circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the decision, the 
identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision; the 
reasons given for the decision; the nature of the competing factors involved; and the impact of the 
decision on the lives and well-being of those affected. Although proportionality is not expressly 
provided for in PAJA, factors like that pertaining to the “impact of the decision”, “the range of 
factors relevant to the decision” and “the nature of the competing factors involved” do appear to 
invite some form of a proportionality inquiry into the reasonableness question.1139 
 
The distinction between judicial review and appeal where questions of law are concerned is 
brought more into question when considering the role of reasonableness in English employment 
law. In contrast to the judicial review remedy in South African employment law, an appeal lies to 
the Appeal Tribunal in respect of any question of law arising from any decision of, or arising in 
any proceedings before, the Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal, in general, distinguishes between 
appealable errors of law (that require no further factual analysis)1140 and non-appealable errors of 
fact (that are factual and contested and do require a consideration of the evidence) - similar to 
judicial review in English administrative law. The meaning of an “error of law” is not statutorily 
defined, but has been developed by the courts on a case by case basis. The misinterpretation of 
statutes; the misapplication of case law; failing to ask or answer the right questions or 
entertaining the wrong issue;1141 making a decision with no proper evidential basis; taking into 
account an irrelevant factor or ignoring a relevant consideration;1142 failing to resolve a conflict 
of evidence or opinion central to a case or a failing to comply with the rules of natural justice; 
and allegations of bias or procedural impropriety1143 all constitute errors of law that may be 
corrected once established. On the other hand, the Tribunal is the final decision-maker as to the 
                                                 
1139 Hoexter Administrative Law 316. 
1140 For example, an error in the construction of a contractual term.  
1141 For example, by the Tribunal substituting its own view for that of the employer in deciding that the dismissal was 
unfair, rather than asking whether the dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses. See Fuller v The 
London Borough of Brent 2011 EWCA Civ 267.  
1142 Bowater v Northwest London Hospitals NHS Trust 2011 EWCA Civ 63. 
1143 Lodwick v Southwark London Borough Council 2004 EWCA Civ 306. 
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merits of a dispute within its jurisdiction and findings, determined by an investigation and 
evaluation of factual circumstances, are not open for correction on appeal. The only exception is 
unless no Tribunal, properly directed in law, could have reached the decision that the Tribunal 
had reached on the evidence. The unreasonableness could be attributed to the fact that a material 
finding of fact was made without supporting evidence or despite contrary evidence. This includes 
the question whether work was performed by a person in the capacity of an employee or as an 
independent contractor;1144 whether an employee resigned or was dismissed;1145 whether taking 
part in an overtime ban amounted to taking part in a strike or other industrial action;1146 whether 
there was a constructive dismissal;1147 and whether the employer’s decision to dismiss was within 
a range of reasonable responses.1148 A standard of perversity as opposed to correctness is applied 
in these cases because: 1) it is the Tribunal’s objective to deal with cases proportionately, 
expeditiously, fairly and in a cost effective manner; and 2) the Tribunal with its lay members sit 
as an “industrial jury” when it hears first hand and in full the evidence and submissions of the 
parties involved, find the facts, apply the relevant law and reach the conclusion to which their 
findings and their experience lead them. Called a “perverse” decision, it is not sufficient that the 
Tribunal’s reasoning process might lead to two potential, and equally reasonable, decisions. 
Merely preferring one decision over another is not perversity. There must be one obvious answer, 
but the Tribunal reached another answer. It is only if these exceptional circumstances are present 
that a decision left for the Tribunal’s determination would provide a ground for a successful 
claim for an appeal on a point of law. Judicial review allows for the decision to be set aside and 
substituted where there is only one decision that could have been reached, but for the error. An 
appeal on a point of law allows for the decision to be set aside and substituted where the decision 
is plainly and unarguably wrong. The question is not whether the discretionary power could have 
been exercised differently. The question is whether it should have been exercised differently. 
There therefore appears to be very little difference, if at all, between an appeal on a point of law 
and judicial review in so far as it relates to discretionary decisions.  
                                                 
1144 Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung and Another 1990 2 AC 374; O’Kelly v Trust House Forte plc 1983 IRLR 
413. 
1145 Martin v Glynwed Distribution Ltd 1983 ICR 511. 
1146 Naylor v Orton & Smith Ltd 1983 ICR 665.  
1147 Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd 1981 IRLR 347; 1982 IRLR 27 EAT. 
1148 UCATT v Brain 1981 ICR 542. See also Gilham v. Kent County Council (No. 2) 1985 ICR 233 and Neale v 
Hereford and Worcester County Council 1986 ICR 471; 1986 IRLR 168. 
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In South Africa, as with the Tribunal system in England, flexibility, accessibility and efficiency 
are concepts entrenched in the rationale behind the establishment of the CCMA.1149 To enhance 
the efficiency with which labour disputes were resolved, decisions emanating from CCMA 
arbitration proceedings are also final as to the merits of the matter,1150 but specifically conferred 
to be subject to judicial review to the Labour Court in the event of a defect. Unlike an error of law 
in English employment law, a “defect” is statutorily defined to exist only where: 1) the 
commissioner committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as an 
arbitrator; 2) the commissioner committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings; 3) the commissioner exceeded his or her powers; and/or 4) the award was 
improperly obtained. Substantive unreasonableness does not feature explicitly as a ground for 
review in section 145(2) of the LRA. The section 145(2) grounds of review have also been 
interpreted by the courts to be largely procedural in nature. Mirroring the grounds of challenge 
recognised by the Appeal Tribunal in England, section 145(2) has been interpreted to include a 
commissioner: 1) committing a material error of law, including misconstruing a statute and/or 
failing to follow legal principles laid down in authoritative case law; 2) not complying with the 
rules of natural justice; 3) misconstruing the nature of a dispute; 4) undertaking the wrong 
enquiry in relation to an issue; 5) failing to consider the credibility and reliability of witnesses or 
the inherent probabilities of the parties’ competing versions; 6) ignoring or improperly rejecting 
materially relevant evidence; or purporting to determine a dispute in the absence of jurisdiction to 
do so. It is evident that despite the different processes preferred in the respective countries, both 
England and South Africa restrict considerably the scope of judicial intervention by focussing on 
the way in which a decision-maker came to his or her conclusions and asking whether it has been 
shown that the decision was arrived at as a result of the commission of an error of law as 
contemplated by section 21(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act or one or more of the section 
145 grounds for review provided for in section 145 of the LRA. Likewise, it is evident that the 
courts in South Africa and England are charged with determining whether a section 145 ground 
                                                 
1149 In South Africa, the importance of these concepts is evident from the fact that the LRA identifies the effective 
resolution of labour disputes as one of the primary objectives of the LRA; prescribes arbitration as the chosen 
mechanism to arrive at a final and binding decision; and specifies that a commissioner may conduct an 
arbitration in such a manner so as to determine the dispute fairly and quickly and with the minimum of legal 
formalities. In England, the same objectives are apparent from the Tribunal’s procedural regulations that confirm 
that the Tribunal must handle cases justly by ensuring that they are dealt with proportionately, expeditiously, 
fairly, on an equal footing and in a cost effective manner. 
1150 In England and South Africa, the courts are not concerned with re-hearing the evidence, but are concerned only 
with the legal argument presented before it.  
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for review or a section 21(1) ground for appeal is present. The question is not whether the 
outcome is correct. Nevertheless, case law in South Africa and England makes it apparent that a 
contemplation of the merits is unavoidable; especially where the reasonableness or otherwise of a 
decision is brought into question. In fact, it is because a perversity challenge questions the 
outcome of the matter that the English courts set such a high hurdle for a perversity appeal.  
 
With the introduction of the 1993 Constitution, the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone looked 
beyond the procedural grounds of review provided for in section 145 and accepted that an 
arbitration award, as an administrative act, must also be justifiable in relation to the reasons given 
for it. Introducing a substantive ingredient into the judicial review process, the Court accepted 
that the test was whether there was a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by 
the administrative decision-maker between the material properly available to him or her and the 
conclusion he or she eventually arrived at. Unlike perversity in English employment law, the 
Court did not expressly hold unjustifiability to be an independent ground of review; but 
determined that it would constitute an excess of power by the commissioner concerned as 
contemplated in section 145(2)(a)(iii). In County Fair Foods, the Labour Appeal Court also 
subsequently linked reasonableness to misconduct in terms of section 145(2)(a)(i) or a procedural 
irregularity in terms of section 145(2)(a)(ii) and in Toyota the Labour Appeal Court expressed 
doubts as to the independent existence of reasonableness as a ground of review.1151 Reminiscent 
of symptomatic unreasonableness in administrative law, the question was thus whether the 
conclusion reached was so aberrant in itself, or so out of touch with the law and the facts, that it 
could be said to be defective in one of the senses contemplated by section 145, properly 
interpreted.  
 
Given the confusion surrounding the proper application of reasonableness, the Constitutional 
Court’s attempted clarification of the role of reasonableness in Sidumo was greeted with 
enthusiasm. In Sidumo, decided under the 1996 Constitution, the Court referred to Carephone and 
the administrative law judgment of Bato Star Fishing and accepted that reasonableness should 
henceforth suffuse section 145 of the LRA. According to the Court, the reasonableness enquiry 
                                                 
1151 Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others 2000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC). 
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required the reviewing applicant to establish that the result of the arbitration award fell outside of 
a range of reasonableness, having regard to the reasoning of the commissioner and the material 
before him or her. Regrettably however the Court in Sidumo did not explicitly determine that 
unreasonableness was an independent ground of review and the role of unreasonableness has 
therefore remained unclear.  
 
Left with the practical task of applying the general principles laid down by the Constitutional 
Court on a case by case basis, the courts have applied unreasonableness review in an arbitrary 
manner with unpredictable results. Fidelity Cash Management Services, Value Logistics Ltd and 
Ellerine Holding Ltd supported reasonableness as a standard or test on review. On the other hand, 
Fidelity Cleaning (Pty) Ltd, Super Group Autoparts and Samancor preferred to treat 
unreasonableness as a ground of review in addition to the section 145(2) grounds of review. The 
courts have also referred to unreasonableness, unjustifiability and irrationality interchangeably – 
suggesting that a light touch review test applies – however, different levels of deference are 
evident in review courts’ decisions since Sidumo.1152 
 
Where jurisdictional questions are concerned, it has also been debated whether questions of 
jurisdiction are subject to a standard of reasonableness or correctness. Fidelity Cash Management 
Services, SARPA, J & J Nfreeze Trust, Solid Doors, Consol Glass (Pty) Ltd and University of 
Pretoria all support the proposition that jurisdictional decisions are reviewable for lack of 
correctness. On the other hand, in Joseph the Labour Appeal Court preferred to assess 
jurisdictional decisions with reference to reasonableness. In addition thereto, judgments like that 
of SA Defence & Aid Fund and Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd distinguish between 
objectively verifiable and subjectively determinable jurisdictional facts. The former is for the 
court to determine whether correct, but the latter focuses on the commissioner’s subjective 
reasons for his findings rather than the jurisdictional fact’s objective existence and hence the 
reasonableness standard is considered to be capable of being applied thereto. It is submitted that 
the latter approach is more in line with English law approach. 
                                                 
1152 See Chapter 6. 
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The courts have attempted to refine the review test in the aftermath of Sidumo. In Bestel v Astral 
Operations Ltd1153 and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Nggeleni,1154 the Courts confirmed that 
unreasonableness review would be competent where a commissioner’s findings were: 1) 
unsupported by any evidence; 2) based on speculation; 3) entirely disconnected from the 
evidence; 4) supported by evidence that is insufficiently reasonable to justify the decision; or 5) 
made in ignorance of evidence that was not contradicted. Despite this attempted clarification, the 
precise meaning of reasonableness in South African employment law remains elusive: 
 
1. Is unreasonableness a standard, test or an independent ground of review?  
2. Is unreasonableness encompassing in that an arbitration award will only be reviewable in 
terms of section 145(2) if it is found to be unreasonable?   
3. How does unreasonableness review of a CCMA award differ from an appeal on the merits? 
4. Is unreasonableness distinct from irrationality or is it equivalent to rationality and 
justifiability?  
5. To what type of decisions should unreasonableness apply? 
6. What is the appropriate test for reviewing CCMA arbitration awards, including the limits or 
bounds thereof, taking into consideration that the CCMA is a specialist dispute resolution 
body that have been mandated by the legislature to resolve disputes quickly and fairly?  
 
Whilst judicial review in terms of the LRA has not necessarily had the effect of enhancing the 
efficiency with which employment disputes are resolved and ambiguity and uncertainty in 
relation to unreasonableness have caused complicated and technical legal arguments, it is 
submitted that this complexity is not novel to South African law. It is also true of 
unreasonableness in English administrative law and perversity in English employment law. There 
is an inevitable and continuing overlap between process and substance and merits and legality in 
both appeal and review proceedings that intensify the complicated nature of unreasonableness. 
Although it is arguable whether the limitation of appeals in labour disputes is actually achieving 
its objectives, in substantive terms, an appeal on a point of law is functionally the equivalent of 
judicial review.1155 In the circumstances, it is submitted that the better answer to the uncertainties 
                                                 
1153 Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd 2011 2 BLLR 129 (LAC). 
1154 Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Nggeleni 2011 4 BLLR 404 (LC). 
1155 See Begum (FC) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets 2003 UKHL 5 para 7. 
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and complexities existing in South African employment law lies in addressing and answering the 
questions raised above and developing a consistent, objective and workable approach to 
unreasonableness review. This will be explored in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
8 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In South Africa there has been an important and continuing controversy regarding the permissible 
scope of judicial review of CCMA arbitration awards in terms of section 145 of the LRA.1156 
Initially, the grounds in section 145(2) were narrowly interpreted to be procedural in nature in 
line with a similarly worded section in the Arbitration Act in respect of private arbitration award 
reviews.1157 As a result, the absence of a justifiable link between the evidence and the conclusion 
was not regarded as misconduct by the commissioner in relation to his or her duties, a gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or proof that the commissioner exceeded his or her 
powers or that the award was improperly obtained in the traditional sense of the terms.1158 
However, in Carephone, the Court determined that the interpretation of section 145 was 
influenced by justifiability in accordance with the right to just administrative action in section 33, 
read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6, of the 1996 Constitution.1159 The Labour Court was 
accordingly required to determine if there was a rational objective basis justifying the connection 
made by the decision-maker between the material properly available to him or her and the 
conclusion he or she eventually arrived at.1160 Subsequently, in Sidumo,1161 the Constitutional 
Court held that section 145 of the LRA was suffused by reasonableness in accordance with the 
right to just administrative action as provided for in section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution. The 
Labour Court was required to determine if the CCMA arbitration award was one that a reasonable 
decision-maker could not reach.1162 However, section 145 makes no reference to unjustifiability 
or unreasonableness. There has also been no constitutional challenge to section 145 on the 
ground that the section fails to give effect to the constitutional right to just administrative action. 
Nor has there been a “reading in” of unjustifiability or substantive unreasonableness as grounds 
                                                 
1156 Chapter 1 para 1 2; Chapter 5 para 5 6 and chapter 6 para 6 5. 
1157 Chapter 2 para 2 6. 
1158 Chapter 2 para 2 6 1 1 – 2 6 1 4. 
1159 Chapter 5 para 5 4. Interim provision. 
1160 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
1161 Chapter 5 para 5 5 2. 
1162 Chapter 5 para 5 5 2. 
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of review into section 145.1163 The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the role of reasonableness in 
the review of CCMA arbitration awards with reference to the role of reasonableness in English 
administrative and employment law. The purpose of the thesis is further to formulate the enquiry 
into reasonableness with greater clarity.1164 Hopefully that will promote the application of the 
concept of reasonableness in labour matters with greater consistency than has been seen thus far.  
 
8 2 REASONABLENESS AS A STANDARD, TEST AND/OR GROUND OF REVIEW 
 
In English administrative law, there is no statutory classification of the grounds of judicial 
review.1165 It is accepted that unlawfulness for review purposes includes the common law 
grounds of illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. Since the Human Rights Act 1998 
was enacted, unlawfulness for review purposes also includes a breach of fundamental rights as set 
out in the European Convention on Human Rights.1166 Examples of sub-grounds of illegality 
include errors of law, errors of fact, exercising a power for an improper purpose, taking irrelevant 
considerations into account or disregarding relevant considerations, fettering of discretion and 
unauthorised delegation.1167 Procedural impropriety includes non-compliance with statutory 
procedural requirements, denying a party the right to a hearing, failing to comply with the duty to 
provide reasons for a decision, non-adherence to the rule against bias and legitimate 
expectation.1168 Irrationality, on the other hand, applies to the exercise of an executive discretion 
where the decision-maker has obviously stepped outside the range of decisions that he or she 
could reasonably make in the circumstances.1169  
 
Irrationality is considered to be an independent ground of review and not merely evidence of the 
grounds of illegality or procedural impropriety, although the grounds may overlap.1170 It is not 
necessary to rely on irrationality where a decision is made for a purpose that is foreign to the 
purpose for which the decision-making authority was granted or where decision-makers 
                                                 
1163 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1. 
1164 Chapter 1 para 1 3 and 1 8. 
1165 Chapter 3 para 3 3. 
1166 Chapter 3 para 3 3 and chapter 7 para 7 2. 
1167 Chapter 3 para 3 3 1. 
1168 Chapter 3 para 3 3 2. 
1169 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1170 Chapter 3 para 3 3. 
250 
 
considered irrelevant factors or disregarded factors which they were obliged to consider.1171 Such 
cases constitute a sub-category to the illegality ground for review. It is also not necessary to rely 
on irrationality where decision-makers failed to observe the rules of natural justice or to act with 
procedural fairness. A decision that is not reviewable on the ground of illegality or procedural 
impropriety, may nevertheless be reviewable because of substantive unlawfulness. The grounds 
of review are not mutually exclusive, but may overlap and cause a decision to be tainted by more 
than one ground of review. A decision may, for example, be reviewable on the ground of 
illegality because the decision-maker acted outside the scope of his or her powers in considering 
irrelevant factors. That decision may at the same time also be reviewable on the ground of 
irrationality, due to the magnitude of the irrelevant considerations, since no reasonable decision-
maker could have made such a decision. Likewise, the failure to grant a person affected by a 
decision a hearing, in breach of principles of procedural fairness, may also result in a failure to 
take into consideration relevant factors. 
 
In English employment law, there is no judicial review process to challenge the decisions of the 
Tribunal. Instead, provision is made for an appeal on the ground of a question of law to the 
Appeal Tribunal.1172 Similarly to English administrative law, there is no further statutory 
classification of the grounds of appeal.1173 It is accepted that questions of law for appeal purposes 
include: 1) a misdirection, misunderstanding or misapplication of the law;1174 2) a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of relevant undisputed or indisputable facts that are material 
to the decision in question;1175 and 3) “perverse” decisions.1176 Perversity is not a test to establish 
whether a question of law is present.1177 It is considered to be a free-standing basis for appeal. 
The grounds of appeal are also not strictly compartmentalised, but may overlap. The Tribunal 
may make a finding of fact which is unsupported by any evidence. At the same time, the finding 
of fact may be one which no reasonable Tribunal, properly directed in law, could have made. 
 
                                                 
1171 Chapter 3 para 3 3 1. 
1172 Chapter 4 para 4 1 and 4 3. 
1173 Chapter 3 para 3 2 1. 
1174 Chapter 4 para 4 4 1. 
1175 Chapter 4 para 4 4 2. 
1176 Chapter 4 para 4 4 and 4 4 3. 
1177 Chapter 4 para 4 4. 
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As far as South African law is concerned, unreasonableness in English administrative law and 
perversity in English employment law are semantically identical to the South African notion of 
unreasonableness. In fact, the South African Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing was 
guided by the English administrative standard of unreasonableness when it set out to determine 
the proper meaning of unreasonableness, recognised as a ground of review in section 6(2)(h) of 
PAJA.1178 Having regard to the English approach, it is submitted that it is not the proper meaning 
of unreasonableness in South African employment law that unreasonableness only widens the 
scope of review by affording a broader interpretation to the grounds of review contained in 
section 145(2).1179 Nor should unreasonableness be regarded as narrowing the scope of review in 
that a section 142(2) ground of review will only be found to be present if it was of such a nature 
that it resulted in an unreasonable decision. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo 
never explicitly addressed the question whether unreasonableness should be identified as a 
ground of review independent from the existing grounds of review in section 145(2)(a) and 
(b).1180 It is submitted that unreasonableness cannot properly be accommodated within the 
context of section 145(2) of the LRA. The grounds of review are not prescribed in an open-ended 
manner.1181 In accommodating unreasonableness within section 145(2), it is suggested that the 
unreasonableness of the outcome of the exercise of the discretionary power will only point to an 
inferred or deemed legal error or that the power has not been properly exercised in terms of 
section 145(2). It does not recognise that unreasonableness may itself provide an independent 
substantive limit on the width of a discretionary power as was the case in Bato Star Fishing and 
as is the case in section 6(2)(h) of PAJA. As an example, section 145(2)(ii) concerns gross 
irregularities that are traditionally regarded as procedural in nature1182 whilst unreasonableness is 
substantive and involves the application of an outcome-based as opposed to a procedure-based 
test. As will be submitted below, it is possible that a decision may be substantively unreasonable 
despite there being no evidence that the commissioner has misconceived the nature of the enquiry 
by undertaking the wrong enquiry or undertaking the enquiry in the wrong manner. Section 
145(2)(iii) relates to excesses of power and generally finds application where commissioners 
exceed their jurisdiction or where commissioners make rulings or awards beyond their 
                                                 
1178 Chapter 3 para 3 1 and chapter 5 para 5 5 2. 
1179 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1 and 6 2 2. 
1180 Chapter 5 para 5 5 3 and 5 6. 
1181 Chapter 1 para 1 1. 
1182 Chapter 2 para 2 6 1 2. 
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powers.1183 Drafted in narrow, procedural terms, section 145(2)(iii) does not traditionally find 
application where a commissioner merely chooses one remedy over another where there is a 
choice of remedies is given, nor does it find application where the substantive outcome is 
undesirable.1184  
 
It is submitted that reasonableness should not be treated as an over-arching standard or test of 
review that is used to determine the reviewability of CCMA arbitration awards in terms of 
section 145(2)(a) and (b). Thus, interference on review should not merely be warranted where the 
irregularity, misconduct or excess of power complained of is of such a nature that it renders the 
decision that has been reached unreasonable in the circumstances. Unreasonableness should be 
recognised as an independent ground of review. It does not mean that unreasonableness has 
replaced the statutory grounds of review or that the statutory grounds of review have merged 
under the broad heading of unreasonableness. Section 145(2)(a) and (b) continue to find 
application as independent grounds of review1185 but unreasonableness exists alongside it. This 
interpretation is in line with section 33 of the 1996 Constitution, which requires administrative 
action to be reasonable in addition to being lawful and procedurally fair. The effect would be that 
a CCMA arbitration award can be reviewed and set aside by the Labour Court on the basis of 
both procedural defects as well as substantive unreasonableness. Such an approach effectively 
widens the scope of CCMA arbitration award reviews. It also clarifies the status of 
unreasonableness vis-à-vis the grounds of review in section 145(2). Section 145(2) is a closed list 
of grounds of review and makes no reference to unreasonableness as a ground of review.1186 In 
the circumstances, it is proposed that section 145(2) be amended to expressly include 
unreasonableness as a ground of review. 
 
Unreasonableness may in certain instances overlap with the section 145(2) grounds of review for 
instance where a commissioner fails to take account of matters which the LRA, upon proper 
construction, indicates are relevant considerations. Such a decision will be reviewable due to a 
gross irregularity as well as on the basis of unreasonableness if, due to the extent of the relevant 
                                                 
1183 Chapter 2 para 2 6 1 3. 
1184 Chapter 1 para 1 2 and chapter 2 para 2 6 1 3. 
1185 Chapter 6 para 6 2 2. 
1186 Chapter 1 para 1 2 and chapter 2 para 2 6. 
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considerations not taken into account, the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
commissioner could have come to it. It is however also possible that section 145(2) may cover 
instances that are irrelevant to or distinct from unreasonableness.1187 Because different tests are 
applied to establish the different grounds for review,1188 the courts should not determine 
unreasonableness with reference to the grounds provided for in section 145(2). Consequently, an 
applicant on review need not establish unreasonableness, for example, to succeed with a review 
application on the basis of a commissioner’s alleged excess of powers. Similarly, where a 
commissioner fails to properly resolve an irreconcilable dispute of fact, the question need not be 
whether the outcome is unreasonable. It needs to be established only whether the commissioner 
undertook the wrong enquiry or undertook the enquiry in the wrong manner, resulting in the 
aggrieved party not having his or her case fully and fairly determined. Unreasonableness also 
does not have to be considered in respect of the other reviewable defects provided for in section 
145(2). However, where an award is defective due to a gross irregularity, the award should be set 
aside on that basis and should not be upheld on the basis that the outcome is reasonable. If 
unreasonableness is afforded the same status as the section 145(2) grounds of review it is 
inappropriate to tolerate a defect because the CCMA arbitration award is considered 
substantively reasonable. Where the section 145(2) grounds are properly interpreted and applied, 
a decision should also not be substantively reasonable despite misconduct by the commissioner in 
relation to his or her duties, a gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or proof that the 
commissioner exceeded his or her powers or that the award was improperly obtained. A different 
approach would suggest that the statutory grounds of review have been rendered redundant, 
alternatively it would advance unreasonableness to a higher status.  
 
8 3 REASONABLENESS REVIEW IS NOT AN APPEAL ON THE MERITS  
 
English administrative law distinguishes judicial review from an appeal on the merits.1189 An 
appeal on the merits is concerned with the correctness of the outcome. The appellate body re-
examines the factual basis of a decision, weigh in the balance the merits of the case and make a 
new decision in substitution for the original decision to ensure that the correct decision is made. 
                                                 
1187 Para 8 2 7. 
1188 Chapter 2 para 2 6 1 1 – 2 6 1 4. In relation to English law, see also chapter 3 para 3 31 – 3 3 3. 
1189 Chapter 2 para 2 3. 
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Judicial review scrutinises the legality of the decision and invalidates the original decision if it is 
unlawful. Whilst the content or outcome of substantive decisions are relevant to unreasonableness 
review, judicial scrutiny in terms of unreasonableness requires a more deferential approach than 
the correctness test applied in an appeal on the merits.1190 Focused on curtailing abuse of 
discretion, unreasonableness review determines whether the original decision falls within a range 
of reasonable outcomes only. It effectively places a substantive limitation on the width of 
discretionary powers and removes from decision-makers the outer range of choices which might 
otherwise have been open to them. But, within these limits, decision-makers remain responsible 
for making decisions on the merits and the review court is not permitted to impose its own 
preferred decision upon the original decision-maker. Simple differences of opinion between 
administrative decision-makers and review courts also do not justify unreasonableness review. 
Where a decision is found to be unreasonable, the review court generally refers the matter back to 
the original decision-maker for reconsideration. It is only where the review court considers that 
there is no purpose to be served in remitting the matter to the original decision-maker that the 
review court may, subject to any statutory provisions, substitute its own decision for the decision 
in question.1191 It remains for the administrative decision-maker to decide upon: 1) the findings of 
fact that should be made; 2) the weight that should be attributed to factors; and/or 3) the 
judgment or discretion that should be exercised. It is clear that an appeal on the merits is wider in 
scope than judicial review. 
 
English employment law further differentiates between an appeal on the merits and an appeal on 
a point of law. In the latter instance, the appellate body does not re-examine the facts to 
determine whether the decision is correct, but identifies and corrects substantive and procedural 
errors of law. An appeal on a point of law also resembles judicial review in terms of the grounds 
of challenge.1192 For instance, a decision is perverse in English employment law within the 
meaning of Wednesbury unreasonableness in English administrative law.1193 The content or 
outcome of substantive decisions also only become relevant to a perversity appeal in so far as it is 
                                                 
1190 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1191 Chapter 3 para 3 2 1; section 31(5)(b) and 31(5A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The Court’s power to substitute 
its own decision for that of the original decision-maker is subject to three qualifications: 1) the decision in 
question was made by a court or tribunal; 2) the decision has been quashed on the ground that there has been an 
error of law; and 3) without the error, there would have only been one decision. 
1192 Chapter 6 para 4 4. 
1193 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
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alleged that the Tribunal’s decision is so irrational as to make the decision perverse in the legal 
sense. Comparable to unreasonableness review in English administrative law,1194 it is accepted 
that another tribunal might legitimately reach a different conclusion on the basis of the evidence 
presented. The question is not whether the Appeal Tribunal considers the Tribunal decision 
incorrect on the facts. Unlike an appeal on the merits, the Appeal Tribunal is cautious not to 
usurp the function of the Tribunal. Unless a point of statutory construction is involved, the 
Appeal Tribunal will not substitute its view unless there is only one possible conclusion that 
could have been reached by the Tribunal.1195  
 
In South Africa, the suggestion has been made that the Labour Court’s review jurisdiction should 
be replaced with an appeal on the merits. The reasoning is that: 1) a correctness appeal may be 
less complex than determining on review whether commissioners exercised their statutory 
discretion to evaluate the fairness of employers’ decisions in a fair manner; and 2) an appeal 
jurisdiction would give rise to a clearer body of precedent to guide commissioners because the 
courts would focus on the correctness of commissioners’ decisions rather than the manner in 
which decisions were made.  
 
It is submitted that the institution of a correctness appeal process calls for rejection. Firstly, a 
correctness appeal is contrary to the objective in section 143(1) of the LRA that arbitration 
awards should be final and binding and subject to scrutiny in limited circumstances only. It also 
fails to take into account that the administrative status of the CCMA requires that some deference 
be afforded to CCMA arbitration awards. An appeal on the merits would allow the Labour Court 
to consider all aspects of a case, rather than just aspects connected to the grounds of review 
contained in section 145(2). It would also involve a consideration of the correctness of a 
commissioner’s decision. Secondly, the more widely the Labour Court is able to scrutinise and 
substitute its decision for that of the commissioner, the more incentive parties are likely to have 
to bring an appeal. That will not support the legislature’s overall objective of effectively 
resolving disputes at arbitration level. Thirdly, commissioners’ decision-making powers tend to 
relate to discretionary or value judgments, made on a combination of findings of facts and 
                                                 
1194 R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2005 EWCA Civ 982 para 11. 
1195 Chapter 4 para 4 3. 
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opinions, for which there is usually no single correct answer. A “correctness” test is therefore 
inappropriate. On appeal, the question would still be whether the discretion was correctly 
exercised. Lastly, providing for judicial supervision in the form of an appeal on a point of law 
rather than judicial review would serve little purpose. English law demonstrates that challenges in 
relation to a perversity appeal and an unreasonableness review are premised on comparably 
similar grounds.  
 
8 4 MEANING OF REASONABLENESS IN RELATION TO RATIONAL 
JUSTIFIABILITY 
 
In English law, there is no agreed distinction between “irrationality” and “unreasonableness”. The 
terms are interchangeably used to refer to decisions that are: 1) arbitrary or capricious; 2) 
frivolous and vexatious; 3) made in bad faith, 4) dishonest, and 5) arrived at as a result of 
considering irrelevant considerations or disregarding relevant considerations.1196 
Unreasonableness is distinguished from proportionality on the basis that it utilises a different 
method of inquiry. Unreasonableness requires that the decision must be so unreasonable that no 
reasonable decision-maker could ever have come to it. Unreasonableness does not specify that 
the review court must consider the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations and 
the balance which the decision-maker has struck between the interests and considerations. 
Proportionality requires that: 1) the decision must be suitable to achieve the desired objective; 2) 
the decision must be necessary for achieving the desired objective and 3) the decision must not 
impose excessive burdens on the individual it affected. Proportionality entails a Proportionality 
may, however, be an aspect of reasonableness where administrative decisions are set aside 
because there has been an improper balance of relevant considerations or the effect of the 
decision was unreasonably oppressive.1197  
 
In South African administrative law, irrationality is recognised as a minimum threshold 
requirement applicable to the exercise of all public power. It does not entail a particularly 
stringent test.1198 Rationality requires that a decision must not be arbitrary. There must be a 
                                                 
 1196 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1197 Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 1. 
1198 Chapter 5 para 5 4 and chapter 7 para 7 6. 
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rational connection between the decision, the information that forms the factual basis of the 
decision and the reasoning provided for in the decision.1199 It focuses on the transparency, 
intelligibility and justifiability of the decision-maker’s reasoning process. The court takes account 
of the substantive merits of the decision under review in so far as it examines the connection 
between the decision and the reasons given for it to determine whether the connection is 
rational.1200 It appears that no clear distinction is drawn between unreasonableness, 
unjustifiability and irrationality: 1) irrationality in terms of PAJA has been assessed with 
reference to the justifiability test in Carephone; 2) Carephone found “rationality” and 
“justifiability” sufficiently similar so as to occasion no deviation between the two tests;1201 3) the 
courts have used “rational justifiability” interchangeably with “reasonableness”1202 and 4) the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Edcon Ltd described the change from rational justifiability to 
reasonableness as semantics.1203 Unreasonableness and irrationality are, however, both 
recognised as grounds of review in terms of PAJA.  
 
It is submitted that, as aspects of the same reviewable defect, unreasonableness imports elements 
of irrationality. For instance, a decision that is arbitrary or capricious will also be unreasonable. It 
is however submitted that “rationality” and “rational justifiability” seemingly relate to 
“dialectical” unreasonableness only.1204 To prevent arbitrariness in the decision-making process, 
rational justifiability is focused on whether there is a rationale for the decision.1205 The rational 
justifiability test determines whether there is a rational objective basis justifying the connection 
made by the administrative decision-maker between the material properly available to him or her 
and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at. Rational justifiability does not determine 
whether the conclusion itself is rational or reasonable. A consideration of unreasonableness 
extends the review enquiry a little further. Included in its scope is the reasonableness of the 
outcome of the exercise of power. This second facet to unreasonableness considers whether the 
decision itself falls with the range of possible acceptable outcomes that is defensible in respect of 
the facts and the law. It does so by evaluating or assessing the reasonableness of the competing 
                                                 
1199 See section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA. 
1200 Chapter 5 para 5 5. 
1201 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
1202 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1. 
1203 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1. 
1204 Chapter 6 para 6 2 3. 
1205 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
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considerations for and against the decision. It asks whether the weight and balance attributed by 
the commissioner to considerations that have been or can be deemed relevant were reasonable. 
Unreasonableness therefore tests the substantive validity of the outcome in addition to the 
rationale for the outcome. Albeit more robust, reasonableness therefore imports elements of 
proportionality.1206 This is supported by Sidumo wherein the decision was considered reasonable 
even though the commissioner had made one or two “erroneous” findings. Essentially, the 
considerations in support of the decision of the commissioner defeated or outweighed the reasons 
against the decision.1207 Unlike gross unreasonableness, the unreasonableness of a decision might 
not be readily apparent from the CCMA arbitration award. There is thus a greater obligation on 
the judiciary to identify and articulate the basis for finding that a discretionary decision was one 
which could not reasonably have been made. Although the terms “irrationality” and 
“unreasonableness” have been used interchangeably by the courts in an attempt to control the 
administrative decision-making process, it is submitted that the two terms are not, in a strict 
sense, synonymous. As such, it is best practice for the review court to avoid references to 
irrationality and/or unjustifiability when referring to Sidumo unreasonableness. 
 
8 5 NATURE OF DECISIONS SUBJECT TO REASONABLENESS REVIEW  
 
In English administrative law, irrationality review arises in the context of matters of fact-finding, 
policy based determinations, the weighing of factors and the exercise of discretion by decision-
makers where more than one conclusion is available in the circumstances. That includes the 
definition and application of jurisdictional, statutory preconditions that are not objectively 
verifiable but dependent on an exercise of a subjective judgment by the original decision-maker. 
Because this entails a degree of discretion, the court determines whether the decision amounts to 
an excess of jurisdictional discretion only.1208 Irrationality also applies where legislation does not 
specify the considerations that must be taken into account by a decision-maker in the 
circumstances. In such a case, it is largely for the decision-maker, in the light of the material 
before him or her, to determine what is relevant and the comparative importance to be accorded 
to the relevant material.  
                                                 
1206 Chapter 5 para 5 1. 
1207 Chapter 6 para 6 3 2. 
1208 Chapter 3 para 3 4 1 2. 
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Irrationality review does not apply to objectively verifiable jurisdictional facts. The review court 
does not ask whether the decision-maker reasonably thought that the jurisdictional fact was 
present, but whether - subject to questions of materiality and discretion - the determination that 
the substance of the matter is within its jurisdiction was correct. Jurisdictional questions, like that 
relating to the interpretation of a statutory provision or the determination of the applicable legal 
standard, is addressed by means of an “appeal test” and no judicial deference is afforded to the 
original decision-makers should they answer it incorrectly. Likewise, a standard of correctness 
applies to the grounds of illegality and procedural impropriety. It is for the court to decide what 
the law is or what fairness requires. 
 
The English review courts are reluctant to review errors of fact. Errors of fact are reviewable by 
way of exception if: 1 ) there has been a mistake as to the existence of a fact, including a mistake 
as to the availability of evidence to support a finding of fact; 2) the fact or evidence was 
uncontentious and objectively verifiable; 3) the appellant or his or her advisers were not 
responsible for the mistake; 4) the mistake played a material, though not necessarily decisive, 
part in the decision-maker’s reasoning; and 5) the statutory context is one “where the parties 
share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result”. Reasonableness is relevant in 
relation to the second condition. A review for error of fact is seemingly ruled out where there is a 
reasonable dispute about whether a finding was sufficiently supported by the evidence. In these 
instances, a finding of fact will only be reviewable if the contested finding of fact is 
unreasonable. Lastly, an error of fact will be reviewable if it amounts to an irrational conclusion 
of fact based on no evidence. 
 
In English employment law, findings of fact are appealable on the basis that it is contrary to the 
evidence, that there was no evidence to support the finding or that the finding was one that no 
reasonable tribunal could have reached and was perverse. Examples of findings of fact include 
whether: 1) a person is an employee or independent contractor; 2) an employee has been unfairly 
dismissed; 3) an employee has been constructively dismissed; 4) an employee has engaged in 
industrial action; 5) an employee is guilty of contributory fault; 6) an employee has resigned or 
was forced to do so and/or 4) whether an employee has taken part in a strike.1209 Taking the 
                                                 
1209 Chapter 4 para 4 4. 
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examples into consideration, a perversity appeal will not succeed because of a mere 
misunderstanding or misapplication of facts or because the Appeal Tribunal has doubts about the 
decision of the Tribunal. A perversity appeal would also not apply where it is alleged that: 1) the 
overall decision is perverse because the findings of fact on specific issues on which there was a 
conflict of oral evidence are perverse; 2) the chairperson’s decision is silent or incomplete on 
factual points and has therefore been overlooked or the resultant findings of fact are therefore not 
supported by the evidence; or 3) the Tribunal has reached different conclusions in cases based on 
similar facts. It is also not enough that the Appeal Tribunal would, on the basis of the merits and 
the oral evidence, have decided the matter differently to the Tribunal or feels strongly that the 
result is unfair. 
 
In South African employment law, the question has also arisen in what circumstances the review 
courts should interfere with commissioners’ assessment of their own jurisdiction. The majority of 
case law accept that all jurisdictional errors require correctness review.1210 Decisions involving 
sanction, guilt, penalty and relief do however require some variability by reason of the value 
judgments they entail. The English administrative law approach to jurisdictional reviews assist 
with resolving these issues. To the extent to which jurisdictional challenges are raised, it is 
submitted that the South African courts should distinguish between objectively verifiable 
jurisdictional facts or state of affairs that must exist before the statutory power(s) of a 
commissioner can validly be exercised and jurisdictional facts that need only be found to exist in 
the subjective judgment of the commissioner.1211 In the case of objectively verifiable 
jurisdictional facts or state of affairs, the review court should be able to determine the objective 
existence of the jurisdictional fact, as a prelude to the exercise of power in a particular case. If the 
review court finds that objectively the fact did not exist, it should be able to declare invalid the 
purported exercise of the power. However, where the legislature has entrusted to the CCMA the 
power to determine whether in its subjective judgment the pre-requisite fact or state of affairs 
existed, prior to the exercise of the power, the existence of the fact or state of affairs is not 
determinable by the review court. It is submitted that in the latter type of cases the review court 
can only interfere with the exercise of the power on the ground of a non-observance of the 
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jurisdictional fact where it is shown that the commissioner unreasonably decided that the pre-
requisite fact or state of affairs existed. The determination of the existence of an employment 
relationship and the existence of a dismissal does fall within the jurisdiction of the CCMA in the 
course of arbitration proceedings in relation to a dispute before it. Where no employment 
relationship or dismissal has been established, the CCMA does not lack jurisdiction to determine 
the dispute. The proper approach is that the employee has failed to discharge the onus of proving 
a dismissal or the existence of an employment relationship. The existence of an employment 
relationship or a dismissal does therefore raise a jurisdictional issue, but not in the sense that it is 
beyond the powers of commissioner to determine. The jurisdictional issue is closely related to the 
merits of the matter. The jurisdictional determination requires the resolution of factual disputes, 
the leading of oral evidence and a determination of questions of mixed law and fact on matters 
that are bound up with the substantive merits of the dispute and left for the CCMA’s final 
determination subject to review. It is thus not beyond the CCMA’s jurisdiction, but it is a 
question that falls within the powers of a commissioner to determine in the course of determining 
whether a case has been made out for relief sought in arbitration proceedings in relation a dispute 
properly before it. As such, the existence of an employment relationship or a dismissal should be 
assessed by the review court with reference to Sidumo unreasonableness only. Lastly, 
commissioners have a broad discretion to resolve disputes generally whilst applying the relevant 
law to the facts. That discretion includes determination of guilt, sanction, penalty and relief. In 
these circumstances, commissioners are required to make value judgments on a combination of 
findings of facts and opinions as opposed to making correct legal determinations only. It is 
therefore not viable to presuppose that there is one correct determination only. 
 
8 6 REASONABLENESS: THE APPROPRIATE TEST 
 
In English administrative law, the courts have traditionally applied the Wednesbury 
reasonableness standard to determine the unreasonableness of a decision. The Wednesbury 
reasonableness standard determines that a decision will be invalidated on review if the decision is 
so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could ever have come to it.1212 Considered to 
articulate a narrow standard of reasonableness, the application of the Wednesbury reasonableness 
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standard is prominent in the context of economic policy, resource allocation and/or political 
disputes where the interacting interests and repercussions are not easily accommodated within the 
adjudicative model of the courts.1213 Case law, however, reflects that the courts have begun to 
distance themselves from a strict application of the Wednesbury reasonableness standard. 
Preferring a more intensive application of the reasonableness standard, the courts refer to an 
irrational decision as a decision that is beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable 
decision-maker or a decision that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.1214 This more 
intensive standard of reasonableness has typically been applied in the context of fundamental 
rights.1215 The more intensive standard of reasonableness suggests that the court will be more 
thorough in its assessment of the weight given to the relevant considerations when considering 
whether there is sufficient justification given for a conclusion. The strict application of the 
Wednesbury reasonableness standard traditionally required the unreasonableness of a decision to 
be evident from the decision itself. The relaxation of the Wednesbury reasonableness test has 
resulted in a focus also on the reasonableness of the decision-making process. It requires scrutiny 
of the outcome and the reasons for the outcome to determine the irrationality of the decision.1216 
 
The irrationality of a decision can therefore be established by means of a two-pronged test. 
Firstly, it needs to be determined if the outcome is manifestly unreasonable or defies 
comprehension. If it is, the decision is reviewable on the basis of irrationality even though it is 
not necessarily clear from the reasons where the decision-maker erred. Theoretically, it is 
possible that despite rational and coherent reasons, the decision-maker’s conclusion is not within 
the range of acceptable outcomes. A decision will be reviewable, despite rational and coherent 
reasons, where the outcome: 1) bears no relation to the relevant considerations that were taken 
into account and the irrelevant factors that were disregarded or 2) is so unreasonable in relation to 
the relevant considerations that were taken into account and the irrelevant factors that were 
disregarded that the decision-maker must have been motivated by other considerations.  
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1214 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3 and 3 5 1. 
1215 Chapter 3 para 3 5 2. 
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If the outcome is not manifestly unreasonable or does not defy comprehension, the decision may 
nevertheless be irrational if the reasons in support of the decision show that the outcome was 
preceded by flawed logic. Because a decision-maker must only take into account relevant and 
material considerations in the exercise of a discretion, the reasons for a decision will be irrational 
if the decision-maker took into account or acted upon immaterial or irrelevant considerations. 
Likewise, the reasoning process will be irrational if it amounts to an unreasonable balancing of 
relevant considerations, lacks logic or comprehensible justification or demonstrates that the 
decision-maker interpreted his or her authoritative power incorrectly or incorrectly assessed the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.  
 
In English employment law, the factual conclusions or discretionary decisions of the Tribunal 
must meet the standard of perversity in order to be appealed against as errors of law. It is not 
permissible to appeal where the sole purpose is to challenge the reasons for the decision or a 
particular finding of fact. Both the outcome and the reasons for the outcome must be challenged 
in a perversity appeal. A decision is perverse, so as to involve an error of law, if the Tribunal has 
reached a decision that no reasonable tribunal, on a proper appreciation of the evidence and the 
law, could have reached.1217 Put differently, a perversity appeal applies where the Tribunal’s 
finding of fact, inference from the evidence or conclusion is “irrational”, “offends reason”, “is 
certainly wrong”, “is very clearly wrong”, “must be wrong”, “is plainly wrong”, “is not a 
permissible option”, “is fundamentally wrong”, “is outrageous”, “makes absolutely no sense” or 
“flies in the face of properly informed logic”. There are two sets of indicators of perversity. The 
first is that the Tribunal misunderstood, misstated or misapplied relevant, undisputed or 
indisputable fact, leading to a crucial finding of fact or inference not supported by probative 
evidence (reasons). The second is that although the Tribunal did not misunderstand, misapply or 
misstate a relevant, undisputed or indisputable fact, the conclusion cannot be justified by the 
evidence presented; further, where the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and 
properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the conclusion in question 
(outcome).1218 As in English administrative law, perversity is established with reference to the 
outcome and the reasons for the outcome.1219 It would be wrong to assert that perversity is 
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1218 I.e. the reasoning underlying the finding of fact goes against properly informed logic (reasoning). 
1219 Chapter 4 para 4 4. 
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established by means of a correctness standard. There is a difference between finding a decision 
“wrong” and inferring that a decision “must be wrong” because the decision defies 
comprehension in outcome or the reasons show that the decision was preceded by manifest 
illogicality. Where the issue is the adequacy of reasoning, the Appeal Tribunal is entitled to refer 
a matter back the Tribunal and request further written reasons for its decision prior to determining 
the appeal.1220 Perversity looks to both the reasoning process as well as the findings that have 
been made. The Tribunal must give reasoned decisions, informing the parties why they won or 
lost their case. The decision must enable the Appeal Tribunal to determine whether a question of 
law arises. Where the reasons explaining the conclusion fall short of the prescribed basic 
standards for adequate reasoning, the decision may be quashed on that basis alone regardless of 
the substantive reasonableness of that decision.1221 
 
In South Africa, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo was prepared to set a decision aside on 
review if the decision was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. The 
reasonableness standard established in Sidumo proposes a higher intensity unreasonableness 
review than suggested in English administrative law in Wednesbury Corporation and CCSU. On 
the other hand, the reasonableness standard established in Sidumo is in line with the more liberal 
approach to unreasonableness review articulated in International Trader’s Ferry Ltd and 
Boddington. The relaxation of the Wednesbury reasonableness test has resulted in a focus also on 
the reasonableness of the decision-making process. It requires scrutiny of the outcome and the 
reasons for the outcome to determine the irrationality of the decision.1222  It is understandable 
that the Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing opted to adopt the interpretation of 
unreasonableness in English law that is applied in the context of fundamental rights. The LRA in 
South Africa was adopted to give effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices.1223 
 
 
                                                 
1220 Barke v SEETEC Business Technology Centre Ltd 2005 IRLR 633, CA. Prior to The Employment Tribunals 
(Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 coming into effect, the power to invite the Tribunal to 
amplify its reasons stemmed from either rule 30(3)(b) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of 
Procedure) Regulations 2004 or section 30(3) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. It is not considered 
appropriate where the inadequacy of reasoning is on its face so fundamental that there is a real risk that 
supplementary reasons will be reconstructions of proper reasons.  
1221 Chapter 4 para 4 4 1.   
1222 Chapter 3 para 3 3 3. 
1223 Chapter 5 para 5 4. 
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The reasonableness standard established in Sidumo provides a threshold for court interference 
that establishes a margin or range of reasonable decisions within which decision-makers acting 
reasonably may reach different conclusions. Focused on the result of the decision itself and how 
the decision-maker arrived at the result, the reasonableness standard established in Sidumo 
involves the review court in the review of the substance of decisions. It must be borne in mind 
that commissioners exercise exclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact and law, subject to the 
limits imposed by section 145(2) of the LRA. It would not be sufficient for review purposes that 
the decision is considered wrong due to incorrect factual or legal findings or due to the weight 
and relevance attached to particular facts. Incorrect factual or legal findings and the weight and 
relevance attached to particular facts are of consequence only if its effect is to render the outcome 
unreasonable. The CCMA is an administrative body exercising a quasi-judicial function when 
determining employment disputes of right. One can glean from case law that unreasonableness 
contemplates a decision that could not reasonably have been reached on the evidence or material 
before the commissioner. The answer to the application of the reasonableness standard 
established in Sidumo would then depend both on the outcome falling within a range of 
acceptable outcomes and on the provision of an analysis that reasonably supports the conclusion 
reached. This reasonableness standard established in Sidumo is an objective one; established with 
reference to the result of the CCMA award and the reasons of the commissioner in support of the 
result. As such, reasonableness will be both dialectical and substantive in nature.1224  
 
It is submitted that, similarly to English law, reasonableness should be established by means of a 
two stage analysis. It needs to be established firstly whether the commissioner reached the 
decision by means of a line of reasoning and/or reliance on supporting factors, values and 
standards that is regarded as valid in the circumstances.1225 The reasons offered in support of the 
decision are important. The review court must consider whether the commissioner brought his or 
her mind to bear on the material before him or her before making the award. The review court 
will determine whether the commissioner considered the principal objections to the decision and 
the arguments in favour of the decision as well as made the decision only after weighing the 
evidence and replying to each objection. Carephone is an example of dialectical reasonableness 
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in so far as it is aimed at the rationality of the reasoning process of the commissioner. Dialectical 
reasonableness establishes whether there is a rational justification in the connection established 
between the evidence and the outcome. Dialectical reasonableness describes defects in the 
reasoning process which may have influenced or affected the outcome of the particular award.1226  
 
Once the review court has established that the commissioner has reached the decision by means 
of a line of reasoning or reliance on supporting factors, values and standards that are valid in the 
circumstances, the review court moves to the second phase of the enquiry. In this second phase 
the court must ask whether no reasonable decision maker would accept that the decision is the 
decision to have been made in relation to the factors values and standards and line of reasoning 
used in its support. The decision-maker must strike a reasonable equilibrium between the 
different relevant and competing factors and must make a decision which amounts to a 
reasonable equilibrium in the circumstances.1227 The fact that the decision-maker must strike a 
reasonable equilibrium between the different relevant and competing factors implies that a 
decision may be reviewable on the basis of unreasonableness where the commissioner affords 
excessive or inadequate weight to a particular consideration. In determining whether the 
challenged decision is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach, the review court 
assesses whether the considerations in favour of the decision outweigh the considerations against 
it. In unreasonableness review, the court does not interfere with the commissioners’ allocation of 
weight to relevant considerations by re-allocating weight to relevant factors, but satisfies itself 
that due weight has been accorded to competing and relevant interests and factors by considering 
whether the decision is supported by factors, values and/or standards that reasonable persons 
would recognise as legitimate. Viewed as such, it is evident that the reasonableness of a decision 
cannot be assessed where the commissioner provides inadequate or incomprehensible reasons for 
the decision. It is submitted that the review court should not in such a case seek its own reasons 
to justify the commissioner’s findings. It is not desirable that the review court should attempt to 
fill the vacuum created by the lack of reasons in the commissioner’s decision by constructing 
possible legal justifications for the outcome, thereby substituting the commissioner’s reasoning 
process with its own. In respect of such circumstances, South African employment law can once 
                                                 
1226 Chapter 6 para 6 2 2. 
1227 Chapter 3 para 3 1. 
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more learn from English law. In the employment context, the Appeal Tribunal has the power to 
refer a decision back to the Tribunal for amplification or clarification unless the reasons given by 
the Tribunal are considered too deficient to be remedied by amplification.  
 
The question whether a decision should be allowed to stand regardless of a defect in the 
reasoning process where the outcome is nevertheless reasonable, can also be answered with 
reference to English administrative law. Reasonableness should be regarded as a ground of last 
resort to make provision for those decisions that are objectionable but is capable of surviving a 
review in terms of the section 145(2) grounds of review. Where the defect in the reasoning 
process amounts to a gross irregularity, for example, the matter can be confined to a review on 
the basis of the irregularity. The reasonableness of the decision need not be considered.  Where a 
commissioner fails to take into account a relevant factor, the flaw in process alone will usually be 
sufficient to set aside the award based on the gross irregularity, permitting a review in terms of 
section 145(1) read with section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. In such a case, the test is not whether 
the outcome is reasonable notwithstanding the gross irregularity, but whether the commissioner’s 
action prevented the aggrieved party from having his or her case fully and fairly determined. 
Since a gross irregularity has long been an accepted basis for review, its recognition under the 
heading of procedural unreasonableness does not extend the scope of review. The decision 
evidencing a deficient process should be susceptible to review regardless of whether the outcome 
is found to be reasonable. However, the analysis in regard to unreasonableness does contemplate 
defects in the reasoning process of the commissioner that fall short of the provisions of section 
145(2). Where the decision demonstrates a procedural defect in the reasoning process that falls 
short of a gross irregularity, it is respectfully submitted that the decision may still be susceptible 
to unreasonableness review. Because the unreasonableness of the decision does not depend solely 
upon the reasons that the commissioner gives for the decision as per Fidelity Cash Management 
Services,1228 the award would in the circumstances only be reviewable if the “defective” reasons 
outweigh the valid reasons. It is possible that circumstances may arise wherein the connections 
drawn by the commissioner between the evidence, the reasons and the CCMA award 
demonstrates that the defective reasons outweigh the valid reasons, but there exist other valid 
reasons discernible from the evidence that support the decision reached. In such circumstances, 
                                                 
1228 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1. 
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the review court should be allowed to take those alternative valid reasons into account when 
assessing the reasonableness of CCMA arbitration awards.1229  
 
It is evident that much of the controversy arising from unreasonableness review in South Africa 
is resolved by a proper reading of English administrative and employment law. The application 
of the principles that have been identified in the process would assist in addressing the 
uncertainties and complexities existing in South African employment law and advance the 
development of a consistent, objective and workable approach to unreasonableness review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1229 Chapter 6 para 6 2 1 and 6 2 3. 
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